This book is fantastic. I found it superb. Joseph Chamberlain was one of the giants of 19th Century English politics - the family owned a business now known as GKN Plc.

In the Conservative Party his great rival was Lord Randolph Churchill, father of Winston who started out as a Conservative, became a Liberal, and switched back to Conservative.

Chamberlain's eldest son Austen [his mother died 2 days after his birth] once dined with Bismarck and won the Nobel Peace Prize as Foreign Secretary. He died just as his younger half-brother, Neville became Prime Minister after a superb track record of social reform but inspired by his brother's work he found a very different Germany and dreams of peace became delusions

This book is fantastic. I found it superb. Joseph Chamberlain was one of the giants of 19th Century English politics - the family owned a business now known as GKN Plc.

In the Conservative Party his great rival was Lord Randolph Churchill, father of Winston who started out as a Conservative, became a Liberal, and switched back to Conservative.

Chamberlain's eldest son Austen [his mother died 2 days after his birth] once dined with Bismarck and won the Nobel Peace Prize as Foreign Secretary. He died just as his younger half-brother, Neville became Prime Minister after a superb track record of social reform but inspired by his brother's work he found a very different Germany and dreams of peace became delusions

Offers an interesting perspective on the background to the rivalry between Churchill and Chamberlain. Of course, it wasn't really a rivalry at all until Munich blew up in Chamberlain's face. Until that moment Chamberlain was utterly dominant and Churchill was a widely disliked "has been". The author demonstrates how luck played a key role in elevating Churchill from the "backbenches" to the "Treasury Bench".

In my untutored opinion, the author is far too kind to Chamberlain who was, again in my opinion, an arrogant fool. Read Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, The Appeasers, for a better take on the enormity of what Chamberlain and Halifax (et al) perpetrated.

Don't waste your time unless you have a strong interest in the gritty details of English history.

In a democracy, the people have the leaders they deserve. This would seem a rather self-evident observation, but one which is often forgotten when the inadequacy of Britain's political leadership facing Hitler in the thirties is discussed. As a citizen of a country that was ultimately liberated from nazi oppression by British troops, I certainly have no wish to belittle the heroism of the British people during World War II, but you need to make a clear distinction between Churchill's Britain living out its finest hour between 1940 and 1945 and the Britain of Baldwin and Chamberlain, struck hard by the twin calamities of World War I and the great depression and seeking only peace and comfort at almost any cost. This is what Burying Ceasar brilliantly demonstrates.

With the future of mankind hanging in the balance, the drama of Britain dealing with the menace of Nazi Germany boils down to a political and personal struggle between two elderly gentlemen, Chamberlain and Churchill, both striving to fulfill the ambitions of their fathers and families: Neville Chamberlain was both a son and a brother of great men, while Churchill, allthough the scion of a great family, was in reality the son of a demented political loser whom he nevertheless adored. No materialistic approach to history here - events are shaped by individuals, their qualities and flaws have decisive influence on the course of history. Burying Caesar portrays both men in an honest and objective way, neither vilifying Chamberlain nor glorifying Churchill and this is one of the great strenghts of the book.

It has been stated that the book seeks to redeem the reputation of Neville Chamberlain, but I do not agree. Burying Caesar merely frees itself from the conventional wisdom that Chamberlain was a narrow-minded and untrustworthy coward, showing us instead a basically decent and well-meaning politician who unfortunately (not least for himself) advanced to a position that demanded greater talents than this rather mediocre personality had been provided with. Chamberlain had been a reasonably succesful chancellor of the exchequer during the worst years of the depression and had his career ended at that, he would have been remembered in a mostly positive light as a minor figure of British history rather than as one of the worst failures of world history. Still, faced with an electorate which (naturally) did not want another war and hampered by his own lack of international experience, Chamberlain no doubt tried his best to serve his country. That he was no match for Hitler is obvious but one might wonder if any other British PM could really have prevented World War II (given, for instance, the attitude of France...).

Which brings us to Churchill. A vain, self-serving man of immense personal ambition, idiosyncratic in his view of the world yet ready to compromize if it might bring him back into the corridors of power. Not a man to be trusted, not a leader for times of great crisis. Yet history proved him right about the nazi menace and he turned out to be just the right leader for Britain when war came and the British people were ready once more to demonstrate heroism in the face of terrible adversity. Burying Caesar depicts Churchill with all his flaws, yet also shows us how he held on to his basic belief that Freedom and Justice would have to stand firm against Oppression and Crime and how that very staunchness made him into the leader now revered by all mankind - a fascinating portrait of the imperfect genius among men who were merely imperfect.

Graham Stewart writes historical non-fiction in the great tradition of British scholars such as A.J.P. Taylor, Corelli Barnett, Martin Gilbert etc. More, please....

It is all well and good to make this big deal over Chamberlian's
conscience, honour etc something that history does not record that had much to do with stopping Chamberlian from breaking his word fairly fairly regularly. A leader has to take responsibilities for the decisions that he makes within the parameters that he works under. In Chamberlain's case, he totally misjudged Hitler and his regime. It is not like the Nazis made any secret of their aims. As this book points out many in his own party like Churchill were worried that his actions.

Before the war and during the war, Chamberlain failed to produce the type of leadership required by his nation.

To Chamberlain credit, as the book points out, once he realized that Hitler could not be trusted his appeasement policy came to an end. I wish that other world leaders would have this sort of moral strength to admit sometimes that what they did was wrong and try to correct it.

Much has been written about Churchill's wilderness years in the 1930's ranging from the lavish praise of William Manchester to the scorn of a John Charmley. I have never before seen a history covering the precise topic of this book which is the rivalry between Churchill and Neville Chamberlain during the decade which began with Churchill an ostracized outcast and Chamberlain a rising star and yet ended with Chamberlain a scorned failure and Churchill a triumphant war leader.

Young British historian Graham Stewart has put together a massive and meticulous study of just how and why events played out as they did between the two men. American readers be warned, this book is extremely British in tone, use of idiom and most of all, in its intricate discussion of British Parliamentary politics in the thirties. Stewart certainly assumes his readers are aware of the British electoral and Parliamentary system and the way it works. I myself, an American reader, am not but this was not too much of a handicap as I was able to follow the story without too much difficulty.

The first part of the book provides a good deal of background on British politics from the age of Churchill's father, Randolph and Chamberlain's father Joseph through the beginning of the twenties. Stewart describes the rise and fall of various parties, in particular the National Liberals of Lloyd George in the early twenties. While Chamberlain was not a player in national politics during the twenties (although his brother Austen was), Churchill was at the height of his influence, having left the Liberal party and slowly edging back towards the Conservatives. Stanley Baldwin would make him Chancellor of the Exchequer and Churchill became a full fledged Conservative once again in 1925. Further chapters describe the Conservative's loss to a Labour/Liberal coalition and Churchill's resignation from the shadow cabinet over the "India Bill". When he gets to the thirties, Stewart covers the Parliamentary maneuvering in incredible detail. Contrary to popular belief, Churchill, though out of favor with the party powers, maintained his supporters, known as Winstonians.

Chamberlain was quite different than Churchill as Stewart demonstrates, unlike Churchill, his primary loyalty was to the party not to any specific principles. It was not for nothing that Churchill referred to him as "that clerk from Birmingham." But this was the sort of man Baldwin was looking for. Churchill's first true breach with the party came over his demand that Britain re-arm in order to protect itself from the designs of Nazi Germany. Although his criticism of the Baldwin government was muted by his desire to regain office, Churchill consistently called for stronger defense preparation. After 1935, when it was clear he would never gain office under Baldwin, Churchill became a vocal and outspoken critic earning him the ire not only of the Conservatives but of the Labourites as well, who favored suicidal disarmament.

Chamberlain became prime minister in 1937 upon Baldwin's retirement. With no background in foreign affairs, he was immediately confronted with foreign crises caused by the growing belligerence of Nazi Germany, the Spanish Civil War and the actions of Fascist Italy. Despite the book's subtitle, there really was no rivalry between Churchill and Chamberlain until the Munich crisis of 1938. At this point Churchill moved into open opposition with his own party by delivering one of the most eloquent addresses of his career, denouncing the Munich pact before the House of Commons. This is the best part of the book. Stewart is never unfair to either man and not at all a revisionist. Nevertheless, he never hesitates to point out the fantastic assumptions upon which Chamberlain based his policy of appeasement. A most interesting point is how little Churchill actively did to maneuver himself into power. Although an outspoken opponent of appeasement, Churchill did nothing either publicly or privately to create the conditions which led to his return to office and his eventual ascension to the prime minister's office. In fact, once he joined the government and the war cabinet upon the outbreak of war, he muted his criticisms of Chamberlain and became a loyal soldier. In the end, despite his best laid plans and hopes, Chamberlain died a sad and broken man, his policy of appeasement in ruins. Churchill ascended to the ultimate heights of greatness in which he is held today. The reader of this book will learn a great deal about Churchill about whom much has been written as well as a great deal about Chamberlain about whom less has been written. Once the story begins to focus on the rising menace of Naziism, it is always riveting and frequently fascinating. The book is dense, scholarly and yet eminently readable. I thoroughly enjoyed it and would recommend it to any serious reader of history.

Any book on this period that wants to be even and ballanced has to deal with the events going on else where but at the same time.

Stalin and the USSR invaded Eastern 1/3 of Poland just as Hitler took the Western 1/3 of Poland yet this is almost NEVER mentioned. Stalin also took the three Baltic States, Finland, and Sinkiang Province of China and bumped up against Manchuria. The invasions of free nations by Stalin is ignored. A little group called FOCUS or the Anti-Nazi Council funded by the owner of a South African gold mine who was a Eastern European Jew and all of London's Fleet Street press were beating the drums of war against Hitler, lying about his intentions to take England, Hitler's only hatred was directed against the USSR, Communism and Communists in Western Europe. Stalin's genocide of the Kulaks was covered up by the NY Times and Walter Duranty. Stalin's shipping of Jews to Siberia is ignored by history too. Why, is the question that does not even get asked ! All too often, the terms of the Versailles Treaty are never mentioned as a cause of German hatred of the West and a determination to excape from depression.
Clearly, Hitler should have been manipulated into going after the USSR and the Brits were insane to declare war over Poland, while Stalin was murdering 10,000 Polish officers in the Katyn forrest.