The Battles for Spotsylvania Courthouse and the Road to Yellow Tavern
By Gordon C Rhea

Between the opening round in the Wilderness and the culminating blood-letting at Cold Harbor there were two other major areas of action in the Overland Campaign.

In volume two of Rhea's extraordinary four volume series the action moves out of the wilderness as Grant seeks to outflank Lee and force a battle in the open where the weight of Union artillery and manpower would give it the opportunity to break the Army of Northern Virginia.

In a pattern which would remain true for this entire campaign, Lee's army simply moved faster and counterattacked faster than the Union Army. The culture of the Army of Northern Virginia was a culture of automatic aggressiveness. When attacked they immediately began to organize a counterattack. When they discovered the Union Army they immediately began to probe to see if they could get around its flank. When they had to defend they immediately began entrenching and dug as deep and fast as possible to give themselves the maximum advantage in stopping a Union attack.

Grant' had a much bigger Army but it was simply a lot slower and a lot more hesitant than its Southern opponent.

The Army of the Potomac was a very courageous and stubborn army when it was attacked but it had a hard time spontaneously engaging Lee.

Grant kept trying to overcome these institutional weaknesses by surprising Lee with night marches, diversions to distract him, and carefully planned mass assaults.

At Spotsylvania the Union Army almost gained an advantage using a surprise move which, if it had worked, would have put Lee at a huge disadvantage. Unfortunately the Confederate Army moved fast enough to get there first and by the margin of a few hours entrench enough to stop the Union advance.

Grant then prepared a massive assault at a vulnerable salient and actually won a shocking victory. Unfortunately , in a pattern which would become the norm in the first world war some fifty years later, the disorganization inherent in breaking through made it impossible to exploit the breakthrough and by the time the Union forces reorganized the Confederates had created a new and equally formidable line a short distance back.

Rhea carries you step by step through the agonizing bloodletting in which two powerful armies tried to maneuver but found themselves again and again engaged in bloody fights of attrition which were sapping northern morale and southern capacity to fight at about the same rate.

These books are a remarkable accomplishment.

I've read all there is to read about Grant vs. Lee
but Rhea's works are the finest. From the Wilderness
to Cold Harbor, each book is a fascinating. There's no
way these books will ever leave my shelf! I usually reread
them every couple of years. Highly recommended!


Matt Looby

Having previously read Rhea's first volume on the 1864 Overland Campaign, I moved on to this work. Just like the first volume, Rhea has written a winner here. I had gotten somewhat tired of "military history" books because they were either overly detailed and dry and boring or they often focused too much on the commanders and not enough on the ordinary soldier. Well, no such problems with this book. Rhea has a very balanced prose focusing on the generals, the privates, and everyone in between. Furthermore, despite being full of enough detail for any military history buff, the book is very readable and Rhea writes in a style that makes you feel as if you are amongst the action, making you turn page after page. Other reviewers can probably write much better than I, but simply put, this book is a must have for anyone interested in military history or the Civil War.

The Battle of the Wilderness May 5-6, 1864
Product Details
* Hardcover: 520 pages
* Publisher: Louisiana State University Press (July 1994)
* Language: English
* ISBN: 0807118737

The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow Tavern May 7-12, 1864
Product Details
* Hardcover: 483 pages
* Publisher: Louisiana State University Press (May 1997)
* Language: English
* ISBN: 0807121363

To the North Anna River: Grant and Lee, May 13-25, 1864
Product Details
* Hardcover: 505 pages
* Publisher: Louisiana State University Press (May 2000)
* Language: English
* ISBN: 0807125350

Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26-June 3, 1864
Product Details
* Hardcover: 552 pages
* Publisher: Louisiana State University Press (September 2002)
* Language: English
* ISBN: 0807128031

I am reviewing the four books a single series although each book is a full stand-alone history. This is a highly detailed military history of Grant's Overland Campaign of 1864. Two of the best generals commanding two of the best armies, in American history, decide the Civil war in the East. Gordon Rhea gives this month the detailed attention it requires and had never received. The 2,000 pages allows for the full story of the campaign, the personalities, failures and success.

The first book covers the major battle of The Wilderness an area Grant wished to clear and Lee hoped to trap him in as he had Hooker in 1863. Through a series of Union miscalculations and command problems, Lee manages to get in Grant's way. What follows is a confused bloody two-day battle that has been termed "Bush whacking on a grand scale". An excellent series of maps, help the reader stay abreast of the battle and understand the confusion of both sides. Lee loses Longstreet and starts to make the hard decisions about personnel that he has avoided since 1862. Grant while testing his relationship with Meade and Burnside, is trying to learn the AOP's generals too. This process dominates the four books as repeatedly Grant is forced to deal with the problems this creates and Lee takes steps that were unthinkable in 1863.

The second book moves the battle from The Wilderness south to Spotsylvania and Yellow Tavern. Grant refuses to "play the game" and retreat behind the Rappahannock but pushes past Lee and continues south. What follows is a race from defensive point to defensive point, which the AOP concedes to the AoNV. Union commanders hesitate at critical moments while the AoNV reinforces the objective. This allows Lee to stay up or ahead producing one of the bloodiest battles in our history at Spotsylvania. In addition, this book covers the critical cavalry operations, Grant's reasoning, and the price paid in taking Sheridan away from Meade. J.E.B. Stuart's death, is well covered. Both in terms of what it means to the AoNV, to Lee and to the Confederacy.

After one of the hardest weeks in their history, the two exhausted bloodied armies eye each other over their entrenchments. Lee understands that he is being trapped and that defensive war can only end in defeat. Grant is trying not to be stuck in a siege and determined to continue south. What follows is a series of forced marches and small battles as Grant and Lee test each other. Each general wins and loses daily as the armies march, counter march and fight. However, at the end of each day, Grant is always closer to Richmond. Lee produces a brilliant trap, Grant takes the bait but circumstances keep lee from springing it. Almost to late, Grant sees the trap pulls back, changes direction and continues south. Book 3, To the North Anna River covers this brilliant and exciting time in detail. Rhea produces some excellent analysis of both commanders and the developing personnel problems they are facing. Neither man is having an easy time of it and both understand they have never faced an enemy like this.

The last book takes us to Cold Harbor, one of the most controversial battles of the war. The detail history and excellent analysis leads us through this battle and produces some startling conclusions. As always, the author provides full support and justification for them. This might be the most important book of the series and the definitive book on the battle of Cold Harbor.

Each book has a full set of maps and illustrations. The writing is uniform and very readable. While detailed, the actions are understandable and you are seldom lost in a sea of names and/or unit numbers. Each book is a stand-alone history and is readable as such. The books were published from 1994 to 2002 and had to be written that way. This is the best account of the Overland Campaign available. It is both an invaluable reference and a great reading experience.

I have recenty - in the past two ot three years - become interested in the Civil War. The Shelby Foote series is wonderful, but still leaves a lot of detail to be fleshed out. The more you read the more you want to know. Much about the War remains a mystery. The battles can be presented in much detail and Rhea's writing is clear and lucid. There is considerable detail in presenting excerpts from diaries, reports and the like to make the battles real from a human standpoint. The books are much like the work of Stephan Sears.
All are well written and enjoyable, although I do recommend a bit of lighter reading between volumes.
The only quibble that I have is with the maps. They often neglect detail that could help follow the action. Plaaces mentioned in the text are sometimes not to be found on the maps.
This complaint can be applied to virtually every Civil War book that I have read. If you are interested in the civil war, this series is excellent.

Recently I spoke to someone who had read all of Rhea's books published thus far. The person commented that he thought Rhea was too dry an author to be enjoyed. After having read Rhea's title on the Wilderness and now just completing his Spotsylvania book, I wonder if my acquaintance was talking about the same person!

In my humble opinion, Rhea has written the defintive study of the campaign that reflected Grant's determination to destroy Lee's army at any cost - Spotsylvania. The book's narrative flows freely and the writing style is easy to follow without being simplistic. He covers in great detail the armies' movements to Spotsylvania, the battles of Spotsylvania, Todd's Tavern, Yellow Tavern, and other engagements. In other words, I believe the professional historian and Civil War layperson will both enjoy the book.

Rhea seems to be fair and balanced in his praise and criticism of both sides - Lee, Early, Anderson, Meade, Upton, Hancock, and others get praise while others (Grant, Ewell, Burnside - surprise surprise!, and others) are criticized for their performance. Since I am a Civil War layperson, I will leave it to the "experts" to analyze whether Rhea's praises and criticisms are warranted. Instead, I am choosing to focus on the book's content and writing style.

I do have one criticism of a shortcoming I find in many Civil War Campaign Studies - the maps. While the maps are well drawn, there could have been at least 10 more and could have gone down to regimental detail. Doing so makes following the flow of action much easier and interesting.

Criticism aside, I highly recommend the title as the definitive study of the continuing struggle between Lee and Grant. The book will serve as a valuable guide to my next visit at Spotsylvania.

Rhea does a wonderful descriptive job on the Battle that changed the Civil War in the east forever. Any romantic feelings of cavaliers and great flanking maneuvers is at a loss for this grim beginning of the complex battle of entrenchments that eventually extend to Petersburg, This battle is ugly in the sense of great casualties as waves of humanity go up against mine balls, canister, bayonets and the well entrenched foes, in the case of the latter, Lee's ANV. Rhea does an outstanding job in two particular areas, one is the study of command for both the Union and Confederates and in his excellent detail descriptions of the many battles at Spotsylvania that culminates in the horrid bloody assaults at the mule shoesalient including the equally high casualty counter attacks. In reference to the command structure, Rhea describes a continuation of the Union problems of command initially described in his preceding Wilderness book (one of a four part series on the Overland Campaign). In this case; however, Grant is much more involved and Meade is seemingly relegated to a senior staff officer position. An example is Meade's dissatisfaction with Sheridan's inability to cut through to Spotsylvania and beat the confederates only to be subjected to Grants intervention to allow Sheridan to cut loose with the entire cavalry in a run at Richmond and Stuart. And ackwardly, Burnside still maintains an independent command under only Grant. Rhea articulately studies the confederate command particularly in reference to Stuart's cavalry brilliantly blocking Sheridan at Todd's Tavern, and Anderson's timely march to support Fitz Lee at Laurel Hill that plants one of the main defenses of Spotsylvania setting the stage for the confederates extended defense works. Rhea does an astonishing job of tracking the complex maneuvers of virtually every brigade from Hancock's attempt to move two exposed divisions north of the Po River attacked by Early to Hancock's attack at the salinet's maze of entrenchments. Rhea equally tracks the confederates in the salient from the initial defenders to those in the many brigades involved in the counterattack. Rhea also highlights the emergence of Gordon that parallel's the demise of Ewell in Lee's eyes. The account of the bloody angle is with first hand quotes of the miraculous charge by Hancock, the bad luck of the Confederates (weather, fog, movement of artillery) and the virtual free for all fight for control of the angle. Krick has a more poignant description of the battle of the mule shoe salient but Rhea provides the whole battle scheme brilliantly. The importance of Laurel Hill is well described and not forgotten nor is Early's late flanking attack against Burnside. Inclusive in this monumental task is a vivid account of Sheridan's raid and Stuarts attempt to harass and finally stop his better-supported foe. As Rhea points out, unlike Sheridan, Stuart left half his troop with Lee while Sheridan took his entire corps. The consequences are better for Lee but not so for Stuart at Yellow Tavern. The book concludes with great analysis of the command success and failures of both sides. Of interest is Warren's conflicts as Grant is frustrated with Warren's desire to avoid headlong attacks against well-entrenched foes (seemingly appropriate), while Warren may be right but he was better served to working for Meade who had a similar cautious nature. Also a good look at Grant's drive to destroy Lee and end the war while suffering great casualties. Two items that could use more detail, was Ewell that bad at Spotsylvania to be reduced in command or was Gordon's star just eclipsing Ewell at this point as Gary Gallagher suggests? And what was the reason why the confederates maintained the salient position that became exposed? Some authors suggest that the layout was the result of night marches with units forming where they stopped at whatever terrain vantage points seemed best in the dark. Fascinating account of Lee as he continues to take an active battlefield role as his officer corps becomes decimated. An excellent book and as the author says in the last chapter, "Twenty-five miles south, toward Richmond, the North Anna beckoned". After reading this book, you are ready for that next part of the campaign.

Any civil war buff or historian will agree that the Battle for Spotsylvania Court House was some of the bloodiest fighting in the Civil War. The utter disregard for human life was shown here on these Virginian fields. It's mind boggling how commanders could waste people's lives in the face of such destruction.

As Rhea reiterates, after the Battle of the Wilderness Confederate general Robert E. Lee had no choice but to move his troops into a defensive position near the Spotsylvania Court House. Knowing that Union commander Ulysses Simpson Grant would pursue his southerners, Lee constructed defensive earthworks that were nearly perfect. Unlike his predecessors, Grant vowed to strike at Lee whenever he possibly could, even if a significant loss of men was apparent. The number of attacks at the Bloody Angle by the Union commander illustrates his testimony to destroying Lee's army. Where Gordon Rhea is perhaps unfair is his continuous criticism of Grant's subordinate officers.

Up to 1864 the Army of the Potomac had a variety of commanding officers ranging from George McClellan to George Meade. All were West Point graduates and all had experience in the field before the Civil War. Therefore all were professional soldiers. What recent scholarship is saying is that the continuous influence of President Lincoln and his War Department on the generals can be construed as overbearing and perhaps detrimental to their performance on the field. Lincoln's goal was to capture Richmond as long as Washington D.C. was protected. By not allowing his army to move freely down the peninsula and attacking Richmond by way of Petersburg, Lincoln must be blamed mostly for the northern lack of success from 1861 to 1864. Now, McClellan, Joseph Hooker, Ambrose Burnside, and Meade all knew how to capture Richmond. They just weren't given full control to carry out their plans. So, the problem with Rhea's critique of the Union officers is that it may seem fair to the average reader, but in reality it is downright unmerited.

With that being said it must be pointed out that Rhea is a good researcher. His manuscript collection, especially the numerous diaries and letters, is quite impressive. But one can point out that Rhea only used sources to back up his own claims, a trait that is common with attorneys. This may be the definitive study of the Spotsylvania campaign from a tactical sense but it fails to understand the larger picture.