This is a well organized, well written and extremely relevant book, especially at a time when the Israeli Air Force is pounding Lebanon with high-precision munitions in an attempt to wipe out a terrorist organization on its northern borders.

In "Why Air Forces Fail" editors Robin Higham and Stephen J. Harris have compiled a series of historical case studies that look at the failures of various air forces in World War I, World War II (Europe, the Eastern Front and the Pacific), the Arab-Israeli Wars, and the Falklands War. It is a wide net that examines air power in Poland, France, German, Italy, the United States, Great Britain, Japan, the Soviet Union, Israel, Argentina, and the Arab nations. Each chapter is written by a specialist in the field and contains a wealth of information on the various air forces and their performance in war.

The editors divide the air forces into three groups: (1) those that never had a chance (the "dead ducks"), (2) those that had initial success, but eventually failed (the "hares" that ultimately lost the race), and (3) those that suffered initial disasters but were victorious in the end (the "phoenixes").

Higham and Harris show that by studying the defeat of air forces at war a number of patterns are discernable. The "dead ducks" were doomed because they lack the infrastructure and resources to withstand their attackers. The "phoenixes", on the other hand, had the necessities, including the resources, political environment, personalities, and strategic space, to rise again.

The editors conclude that, historically, the practitioners of airpower have only rarely achieved anything like the ideal of a quick and lasting decisiveness. Nonetheless the pernicious myth of independent air action capable of winning wars by itself persists. One has only to look at the promises made by the proponents of airpower in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and, more recently, Israel, and the aftermath of air strikes, even over the long-term, to see that even a small nation or military organization cannot be defeated by airpower alone.

"Service doctrine that is not in harmony with government policy is likely to produce circumstances in which air forces will fail," write Higham and Harris. "Government policy made in isolation of service capabilities tends to do the same. Avoiding such dissonance is not easy, even where think tanks abound."

Of course, the main lesson of the book is that the ends must match the mean in the short term and when national survival is at stake.

An extremely readable and informative work, with essays ranging from the First World War to the Falklands conflict. The essays are quite reasonable in length, if anything sometimes too short, and include sections on areas which need more research and recommended reading. I ask you my fellow history lovers- is there anything more helpful to the student of history than a good annotated bibliography?

WHY AIR FORCES FAIL: THE ANATOMY OF DEFEAT examines the reasons for catastrophic failures of the air forces not just of this country, but other nations. Air forces are divided into three categories here: forces what never had a chance, forces that began with victory but ultimately were defeated, and those which were defeated early on but rose to win. In making WHY AIR FORCES FAIL a global examination, focusing on major wars, contributors provide a range of analysis on the causes of defeat of all kinds of strategies and differing air force scenarios in a sweeping set of insights essential to understanding air force approaches.

Diane C. Donovan
California Bookwatch

Why Air Forces Fail consists of 11 scholarly essays by different authors that address the reasons for the defeat of air power in conflicts from 1914 up to the contemporary era. Unlike many essay anthologies, this book has real meat in it, not just opinions. The authors categorize three different types of defeated air forces: the `dead ducks' that never had a chance, the `hares' who won initially but lacked the ability to conduct protracted warfare and `the phoenixes' who suffered initial disasters but came back to win in the end. Why Air Forces Fail is geared for a military-academic audience, and each chapter includes notes on areas that still need more research and lengthy bibliographies. For the most part, the writing style and research that went into this volume is first-rate and Why Air Forces Fail represents an excellent series of case studies that deserve serious attention from all those who see air power as a panacea for international problems. The eleven essays are:

* "Poland's Military Aviation, 1939: It Never had a Chance," by Michael Peszke: A good essay in which the author looks at the dilemmas facing a small power air force that lacks the resources to successfully accomplish its missions. One point the author fails to mention: the Polish Air Force continued to fight and win after 1939 - it did not cease to exist.

* "L'Armee de l'Air, 1933-40: Drifting Toward Defeat," by Anthony Cain: This essay examines the doctrinal, organizational and technical reasons that led to French defeat in 1940. Disunity of command, vague doctrine and poor choice of aircraft were major factors in the debacle that followed.

* "The Arab Air Forces," by Robin Higham: This is the weakest essay in the volume, marred by misspellings, mistakes (e.g. Iranians are not Arabs), several dubious contentions and some glib assertions. The author contends that the Egyptian Air Force has reached parity with the Israelis by 2003, that the Royal Saudi Air Force is an elite, professional force (ha, ha - good joke) and that Arab air forces have consisted of "simple Koranized mechanics." Skip this essay.

* "Defeat of the German and Austro-Hungarian Air Forces in the Great War, 1909-1918" by John H Morrow Jr.: This author argues that the Germans wasted too many resources on Zeppelin construction (which he never proves in any statistical fashion) and had not developed a sufficiently robust aviation industry to sustain four years of attrition warfare. A bit contentious, but well written.

* "Downfall of the Regia Aeronautica, 1933-1943," by Brian Sullivan: An excellent essay that discusses how Italy's attempt to build a force in line with Douhet's theories of strategic bombing - but for which they lacked the resources - led to the development of a weak air force that was incapable of accomplishing virtually any mission. Poor technological and labor decisions also led to too few, too poor-quality aircraft. This is a great essay about how an air force can be totally disrupted by a few bad decisions.

* "The Imperial Japanese Air Forces," by Osamu Tagaya: Another great essay, that pins the blame for Japanese defeat on a divided force (army and navy aviation) that essentially fought their wars separately. After building a great fighter like the Zero, the Japanese failed to produce a successful replacement and their aircraft were undermined by lack of radios and radar. Failure to train enough replacement pilots also contributed greatly to defeat.

* "Defeat of the Luftwaffe, 1935-45," by James S Corum: A good essay that blames doctrine (failure to develop a naval air component to cripple England's economy), poor management of the aircraft industry and inadequate forward repair capabilities as the primary causes for German defeat.

* "The Argentine Air Force versus Britain in the Falkland Islands 1982," by Rene De la Pedraja: The author stresses that the Argentine Air Force did not prepare for this war but it had to carry the lion's share due to the pathetic performances of the army and navy. The author contends that the Argentine Air Force could have won with a more aggressive effort to repair the Port Stanley airfield.

* "From Disaster to Recovery: Russia's Air Forces in the Two World Wars," by David R Jones: This essay tries to cover too much ground and skims over WW1 a bit, through the Soviet build-up in the 1930s, then to disaster in June 1941. The Red Air Force was a `phoenix' because it harnessed the Soviet Union's industrial power to outbuild the Luftwaffe and come back to regain air superiority. This essay focuses a bit too much on the Soviet-superiority-through-numbers approach, which ignores other factors that helped the Red Air Force (like depth, that allowed them to pull back out of range of attacks, when necessary).

* "The United States in the Pacific," by Mark Parillo. A good essay that looks at the disasters at Pearl Harbor in the Philippines. The author makes good points that US leaders up to Roosevelt had false illusions about the military capability of small numbers of B-17s in the Pacific. There is also a point made here about military forces forward deployed for deterrent value, but which lack the logistic support to conduct actual military operations when the balloon goes up.

* "Defeats of the Royal Air Force: Norway, France, Greece and Malaya, 1940-42," by Robin Higham and Stephen J. Harris: The authors view the RAF's key weaknesses as a bomber-centric philosophy at the start of the war and poor operational intelligence about enemy capabilities. The succession of disasters in these early expeditions apparently didn't teach the RAF too much.