Very few people have more experience in the American foreign policy realm than Richard Haas. He has been an advisor to presidents, expert commentator for television and is resident guru for the Council on Foreign Relations. Perhaps most importantly he was present at the creation of two significant shifts in American foreign policy, the first and second Iraq wars.

In this book Haas seeks to argue that these two wars can be categorized as a good war and a bad war, a war of necessity (Gulf War I) and a war of choice (Gulf War II) Most Americans outside the neo-con bubble will certainly agree with the latter. The former is open to debate.

Haas takes us inside the concepts of strategic vision that were a part of the decision making process. Inevitably there is some self-protection, but after all it is his book. In general I found it to be well thought out and well written. His experience and strategic sensibility comes through consistently.


I highly recommend this book. Taken with books such as Tom Ricks' Fiasco, it broadens our sense of what has happened, what should happen and what should never happen again. An excellent read

Richard Haas was one of a few who were in a unique position to serve in two administrations of father and son. He served on the National Security Council staff for George Herbert Walker Bush, and later served in a less desirable position (according to him) as Director of Policy Planning in the State Department under George W. Bush.

Haass describes the First Gulf War as one of necessity. Had the U.S. not acted and allowed Saddam Hussein to conquer Kuwait, he would have been in charge of one quarter of the world's oil supply, and it would have tipped the balance of power in the Middle East. He commends George Bush (41) for never making policy that was centered on war, but finding military might as a useful part of it. He describes how Bush senior got the Saudis to allow the U.S. to open bases in their country, by assuring the Saudi king that we would come over as allies or later, as liberators. Bush's execution of the war was near flawless. He managed to form a coalition, defined sound objectives, used overwhelming force, and withdrew with having expended little loss of life or money. The only thing the author perhaps faults George Sr. for is not decimating Saddam's army further, and his belief that the Iraqi people would overthrow the psychopathic dictator.

His opinion of George Walker Bush is somewhat different. His contention is that the second war in the Gulf, namely Iraq, was a war of choice. Numerous diplomatic alternatives to war were ignored, and the decision to go to war was made months before it was announced to the public. This war of choice was supposed to enhance American power and prestige in the Middle East, defeat terrorism, bring democracy to Iraq, and provide a cheap supply of oil. But without clear objectives, and one blunder after another from Chalabi to abu-Ghraib, and misuse of the military, George W., the man who eschewed nation-building as a candidate, not only failed to meet these objectives, he even reversed them. It is unlikely that a democratic regime will survive without U.S. presence, according to the author.

He faults George Jr. for surrounding himself with people who agreed with him. Such a staff was able to present to him rosy colored estimates and rationalizations that distorted reality. Secretary of State, Colin Powell who usually offered more circumspect and contrarian advice, was not considered a team player and his wisdom was discounted. Powell could not stand up to Cheney, Rumsfeld, Rice and Wolfowitz when they had the ear of the president.

Haass's observations of both administrations are analytical and factual bringing a perspective that is unbiased and insightful. His words ring like the consummate diplomat who couches his criticisms with sprinklings of praise for the character of George W. He is articulate and there is a flow to his writing. So, why didn't I care for this book?

Memoirs are usually self-serving, but this one is the exception. Ordinarily I find memoirs dull, and Mr. Haass hasn't had much of an interesting life (to me) to hold my attention. His errands to Ireland or Saudi Arabia made me feel like I was experiencing every last frequent flyer mile, and I crashed several times while reading it (on the couch). Much of this information about both administrations has been told many times over. As a result, I labored through the book and skipped pages once I found one mundane paragraph after another.

Let me put this as diplomatically as possible: this would not be my book of choice.

War of Necessity is a comparison of the two Iraq wars and whether or not they were necessary in nature or choice.

Richard N. Haass was a member of the National Security Council advising President George H.W Bush during the first Iraq war and was later an adviser to Colin Powell during the second Iraq war.

Mr. Haass feels the first gulf war was a war of necessity in that there was a clear goal with the ouster of Saddam from Kuwait and to maintain the balance of the region.

The second gulf war was a war of choice with the goal of removing Saddam and several hopeful goals such as bringing a democracy to a country that really didn't have a concept of it. The fact there wasn't room for changes in the plan and when there was a concern the option was to stay the course or else look weak.

One may debate the merits or demerits of the Presidency of George W. Bush. Mr. Haass made an effort to be neutral. At times he criticized the President such as when a decision was made; the course would remain no matter what new information was presented. Other times; Mr. Haass would challenge the claims of the President being less intelligent or lying to the country.

One aspect I found interesting was the presentation of the internal aspects of the administration as he wrote about his interactions with people. He wrote of his previous relationship with Condi Rice and how it became strained as she chose to follow the administration's plans without question. As he wrote she would shut him down by declaring the President has made up his mind. His workings with Colin Powell which you will see he admires the man for his ability to weigh conflicting information and his efforts to challenge opinions. I also found it interesting to read of his displeasure with the perceived increase of power by Cheney.

An area of great debate was Presidents call for "first strike" situations where the US should strike at perceived threats. Many would argue the second Gulf was an example of that policy. Considering the current problems; I thought it was interesting that Mr. Haass referenced past advice of John Quincy Adams the only other President who was a son of a President. He advised the country "goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy"

With this in mind Mr. Haass declares Saddam was a monster but was it worth a war to oust him? Wars of choice should be avoided.

Overall; I found the book to be a little dry at times. But I will state that Political science is not one of my favorite areas so I will not knock the book for the writing. The GWB Presidency will be a subject of great debate for years to come. This book will probably become a useful reference as it showed some of the inner activities of the time.

This book explores the planning for both Iraq wars, in 1991 and 2003, by one of the few people in a senior Washington position for both conflicts.

The 1991 Gulf War does a very good job of fitting the definition of a "just war" or a "necessary war." The cost of letting Saddam Hussein keep Kuwait, and its oil, and thereby strongly influence the entire Middle East oil supply, was too high. The objectives of the war, to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, were focused and clear-cut. Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Cheifs of Staff, believed in using overwhelming force. If you have to go to war, make absolutely sure you have enough troops to do the job; about 500,000 troops were assembled. The war had huge international support, even from several Arab countries. It was consistent with accepted international norms concerning self-defense. As a senior member of the National Security Council, the author saw it all, first-hand.

For the 2003 invasion, the author was a senior adviser to Secretary of State Powell. Haass felt that sanctions and inspections were not given enough of a chance to work; invasion was not a last resort. It had much less legal and international support than Gulf War I; this was basically a unilateral affair. There was only one Security Council resolution for support, after America concluded that it was not going to get support for a second. The first Gulf War used half a million troops in a country like Kuwait; how would a much larger place like Iraq need only a third as many troops? Because of financial contributions from other member countries, Gulf War I cost America almost nothing; the tab for Gulf War II has passed $1 trillion; with little chance of America getting financial support from anyone. No matter how good an idea it may have seemed, to its supporters, the execution has to be as good (which it wasn't), or maybe it was not such a good idea in the beginning.

Here is a very interesting look at two important events in recent American history. Written by an insider, it does a fine job of showing two different answers to the question "How does America go to war?" It is very much worth reading.

Richard Haass had the unique experience of being observer to and at times part of the decision making process that went into the shaping of American involvement in what would become Operations Desert Storm in the early 1990's and the current Operation Iraqi Freedom. Haass describes the political environment leading up to these two wars to help explain why certain decisions were made and what the influences of these decisions were. He also goes into great detail and discussion as to the differnces between the two wars and the rationale of the level of American involvement.

Haass' inside account is extremely interesting to outside observers of both wars and he goes to great lengths to present this book in ways that are easy to follow by an ordinary citizen. As the child of a soldier who served in Desert Storm and a soldier myself who served in Operation Iraqi Freedom, I particulary appreciated the inside look into the decision processes and thinking that resulted in both my father and myself being sent into harm's way.

"War of Necessity, War of Choice" by Richard N. Haass is a memoir that provides his take from the inside as it were. Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, was a member of the National Security Council advising President George H.W. Bush on Operation Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991. He was later a State Department adviser to Colin Powell on the second Iraq war in 2003. As the title suggests in his book he explains why in his opinion the first Iraq war was a war of necessity and the second was a war of choice. With hindsight it is very easy to agree with this sentiment.

Though a bit of haughtiness comes through in this book, Mr. Haas personal memoir of the events in question leading up to both wars is very interesting. I would love to read a memoir like this from someone who was in the inner circle and part of all the relevant discussions. His insights into the personalities of those he worked with were very helpful in providing insights at how the two wars came about and the methods used to execute the diplomatic relations with Iraq. War being the final tool in the arsenal one should try to avoid at all cost.

His opinion on both President Bush's, though different, is respectful. The author even shares how his relationship changed dramatically with Condoleezza Rice. During the first Bush administration, George H. W. Bush, Sr., they were good friends and watched football games together. But during George W. Bush's administration their relationship became strained as she grew ever more ideologically rigid and closed ranks with the president. This showed me in government you really have no friends just temporary alliances.

I feel the author is honest in his beliefs and writings. Mr. Haas confirms like in any job that involves people in large organizations that the policy perspective has some inherent limitations. He makes it clear that he did not know how the President, George W. Bush, made the decision to go to war. It actually came as a surprise as the author was writing policy papers that it seemed no one really wanted to read outside of the Sate Department.

The author asserts that either Tony Blair or Colin Powell could have stopped the second Iraq war with a single public speech yet stayed silent. Of course no one can really know what someone else is thinking at the time. So they, like the rest of the world, must have believed in the intelligence reports.

Though I disagree with many of Mr. Hass's convictions, like a country should always go to the U.N. first to consult about their foreign policy even before consulting their own representatives, I do agree that the second Iraq war was a war of choice as defined in this book. The author has a couple of other points I do not agree with that the reader will have to decide for themselves. And for a man who referenced so many other sources, I did not like that does not use direct citations of his sources. Still, this is a good case study on how the U.S.A. went to both wars and how different the approaches were.

Richard Haass was one of the few senior advisors to be involved in planning for both of the wars in Iraq, so he is uniquely qualified to speak to the similarities and differences between the two. As part of the first President Bush's National Security Council, Haass correctly saw the need to force Iraqi troops out of Kuwait as part of that president's concept of a New World Order, and played a part in assembling the broader coalition of nations that accomplished that goal. Haas believed that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait violated the principle of inviolability of a sovereign state but wanted to avoid attempting to create a democracy in the aggressor state. Therefore he wisely advised to liberate Kuwait but against toppling the Iraqi regime, a somewhat unpopular choice at the time.

Haass's thoughtful and intelligent stance in the first Iraq was served America and the world well, and rather than being self-congratulatory Haass is instead somewhat matter-of-fact about it. After discussing the successes in the first Iraq war the book shifts focus from the "how-we-won-the-war" narrative to one of disappointment and despondency as Haass serves during the second Bush presidency. This time serving as an advisor in Colin Powell's State Department Haass is critical of the Administration's policies on seemingly everything: the withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, policies towards North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and especially the `War on Terror'. Haass particularly disliked the way the Bush Administration parlayed Powell's popularity into making him an advocate for pre-emptively attacking Iraq. In spite of being enraged by what he saw and resigning Haass stayed on, which begs the question, why?

It is the descent into complacency that shifts the tone of the book from the "how-we-won-the-war" narrative into a "nobody-would-listen-to-me" pity party. Rather than resigning on principle Haass stays on, hoping against hope that he can change the Administration's hearts and minds. For me this is mystifying; how could one of the brash persuasive architects of the first Iraq war morph into such a cowed milquetoast in the run up to the second Iraq war? In his defense Haass indeed provided prescient warnings about what post-invasion Iraq could turn into, which proved largely true. But this time Haass wasn't at NSC which had considerable clout within the Bush Administration, but was instead relegated to the completely isolated and marginalized State Department. And in the Bush Administration if you were at State then nobody could hear you scream.

In the end Haass's book is a small drop in the larger flood of books on the second Iraq war although it is unique as it shows quite clearly the sharp differences and similarities between the two wars. More importantly "War of Necessity" serves as a warning to those considering entering bureaucracy or who are already there: speak truth to power, silence is seen as tacit agreement, and no one can force policy change unless there is a desire for change. Haass was, and remains, brilliant regarding foreign policy, yet like his former boss, Colin Powell, his resume and credibility are now damaged beyond repair. This book should serve as an effective warning beacon for all about the dangers of not speaking truth to power.