It's telling that an academic Cambridge UP book has received seven or eight (as of early 2008) reviews; most of the time, academic books get scanty attention at best, unless a colleague (or mom!) reviews them. This is particularly true of philosophy books. Anyhow, I'm not surprised this book has an appeal. Wielenberg is a graceful and incisive writer. He seems incapable of writing turgid or indecipherable sentences. He reasons lucidly, and lucidly places his faith in reason. I would think him to be an excellent teacher, good with examples and capable of focused argumentation, but without losing sight of the big picture. His examples range from Dostoevsky to Milton, the Bible to C. S. Lewis. Of course many philosophers make an appearance too, some ancient (e.g., Aristotle) and some contemporary (e.g., Graham). And he's read neuroscientists (Damasio) too. General readers interested in big questions -- like: the naturalization of ethics, the role of faith in life, the necessity (or not as the case may be) of a higher being for the flourishing of human agents -- will find a lot to chew on. And all this in a 160 page book to boot. (NB: it is not the case that the author simply gives us some syllogisms. On the contrary, while there are some, they are embedded in as smart and clear a text as one could want.)

The increased attention that the popular presses have given to atheist apologetics in recent years has allowed modern skeptics and non-believers to fill their shelves with entertaining, if sometimes imperious, arguments by such popular authors as Dawkins, Harris, Dennett, and now even Hitchins, to name just a few. This book offers entry into an under-explored, but important, question: assuming there is no God, is there a strong basis for an ethical, purposeful, and "meaningful" life?

A few other Amazon reviewers have attended to this book's arguments quite thoughtfully, so I'll restrict my comments the style and presentation. The book tries to be at once both "academic" and "popular," reading not so much like lecture notes (as one reviewer characterized it) as like a Ph.D. dissertation that the author has attempted to revise for a wider audience. (I have no idea whether this is the actual origin of the book.) It is full of reference citations and quotations not only of earlier philosophers but even of occasional examples from popular culture. Readers who have had at least an introductory course in formal logic may appreciate the disciplined style of argument, but more "general" audiences may find this to be something of an obstacle. You certainly don't need a degree in philosophy to follow this author's lines of thought, and the serious lay reader will be rewarded by the time spent with this book, but it's probably the academic reader who will find this book's style most familiar and engaging.

I hope that some future authors will take up this topic and bring it to a wider audience. It addresses an important objection often raised by theists who are defending the necessity of religion in civilized society. "How can you live a good life without God?" is a question that long-time atheists may find both curious and tiresome, but it still deserves a serious answer.

This book is a professor's expanded lecture notes for lectures that are probably both challenging and interesting (I'd enjoy auditing those courses). Previous reviews by Robin Friedman and David Sewell describe the overall form of this book well. I want to deal with one particular failing that I found critical.



I read this book in the course of a project to really understand the secular basis for morality. Wielenberg seems to make a good, although overly-cautious and tentative, argument for a secular meaning of life. And he gives an effective critique of the theistic positions of God as the creator of ethics and God as the guarantor of ultimate justice. With this out of the way I turned to Chapter Four, "Ethical Character in a Godless Universe," with high anticipation.



This chapter begins with a digression on how strongly heirarchical the Christian system is, with God at the top, then angels, humans, animals, obligation flowing down and obedience up. This illuminates some aspects of theistic morality but might better be part of a preceding, critical chapter, rather than this, supposedly constructive chapter.



At this point Wieland introduces the idea of "naturalistic humility": that the naturalist has every bit as good a reason to be humble in the face of a risky and contingent universe, as the believer has to be before the throne of God. This section also is original, convincing, and illuminating, and I was excited to see the next heading was "From Humility to Charity."



Alas, here I was disappointed. Wieland claims to bridge the gap from humility to charity: from a solid logical conclusion that we are each of us supremely lucky simply to be alive, even luckier in whatever wealth we may have, he claims to reach an equally solid conclusion that we are obligated to share that wealth with those less fortunate. But he does not! Here are the key sentences (p115):



"This obligation is grounded not in any divine command but instead in the particulars of the situation. Among the more salient features of the situation is the _lack of control_ the two [a hypothetical rich man and poor man] have over their respective fates. If the winds had blown slightly differently, their situations could have been reversed. Is it not clear that it is not morally permissible to refuse entirely to offer any help to the less fortunate who find themselves in difficult circumstances through no fault of their own and who will probably suffer and even perish if we do not help them?"



That's it; the entirety of the logical hookup he makes between humility and charity is in the phrase "Is it not clear that it is not morally permissible..." There is no further exposition of this absolutely crucial point; from here onward in the book he writes as if the point was proven. As near as I can tell, he is making an appeal to empathy (he does not use the word). And the claim is simply not convincing (I don't understand how his students have let him off the hook for this, either).



I can fully imagine a decent naturalist who replies "It is not at all clear to me. Yes, I fully agree the position of those unfortunate people is distressing to them and to me. But I have good reasons to conserve everything I have, indeed to look for more; after all, in the face of this humbling and hostile universe, how can I be sure I won't be in dire straits myself at any minute? In any case, there are so very many of the needy, and so various their needs, how much time and effort (that my family needs to survive) am I supposed to devote to studying their needs and selecting whom I should help and by how much?"



While Wieland discusses the views of virtue espoused by theists, by Aristotle, by Plato, and by Kant, he also gives only a weak and confusing (to me) exposition of how a naturalist should view virtue and why pursue it.



In short, this book is a good critique of "value and virtue in a theistic universe" but only a weak and unhelpful display of the title subject.

This book is a professor's expanded lecture notes for lectures that are probably both challenging and interesting (I'd enjoy auditing those courses). Previous reviews by Robin Friedman and David Sewell describe the overall form of this book well. I want to deal with one particular failing that I found critical.

I read this book in the course of a project to really understand the secular basis for morality. Wielenberg seems to make a good, although overly-cautious and tentative, argument for a secular meaning of life. And he gives an effective critique of the theistic positions of God as the creator of ethics and God as the guarantor of ultimate justice. With this out of the way I turned to Chapter Four, "Ethical Character in a Godless Universe," with high anticipation.

This chapter begins with a digression on how strongly heirarchical the Christian system is, with God at the top, then angels, humans, animals, obligation flowing down and obedience up. This illuminates some aspects of theistic morality but might better be part of a preceding, critical chapter, rather than this, supposedly constructive chapter.

At this point Wieland introduces the idea of "naturalistic humility": that the naturalist has every bit as good a reason to be humble in the face of a risky and contingent universe, as the believer has to be before the throne of God. This section also is original, convincing, and illuminating, and I was excited to see the next heading was "From Humility to Charity."

Alas, here I was disappointed. Wieland claims to bridge the gap from humility to charity: from a solid logical conclusion that we are each of us supremely lucky simply to be alive, even luckier in whatever wealth we may have, he claims to reach an equally solid conclusion that we are obligated to share that wealth with those less fortunate. But he does not! Here are the key sentences (p115):

"This obligation is grounded not in any divine command but instead in the particulars of the situation. Among the more salient features of the situation is the _lack of control_ the two [a hypothetical rich man and poor man] have over their respective fates. If the winds had blown slightly differently, their situations could have been reversed. Is it not clear that it is not morally permissible to refuse entirely to offer any help to the less fortunate who find themselves in difficult circumstances through no fault of their own and who will probably suffer and even perish if we do not help them?"

That's it; the entirety of the logical hookup he makes between humility and charity is in the phrase "Is it not clear that it is not morally permissible..." There is no further exposition of this absolutely crucial point; from here onward in the book he writes as if the point was proven. As near as I can tell, he is making an appeal to empathy (he does not use the word). And the claim is simply not convincing (I don't understand how his students have let him off the hook for this, either).

I can fully imagine a decent naturalist who replies "It is not at all clear to me. Yes, I fully agree the position of those unfortunate people is distressing to them and to me. But I have good reasons to conserve everything I have, indeed to look for more; after all, in the face of this humbling and hostile universe, how can I be sure I won't be in dire straits myself at any minute? In any case, there are so very many of the needy, and so various their needs, how much time and effort (that my family needs to survive) am I supposed to devote to studying their needs and selecting whom I should help and by how much?"

While Wieland discusses the views of virtue espoused by theists, by Aristotle, by Plato, and by Kant, he also gives only a weak and confusing (to me) exposition of how a naturalist should view virtue and why pursue it.

In short, this book is a good critique of "value and virtue in a theistic universe" but only a weak and unhelpful display of the title subject.

This book is a professor's expanded lecture notes for lectures that are probably both challenging and interesting (I'd enjoy auditing those courses). Previous reviews by Robin Friedman and David Sewell describe the overall form of this book well. I want to deal with one particular failing that I found critical.

I read this book in the course of a project to really understand the secular basis for morality. Wielenberg seems to make a good, although overly-cautious and tentative, argument for a secular meaning of life. And he gives an effective critique of the theistic positions of God as the creator of ethics and God as the guarantor of ultimate justice. With this out of the way I turned to Chapter Four, "Ethical Character in a Godless Universe," with high anticipation.

This chapter begins with a digression on how strongly heirarchical the Christian system is, with God at the top, then angels, humans, animals, obligation flowing down and obedience up. This illuminates some aspects of theistic morality but might better be part of a preceding, critical chapter, rather than this, supposedly constructive chapter.

At this point Wieland introduces the idea of "naturalistic humility": that the naturalist has every bit as good a reason to be humble in the face of a risky and contingent universe, as the believer has to be before the throne of God. This section also is original, convincing, and illuminating, and I was excited to see the next heading was "From Humility to Charity."

Alas, here I was disappointed. Wieland claims to bridge the gap from humility to charity: from a solid logical conclusion that we are each of us supremely lucky simply to be alive, even luckier in whatever wealth we may have, he claims to reach an equally solid conclusion that we are obligated to share that wealth with those less fortunate. But he does not! Here are the key sentences (p115):

"This obligation is grounded not in any divine command but instead in the particulars of the situation. Among the more salient features of the situation is the _lack of control_ the two [a hypothetical rich man and poor man] have over their respective fates. If the winds had blown slightly differently, their situations could have been reversed. Is it not clear that it is not morally permissible to refuse entirely to offer any help to the less fortunate who find themselves in difficult circumstances through no fault of their own and who will probably suffer and even perish if we do not help them?"

That's it; the entirety of the logical hookup he makes between humility and charity is in the phrase "Is it not clear that it is not morally permissible..." There is no further exposition of this absolutely crucial point; from here onward in the book he writes as if the point was proven. As near as I can tell, he is making an appeal to empathy (he does not use the word). And the claim is simply not convincing (I don't understand how his students have let him off the hook for this, either).

I can fully imagine a decent naturalist who replies "It is not at all clear to me. Yes, I fully agree the position of those unfortunate people is distressing to them and to me. But I have good reasons to conserve everything I have, indeed to look for more; after all, in the face of this humbling and hostile universe, how can I be sure I won't be in dire straits myself at any minute? In any case, there are so very many of the needy, and so various their needs, how much time and effort (that my family needs to survive) am I supposed to devote to studying their needs and selecting whom I should help and by how much?"

While Wieland discusses the views of virtue espoused by theists, by Aristotle, by Plato, and by Kant, he also gives only a weak and confusing (to me) exposition of how a naturalist should view virtue and why pursue it.

In short, this book is a good critique of "value and virtue in a theistic universe" but only a weak and unhelpful display of the title subject.

I was disappointed. The book title, and chapter titles, promise a very interesting subject matter, but the book delivers mostly logical syllogisms about the existence of God and morality.

The book looks back in time rehashing old arguments, without managing to peer creatively into a future world without a moral code derived from a divine will.

What happens to value and virtue when the gods are gone? It is an excellent question, which remains unanswered by the author, who only tangentially addresses the issue.

This is a gem of a book. Rigorous but not rigid, brief but not incomplete, well-argued but not shrill or dismissive. Rather than constructing straw men to attack, Prof. Wielenberg respectfully quotes and exposits some of the most interesting ideas of Christian apologists such as C.S. Lewis, Plantenga, and Craig, then demonstrates with clear prose, accessible formal logic, and examples from literature how those ideas are or could be mistaken. In place of the theistic view, he constructs a cogent case that a godless life can be moral and meaningful--and not in some second-class, grudging way, but in a way that could bring real joy and satisfaction. This book is not perfect, but it's probably "best in class." As useful as some of the more strictly academic books have been to me, I have long wished there was a more popular treatment of morality and meaning from an atheist perspective, and of the current crop of such books, this is the best I've encountered. It is the hallmark of a useful book that it is quoteable--which this book is. Highly recommended.