This is an excellent book, well written. I learned of this book from a close friend who is mentioned and show in a photo depicting The Alamo in Vietnam.

Being a veteran of Operation Pegesus and a former member of the 1st Battalion 2nd Marines, I highly recommend this book. It's very well researched, thoughful, and easy to read. However, I was disappointed that the authors didn't describe or write how the siege was actually continued (contrary to the media) even after the departure of the 1st Air Cav and the 26th Marines. After moving out of Con Thien in early April, my unit (2/1) spend 77 days at Khe Sanh, until we finally destroyed the combat base and moved to the coast. During that time, the NVA did attempt to overrun the combat base on Ho Chi Minh's birthday May 19th, which the authors Prados and Stubbe have failed to mention. It was the pinnacle moment of the siege. If the NVA had overrun the combat base, it would have shocked the politicians in Washington and further the disillusioned the American public. Only by a strange set of circumstances and the enemy mistakes were we able to overcome their plans. Meanwhile, the surrounding hill fights were still continuing and being fought by the 1st Battalion 1st Marines. If a person is interested in reading about these engagements and the continuing siege, he or she can read my book, "Arc Light," by G.V. Short.

Moreover, the authors didn't seem to understand the strategical meaning behind the Tet Offensive or the NVA's battlefield tactics. But what I did find very amusing about their book was that after conducting their thorough research, the authors obviously discovered how flawed the offical accounts have been in describing the campaign.

In Valley of Decision, The Siege of Khe Sanh, the authors chronicle the trials of both the Marines and the North Vietnamese who fought there. Both sides attempted to turn this remote outpost on the Laotian border into a decisive campaign that would ultimately determine the outcome of the war. Both sides failed in this attempt despite their best efforts.

After reading this book I find Khe Sanh to be the war in Vietnam in microcosm. The problems of differing perceptions held by Westmorland, Marine General Walt, the CIA, Special Forces, Marine Force Recon and the Bru tribesmen who occupied Khe Sanh illustrate the violations of the principles of war of objective and unity of command. Hovering above it all was the President of the United States exercising personal control of a battlefield from his office, 10,000 miles away.

In retrospect, Khe Sanh was a victory in a sense for the U.S. An isolated U.S. garrison that blew reville and raised a tattered American flag each day despite the inevitable mortar/artillery barrage it drew, told the Bru tribesmen and the North and South Vietnamese that he U.S. was still in control despite being outnumbered significantly. Almost unlimited American artillery and air support helped make the point.

Reading this book, one almost feels the fear, frustration, and misery the garrison endured there. Yet the reader senses the fierce pride that only combat soldiers doing a dirty, thankless job can feel. You can also imagine the rage felt when they were told simply that Khe Sanh was no longer important and to simply walk away.

Valley is essentially a foxhole level analysis of this campaign that shows how decisions emenating all the way from Washington and Saigon impacted the lives of the men on the ground. They were indeed the bait that lured thousands of North Vietnamese to their deaths. Like elsewhere in Vietnam, they were left with nothing to show for their heroic efforts.

In Valley of Decision, The Siege of Khe Sanh, the authors chronicle the trials of both the Marines and the North Vietnamese who fought there. Both sides attempted to turn this remote outpost on the Laotian border into a decisive campaign that would ultimately determine the outcome of the war. Both sides failed in this attempt despite their best efforts.

After reading this book I find Khe Sanh to be the war in Vietnam in microcosm. The problems of differing perceptions held by Westmorland, Marine General Walt, the CIA, Special Forces, Marine Force Recon and the Bru tribesmen who occupied Khe Sanh illustrate the violations of the principles of war of objective and unity of command. Hovering above it all was the President of the United States exercising personal control of a battlefield from his office, 10,000 miles away.

In retrospect, Khe Sanh was a victory in a sense for the U.S. An isolated U.S. garrison that blew reville and raised a tattered American flag each day despite the inevitable mortar/artillery barrage it drew, told the Bru tribesmen and the North and South Vietnamese that he U.S. was still in control despite being outnumbered significantly. Almost unlimited American artillery and air support helped make the point.

Reading this book, one almost feels the fear, frustration, and misery the garrison endured there. Yet the reader senses the fierce pride that only combat soldiers doing a dirty, thankless job can feel. You can also imagine the rage felt when they were told simply that Khe Sanh was no longer important and to simply walk away.

Valley is essentially a foxhole level analysis of this campaign that shows how decisions emenating all the way from Washington and Saigon impacted the lives of the men on the ground. They were indeed the bait that lured thousands of North Vietnamese to their deaths. Like elsewhere in Vietnam, they were left with nothing to show for their heroic efforts.