This book provides an in-depth accounting of the American-Iranian relationship. The book focuses very little on ancient Iranian history - instead picking up with the 1953 coup against Mossadeq, the Pahlavi shahs, the 1979 Revolution, and the US-Iranian issues that have stemmed from those incidents.

After detailing the history, the author explains why President Clinton's effort to renew ties with Iran failed. He also explains in great detail the temporary end of Iran's reformist counterrevolution, which fizzled out when President Khatami failed to challenge the right-wing clerics in control of Iran in the late 1990s. He paints a troubling picture of anti-Americanism emanating from Iran - sometimes irrational, other times understandable. His major cause of concern is Iran's nuclear weapons program, which he thinks can be derailed only by a united world (USA, Europe, China, Russia, etc).

The book basically runs through recent Iranian history and US-reactions. In the end, he advocates a particular policy (keep the Grand Bargain on the table, don't attack Iran, unite the world to stop its nuclear weapons program, etc).

It is a great (yet long) book. This one is not for you if you can only stay with a book for 200 or 300 pages. But if you hang in, you will emerge smarter than you entered, as I did.

Mr Pollack's fine tome deserves to be read by all interested in this seemingly intractable dilemma facing Iran and the USA. He makes a brave effort at fairness but alas his imperialist upbringing colors all his views about sovereign Iran's rightful place in the post-US-hegemonic world. His book does illustrate that Iranians have been quick to blame external intervenors (of which there have been many) and less prone to self-criticism of selfish natives who sold out to the highest bidder or acquired the brightest colored feathers to line their private nests with. He shows opportunities both sides have had to foster better relations, but in the end domestic politics trumped international amity concerns. Pollack is weakest at arguing against Iran's possession of nuclear weapons, which seems absolutely necessary to prevent lunatics like Bush from launching ever-less likely wars (just because the US is currently being economically whipsawed.) His logic seems to be that if we don't like a country's government, then they shouldn't have nukes, because then we can't bully them around. Which is exactly why Iran will acquire them.
Still, imperialist or no, Pollack has a good writing style and an eye for the relevant, so this book needs to be read by fans of history, international politics and Iran.

This is the same Kenneth Pollack who was a cheerleader for the Iraq war, then presented himself as a critic of the war to help sell the "surge?" That's all we need to know about his wisdom, foresight, and intellectual honesty. The book follows the same poor judgment and lack of intellectual vigor as his writings on Iraq.

For one thing, as Jonathan Schwarz points out, Mr. Pollack could not figure out why the Iranians, after the Iran-Iraq war, wanted to defend themselves against the US by purchasing "mostly weaponry intended for naval warfare." This made Mr. Pollack realize that "Iran was a very different country from most others and that it was a country obsessed with the United States of America."

Well, perhaps the obsession had to do with the fact that the US had overthrown Iran's secular, democratic government in the 50's. Maybe it was because the US had played both sides of the Iran-Iraq war against each other. Maybe it was because, as Barry Lando, author of 'Web of Deceit,' points out, during the Iran-Iraq war "heavily armed U.S. Special Operations helicopters...were ordered to the Persian Gulf. Their mission was to destroy any Iranian gunboats they could find." Maybe it was because, as Lieutenant Colonel Roger Charles, who was serving in the office of the secretary of defense at the time points out, plans were in place "for a secret war, with the U.S. on the side of Iraq against Iran..." Mr. Lando's 'Web of Deceit,' a book about neighboring Iraq, does a better job of explaining Iran than does Mr. Pollack's book.

A little research by Mr. Pollack may have brought up these facts. But then, they would not fit with his preconceived notions. Stay away from this book and anything Mr. Pollack puts on paper. He's pushing a specific ideology and will not let facts get in his way.

Kenneth Pollack is a member of the US state's National Security Council and a long-time CIA member. In his previous book, published in October 2002, he called for the invasion of Iraq. He now admits that the attack was "based on a case for war that turned out to be considerably weaker than was believed at the time." Iraq "was (mistakenly) believed to be close to acquiring nuclear weapons."

In this fascinating book, he explores Iran's relations with first Britain and then the USA. He exposes British imperialism's profiteering in Iran: in 1950, Iran got only £57 million of the £275 million oil profits. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company paid its workers 50 cents a day, refused to observe Iran's labour laws, bribed officials and illegally interfered in Iran's elections.

In 1950, the Attlee government planned to invade Iran with 70,000 troops, the CIA and MI6 covertly operated against the elected Mossadeq government, and together the CIA and MI6 organised the 1953 coup. After the coup, US oil firms moved into Iran, making AIOC worse off than if it had agreed to Iran's 1950 offer of a 50/50 split.

Pollack writes, "After the coup ... Iranians increasingly believed that the United States was a malevolent power that had replaced the British as the insidious force controlling Iran's destiny and preventing it from achieving its rightful stature and prosperity. As usual, that myth is not right, but it is also not entirely wrong either. There is a kernel of truth in it, and therein lies the rub: the United States did help to overthrow Mossadeq, and it was culpable in the establishment of the despotism of Mohammed Reza Shah that succeeded him." So why call it a myth?

Similarly, the CIA did organise SAVAK, the Shah's secret police, and the USA did give the Shah vast amounts of military aid. Pollack writes, "the Eisenhower administration tried hard to keep Iran at arm's length" yet in the next sentence notes how the CIA developed `a liaison relationship with SAVAK." He notes the US state's `assistance to SAVAK, and other pernicious policies', yet eight lines later writes that there is `no evidence that the United States directly aided SAVAK ... or even provided general advice and assistance'. He admits that the US state never did anything to stop SAVAK's mass systematic torture. He sums up, "Washington probably had too cozy a relationship with SAVAK and may have purposely ignored the stories of its terror and its tortures, but at most, the United States was an accomplice, not the inspiration." Probably? May have? And 26 years of state terrorism and tortures are just `stories'? And isn't an accomplice guilty of the crime?

In September 1978, the day after the Shah's army, US-armed and US-trained, killed hundreds of people, President Carter called the Shah to express his support. This was part of "a coordinated campaign by the administration to demonstrate its support to the shah and convince him to deal more decisively with the crisis." On 28 December 1978, the US urged the Shah to appoint a `firm military government'.

In January 1979, the US state tried "to convince the Iranian military to take over the country and snuff out the revolution, and to assist them in doing so." This, Pollack writes, was `more fodder to feed the conspiracy theories'. Not evidence, just `fodder'. And he admits, "this central element of their paranoid fantasies ultimately turned out to be very real", so not paranoid fantasies at all then.

In the Iraqi war of aggression against Iran, the US state backed everything that Saddam Hussein did, even his chemical warfare. Pollack writes, "it was not so much a conscious decision to condone Iraq's use of chemical weapons against Iran, although some officials did do precisely that, as much as it was a general lack of interest in whatever horrible things were befalling the Iranians." Again, Pollack finds excuses for US state crimes, for who had sold Saddam Hussein the chemical weapons? Did the USA sell the weapons unconsciously?

The US state frames its enemies as coercive, irrational, and aggressive and assumes that the USA is always peaceful, rational and defensive. So Pollack can write, "One can tick off America's problems with Iran on one hand: support for terrorism, pursuit of nuclear weapons, opposition to the Middle East peace process, undermining of regional stability, and a poor human rights record." So blind is his faith in US rectitude that he cannot see that the USA has done all the things of which he accuses Iran.

Pollack reminds us of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's 2000 speech admitting, but not regretting, that the US state had backed the 1953 coup, the Shah's repression and Iraq's attack on Iran. She accused Iran - "control over the military, judiciary, courts and police remains in unelected hands." Aren't the US Defense Secretary and Attorney-General unelected political appointees? The US state and its servants judge other countries' practices, not against US practice, but against US ideals.

Thankfully, Pollack has learnt enough from the Iraq disaster to oppose the idea of invading Iran - "an invasion of Iran has nothing to recommend it." He points out that Iran has not attacked the USA directly or indirectly since 1996. Iran's population is three times Iraq's, its geographical area four times Iraq's, making invasion militarily unfeasible. He also opposes the idea of attacking Iran's nuclear facilities, saying that even if Iran had nuclear weapons (which it hasn't - see the USA's latest National Intelligence Estimate), the best policy would be containment. And an invasion would have no international support, apart from the usual dependencies.

You know, I am not a Colombia university intelelctual, but I find it odd that our future leaders getting educated in colombia university were more concerned wether or not Iranian homo's are free to give and receive BJ, rather than worrying about our soldiers in iraq and the fact that, this year alone, 35000 civilians have died in Iraq and the fact that we invaded Iraq utlizing WMD deception. I wonder if Colombia students have evolved so much as to have their brain hard wired to their dick? Can anyone write a book on this evolutionary puzzle?

This is an excellent introduction to both the history of US-Iranian relations and the current conflict between the two countries. It is not a history of Iran, or a book about Iran per se. I say that, for while the 428-page text packs loads of information, it is selected to emphasize facts relevant to US-Iranian relations and ignore other issues, so one looking for a history of Iran should look elsewhere.

The book is premised on the belief that Americans know too little about Iran and Iranians know to much about what they think is the truth about America. That is, in a wonderful phrase, Pollack says that Americans are "serial amnesiacs" who are blissfully ignorant of the outside world until a country like Iran does something bad, then we "learn" that a country out there is angry at us, and then we forget again when the crisis passes. Yet while Americans care nothing for Iran, Iranians are obsessed with the U.S. and are constantly replaying for themselves a version of history which is a mix of fact and fiction, and this makes it hard for them to deal with the present.

The book does contain a lot of relevant historical background. In fact, the first 12 chapters trace relations between Iran and first Britain and then the U.S. up through the Bush administration in 2004 (the book was published at the beginning of 2005 and the information cut-off appears to be early 2004). Only the last chapter analyzes the current situation and the options available to the U.S. The value of this book is indeed the background. I take five broad points away from Pollack's analysis.

First, the first five chapters running up through the Islamic revolution in 1979 are invaluable to understanding why Iranians, including many of the majority who do not support the current regime, are distrustful of the U.S. Britain exploited Iran ruthlessly during the colonial period, and the 1953 coup happened mainly because Britain wouldn't accept a 50/50 division of profits on oil royalties. Although the U.S. pressured Britain to compromise, we did engineer the coup of Mossadeq, and this fact gave rise to the myth that the U.S. controlled the Iranian government from then on out. This bred an obsession with foreign influence which is ably exploited by the current regime in Tehran.

Second, the behavior of revolutionary (post-1979) Iran can be modified by deterrence in tactical matters but not strategic ones. Reagan's failure to strike back at Iran for the various hostage takings and killings of Americans during the 1980s emboldened them, while a rout of the Iranian navy and the 1991 defeat of Iraq restored that deterrent posture partially. Iran was also worried in the late 1990s that European public opinion would cause Europe to launch U.S.-style economic sanctions, and combined with the threat of massive retaliation to the Khobar Towers attack (the Saudis wanted the U.S. to bomb Iran back to the Stone Age after that 1996 attack), this caused Iran to moderate its terror sponsorship in terms of murdering dissidents inside Europe and attempts to overthrow the Arab Gulf states. Yet at no time has the Iranian regime halted its support for global terrorism or its nuclear weapons program.

Third, during the 1990s there were two "engagement" policies with Iran, one U.S. and one European, and they both failed. The EU policy was called "critical engagement," and it mean lecturing Iran over human rights and terrorism but never seriously threatening economic sanctions, much less military action. The U.S. approach, begun after the 1997 election of Muhammad Khatami, was to make selected concessions to Iran in hopes of strengthening any attempt by Khatami to change Iranian policy. Yet when the people rose against the regime in 1999, Khatami sided with the regime, and a final attempt at engaging Iran by the Clinton administration was simply laughed at in Tehran. Pollack says that Clinton's engagement policy was worth trying, even though it never really had a chance of success given what happened inside Iran.

Fourth, Iranian conduct toward to West is often driven more by internal Iranian dynamics than anything the West could do or has done. Pollack shows that the 1979 hostage crisis at the U.S. embassy was dragged out by Khomeini as a tool for internal control, and the 1989 fatwa against Salman Rushdie was likewise a Khomeini ploy to strengthen his attempt to freeze Iranian policy in an anti-Western stance after he died.

Fifth, the Iranian regime's bad behavior continued right up to 9/11 and afterward, with that momentous event marking no substantive change vis-à-vis terrorism or nuclear development (they did tone down the rhetoric immediately after the attacks, and work with the U.S. on Afghanistan, but I think this was only because the Shia are a minority in Afghanistan, and they don't want chaos there). Prior to the "Axis of Evil" statement in the 2002 SOTU, Pollack notes events including (1) the Karine A incident (supplying weapons to Palestinian terrorists), (2) safe haven given to al-Qaeda fleeing from Afghanistan and (3) reports of uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons development. This is not to say that it is a good idea for American presidents to call other governments evil, and Pollack certainly does not endorse this approach, but aside from some helpful conduct in Afghanistan, one may reject the notion that the "Axis" statement (or any action by any U.S. president) caused Iran's bad behavior.

Further facts coming to light after this book apparently went to press are worth noting. One, indications came to light that Iran helped the 9/11 hijackers travel from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan so as to make it appear that they went to Lebanon rather than to visit al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Two, it became clear a couple years ago that Iran was fueling Shia radicalism in Iraq through the militias. I believe this was the case from 2003 as part of a grand strategy to radicalize the Iraqi Shia, but this wasn't clear in 2004.

Overall, I give this book a strong recommend.

This is an excellent introduction to both the history of US-Iranian relations and the current conflict between the two countries. It is not a history of Iran, or a book about Iran per se. I say that, for while the 428-page text packs loads of information, it is selected to emphasize facts relevant to US-Iranian relations and ignore other issues, so one looking for a history of Iran should look elsewhere.

The book is premised on the belief that Americans know too little about Iran and Iranians know to much about what they think is the truth about America. That is, in a wonderful phrase, Pollack says that Americans are "serial amnesiacs" who are blissfully ignorant of the outside world until a country like Iran does something bad, then we "learn" that a country out there is angry at us, and then we forget again when the crisis passes. Yet while Americans care nothing for Iran, Iranians are obsessed with the U.S. and are constantly replaying for themselves a version of history which is a mix of fact and fiction, and this makes it hard for them to deal with the present.

The book does contain a lot of relevant historical background. In fact, the first 12 chapters trace relations between Iran and first Britain and then the U.S. up through the Bush administration in 2004 (the book was published at the beginning of 2005 and the information cut-off appears to be early 2004). Only the last chapter analyzes the current situation and the options available to the U.S. The value of this book is indeed the background. I take five broad points away from Pollack's analysis.

First, the first five chapters running up through the Islamic revolution in 1979 are invaluable to understanding why Iranians, including many of the majority who do not support the current regime, are distrustful of the U.S. Britain exploited Iran ruthlessly during the colonial period, and the 1953 coup happened mainly because Britain wouldn't accept a 50/50 division of profits on oil royalties. Although the U.S. pressured Britain to compromise, we did engineer the coup of Mossadeq, and this fact gave rise to the myth that the U.S. controlled the Iranian government from then on out. This bred an obsession with foreign influence which is ably exploited by the current regime in Tehran.

Second, the behavior of revolutionary (post-1979) Iran can be modified by deterrence in tactical matters but not strategic ones. Reagan's failure to strike back at Iran for the various hostage takings and killings of Americans during the 1980s emboldened them, while a rout of the Iranian navy and the 1991 defeat of Iraq restored that deterrent posture partially. Iran was also worried in the late 1990s that European public opinion would cause Europe to launch U.S.-style economic sanctions, and combined with the threat of massive retaliation to the Khobar Towers attack (the Saudis wanted the U.S. to bomb Iran back to the Stone Age after that 1996 attack), this caused Iran to moderate its terror sponsorship in terms of murdering dissidents inside Europe and attempts to overthrow the Arab Gulf states. Yet at no time has the Iranian regime halted its support for global terrorism or its nuclear weapons program.

Third, during the 1990s there were two "engagement" policies with Iran, one U.S. and one European, and they both failed. The EU policy was called "critical engagement," and it mean lecturing Iran over human rights and terrorism but never seriously threatening economic sanctions, much less military action. The U.S. approach, begun after the 1997 election of Muhammad Khatami, was to make selected concessions to Iran in hopes of strengthening any attempt by Khatami to change Iranian policy. Yet when the people rose against the regime in 1999, Khatami sided with the regime, and a final attempt at engaging Iran by the Clinton administration was simply laughed at in Tehran. Pollack says that Clinton's engagement policy was worth trying, even though it never really had a chance of success given what happened inside Iran.

Fourth, Iranian conduct toward to West is often driven more by internal Iranian dynamics than anything the West could do or has done. Pollack shows that the 1979 hostage crisis at the U.S. embassy was dragged out by Khomeini as a tool for internal control, and the 1989 fatwa against Salman Rushdie was likewise a Khomeini ploy to strengthen his attempt to freeze Iranian policy in an anti-Western stance after he died.

Fifth, the Iranian regime's bad behavior continued right up to 9/11 and afterward, with that momentous event marking no substantive change vis-à-vis terrorism or nuclear development (they did tone down the rhetoric immediately after the attacks, and work with the U.S. on Afghanistan, but I think this was only because the Shia are a minority in Afghanistan, and they don't want chaos there). Prior to the "Axis of Evil" statement in the 2002 SOTU, Pollack notes events including (1) the Karine A incident (supplying weapons to Palestinian terrorists), (2) safe haven given to al-Qaeda fleeing from Afghanistan and (3) reports of uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons development. This is not to say that it is a good idea for American presidents to call other governments evil, and Pollack certainly does not endorse this approach, but aside from some helpful conduct in Afghanistan, one may reject the notion that the "Axis" statement (or any action by any U.S. president) caused Iran's bad behavior.

Further facts coming to light after this book apparently went to press are worth noting. One, indications came to light that Iran helped the 9/11 hijackers travel from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan so as to make it appear that they went to Lebanon rather than to visit al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Two, it became clear a couple years ago that Iran was fueling Shia radicalism in Iraq through the militias. I believe this was the case from 2003 as part of a grand strategy to radicalize the Iraqi Shia, but this wasn't clear in 2004.

Overall, I give this book a strong recommend.