This is a great book that gives a view of WW II from the British point of view. Clarke explains the reasons for the breakup of the British Empire and that in order to win the war the breakup was inevitable.

Clarke has combed through the diaries of some of the men who "were there" when the British Empire, victorious over the Third Reich in WWII, nevertheless, lost its Empire--notably India but also Palestine. The reader should be familiar with the overall history and the players; (Clarke can be frustrating using multiple names, nicknames and official titles for the players--nearly like reading a Russian novel!) Interesting insight into Churchill, less so for Roosevelt and Truman, even less so for Stalin. The roles of "lesser lights" in forging the post-war world (the associate ministers and cabinet officers) are made, if not brighter, a bit clearer. A good read. Reading this book while Obama was making his "magical mystery tour" of Iraq and Europe brought home the danger his lack of experience--good intentions are not enough--the men who "were there" after WWII show us the absolute necessity of knowing what you are doing in international relations.

This work chronicles the relatively rapid dissolution of the British Empire as a consequence of already existing nationalistic pressures within its component parts and the drastic diminution of British power ironically brought about by World War II. Though a victor, Britain was dwarfed by the size of its debt and the might of its partners, the Soviet Union and the United States. Mr. Clarke delineates glimmers of decline by detailing internecine rivalries between British and American commanders, how they grow and impinge operations as Allied forces move beyond Normandy. The gradually overwhelming preponderance of American forces and equipment is resented and in cases resisted, but eventually has to be accepted: the might of the arithmetic cannot be ignored. The diminution of British power is nowhere more painfully shown than at the Yalta conference where it becomes obvious to everyone, perhaps more desperately so to Churchill himself, that the Big Three had become the Big Two, though not rudely so. (There is ample, at times ironic discussion of Churchill's positions on post-war European boundaries and the issue of which Polish government to recognize). America was clear and unanimous (Democratic and Republican) in its political judgement when it joined the war that it would save Britain but not its Empire.

Even at its height, during the Edwardian era, careful observers had noted that the British empire could not be sustained. The gradual evolution of concepts such as Dominion and Commonwealth attested to the futility of trying to exercise central control far removed from robust constituent nationalities or original settlements such as Canada, Australia and South Africa which had developed their own ways. Their loyal and quick supportive response to the challenge of WWII, though touted by Churchill as evidence of the inherent "goodness" of the British Empire, indeed manifested most enlightened self-interest, as no one doubted the debt incurred by Britain would pave the way to greater power and independence once the wartime emergency had passed. Indeed, with the fall of Singapore to the Japanese, an outpost of empire such as Australia could no longer look to Britain for support and defense, only to itself and to the United States.

Mr. Clarke's book is faithful to its title. It shows how and why it came about that the British Empire was dismantled in the aftermath of World War II. It does not discuss whether such dismantling would have come about anyway, indeed that it was contemplated even at the end of the nineteenth century. Rather, the emphasis is on the acceleration provided by the conclusion of the war, the indebtedness Britain had incurred, the new multinational world aspired to but the bipolar one which ensued. The higher up in the ranks the tale goes, the smoother it is told (e.g. the interactions between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin). The narrative gets a bit confusing and the details messy when it gets into military history such as the discussion of Operation Market Garden. In fairness to Clarke, it is difficult to discuss strategies and operational details while trying to illustrate rivalries, pettiness, egos, wounded pride, concurrently at play, as the British gradually realize that their relative power is diminishing and that the final defeat of Germany from the West is emerging as primarily an American show. After all the pain and privation, somehow it did not seem fair.

India and Pakistan are obviously covered, but those histories are better served in stand-alone texts than in survey, though what is here is apt. There is an interesting section on Palestine, the termination of the British Mandate, and the grave political and moral questions it posed for Britain in dealing with post-Nazi European Jewish emigration to a land where they were not welcomed and which was under their administrative control. There is discussion of Arab political ineptness, Zionist terrorism, Arab recalcitrance, occupying authority anti-semitism, the President Warfield SS ("Exodus") incident, etc., cumulatively leading to partition, war, the emergence of modern Israel and the growing problems America, as a power with interests in all sides of the conflict, still faces in the Middle East.

The final sections of the book deal with the economic consequences of the war (pace Keynes), and to America's role in rescuing post-war Britain, much to the chagrin of some. There's an Epilogue that aims at analysing what is referred to as the "special relationship" between Britain and America, more than just a literary conceit but, now that the power scales are so tilted, certainly not always a mutuality of interests. One cannot help but recall Hans Morgenthau's realistic dictum that countries have no friends, only interests.

Mr. Clarke's preference for detail over analysis, working by inference, so to speak, is helpful but at times proves distracting from the general thrust of argument. Churchill appears central to the narrative, as indeed he was, even when dismissed from office. The portrait that emerges is less iconographic than usual, but more human. In some ways closer to what one gets from Lord Moran's memoirs without the medical detail.

This is a valuable guide to how British imperial power came apart. It passed to no inheritor, though American interests are significantly present in most of those areas of the mapa mundi which used to be colored red. Strongly recommended.

This book is a splendid achievement. In it, Peter Clarke, former Master of Trinity Hall, Cambridge, examines the last thousand days of the British Empire (1944-1947) in its personal as well as in its economic dimensions. Demonstrating a comprehensive grasp of the facts and macaulayan narrative skill, Clarke shows us with what astonishing rapidity the Empire was given up, once the elites had grasped the hopelessness of the situation. Though he describes the birth of Israel and an independent India, his focus is on the troubled relations between Britain and the US in this period of world-historical transition. The timing of this book's publication was apt (2007 in the UK edition), roughly coinciding with Britain's final payment on its war debt to the US (December 2006).

Clarke sketches Churchill and FDR with light, economical strokes, bringing them to life in a way that no historian has done heretofore and showing them for the first time as, to use his phrase, "fully plausible human beings." He displays a quite remarkable capacity for stepping into the shoes his actors, major and minor, and seeing the world through their eyes. His prose is a delight--precise diction and wonderfully varied rhythms. Flashes of wit catch the reader unawares and the author's gift for phrase-making relieves a long journey (about 526 pages). It cannot be said of Clarke that his "tired tropes succumbed to repetitive strain injuries through over-exercised metaphors," though his metaphors do get a vigorous workout.

Clarke does not press the point, but his story resonates powerfully with current events. In the end, though, his message is not entirely clear. His strictures against those who, like Ghandi, were willing to indulge romantic notions if it cost a million lives, are strangely suspended whenever Churchill comes into view. Can myth-making be excused when things happen to turn out well?