The book answers a lot of questions about the long history of the eastern part of the former Romer empire, and its enormous importance in the defence or european culture and civilization.
A book highly recommendable for anybody interested in history

A great book on strategy that is tempered with the practicality of living in a dangerous and volatile world, as seen through the grand prism of the Byzantine (Eastern Roman) Empire. The lessons to be learned from the Byzantines are as relevant today as they were back then. The book is filled with colorful information about Byzantine culture. And in an engaging way, uses recent history (e.g. WWII events) to illustrate what can be learned from the Byzantine Empire.

What can America learn about strategy from a vanished empire whose very name means "devious?" Almost everything, according to //The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire//, by Edward Luttwak. A leading strategic theorist and intellectual provocateur, Luttwak's previous writings include the much praised "Strategy: the Logic of War and Peace" and "Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook." Here he brings his keen research and analytical skills to explaining how Byzantium, surrounded by hostile powers that possessed superior natural resources, managed to not only survive but flourish, outlasting the Western Roman Empire by almost 1,000 years.

Yet this work is not an academic exercise - throughout Luttwak offers an implicit roadmap for U.S. decision makers, a plea that they shed their narrow dogmatisms with its search for "the end of history," and replace it with Byzantium's subtle practicality. "The Byzantines knew better. They knew that peace was a temporary interruption of war, that as soon as one enemy was defeated, another would take its place...Even the destruction of the enemy was not a definitive gain, because in the unending war, yesterday's enemy could become the best ally." And as everywhere, their success abroad rested on sound finances at home, Byzantium's advanced tax collecting methods, unmatched at the time, providing the Empire a deep purse.

Practical rules abound. Avoid war at all costs (since war is expensive and even victory's results are unpredictable). Maintain a military as if war could come at any time (which is the most efficient deterrence). Use force prudently. If enemy strategies or techniques prove superior, adopt them, without hesitation. Invest in gathering intelligence. Embrace diplomacy. Eschew occupations and over-commitment in favor of flexibility and mobility.

For Luttwak, realism and judiciousness are the hallmarks of a successful sustainable national program. Nor is this an abstract book. Leader by leader, conflict by conflict the author distills valuable lessons as well as offering an excellent overview of the empire's strengths and weaknesses, their successes and failures, often drawing useful analogies to more recent history. Even details that many think would be dry - the importance of composite bow technology and the over-emphasis on the stirrup by historians - are presented in a way that is not only digestible, but entertaining. His command of detail, from small unit tactics, to the impact of epidemics on Byzantium, to immigration patterns of the tribes of the Asian steppes, would make this amateur historian the envy of most professionals.

Perhaps most interesting, Luttwak shows how the empire was several times driven to the brink, only to reemerge more vibrant than before. In a period marred by pessimism, this work offers hope, and that should be reason enough for anyone with a serious interest in international affairs to reflect on //The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire// and recognize how much they have to teach us.

Reviewed by Jordan Magill

This book has many problems. I'll start with where many books on Byzantium begin: the preface. A large number of books on Byzantium have a preface that describes the transliteration style that the author has chosen. This book does not have that, and that is not a problem, but what is a problem is Luttwak's completely inconsistant methods of transliteration. Terms transliterated in different ways show up on opposite pages, for example. Sometimes multiple transliterations are given when a name or term is first introduced, but that is not a hard and fast rule and it changes at random throughout the book. It also has numerous grammatical errors - mostly missing words and whatnot, but a thorough edit could easily have taken care of this issue. He also uses a lot of modern military vocabulary, which goes somewhat beyond the Byzantine context and simply serves to make the book seem stilted at times.

As for the content, Luttwak is mostly well-read and well-informed and is up to-date with modern Byzantine scholarship, and as such, I expected a lot more from his work. There are a couple of minor details, such as the fall of Syria to the Arabs and the dating of the sea walls of Constantinople where he has simply been forced to go along with one scholar over another, as no consensus exists. My main problem is with his historical method and organization. For a book on grand strategy, I would have hoped that he would have come up with one for the organization of his book, but Luttwak does not. It starts with the Huns and ends with Herakleios in Persia, and is organized more as a series of minor, poorly-directed essays combined into a book. The issue here is that Luttwak does not provide any sort of analysis to his work. Most of the page space is spent telling the historical story behind his point or performing some half-baked source criticism. There is no new information in this book whatsoever, and it suffers for it. Most of it is made up of rote recitation of the sources or modern scholarly opinion. He also misses an awful lot of events that certainly exemplify Byzantine strategy - for example, the crusades are almost ignored, as is the Empire post-1204. The maps are also very poor, and one can see that they were edited with a pencil, and where the editor erased earlier marks.

This leaves me wondering who exactly is the target audience for this book? Scholars are going to find almost nothing of value here - John Haldon's 'Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World' is a much more informative and academic text. This book is also not a great general military history of Byzantium with a focus on strategy, as it almost completely ignores some topics, like the theme system. And yet it seems to be written for those who have little or no experience with the Byzantine military. A good 100 pages of the book are just spent reciting what the military manuals have said. Now admittedly parts of this are useful - for example there is no complete English edition of Nikephoros Ouranos' massive work, and good luck finding Kekaumenos' text, but four of the major ones discussed in the text are easily available in editions translated by George T. Dennis, and a fifth, the 'Taktika' of Leo VI, is due out Summer 2010.

So far, it sounds like I am writing a review for a one-star book, but I have given it three. This is because, for all of the flaws of historical method, organization, no clearly-defined audience and the apparent lack of a good edit, Luttwak's conclusions are valid. While at times he takes them outside of their context and frequently refers to them in modern military parlance, his assessment of Byzantine strategy is correct, even if this book does not reveal any new information.

In sum, this is a decent and easy read, but adds little or nothing to Byzantine scholarship. Most of the points that Luttwak discusses were briefly made in Harris' 'Byzantium and the Crusades' in regard to Byzantine strategic thought.

I have previously reviewed Mr. Luttwak's "The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire" (which I gave 5 stars) and I can say with all veracity that Mr. Luttwak has truly surpassed his previous book. "The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire" is truly a wonderful book. I personally found chapters eight (Bulghars and Bulgarians, 26 pages) and nine (The Muslim Arabs and Turks, 38 pages) to be especially fascinating. In short, both chapters cover the major events of the players involved. While I realize that one could write entire novels about the interactions of the three states, Mr. Luttwak gives the reader a very good overview of the major events in a modicum amount of pages. For example, in chapter 8, Mr. Luttwak starts with why a Bulgarian state was so dangerous to the Empire, then moves on to the first interactions between the two, and then moves on to the war of 811 (the Empire's failed attempt to extirpate Bulgaria). Finally, it concludes with Emperor Basil's II successful war that destroyed Bulgaria and ensured that "...Byzantine rule was restored from the Adriatic Sea to the Danube for the first time in three centuries" pg 195.

Another point that I believe is interesting is Mr. Luttwak's re-examination of Emperor Justinian I. In spite of all the Justinian bashing that is commonplace in this era; Mr. Luttwak puts forth good arguments that Justinian's ambitions were not acts of megalomania, but rather reasonable goals. Mr. Luttwak believes that it was the unforeseen "Plague of Justinian (also known as the plague of 541-542)" that wrecked Justinian's plans. Indeed, Mr. Luttwak states "...the new biological evidence...compel a reassessment of Justinian and his policies. He could have been just as successful in his military ambitions as he was in his jurisprudential and architectural endeavors. It was Yersinia pestis that wrecked the empire..." pg 92. In my humble opinion, despite Mr. Luttwak's good arguments, I still believe that the fundamental problem of Justinian's expansion was that it proceeded with too much celerity. After conquest, a period of consolidation to ensure total Byzantine authority should have occurred before the next advance. Just my opinion.

One minor problem I have with the book is that very little is said the Fourth Crusade, which resulted in the loss of Constantinople on April 13, 1204. In fact, only a few scattered sentences and two connecting paragraphs (pgs. 232 and 234) are written about it. I believe Mr. Luttwak could have written about the flaws in Byzantine strategy before and during the Fourth Crusade. Then, Mr. Luttwak could have written what the Emperor's should have done to prevent the calamity. The first sack of the city in nearly nine hundred years could have been added in. But this is a minor complaint.

In conclusion, this is a magnificent book about the Byzantine Empire, which for far too long as been disregarded. I would highly recommend this book. I will end with what the front panel of the dust cover states, "It will appeal to scholars, soldiers, classicists, and readers of military history."

Edward Luttwak has devoted much of his career to the analysis of the concepts of strategy especially what is called `grand strategy'. In this book he has attempted to distill the basics of the grand strategy used by the Eastern Roman or Byzantine Empire to out last the Western Roman Empire by almost 1000 years. Since grand strategy is a modern concept, Luttwak had to analyze the history of the Byzantine Empire and infer the strategic designs that it followed from relevant historical evidence, including events, fragmentary comments, and official writings. All in all, he has done a pretty good job of it.
Constantinople (Istanbul) was at the center of Byzantine strategy since for much of its history it was the most prosperous and populous city in Western Christendom. Its unique location made it highly defendable and indeed until it was successfully captured in the Fourth Crusade (1204) it was the anchor of the Empire. The Byzantines used the magnificence and wealth of the city as well as the carefully staged extreme opulence and ritual of the imperial court to overawe enemies and allies alike. Operating from this nearly impregnable bastion, successive Emperors and their bureaucracies were able to employ a complex mixture of intelligence information, bribery, diplomatic maneuvering including duplicity, and military force to thwart all imperial enemies even in the face of much stronger military forces. Perhaps their greatest enemy was the high cost of their strategy for in spite of a very effective system of taxes Byzantium was very near to bankruptcy several times in its history.
Since the very survival of the Empire was at stake, the Byzantines studied and analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of their potential enemies in a very modern and effective manner. Their military forces evolved over the years, but until the last 200 years before the destruction of the empire, always included a strong navy and an army consisting of a core of well trained native troops supplemented by large contingents of mercenaries. After the Emperor Justinian (ce 6th Century) the empire was largely on the defensive. As Luttwak explains in considerable detail the Byzantines developed a strategy that enabled them to defend and maintain the empire against a variety enemies bent on its destruction. This is an interesting and well researched book

The author or an assistant should make sure the maps are accurate. The eastern border on Map 5 is inaccurate. A line from mid-way down the eastern border should be drawn northeast through Lake Van from there two-thirds the way to Lake Urmia and then double back to the border on the coast as shown. The imperial border did not extend that far east from Antioch: as shown it would have included the city of Aleppo, which was not part the Empire.

Map 7 for the year 668 does not show that the northern half of Tunisia and eastern coastal Algeira which still belonged to the Empire. Even though semi-autonomous, the region was still a part of the Roman Empire. The extreme southeastern border on the coast west of Antioch should be moved back about 40-50 miles to the Iron Gates, passes through the mountains from the plains of Cilcia (shown as ocuppied by Byzantium, but in fact unde Arab control). The passes provided a strong barrier to invasion, when fortified and garrisoned. The actual situation of the border in 668 is more accurately shown on Map 8, 780 AD.

In 780, Map 8, Sicily was still part of the Empire, but is not indicated as it should be. Invasion from Tunisia came in the year 827 and was fiercely resisted until the last stronghold, Taormina was taken in 904. On Map 9 parts of the Italian boot are shown to be under Byzantine control. All formerly-held imperial territory had been lost with the fall of Taranto in 1071.

Map 11 shows Trebizond as a part of the Empire. Not so. This area was ruled by a branch of the Komnenos family as an independent Empire until a few years after the fall of Constantinople in 1453.

This work offers almost nothing new concerning the Byzantine Empire over classical works on the Eastern Roman Empire, but what is new it that the author uses the Byzantine general strategy since Justinian (or Heraclius) to explain why the Byzantine empire laster more than the normal 250 year lifetime of an empire. Although author Luttwak avoids the traditional analysis that the Empire re-invented itself several times in its history and even used different populations to provide itself with the necessary strength for survival, the author suggests that the general Byzantine strategy is what the U.S. needs to adopt if we are to survive much longer. There is much merit in this analysis, but also grave flaws that need attention.

The Byzantines after Justinian found themselves unable to produce a martial population to defend their borders (that featured no natural defenses), and were forced into a foreign policy of alliances, negotiations, redirection of aggression, and outright bribery. Throughout all of this a competent if not numerically strong Byzantine military machine stood ready to die in defense of the empire, thus imparting a definite degree of risk to opponents who might decide on an aggressive strategy. The Byzantines featured a standing professional army to confront national armies of peoples, usually with martial skills limited to only certain modes of warfare, plus the possibility of allies supporting their cause from unexpected quarters. Sometimes these allies were paid by Byzantine gold, sometimes they supported the Byzantines as such action was in their interest for other reasons. The Byzantines could dazzle others with the splendor of Constantinople, clearly the foremost city in the world for a thousand years, and as the seat of the Orthodox Christian religion.

The massive debasement of Byzantine coinage did not begin until the reign of Michael IV, the Paphlagonian, in 1034. Once started, the empire never fully recovered economically. The Latins conquered Constantinople in 1204, and the Ottomans in 1453. The United States is facing a massive debasement in the form of devaluation of the dollar as we speak. The importance of a strong economy needs examination.

Contrasting the Byzantines with the U.S. is interesting but somewhat speculative. Our money has seen an 80% decline in purchasing power since the start of progressive and socialistic measures first introduced by President Roosevelt. We have avoided runaway inflation to the current time, but the 165 trillion dollars in funded and unfunded debt now looming over us indicates that a devaluation of our currenty is only a matter of time -- and a short time at that (probably a 10:1 or 5:1 devaluation.) American politicians are currently spending as much as possible to feather their own nests and turn their interests into real property before the collapse, something that never happened in the Byzantine Empire. The American people's attention has been re-directed into meaningless sports in the meanwhile, an action and trend stopped dead in its tracks by Justinian when he forbade chariot racing and other professional sports to focus on strengthening the military and his empire. In many respects, the Byzantines were better served by their emperors than the U.S. is by its politicians.

The Byzantines survived on trade rather that manufactures, and with the US reaching to point where little is manufactured by American companies in the U.S., the U.S. is also faced on surviving on trade. But what will the U.S. offer in trade? Its land can only go so far. Americans generally believe that innovation will produce the necessary trade items, but the Federal Government is currently moving heaven and earth to stifle private business, entrepreneurship and small business where much of the innovation has historically taken place. Few individuals in the current administration have any experience in for-profit business, and forgotten is the aspect that government produces no wealth. The Byzantines never forgot that axiom. And for security, their formation of the empire into "Themes" with local/provincial military forces (and what would today be called militias) proved eminently successful when backed up by the professional standing army. The U.S. has no such comparable structure. Whereas all Byzantines were expected to help provide for defense, thus making even successful attacks costly for invaders, the U.S. is moving towards gun confiscation and a repeal of the 2nd Amendment.

The argument is strong that Americans could learn from the Byzantines, but everything we are currently doing belies that experience and knowledge. As the U.S. loses strength, both in its professional military force and in citizen participation in defense, diplomacy becomes ever more problematic. The Byzantines proved that diplomacy was not a substitute for military force, simply the best approach rather than always resorting to the use of military force. Repeated use of military force bleeds an empire white and eventually brings about its downfall. Since few have heeded the lessons of the Byzantines, empires have normally lasted only as long as the primary cultural and ethnic stock that built the empire remains vigorous. That normally does not last beyond 250 years. In point of reference, the Revolutionary War was 235 years ago.

This is an excellent, scholarly book. Highly recommended to everyone interested in the survival of the U.S.

What can America learn about strategy from a vanished empire whose very name means "devious?" Almost everything, according to "The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire," by Edward Luttwak. A leading strategic theorist and intellectual provocateur, Luttwak's previous writings include the much praised "Strategy: the Logic of War and Peace" and "Coup d'état: A Practical Handbook." Here he brings his keen research and analytical skills to explaining how Byzantium, surrounded by hostile powers that possessed superior natural resources, managed to not only survive but flourish, outlasting the Western Roman Empire by almost 1,000 years.

Yet this work is not an academic exercise - throughout Luttwak offers an implicit roadmap for US decision makers, a plea that they shed their narrow dogmatisms with its search for "the end of history," and replace it with Byzantium's subtle practicality. "The Byzantines knew better. They knew that peace was a temporary interruption of war, that as soon as one enemy was defeated, another would take its place...Even the destruction of the enemy was not a definitive gain, because in the unending war, yesterday's enemy could become the best ally." And as everywhere, their success abroad rested on sound finances at home, Byzantium's advanced tax collecting methods, unmatched at the time, providing the Empire a deep purse.

Practical rules abound. Avoid war at all costs (since war is expensive and even victory's results are unpredictable). Maintain a military as if war could come at any time (which is the most efficient deterrence). Use force prudently. If enemy strategies or techniques prove superior, adopt them, without hesitation. Invest in gathering intelligence. Embrace diplomacy. Eschew occupations and over-commitment in favor of flexibility and mobility.

For Luttwak, realism and judiciousness are the hallmarks of a successful sustainable national program. Nor is this an abstract book. Leader by leader, conflict by conflict the author distills valuable lessons as well as offering an excellent overview of the empire's strengths and weaknesses, their successes and failures, often drawing useful analogies to more recent history. Even details that many think would be dry - the importance of composite bow technology and the over-emphasis on the stirrup by historians - are presented in a way that is not only digestible, but entertaining. His command of detail, from small unit tactics, to the impact of epidemics on Byzantium, to immigration patterns of the tribes of the Asian steppes, would make this amateur historian the envy of most professionals.

Perhaps most interesting, Luttwak shows how the empire was several times driven to the brink, only to reemerge more vibrant than before. In a period marred by pessimism, this work offers hope, and that should be reason enough for anyone with a serious interest in international affairs to reflect on "The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire" and recognize how much they have to teach us.

Clear well researched diplomatic history. Important view of the Eastern Roman Empire's transition to Byzantium.

Most history fans are only familiar with the smaller half of the Roman story. But the other half, the story of Byzantine, is possibly more interesting, more relevant, as well as bigger. And Luttwak provides an excellent onramp to this long ignored story via his earned expertise in grand strategy.

As an aside, if you're unsure whether or not reading a little about Byzantine is worth the time, just consider why Western historians relegated such an impressive state. That's a story in itself!

In a previous work called The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third (Johns Hopkins Paperbacks), Edward Luttwak described the strategies of a vast and powerful empire, from its apex to its eventual fall. In the present work, he outlines the strategies of the Byzantine Empire, a smaller and less wealthy cousin of the Romans. Small and weak as it was, it managed to survive, and sometimes thrive, for another 1,000 years.

Byzantine, as it is used as an adjective in everyday conversation, usually denotes someone or some entity that is scheming, devious, deceitful, and annoyingly complicated. This pretty much describes the national-security policy of the Byzantine Empire. They could not afford, nor did they have the manpower, to field an army to confront the enemy in classic force against force confrontation. Their enemies where many and they came from all sides. Even though this so-called empire had a small and well-trained army, they used force only as a last resort.

There is much here to learn for small countries such as Isreal, of which Luttwak is a vigourous supporter. There is also much to learn here for declining superpowers such as the United States, which finds itself today with less wealth, less power, and fewer friends.

Thanks in no small part to Edward Gibbon the military strategies of the Roman Empire have always been glorified and those of Byzantium have always been denigrated. They have been viewed as disreputable, decadent, and no doubt illegitimate. However, when dealing with a ruthless enemy and one's survival, the scope of what is legitimate is suddenly enlarged. The tactics of deceit, bribery, subversion, and divide-and-conquer can be very effective. The war in Iraq turned when these tactics where used with the Sunni insurgency. This will also be true in Afghanistan when these tactics are successfully applied. The Taliban can only be conquered by dividing it against itself.

Although Luttwak is not in the Obama camp - in fact he has few kind words for Obama - it can be said that Obama is practicing what Luttwak preaches. In a rapidly nuclearizing world, what else can an impoverished superpower do but use diplomacy, subversion, and minimal direct force. The days of multi-billion dollar invasions are over. We have reached the Byzantine phase of empire, but will this grand strategy serve use for the next 1,000 years?