Essential reading for any safety investigator. An eye-opening way to transform your investigations by moving from the old-view to the new-view. I've used this book as a 'course book' for a seminar of 25 safety professionals to great effect. Plus there is a good guide to the role of a safety department too.

We all are extremely good to forecast the past. When this simple principle is applied to human error, it is very easy blaming the human operator.

Dekker tries to put himself in the shoes of that human operator showing why an analysis that does not try to understand an event from that position is useless.

There is a very hard criticism to different kind of positions taken by people that do not make that effort.

If we try to make something as a "winzip on a summary" of the book, I think we could reach these conclusions:

When we have to analyze an event, it should be useful starting with this hipothesis: "People are not usually dumb, people are not usually crazy and people have not usually chosen the day of a big accident to make self-killing." This starting point could be enough to avoid many of the practices fairly critiziced by Dekker.