This book is David Halberstam doing what he did best which is reviewing the war as a political-military history, providing insights into the personalities of the leading characters and standing up for the guys who fought the war at the sharp end.

This is not a detailed campaign history of the Korean War, if that is what you are looking for then look to other works. Halberstam takes a few key battles to elucidate the main phases of the war: the North Korean attack and subsequent rout of the South Korean and U.S. forces back to Pusan; the stand of the U.N. forces in the Pusan perimeter; Inchon and the breakout and pursuit of the North Koreans to the Yalu river; and the entry of the Chinese and the subsequent stalemate.

His portraits of the leading players are colorful and he is not afraid to take a strong position on the various merits and flaws of each of these. As others of pointed out a great deal of the book concerns MacArthur, MacArthur's feud with Truman and MacArthur's key role in the disaster that befell the U.N. force after the Chinese intervention. Halberstam is not a fan of Douglas MacArthur, essentially portraying him as a deeply flawed individual.

The military history of the book is shown primarily through the recollections of the men who found in some of the nastiest battles of the "police action" including the Naktong river, Chosin, the Twin Tunnels, Chipyongni and Unsan. Halberstam clearly brings home the desperation of the fighting and the cynicism of the men, who often felt betrayed by the incompetence of their military leadership and forgotten by the American people. Sadly the average fighting man in Korea was, particularly in the early stages of the war prior to Ridgeway's arrival, poorly served by the senior officers and Halberstam is unflinching in his portrayal of their incompetance.

Overall an excellent review of the "forgotten war". Those who fought there deserve to be remembered for what they did and this book certainly reminds us of what the ordinary soldier went through in Korea. The book is easy to read and is accessible to anyone with an interest in 20th century history, not just the hard core miltary history enthusiasts. There are one or two minor flaws mainly around the maps which are sometimes in conflict with the text, but these are minor issues. Well worth reading.

Having just finished reading 28 books on the Korean War I looked forward to this book. It was a major disappointment. I found nothing new in it. I also found very little information about the korean War period in the book. It seems that few sources were actually used. His major sourse seems to have been Colonel Paul Freeman. Freeman had a very mixed history in Korea. Faced with the possible loss of his regiment while the rear guard commander of the 2nd Infantry Division he found an alternative route to move his troops. He saved his troops but left three other army battalions that his troops were supposed to be protecting to be destroyed by the Chinese. To some he was a hero, to others a man who left other troops in the lurch. He seems to have used no sourses from the Marine Corps and few period.
For someone who covered the Vietnam war he seems unable to understand many of the military moves. He also doesn't seem to understand just how bad the US Army was during the early part of the Korean War. He makes statements that the 1st Cavalry Division and the 2nd Infantry Division were elite units when they had been badly beaten by the North Koreans and were only a shadow of the proud World War II diviisons of the same name.
The book is really about General MacArthur and the Right Wing Republicans. Halberstam does a good job telling about this but fails to mention the problems caused by the left wing and their failure to understand the danger of the communist. He also fails to even mention the British spy ring that gave near real time intellengence about all major American decisions during the Korean War. Halberstam also seems to come to some simplistic conclusions about Communist China and the USA. He actually seems to believe that the US-Chinese relationship could have been very different very quickly if MacArthur hadn't pushed the UN troops into North Korea. Sometimes it just takes time for things to work themselves out. This is another example of wishful thinking as if Mao Tse-tung hadn't been a hard core Communist for nearly 25 years. The same Mao who would play games for two years during the Korean peace discussions while hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers were being killed and would later murder between 50-75 million of his own people to further his own cult of personality.
The following is a list of books that should be read about the Korean War. This kind of War by T.R. Fehrenbach; South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu; Escaping the Trap; and East of Chosin by Roy E Appleman; Chosin by Eric Hammel; and Conflict by Robert Leckie.

A thoroughly readable, incredibly detailed history of MacArthur's North Korean initiatives. Give yourself a while to digest this book, it will be well worth it. It's tragic this is Halberstam's last work--but it's a joy to know he left us with his best.

I did not know that much about the Korean war until I read this book. I do know this book coers it ALL! I especially enjoyed the battle scenes because he gave the reader both sides of the battle. I can see why it took ten years to write. I felt like I lost a good friend when David passed on. Great job, Mr. Haberstam. Rest in peace.

--Gerard Zemek, husband of author of "My Funny Dad, Harry"

It took me a long time to finish reading The Coldest Winter. I would read for a while and then leave it behind as I picked up another book only to find myself returning to another section of what is a really great book. The beauty of Halberstams book is that it has eleven parts which read as self contained essays. Frustrating some readers will be the lack of an overall narrative. I, for one, enjoyed how the book lacked narrative and each section stood alone, each building on the other like a string of short stories. The book reads neither as a political history or a military history but instead appears more personal. Personal to Halberstam as you can almost witness his surprise when his research discovers something he had just learned. And the book is personal to the stories of the front line troops that fought, bleed, and died in Americas forgotten war, Korea. Halberstam does a wonderful job of viewing the conflict from all sides. You find your with Mao and learn his motives, see Stalins influence and most important focus on General MacArthur, his ego, errors and politics. No book can replace the great AMERICAN CAESAR BY WILLIAM MANCHESTER as a biography. But Halberstam is not wanting too write a biography. Instead he follows MacArthurs decisions and views the results as implemented on the ground by a wide variety of United Nation troops. When you have completed the book you have a grand overview and a better perspective of where the Korean War fit in to the geo-politics of the day and was a steppingstone for the Republican Partys right wing who still today try and leverage the simplistic military solution to national security for political advantage. The heart breaking thing is the number of dead and the many on both sides lost due to poor leadership and missed calculations and missed opportunities. A large part of the end of the book is spent covering several important battles. However, the last two years of the war are covered quickly with only a short section on Pork Chop Hill. Mainly because all these battles were a war of attrition and a meat grinder approach. None, in the end, changed anything about the outcome. No doubt that when Halberstam met and interviewed Paul McGee the pulse and heart of the book was discovered. In the end my very favorable opinion and recommendation for this book is based on the fact that Halberstam is a gifted story teller on these pages. He brings you down to the personal no matter if its Mao, Truman, MacAurther or Paul McGee holding the perimeter against thousands of Red Chinese attacking his platoons position. Read it and you will be shaken.

While politicians and generals dither, squabble and preen soldiers die in bitter cold. An examination of a distant time that resonates in todays news.

David Halberstam's untimely death in 2007 puts a deeper weight on this, his last book published later that year, than it really should have to bear. "The Coldest Winter" is uneven work, both riveting and rambling.

Emboldened by a desire to emulate his hero Stalin and aggressively enlarge his communist state, North Korean strongman Kim Il Sung in June 1950 sent his army across the 38th Parallel, a somewhat arbitrary dividing line that separated North Korea from South Korea, backed by the United States. Soon the two Koreas were almost completely united under Kim's firm hand. But then the United States struck back, and the first shooting phase of the Cold War, perhaps its bloodiest in terms of sheer concentration of time, was underway.

"A shrimp is crushed in the battle of the whales," said South Korea's president, Syngman Rhee, quoting a Korean proverb. Rhee was a big part of the problem in Korea, though, as were a number of other leaders on both sides of the 38th Parallel.

Halberstam's book is more about those failures of leadership than the war itself. Most especially, it is an indictment of U.S. commander Douglas MacArthur, a revered figure of his time who Halberstam portrays as stubborn, egomaniacal, and self-distancing.

I think Halberstam makes his points very well, better than Halberstam himself apparently believed, as he keeps making them again and again, beating them into the ground like tent poles. It's not enough to say MacArthur didn't spend one night in Korea during the war; it must be repeated twice.

If he isn't rounding on MacArthur, Halberstam is holding up for ridicule some other figure of less renown, like Ned Almond, a corps commander and MacArthur's bulldog lackey who dismissed the possibility the Chinese might enter the war well after his troops were already fighting them.

That Halberstam's book is readable is without doubt. The first 40 pages, detailing the surprise Chinese assault on U.S. positions, offers the kind of first-person reportage that Halberstam did like no one else. It's a bit disappointing, if necessary, to have to pull away from that to a grander overview of the root causes behind the war. Yet Halberstam gets lost in the brambles with too much backstory.

One might expect to get to Inchon, MacArthur's tide-turning invasion against the North, by page 200 in a 650-page book. Instead, one reads there about the 1948 presidential run of Tom Dewey. He actually only devotes a couple of paragraphs to Inchon itself, and only a few pages to the dramatic rollback of North Korea which followed, there mostly to slam MacArthur for pushing on north past the 38th Parallel.

The book concludes with MacArthur's dismissal in April, 1951, two more years of Korean conflict left to run. Halberstam assures us we aren't missing much: "In the end, there would be no great victory for anyone, only some kind of mutually unsatisfactory compromise."

Yet this book seems an unsatisfactory compromise, too. Halberstam may skirt a lot of the more successful battles for the U.S. side, but what he does present in the way of soldiers' stories brings this war to one in a way no writer of his stature had done before. The gritty battles around the Twin Tunnels, for example, of beating off decimating human wave attacks by digging deep and standing firm, forced from me a reckoning of this war's uniqueness and sacrifice both painful and exhilarating.

Halberstam's feeling and ability to communicate that human element is "Coldest Winter's" greatest asset, something you have ample opportunity to notice when he's off on another geopolitical tangent.

This is a rather complete history of the times and battles. Well written, if a bit turgid relating need historical context, and the author has definite opinions of the major characters: watch for that.

I'm a big fan of David Halberstam, having read The Reckoning, and The Fifties before. This book is among his best, and I learned so much about the Korean War, the Chinese, and U.S. politics and the military of the 1950s. I listened to much of it on CD while commuting, and read the rest of at home in between trips.

The fact that Halberstam died last year makes it even more of a poignant "read." He compelling wrote all his books in ways that make you feel like you are right there in those times and places. I will miss him greatly.

Aneil

This book is an amazingly thorough analysis of a war which we do often have the chance to read about. Some wars, like the American Civil War, have been the subject of thousands of books; others are not nearly so well studied. The Korean War is in the latter category, but, after reading Halberstam's extraordinarily thoughtful, well-researched treatment of this subject, I, for one, feel at last that I have a far better understanding of what went on over there, starting in the year of my birth.

I have read a lot of reviews of this book and recall that Halberstam spent perhaps a decade writing it and regarded it as among his best works. Having read many of his books, I believe this one to be the finest book of his that I have read and it is truly sad that he is not around to see, hear and enjoy the well-earned praises of so many.

Each of the major personalities involved in this war is described, biographed, and analyzed thoroughly. The reader can understand far more about their disputes and conflicts in the context of their times when they arise in this superb biography of this war, if a war can have a biography like the life of a human being. The Korean War as described in this book has so many, often eerie, parallels with the later Vietnam and Iraq wars. MacArthur and Truman are well drawn and the basis for their inevitable, looming conflict is well explained with no attempts to candy-coat the failings of the legendary general.

The detail of the battles and the troop movements, plans and mistakes can only be the result of years of painstaking research and interviews with so many who survived and their often tragic stories about so many who did not. For military strategy buffs, this book should not disappoint.

All in all, this is one of the best books I have ever read to explain where we find ourselves today in the still early days of the 21st century. After reading it, and I have read a LOT of 20th Century history by any measure, I have a much better appreciation for the follies of ego, the condemnation of those ignorant of history to repeat it, and the clashes of titans and their ideologies which the Cold War produced and which go on in other forms long after the Cold War has been consigned to the history books.

I have some 350 books on my Kindle now and have my reading planned out for a long time to come (so you will be hard pressed to find a bigger Kindle-booster), but, the format on Kindle for the maps and charts in this book leaves something to be desired and I hope that succeeding generations of Kindles will cure this fuzzed out presentation of graphics which sometimes snags us early adopters. I actually also own the hard copy of this book, which pre-dates my Kindle ownership, and a comparison of the maps and charts indicates the shortcomings on the Kindle.

I would say 'run, don't walk,'to buy and read this book, but, all you have to do is hit that button, get a glass of water, and you will have it on your Kindle. Enjoy the many hours you will invest, as this book is well worth your time.

_The Coldest Winter_ is brilliantly written, insightful, passionately argued, vivid, moving,and illuminating. It combines incisive and penetrating character portraits with gritty field-of-battle reportage.

You might or might not like it.

_The Coldest Winter_ sets out to do a particular thing, and does it superbly. That thing may not be what you're looking for, though.

There are a good many things _The Coldest Winter_ is not. Most importantly, it's not a blow-by-blow straight military history of the Korean War. There's absolutely no attempt to give even, neutral treatment to all the battles. The successful Inchon invasion gets a few pages; the horrific Unsan ambush gets a full chapter.

It also is not a neutral piece of descriptive bio-history. Halberstam has a point to make--maybe even an axe to grind. He's unsparing in his judgements, whether he's describing the vicious brutality of Stalin and Mao or the wooden-headed obtuseness of some U.S. commanders.

What it is, is a story. This is history as narrative, complete with moral. Halberstam has a tragic villain (Douglas MacArthur), a villain's henchman (General Ned Almond, MacArthur's protege), and a sinister cabal of political intriguers (the American "China Lobby"). He has, too, a hero (General Matthew Ridgeway) and a hero's sidekick (Colonel Paul Freeman). He opens with a narrative hook (the Unsan debacle) and closes with a dramatic climax (the downfall of MacArthur). The battles he chooses to describe are those that are required to move his plot along.

This is not to say that _The Coldest Winter_ is one-dimensional or simplistic. Halberstam gives MacArthur, for instance, full marks for military brilliance and dedication, even while he documents MacArthur's egomania. Truman and Acheson take their share of hits. All of his portraits are thoroughly researched and well-documented. It's all compelling, and it's pretty damn persuasive.

Still, for all its brilliance, this book is an *argument* in favor of a particular set of positions and ideas. Halberstam, as he did in _The Best and the Brightest_, is giving an explanation for why a bunch of really smart people ended up supporting policies that ultimately failed. It's a superb piece of analysis. It convinced me. Whether it will convince anyone who comes to the table with different notions is open to question.

(Aside: The applicability of this question to current politics is obvious. In one case, Halberstam gives in to the temptation to make the connection explicitly. As usual, I think his case would be stronger if he hadn't done so.)

So if you're looking for unadorned battle history, this is not the book for you. If you're looking at a balanced, non-judgemental political history, this is not the book for you. If you're looking for a complete, exhaustive general history, this is not the book for you. And if you're a passionate admirer of Douglas MacArthur, this is *definitely* not the book for you.

Still, _The Coldest Winter_ does do one thing that all readers should applaud: it pays the soldiers of "the forgotten war" the tribute they deserve. However murky the politics of Korea, young men suffered and died there. Give Halberstam full marks for remembering them--no matter what else you may believe.

I was twelve when the war started. It was not taught in my high school, it was not taught when I was studying for the Navy, it was never taught. Truely the "Forgotten War", but David Halberstam brought it to life after fifty some years and I was in awe of the personalities. What a wonderful gift! What a sad fact that he is no longer with us to bring us more history.

Well written, entertaining. This book gives a great overview of the Korean war. What went wrong and what went right. Why it all started and an in-depth look at MacArthur.

In terms of books written about it, the Korean War was the black hole of American historiography, compared to the large output on WW2 and Vietnam; a nasty 'little' forgotten war. With Halberstam's last book before he died in a car accident, the gap is a little smaller.
Most wars can be seen as a series of mistakes. The Korean War offers itself perfectly for that approach. We know who 'started' it, that was clearly North Korea's invasion of the South in June 50.
But who 'caused' it? If monocausal explanations are worth anything, then Dean Acheson surely is the prime candidate with his monumental gaffe of forgetting to include Korea in a speech defining America's interest zone in Asia. That was clearly the signal to the uneasy triad of Kim, Mao and Stalin, that an adventure might work. Which was mistake number two. They had not counted on incompetence in the US government.
Next: the breathtaking inefficiency of MacArthur's intelligence, his view of the world defined as truth, which ignored on a level of criminal negligence the reports that something was building up North of the demarcation line. (Comparable to intelligence failures before 9/11 and the lies before the Iraq invasion? This is what happens when intelligence is a tool for a pre-defined view!)
Kim's stupidity in ignoring the warnings about the Inchon landing. Lucky for the good guys.
The focus on conquering Seoul rather than blocking the retreat to the North for the invaders. Costly! Again PR value over strategy!
The silly amphibious landing in Wonsan, when the Marines could have gotten there easily and faster on land from Pusan. (And Bob Hope had to perform to a nearly empty audience, as the Marines were stuck in their ships when the harbour was mined.)
Not wanting to repeat the whole book here (which is 650 pages of bad weather and anti-MacArthurism, not to forget the brillant brief bio sketches of the main protagonists, that we are used to expect from Halberstam), let's jump into the phase when the war seemed to be won: next mistake, underestimating the enemy, caused by the same basic flaw: intelligence to prove what we know already.
The failure to anticipate the Chinese invasion was a massive misjudgement, equally hard to understand as the man's previous failure to expect the Japanese invasion of the Philippines. Of course in between he had made the impossible become true and carried out the Incheon landing, which erased the memory of previous errors.
That in turn was the basis for the US government's next big error: not to remove MacArthur from his command in time. The man seemed untouchable. A very costly overestimation of his value. Of course how would a weak accidental president be expected to trust his own judgement more than that of a war hero?
The pity is that mistakes are never learnt from. That is of course mainly because we can usually not agree on the what and the who in first place.
Or sometimes, when they are learnt from, then in the sense of the generals who fight the previous wars: unaware of the law of life which says that once you know the answers, the questions get changed.
Skimming through the book later, it occurs to me that I ought to have mentioned the special story of the 'loss' of China, which was politically a very relevant background noise of the Korea War. Of course the tragedy of China's civil war was that there was no competent leadership on the nationalist side, and that furthermore the anti Truman forces in the US had decided to be so totally taken in by that fraud CKS and his Missimo. While Mao had his starry eyed Edgar Snow for propaganda, CKS commanded the loyalty of Henry Luce and his press empire. Luce turned out to be a mighty force for befuddlement of American brains. In comparison, Snow was not much more than a court jester.

In terms of books written about it, the Korean War was the black hole of American historiography, compared to the large output on WW2 and Vietnam; a nasty 'little' forgotten war. With Halberstam's last book before he died in a car accident, the gap is a little smaller.
Most wars can be seen as a series of mistakes. The Korean War offers itself perfectly for that approach. We know who 'started' it, that was clearly North Korea's invasion of the South in June 50.
But who 'caused' it? If monocausal explanations are worth anything, then Dean Acheson surely is the prime candidate with his monumental gaffe of forgetting to include Korea in a speech defining America's interest zone in Asia. That was clearly the signal to the uneasy triad of Kim, Mao and Stalin, that an adventure might work. Which was mistake number two. They had not counted on incompetence in the US government.
Next: the breathtaking inefficiency of MacArthur's intelligence, his view of the world defined as truth, which ignored on a level of criminal negligence the reports that something was building up North of the demarcation line. (Comparable to intelligence failures before 9/11 and the lies before the Iraq invasion? This is what happens when intelligence is a tool for a pre-defined view!)
Not wanting to repeat the whole book here (which is 650 pages of bad weather and anti-MacArthurism, not to forget the brillant brief bio sketches of the main protagonists, that we are used to expect from Halberstam), let's jump into the phase when the war seemed to be won: next mistake, underestimating the enemy, caused by the same basic flaw: intelligence to prove what we know already.
The failure to anticipate the Chinese invasion was a massive misjudgement, equally hard to understand as the man's previous failure to expect the Japanese invasion of the Philippines. Of course in between he had made the impossible become true and carried out the Incheon landing, which erased the memory of previous errors.
That in turn was the basis for the US government's next big error: not to remove MacArthur from his command in time. The man seemed untouchable. A very costly overestimation of his value. Of course how would a weak accidental president be expected to trust his own judgement more than that of a war hero?
The pity is that mistakes are never learnt from. That is of course mainly because we can usually not agree on the what and the who in first place.
Or sometimes, when they are learnt from, then in the sense of the generals who fight the previous wars: unaware of the law of life which says that once you know the answers, the questions get changed.
Skimming through the book later, it occurs to me that I ought to have mentioned the special story of the 'loss' of China, which was politically a very relevant background noise of the Korea War. Of course the tragedy of China's civil war was that there was no competent leadership on the nationalist side, and that furthermore the anti Truman forces in the US had decided to be so totally taken in by that fraud CKS and his Missimo. While Mao had his starry eyed Edgar Snow for propaganda, CKS commanded the loyalty of Henry Luce and his press empire. Luce turned out to be a mighty force for befuddlement of American brains. In comparison, Snow was not much more than a court jester.

In terms of books written about it, the Korean War was the black hole of American historiography, compared to the large output on WW2 and Vietnam; a nasty 'little' forgotten war. With Halberstam's last book before he died in a car accident, the gap is a little smaller.
Most wars can be seen as a series of mistakes. The Korean War offers itself perfectly for that approach. We know who 'started' it, that was clearly North Korea's invasion of the South in June 50.
But who 'caused' it? If monocausal explanations are worth anything, then Dean Acheson surely is the prime candidate with his monumental gaffe of forgetting to include Korea in a speech defining America's interest zone in Asia. That was clearly the signal to the uneasy triad of Kim, Mao and Stalin, that an adventure might work. Which was mistake number two. They had not counted on incompetence in the US government.
Next: the breathtaking inefficiency of MacArthur's intelligence, his view of the world defined as truth, which ignored on a level of criminal negligence the reports that something was building up North of the demarcation line. (Comparable to intelligence failures before 9/11 and the lies before the Iraq invasion? This is what happens when intelligence is a tool for a pre-defined view!)
Not wanting to repeat the whole book here (which is 650 pages of bad weather and anti-MacArthurism, not to forget the brillant brief bio sketches of the main protagonists, that we are used to expect from Halberstam), let's jump into the phase when the war seemed to be won: next mistake, underestimating the enemy, caused by the same basic flaw: intelligence to prove what we know already.
The failure to anticipate the Chinese invasion was a massive misjudgement, equally hard to understand as the man's previous failure to expect the Japanese invasion of the Philippines. Of course in between he had made the impossible become true and carried out the Incheon landing, which erased the memory of previous errors.
That in turn was the basis for the US government's next big error: not to remove MacArthur from his command in time. The man seemed untouchable. A very costly overestimation of his value. Of course how would a weak accidental president be expected to trust his own judgement more than that of a war hero?
The pity is that mistakes are never learnt from. That is of course mainly because we can usually not agree on the what and the who in first place.
Or sometimes, when they are learnt from, then in the sense of the generals who fight the previous wars: unaware of the law of life which says that once you know the answers, the questions get changed.

In terms of books written about it, the Korean War was the black hole of American historiography, compared to the large output on WW2 and Vietnam; a nasty 'little' forgotten war. With Halberstam's last book before he died in a car accident, the gap is a little smaller.
Most wars can be seen as a series of mistakes. The Korean War offers itself perfectly for that approach. We know who 'started' it, that was clearly North Korea's invasion of the South in June 50.
But who 'caused' it? If monocausal explanations are worth anything, then Dean Acheson surely is the prime candidate with his monumental gaffe of forgetting to include Korea in a speech defining America's interest zone in Asia. That was clearly the signal to the uneasy triad of Kim, Mao and Stalin, that an adventure might work. Which was mistake number two. They had not counted on incompetence in the US government.
Next: the breathtaking inefficiency of MacArthur's intelligence, his view of the world defined as truth, which ignored on a level of criminal negligence the reports that something was building up North of the demarcation line. (Comparable to intelligence failures before 9/11 and the lies before the Iraq invasion? This is what happens when intelligence is a tool for a pre-defined view!)
Not wanting to repeat the whole book here (which is 650 pages of bad weather and anti-MacArthurism), let's jump into the phase when the war seemed to be won: next mistake, underestimating the enemy, caused by the same basic flaw: intelligence to prove what we know already.
The failure to anticipate the Chinese invasion was a massive misjudgement, equally hard to understand as the man's previous failure to expect the Japanese invasion of the Philippines. Of course in between he had made the impossible true and carried out the Incheon landing, which erased the memory of previous errors.
That in turn was the basis for the US government's next big error: not to remove MacArthur from his command in time. The man seemed untouchable. A very costly overestimation of his value. Of course how would a weak accidental president be expected to trust his own judgement more than that of a war hero?
The pity is that mistakes are never learnt from. That is of course mainly because we can usually not agree on the what and the who in first place.
Or sometimes, when they are learnt from, then in the sense of the generals who fight the previous wars: unaware of the law of life which says that once you know the answers, the questions get changed.

I found the opening chapter of this book, which depicts the US soldiers blindly stumbling into well-prepared Chinese ambushes, to be utterly engrossing. Unfortunately, Halberstam couldn't keep it up through the book.

As a nice survey of the first few years of the Korean War and its underlying causes, this is a good book, but while Halberstam does a good job going into the political causes, with long chapters detailing the motives of MacArthur, Truman, Stalin, and Mao, I was disappointed that he didn't spend more time with the soldiers who were on the ground. Their stories were far more compelling, but Halberstam doesn't spend nearly enough time with them.

In addition, he glosses over the last few years of the war and the public's growing disaffection with it.

As a starting point for learning more about Korea, this works pretty well, but I thought the lack of clear focus was a disappointment.

A great review of the history leading up to the war and the failure of MacAurthur's Headquarters which permitted such early success by the North Koreans and latter by the Chinese. It is too bad Truman did not relieve MacAurthur sooner, many thousands of lives could have been saved.
Roger L. Hatton
Col., USAF, Ret.

Shows the darker side of Douglas McArthur and some of his underlings. Makes you proud of the Marine general who stood up to McArthur's staff and saved the day. I recommend this book to any student of history. After Inchon it was all downhill from there with McArthur and some of his self serving actions.

I have been reading these reviews prior to getting this book. Many people seem to be disappointed in the coverage of the Korean War by this author as well as certain inacurracies, e.g. the rebuilding of the highway bridge by army engineers as the Marines fought their way south in their retreat from the Choisin Reservoir. You might be interested to read "BREAKOUT: The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, Korea 1950." The author is Martin Russ who also wrote "The Last Paralell." This is a riveting account of the incredible battles by the Marines to survive an onslaught by thousands of Chinese soldiers and then to fight their way south from the Chosin Reservoir. As in "The Coldest Winter", General MacArthur does not come off well at all in terms of his judgment and decision-making.

After his early work on Vietnam 'The Best and the Brightest', this is another masterpiece from Halberstam. His mixture of battle narrative and character analysis is irresistible; one really cannot put it down after Chapter 1 on the Yalu River and China's entry into the Korean War. It is also provocative and convincing about the errors of the late 1940s and early 1950s that led to so much grief for the USA, indeed up to the recent bogdown in Iraq. Much of Halberstam reads like Titus Livius, especially the Roman historian's account of the war with Hannibal.

As other reviewers have noted, this is not a comprehensive history of the Korean War. However as in most good historical works, the author is highly selective in the material he chooses to present. That material supports the author's main theme: the political failures that lead to the war, the personal failures that resulted in the creation of a debacle, and the failure to learn any lessons from the war that resulted in a repetition of the failures, even to this day.

The book draws to a rather abrupt, and for me disappointing, conclusion immediately after the events of Chipyongni with about 2 years left to go in the war. But on reflection I think the unsatisfying conclusion to the book simply mirrors the unsatisfying conclusion to the war itself.

The nugget of gold in this book is found at the end in the section called "The Consequences", and in the epilogue. A lot of food for thought there. And some interesting conclusions as to the consequences of the war for the rest of the century and beyond.

I came away with a much better understanding of this war, its causes and consequences. And it was an excellent read by a good author.

In his incredibly productive life, David Halberstam wrote brilliantly on a myriad of topics _ from Bill Belichick to this, an opus that sheds light not only on the mostly ignored Korean War but on the failures of world diplomacy and American politicians after World War II. Sadly, it continues into the 21st century.

Others, including a number of Korean War veterans, have written eloquently on Halberstam's portrayal of that sad epic _ or rather the first year-and-a-half of it, and the failure of leadership in both Washington and Tokyo. What struck me, someone who has read a lot of military history, was the portrait of what has to be one of the worst generals ever to hold high command in the U.S. Army _ Ned Almond, a racist of incredible hubris and equal incompetence who was allowed to keep his post as X Corps commander even when Ridgway took over the 8th Army command. Even the worst of the union commanders in the Civil War were more fit than he was.

But what really struck me was the insight into Soviet, Chinese, and American politics that has led to a series of unnecessary wars, right up to Iraq. I've always sensed it with one part of my brain, but never thought consistenly about how U.S. domestic policy drives foreign policy, right up to the use of 9/11 to justify the disastrous Iraq invasion. Halberstam clearly catches the mood of American politics during Korea _ the dominance of the China Lobby. But he also catches in the last 20 pages the way the Democratic party has been paralyzed since by the effects of that war _ that the sense of being "soft,'' first on Communism and then on terrorism, led to Vietnam and the early lack of dissent on Iraq.

Maybe this book will contribute to a new reality in American politics.

Given the history Halberstam portrays, probably not.

As a child growing up in New York my memories of the Korean War include a social studies class with the words "Aggression in Korea" written on the blackboard and, later, a ticker tape parade for Douglas MacArthur. More than fifty years have passed since then. Other world events made headlines and the war that nobody seems to have won faded from interest. During all those years though, David Halberstam was honing his skills as a journalist, including a Pulitzer Prize for his epic work about the Vietnam War, The Best and the Brightest. He was always fascinated by what happened in Korea though, and after several years of research, produced this epic analysis of the causes, the costs, the politics and all the players of this somewhat unappreciated period in American history. Sadly, just days after submitting the completed manuscript to his publisher, he was tragically killed in a car accident, leaving this final masterwork for future generations.

The book is more than 700 pages long, including all the footnotes. It took me several months to read because it is so dense with facts that a few pages were all I could absorb at one time. I was fascinated though and details would echo in my mind until I picked the book up again, feeling the pull of this history with all its characters, battles, politics, miscalculations, subtleties and finely honed portraits of all the important players. It's all there, the victory in WW2, the atom bomb and the occupation of Japan under Douglas MacArthur, whose personal biography is traced back for several generations and who comes across as an arrogant self-righteous despot with little regard for the waste of human life.

Halberstam interviewed former soldiers for up-close and personal descriptions of the battles. He researched thousands of government documents, including diaries of President Truman and correspondence with General Ridgway. There were differences of opinions and conflicts in Washington and names such Dean Atchison, Omar Bradley and George C. Marshall which I have only heard in passing, became real to me. I learned about the conflict between Mao and Stalin and the leaders of both North and South Korea. I learned about how the threat of communism led to the excesses of Senator Joseph McCarthy.

I know I'll never remember the names and details all the battles. But I will remember the incredible hardships of the fighting men on both sides with temperatures well below zero on mountainous terrain. Some American forces were sent to battle in only their summer uniforms. The tanks and trucks were not suited to the landscape. The ammunition was all wrong. Weapons that had been supplied to Nationalist China had all been taken by the Chinese Communists and were now being used against the Americans. Over and over I cringed with horror at all the mistakes and miscalculations. War is horrible, particularly when the cause is based on politics and ego.

I loved this book. It was worth all those hours and hours and hours of reading. It is truly a masterpiece and a lasting tribute to a great journalist. I give one of my highest recommendations.

This is by far the best book covering the Korean War that I have read. It is written with a style and knowledge of the subject that makes this a book that is hard to put down. Obviously well-researched, Halberstam reveals aspects of the war and its participants that will surprise the majority of readers who have been exposed to very little concerning "the forgotten war." Highly recommended for the casual reader as well as the serious student.

As the wife of a U. S. Army Infantryman who served a 17 month tour in
South Korea, 1952 through the "armistice"(??) and into October, 1953, I respect and honor all the heroes of the Korean War, better known as Mr. Truman's "Police Action". However, the American dead number between 38,000 - 50,000, MIAs are 8,000+. This was a colossal mistake perpetrated by Mr. Acheson, General MacArthur, and, unfortunately, President Truman who should have named this United Nations undertaking "The Korean War." General MacArthur is, in the opinion of many army veterans and
retired career army veterans, and this reviewer, a man who was much in love with himself, his ego, his status, and his self-recognized genius. His defiant decision to cross the Yalu River into North Korea was the factor that brought him down. Do not ever forget HEARTBREAK RIDGE and
BLOODY RIDGE! Mr. Halberstam is a man of enormous accomplishments and we grieve over his untimely passing and the void we will experience without the anticipation of his next book. Mr. Halberstam's superb books, every one of them, are in our library and have been read over and over.

{{ASIN:"The Coldest Winteris very well researched. Halberstam writes in the best prose style. The book reads as well as a novel. He concentrates on the on-the-ground experiences of the combatants. He describes the complex military manouvers in an understandable way.The only criticism I have is of the maps, but they are better than most maps in military histories. My wife who almost exclusively reads fiction was fascinated by the book. What a tragedy his death was.

This is Halberstam's magnum opus and is a wonderful restatement of his essential criticisms of American foreign policy. Other reviewers' criticism of the book as adding nothing "new" is not fair. First, this ignores the fruits of Halberstam's decades of interviews with company commanders, soldiers, policymakers, and with greats like Ridgway. Second, the reviewers miss the essential point that Halberstam is giving us a new and important interpretation of history that puts the Korean War in its proper context as one of the seminal events of the postwar era.

Korea was the first limited conflict in a century of total war, and for that reason alone deserves special study. An important strand of political thought, which MacArthur attempted to exploit, could not come to terms with this. And in Vietnam as well as in subsequent conflicts, we see that frustration boil to the surface and be exploited by various politicians.

Halberstam's essential thesis is that American foreign policy is to a significant extent determined by domestic sources -- sources that are themselves dysfunctional and that tend to skew foreign policy in an often tragic fashion. In particular, the deep racism of American culture prevented generals and important policymakers from appreciating the skills of the Chinese and North Koreans, and from exploiting the important rifts between China and North Korea as well as between the Soviet Union and China. Too often we viewed these cultures monolithically and in a condescending fashion.

Another problem is what Hofstadter terms the "paranoid style" in American politics. Halberstam's narrative is excellent in bringing this to life. The "China Lobby" ignored the facts to build up the myth of Chaing and the "loss" of China. It didn't really matter what the facts were. What mattered was constructing a compelling narrative of an opportunity "lost" by the striped-pants sissies and traitors in the State Department. In this narrative, even Marshall's patriotism is suspect, a completely irrational and mean-spirited assertion. But it does fall within the grand tradition of the paranoid style that attacked Adams and Lincoln; that led to the "Know-Nothing" movement of the 1840s; that fanned the flames of the Palmer raids in 1919; and that resulted in the Japanese internment.

Our dysfunctional and often vicious domestic politics made Truman's position impossible -- but it also led Kennedy to walk the tightrope in Vietnam, sank Johnson, and tempted Bush to think he could define his own reality in Iraq. Mix in messianic notions of American exceptionalism and a view of the world tinged by racism and we can see the roots of all the disastrous miscalculations of the last half-century -- dropping the Bomb, failing to internationalize atomic energy, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq.

On the other hand, American in the end did the right thing in Korea and in the Cold War in general. Its misadventures have been tragic, but America has been, on balance, a force for peace and democracy and has used its superpower status in a manner far more responsible than its predecessors. And at the individual level, one can only read with great national pride about the conduct of the likes of generals like Ridgway and Walker, and junior officers like McGee. These men reflect everything that is good and decent in the American character.

Halberstam's zeal at uncovering the truth leads him to paint greats like Truman, Acheson, and even Marshall in an ambivalent light. Truman did the right thing in canning Marshall, but he is responsible for a great deal of miscalculation before then. And Acheson, while a subtle thinker and often right in his judgments, comes off as unconscionably weak in going along with the vague instructions to MacArthur that gave the General room to create the disaster. Most tragic is the brief appearance of the Vietnam-era Acheson as angry cold-warrior and as a Cheney-like caricature of himself. Even Marshall has uncharacteristic moments of weakness in responding to the disaster that befell the U.N. forces after the Chinese invasion.

Halberstam gives MacArthur what he deserves -- in a way that only someone with the uncompromising passion of Halberstam can. I suppose the MacArthur of the first 30 years of the century was a great man. But the vain and corrupt General of the 1940s and 1950s -- on the take from Philippines politicians, the man who screwed up the defense of the Philippines, the guy who took credit for what Nimitz did, the man who would dare to be the general-in-chief in Korea without ever spending so much as one overnight there -- that man was deserving of reproach. But the guy who could not admit his own mistake in pushing toward the Yalu, who refused to take the steps necessary to rally his own defeated troops, and who would advocate a larger war against China to cover his own miscalculations -- that man belongs in the Hall of Shame with the likes of George Armstrong Custer, George McClellan, and Benedict Arnold.

This is a remarkable book. I wish we could have heard more about how Ridgway handled things and about the last 2 years of the War. But it is powerfully written and is an important addition to the field. Best of all, it's completely absorbing. I highly recommend it.

This is Halberstam's magnum opus and is a wonderful restatement of his essential criticisms of American foreign policy. Other reviewers' criticism of the book as adding nothing "new" is not fair. First, this ignores the fruits of Halberstam's decades of interviews with company commanders, soldiers, policymakers, and with greats like Ridgway. Second, the reviewers miss the essential point that Halberstam is giving us a new and important interpretation of history that puts the Korean War in its proper context as one of the seminal events of the postwar era.

Korea was the first limited conflict in a century of total war, and for that reason alone deserves special study. An important strand of political thought, which MacArthur attempted to exploit, could not come to terms with this. And in Vietnam as well as in subsequent conflicts, we see that frustration boil to the surface and be exploited by various politicians.

Halberstam's essential thesis is that American foreign policy is to a significant extent determined by domestic sources -- sources that are themselves dysfunctional and that tend to skew foreign policy in an often tragic fashion. In particular, the deep racism of American culture prevented generals and important policymakers from appreciating the skills of the Chinese and North Koreans, and from exploiting the important rifts between China and North Korea as well as between the Soviet Union and China. Too often we viewed these cultures monolithically and in a condescending fashion.

Another problem is what Hofstadter terms the "paranoid style" in American politics. Halberstam's narrative is excellent in bringing this to life. The "China Lobby" ignored the facts to build up the myth of Chaing and the "loss" of China. It didn't really matter what the facts were. What mattered was constructing a compelling narrative of an opportunity "lost" by the striped-pants sissies and traitors in the State Department. In this narrative, even Marshall's patriotism is suspect, a completely irrational and mean-spirited assertion. But it does fall within the grand tradition of the paranoid style that attacked Adams and Lincoln; that led to the "Know-Nothing" movement of the 1840s; the Palmer raids of 1919; and the Japanese internment.

Our dysfunctional and often vicious domestic politics made Truman's position impossible -- but it also led Kennedy to walk the tightrope in Vietnam, sank Johnson, and tempted Bush to think he could define his own reality in Iraq. Mix in messianic notions of American exceptionalism and a view of the world tinged by racism and we can see the roots of all the disastrous miscalculations of the last half-century -- dropping the Bomb, failing to internationalize atomic energy, Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq.

On the other hand, American in the end did the right thing in Korea and in the Cold War in general. Its misadventures have been tragic, but America has been, on balance, a force for peace and democracy and has used its superpower status in a manner far more responsible than its predecessors. And at the individual level, one can only read with great national pride about the conduct of the likes of generals like Ridgway and Walker, and junior officers like McGee. These men reflect everything that is good and decent in the American character.

Halberstam's zeal at uncovering the truth leads him to paint greats like Truman, Acheson, and even Marshall in an ambivalent light. Truman did the right thing in canning Marshall, but he is responsible for a great deal of miscalculation before then. And Acheson, while a subtle thinker and often right in his judgments, comes off as unconscionably weak in going along with the vague instructions to MacArthur that gave the General room to create the disaster. Most tragic is the brief appearance of the Vietnam-era Acheson as angry cold-warrior and as a Cheney-like caricature of himself. Even Marshall has uncharacteristic moments of weakness in responding to the disaster that befell the U.N. forces after the Chinese invasion.

Halberstam gives MacArthur what he deserves -- in a way that only someone with the uncompromising passion of Halberstam can. I suppose the MacArthur of the first 30 years of the century was a great man. But the vain and corrupt General of the 1940s and 1950s -- on the take from Philippines politicians, the man who screwed up the defense of the Philippines, the guy who took credit for what Nimitz did, the man who would dare to be the general-in-chief in Korea without ever spending so much as one overnight there -- that man was deserving of reproach. But the guy who could not admit his own mistake in pushing toward the Yalu, who refused to take the steps necessary to rally his own defeated troops, and who would advocate a larger war against China to cover his own miscalculations -- that man belongs in the Hall of Shame with the likes of George Armstrong Custer, George McClellan, and Benedict Arnold.

This is a remarkable book. I wish we could have heard more about how Ridgway handled things and about the last 2 years of the War. But it is powerfully written and is an important addition to the field. Best of all, it's completely absorbing. I highly recommend it.

First off, let me say that I don't often read military histories, but was drawn to this one by an interest in Korea and by Halberstam's reputation as a writer. So it was with some surprise that I found myself completely absorbed by his account of the Korean War. When my father died a few years ago, I discovered among his things a document indicating that he had stayed in the Army, as a member of the reserves, after his service in World War II. In 1950, as the war got underway, an officer friend advised him to "get out" (my dad had a wife and a child by this time) and he did. As I read Halberstam's book, I could only think that my young father might easily have perished in those terrible years, too. There are several themes in this account of the war that I found interesting. The first is the towering arrogance of General MacArthur, not only towards Truman, his commander-in-chief, but towards his colleagues in the Army, as well. The second is the pervasive racism that caused MacArthur and his staff to often fatally underestimate their adversaries, the Chinese, as "laundrymen." I was also struck by Halberstam's devastating critique of Charles Willoughby and his doctoring of intelligence to fit the requirements of MacArthur's plans. Hmm, this sounds familiar. Finally, I learned a lot about how political pressures shape what happens on the battlefield. Read this book; it will make you think about things that are happening today, in Iraq. And don't be put off by readers who complain that the book is not a comprehensive history of the Korean War. It does not pretend to be that--as the title clearly indicates. One of the best things about this book is the interviews it contains with ordinary soldiers, whose war, along with their roles in it, has mostly been forgotten. Halberstam's recounting of these stories is peerless.

For most of us, anything we know about the Korean War is based on MASH, even though the movie and TV series were actually protests against the Vietnam War, placed in Korea because the southeast Asian conflict was too close at the time. Perhaps the southern California hills looked more like the terrain of Korea than the jungles of Vietnam, but the attitudes in the film and series reflected the changing 70's, not the 50's.

In a book finished just days before he died in an automobile accident, David Halberstam delivers a blockbuster about a war most wanted to just forget. His strongest descriptions are his portrayals of the key personnel. Douglas MacArthur, who basically ruled Japan and South Korea for the United States after World War II, comes across as too egotistical to understand what was happening in a country where he didn't spend a single night during the conflict, and too quick to blame others for his own massive mistakes. First the American forces in South Korea were too poorly trained and armed to defend against the unexpected invasion from the North. Then, when American troops and weapons began to flow in, and MacArthur launched a brilliant counterattack behind the North Korean lines, he sent badly split forces in summer uniforms racing towards the Chinese border as winter arrived. He assured everyone the Chinese would not intervene. When they did, they almost threw the Americans out of Korea.

Either MacArthur did this because he was clueless or because he actually wanted a nuclear war against Red China and he believed provoking Mao into an invasion of Korea would give him the opportunity. He was wrong and eventually was removed from his command for openly criticizing the political masters he refused to acknowledge.

China is key to this book. MacArthur was part of the China Lobby, the right wing politicians who accused the Truman administration of "losing" China, as if the United States could impose its will on a nation three times its size on the other side of the planet. Halberstam writes how China was actually lost by Chiang Kai-shek, the corrupt warlord who paid too little attention to the needs of his people. Ironically the American experts on China, the China Hands, who had spend years pointing out that Chiang was losing and the weapons sent to him immediately fell into the hands of the Communists, were later blamed by the China Lobby for the very disaster they had warned against.

Because men like George Kennan were ignored, the China Lobby couldn't see a split coming within what they saw as the monolith of international Communism. Halberstam hints that what now seems like the inevitable progression of the Cold War might have turned out quite differently had the United States taken a different approach to China, both before and after the Communist triumph.

I have two small qualms with this book. One is that while Halberstam rightly describes the American side over and over again as the United Nations, there is very little actual explanation of the UN role, aside from an occasional reference to a British or French unit involved in one of the battles. The massive error by the Soviets at the Security Council that allowed the UN to enter the war is hardly touched on. There is nothing about the other countries within the UN coalition or the politics that allowed them to take part.

The other qualm is that most of the actual battles of the conflict are hardly mentioned. Aside from in-depth profiles of two or three key battles, which are very extensive, the rest of the confrontations are only referred to in broader strokes. The book is almost 700 pages long, and is filled with deep and incisive profiles of major personalities involved. But except for the most important battles, the actual campaigns are mostly glossed over.

David Halberstam did his research on this one. Very interesting reading about the politics of the 1950's Korean War and how things really haven't changed that much today. The book verified other sources I've read about McCarther and his Staff as being prima dona's.

Halberstam is very good at many things; vectoring in on particular points in history, finding the right sources to illustrate key points, and I think most importantly, keeping the narrative moving and therefore the reader engaged in the progress of history. Because he wrote such large books I think sometimes reviewers expect to be treated to absolutely everything and that is impossible. In this book Halberstam is on sure ground with MacArthur and Truman and less so when discussing military tactics etc...Halberstam really takes Truman to task for the extreme penny pinching that so damaged the army after WWII. Also he gathers an enormous amount of evidence regarding MacArthur's insubordination and outright refusal to go along with US policy in Asia. Many of the quote from Stillwell and Truman on Chiang Kai Shek are priceless. This is another definitive book that isn't afraid to take on the reputations of people like MacArthur and CKS and provides a thorough, thoughtful presentation of the origins and the first year of the Korean War.

Halberstam is very good at many things; vectoring in on particular points in history, finding the right sources to illustrate key points, and I think most importantly, keeping the narrative moving and therefore the reader engaged in the progress of history. Because he wrote such large books I think sometimes reviewers expect to be treated to absolutely everything and that is impossible. In this book Halberstam is on sure ground with MacArthur and Truman and less so when discussing military tactics etc...That said, this is another definitive book that isn't afraid to take on the reputations of people like MacArthur and provides a thorough, thoughtful presentation of the origins and beginnings of the Korean War.

What makes this book a page turner for me, is the level of incompetence alledged at every command level from MacArthur on down. If the facts are true, many many generals should not only have been relieved of their commands, they should have been court martialed to boot.
Before reading this wonderful book, I knew little about this war and I had pre-conceived notions about MacArthur and Truman; I hate to admit that those notions may have been wrong.
If what Halberstam says is true, and I have no reason to doubt him, thousands of fine soldiers and marines died for no reason other than to feed the egos of some very stupid men.
A must read.

For a relative history neophyte, but with a keen interest in the Korean War, this book provides a great historical setting as well as many personal stories of the Korean War. The title mentions it, but to be clear, this book focuses on the first year of the war, with a small portion devoted to the aftermath of the first winter. Halberstam is able to weave in stories from platoon and company soldiers to the larger picture between major world powers, which to me is the greatest strength of this book.

The research into the book must have been enormous but it shows with interesting details each solider remembered from particular battles, especially the major ones that Halberstam focused on (Naktong, Inchon, etc). A highly enjoyable read for me.

For those of us who were part of the Korean war (it was never just a police action for us) reliving it by reading The Coldest Winter is a profoundly moving experience. We rarely. if ever, talk about it with anyone for reasons that are somehow too complex to explain easily, but for anyone fortunate not to have been part of it, the book should be must reading. Thoroughly researched and extremely well written, it is an invaluable contribution to our history.

There is nothing new in this book on Korea, but Halberstam's presentation is excellent. Fortunately for the reader a good review of the American position in the immediate pre-war Korea and the behind-the-scenes political intrigue of the Chinese and North Korean military leaders is worth the price of this book. Mr. Halberstam always gets his digs in when he writes is books. The comment on President Bush's handling of the Iraq conflict is unfortunate but true to his political persuasion. His earlier book on the Vietnam War, The Best And Brightest, had similar digs, but for a Democratic administration, so at least he passes his digs around.

The book teaches us all a lesson in that we must ALWAYS be prepared for war. We have been attacked too many times by people who hate us. To allow the military to demilitarize like they did prior to Korea and after the mess in Vietnam where military leadership was at its lowest level only provides an opening for others to put a black eye on our country. And like Korea and Vietnam, the persons who pays the price for our political and military ineptitude are our American service personnel.

Having lived in Korea 1960-62, with a father who served in the Korean War, I was eager for the book. It has always seemed odd that so little was spoken, written or reported about that war. I confess to hearing the abridged version of it, rather than reading it. What I heard seemed to me very poorly edited, often repetitive, and rather lopsided in its emphasis on the period till MacArthur was sacked. It seemed like a first draft instead of a last draft. That said, Halberstam's reporting is first-rate, and his conclusions about the effect of the Korea War on later foreign policy seem right on. An important book!