I liked the book in general but struggled with the utility analogy. Here is why:

The utilities have traditionally built the infrastructure from the generation plant to your house. If the meter goes wrong, you call them. Power goes out in the middle of the night, they are on the hook. They make the investments, and they reap the rewards.

In the utility computing environment world, we have multiple players. If the connection between me and say Google is down, it could be my local ISP, the connection or backbone or Google itself. The physical connection has multiple entities, with far different agendas in play.

In the book, many of the examples are for free or very cheap solutions. Who pays for the required upgrades to the infrastructure? The consumer will at the ISP level indirectly, not the IT utility. I found it curois when Carr sited Google's new data center and its placement, where the local county had made the investment in dark fiber.

The final flaw is this: if ISPs start charging for bandwidth caps, it goes against the utility model. Unlike the electricity where power users get better rates, the consumer ISP model would suggest that I limit my usage or at least aggressively monitor my usage. With teenage daughter who have grown accustom to videos and music on demand, this will be areal challenge.

Big Switch is easy to read and, for the most part, entertaining. The first half of the book is coherent and provides a fun (but not new) comparison of the development of electrical distribution systems to the development of information distribution systems. I enjoyed reading the first half of the book.

The second half of the book needs the attention of an editor with a sharp pencil and some technical knowledge. The technology and challenges are trivialized and seemed to be presented in an almost random fashion. I did not enjoy the second half of the book and wanted to send it back for a rewrite.

Carr teases us with a fascinating explanation of the development of electricity-as-service in the 19th century, then examines the consequences of the grid in the 20th century with hasty, shallow criticism. The rest of the book is a patchwork of web 2.0 anecdotes and borrowed predictions.

The book is worth reading if you don't know much about computer science or computer commerce, and wonder what all the hubbub is about. Don't let it be the last word you consider on the subject -- this is a seductive book, but don't expect it to stick around for breakfast.

Nicholas Carr wrote a good book about the big switch from personal/local computing towards centralized computing. He compares this switch with the change from the local electricity production towards centralized power plants. He takes quite a few pages to explain this parallel, even though it's a very obvious switch.
Unfortunately, he misses the big picture, i.e., the fact that these big switches have been taking place for centuries on all kinds of trades. And these switches are still taking place.
It's an economic truth that holds just as well for:
- making your own tools, towards buying factory made tools;
- growing your own food, towards buying your food prepared in a factory;
- knitting your own clothes, towards buying your clothes made in factories (centralized in low wage countries);
- preparing your own diner, towards buying ready made meals or eating outdoors;
- from fishing your own trout towards getting it from large fish farms;
- teaching your children, towards schools that educate your children;
- taking care of your children, toward daycare centers;
- etc., etc.

Interesting question for you: what will be the next big switch?

Next question:
Will there ever be a reversal, i.e., from centralized production/care taking back towards local/personalized production?

Is it likely that power production will move back again to individual homes? For example, due to solar power cells on roofs? (less loss of energy due to transport)
Will grid computing ever change the centralization toward local computing again? It will be interesting to see if economy of scale has limits, for example environmental limits. What is better for your child: big centralized schools, or small local ones? Which food tastes better: factory food or the local grown food?
When will "better" win from "cheaper"?

Save your money. This book contains nothing but an extended defense of a Utopian vision of the IT future first published in Carr's HBR article. Limited understanding of underlying IT technologies, haziness and lack of concrete detailed examples (obscurantism) are typical marks of Carr's style. Carr used focus on IT shortcomings as a smokescreen to propose a new utopia: users are mastering complex IT packages and perform all functions previously provided by IT staff, while "in the cloud" software service providers fill the rest. This is pretty fine humor, the caricature reminding me mainframe model, but not much more.

His analogies are extremely superficial and are completely unconvincing (Google actually can greatly benefit from owning an electrical generation plant or two :-) Complexity of IT systems has no precedents in human history. That means that analogies with railways and electrical grid are deeply and irrevocably flawed. They do not capture the key characteristics of the IT technology: its unsurpassed complexity and Lego type flexibility. IT became a real nerve system of the modern organizations. Not the muscle system or legs :-)

Carr's approach to IT is completely anti-historic. Promoting his "everything in the cloud" Utopia as the most important transformation of IT ever, he forgot (or simply does not know) that IT already experienced several dramatic transformations due to new technologies which emerged in 60th, 70th and 90th. Each of those transformations was more dramatic and important then neo-mainframe revolution which he tried to sell as "bright future of IT" and a panacea from all IT ills. For example, first mainframes replaced "prehistoric" computers. Then minicomputers challenged mainframes ("glass wall" datacenters) and PC ended mainframe dominance (and democratized computing.). In yet another transformation the Internet and TCP/IP (including wireless) converted datacenters to their modern form. What Carr views as the next revolution is just a blip on the screen in comparison with those events in each of which the technology inside the datacenter and on user desks dramatically changed.

As for his "everything in the cloud" software service providers there are at least three competing technologies which might sideline it: application streaming, virtualization (especially virtual appliances), and "cloud in the box". "In the cloud" software services is just one of several emerging technical trends and jury is still out how much market share each of them can grab. Application streaming looks like direct and increasingly dangerous competitor for the "in the cloud" software services model. But all of them are rather complementary technologies with each having advantages in certain situations and none can be viewed as a universal solution.

The key advantage of application streaming is that you use local computing power for running the application, not a remote server. That removes the problem of latency and bandwidth problems inherent in transmitting video stream generated by GUI interface on the remote server (were the application is running) to the client. Also modern laptops have tremendous computing power that is very expensive and not easy to match in remote server park. Once you launch the application on the client (from a shortcut ) the remote server streams (like streaming video or audio) the necessary application files to your PC and the application launches. This is done just once. After that application works as if it is local. Also only required files are sent (so if you are launching Excel you do NOT get those libraries that are shared with MS Word if it is already installed).

Virtualization promises more agile and more efficient local datacenters and while it can be used by "in the loud" providers (Amazon uses it), it also can undercut "in the cloud" software services model in several ways. First of all it permits packaging a set of key enterprise applications as "virtual appliances". the latter like streamed applications run locally, store data locally, are cheaper, have better response time and are more maintainable. This looks to me as a more promising technical approach for complex sets of applications with intensive I/O requirements. For example, you can deliver LAMP stack appliance (Linux-Apache-PHP-MySQL) and use it on a local server for running your LAMP-applications (for example helpdesk) enjoying the same level of quality and sophistication of packaging and tuning as in case of remote software providers. But you do not depend on WAN as users connect to it using LAN which guarantees fast response time. And your data are stored locally (but if you wish they can be backed up remotely to Amazon or to other remote storage provider).

The other trend is the emergence of higher level of standardization of datacenters ("cloud in the box" ot "datacenter in the box" trend). It permits cheap prepackaged local datacenters to be installed everywhere. Among examples of this trend are standard shipping container-based datacenters which are now sold by Sun and soon will be sold by Microsoft. They already contain typical services like DNS, mail, file sharing, etc preconfigured. For a fixed cost an organization gets set of servers capable of serving mid-size branch or plant. In this case the organization can save money by avoiding paying monthly "per user" fees -- a typical cost recovery model of software service providers. It also can be combined with previous two models: it is easy to stream both applications and virtual appliances to the local datacenter from central location. For a small organization such a datacenter now can be pre-configured in a couple of servers using Xen or VMware plus necessary routers and switches and shipped in a small rack.

I would like to stress that the power and versatility of modern laptop is the factor that should not be underestimated. It completely invalidates Carr's cloudy dream of users voluntarily switching to network terminal model inherent is centralized software services ( BTW mainframe terminals and, especially, "glass wall datacenters" were passionately hated by users). Remotely running applications have a mass appeal only in very limited cases (webmail). I think that users will fight tooth and nail for the preservation of the level of autonomy provided by modern laptops. Moreover, in no way users will agree to the sub-standard response time and limited feature set of "in the cloud" applications as problems with Google apps adoption demonstrated.

While Google apps is an interesting project which is now used in many small organizations instead of their own mail and calendar infrastructure, they can serve as a litmus test for the difficulties of replacing "installed" applications with "in the cloud" applications. First of all, if we are talking about replacing Open Office or Microsoft Office, functionality is really, really limited. At the same time Google have spend a lot of money and efforts creating them but never got any significant traction and/or sizable return on investment. After several years of existence this product did not even come close to the functionality of Open Office. To increase penetration Google recently started licensing them to Salesforce and other firms. That means that the whole idea might be flawed because even such an extremely powerful organization as Google with its highly qualified staff and huge server power of datacenters cannot create an application suit that can compete with preinstalled on laptop applications, which means cannot compete with the convenience and speed of running applications locally on modern laptop.

In case of corporate editions the price is also an issue and Google apps in comparison with Office Professional ($50 per user per year vs. $ 220 for Microsoft Office Professional) do not look like a bargain if we assume five-seven years life span for the MS Office. The same situation exists for home users: price-wise Microsoft Office can be now classified as shareware (Microsoft Office Home and Student 2007 which includes Excel, PowerPoint, Word, and OneNote costs ~$100 or ~$25 per application ). So for home users Google need to provide Google apps for free, which taking into account the amount of design efforts and complexity of the achieving compatibility, is not a very good way of investing available cash. Please note that Microsoft can at any time add the ability to stream Office applications to laptops and put "in the cloud" Office-alternative software service providers in a really difficult position: remote servers need to provide the same quality of interface and amount of computing power per user as the user enjoys on a modern laptop. That also suggests existence of some principal limitations of "in the cloud" approach for this particular application domain. And this is not unique case. SAP has problems with moving SAP/R3 to the cloud too and recently decided to scale back its efforts in this direction.

All-in-all computing power of a modern dual core 2-3GHz laptops with 2-4G of memory and 100G-200G hard drives represent a serious challenge for "in the cloud" software services providers. This power makes for them difficult to attract individual users money outside advertising-based or other indirect models. It's even more difficult for them "to shake corporate money loose": corporate users value the independence of locally installed on laptop applications and the ability to store data locally. Not everybody wants to share with Google their latest business plans.

Therefore Carr's 2003 vision looks in 2008 even less realistic then it used to be five years earlier. As during those five years datacenters actually continued to grow, Carr's value as a tech trends forecaster is open for review.

Another problem with Carr central "software service provider" vision (aka neo-mainframes vision) is propaganda of "bandwidth communism". Good WAN connectivity is far from being free. As experience of any university datacenter convincingly demonstrates that a dozen of P2P enthusiasts in the neighborhood can prove futility of dreams about free high quality WAN connectivity to any skeptics. In other words this is a typical "tragedy of commons" problem and should be analyzed as such.

Viewing it from this angle makes Carr's views of reliable and free 24x7 communication with remote datacenters unrealistic. This shortcoming can be compensated by properties of some protocols (for example SMTP mail) and for such protocols this is not a problem, but for other it is and always will be. At the same time buying dedicated WAN links can be extremely expensive: for mid-side companies it is usually as expensive as keeping everything in house. That makes problematic "in the cloud" approach to any service where disruptions or low bandwidth in certain times of the day can lead to substantial monetary losses. Also bandwidth is limited: for example OC-1 and OC-3 lines have their upper limit of 51.84Mbit/s and 155.2 Mbit/s correspondingly. And even within organization not all bandwidth is used for business purposes. In a large organization there are always many "entertainment-oriented" users, who strain the connection of the firm to the Internet cloud.

Another relevant question to ask is: "What are financial benefits to a large organization for implementing Carr's vision." I do not see any substantial financial gains. IT costs in large enterprises are already minimized (often 1-3% of total costs) and further minimization does not bring much benefits (what can you save from just 1% of total costs; but you can lose a lot). Are fraction of a percent savings worth risks of outsourcing your own nerve system ? That translates into the question: "What are principal differences in behavior of those two IT models during catastrophic events ?" The answer is: "When disaster strikes the difference between local and outsourced IT staff becomes really critical and entails huge competitive disadvantage for those organization who weakened their internal IT staff."

That brings us to another problem with Carr's views: he is discounting IQ inherent in local IT staff. If this IQ falls below certain threshold that not only endangers an organization in case of catastrophic events but instantly opens such an enterprise to various form of snake-oil salesmen and IT consultants proposing their wares. Also software service providers are not altruists and if they sense that you are really dependent on them or became "IT challenged" they will act accordingly.

In other words an important side effect of dismantling of IT organization is that instantly makes a company a donor in the hands of ruthless external suppliers and contractors. Consultants (especially large consultant firms) can help but they also can become part of the problem due to the problem of loyalty. We all know what happened with medicine when doctors were allowed to be bribed by pharmaceutical companies. This situation which is aptly called "Viva Viagra" and in which useless or outright dangerous drags like Vioxx were allowed to became blockbusters was fully replicated in IT: myth about independence of IT consultants is just a myth (and moreover, some commercial IDS/IPS and EMS systems in their destructive potential are not that different from Vioxx ;-).

Carr's recommendation that companies should be more concerned with IT risk mitigation then IT strategy is complete baloney. He just does not have any "in depth" understanding of very complex security issues involved in large enterprise. Security cannot be achieved without sound IT architecture and participation of non-security IT staff. Sound architecture (which is a result of proper "IT strategy") is more important then any amount of "risk mitigation" activities which most commonly are simple waist of money or, worse, entail direct harm to the organizations (as SOX enthusiasts from big accounting firms recently aptly demonstrated to the surprised corporate world).

I touched only the most obvious weaknesses of the Carr's vision (or fallacy to be exact). All-in-all Carr proposed just another dangerous utopia and skillfully milked the controversy his initial HBR article generated in his two subsequent books.

Virtualization promises more agile and more efficient local datacenters. It also permits packaging key enterprise application as "virtual appliances". The latter compete directly with centralized "in the cloud" software service providers vision and have several key advantages: they are local, they are cheaper, and they are more maintainable. Delivery of virtual appliances to local datacenters instead of "in the cloud" software services looks to me a more promising technical approach for complex applications with intensive I/O requirements.

The other trend is a higher level of standardization of datacenters ("datacenter in the box"), which permit cheap local datacenters to be installed everywhere. Among examples of this trend are standard shipping container-based datacenters which are now sold by Sun and soon will be sold by Microsoft. They already contain typical services like DNS, mail, file sharing, etc preconfigured. For a fixed cost an organization gets ready-make local datacenter capable of serving mid-size branch or plant. This trend also competes with the idea of software service providers and for a medium size organization might be cheaper in the long run then paying monthly "per user" fees -- a typical cost recovery model of software service providers. It permits streaming both applications and virtual appliances to the local delivery point. For a small organization such a datacenter now can be pre-configured in a couple of servers using Xen or VMware plus necessary routers and switches and shipped in a small rack.

I would like to stress that the power of modern laptop is the factor that should not be underestimated. It completely invalidates Carr's dream of users voluntarily switching to network terminal model inherent is centralized software service provision ( BTW mainframe terminals and, especially, "glass wall datacenters" were passionately hated by users). Such a solution can have a mass appeal only in very limited cases (webmail). I think that users will fight tooth and nail for the preservation of the level of autonomy provided by modern laptops. Moreover, in no way users will agree to sub-standard response time and limited feature set of "in the cloud" applications as problems with Google apps adoption demonstrated.

Can we call Google experiment with creation of Net-based alternative of the Office (Google apps) a failure? I think we can: Google have spend a lot of money and efforts creating them and never got any traction and/or sizable return on investment. After several years this is not even a financially sustainable project. That's why Google is licensing them to Salesforce and other firms. And forget about dreams of denting Microsoft dominance. Office 2003 and 2007 each in its own way were a knockout for such Google dreams. That means that the idea might be flawed because even such an extremely powerful organization as Google with its highly qualified staff and huge server power of datacenters cannot compete with the convenience and speed of running applications locally on modern laptop. It also cannot compete on price: price-wise Microsoft Office can be now classified as shareware: the cost is $25 per application (Excel, PowerPoint, Word, and OneNote) in Microsoft Office Home and Student 2007. So any price wars with Microsoft can be fought only on zero cost basis and taking into account the amount of design efforts and complexity of the achieving compatibility this is not a very good way of investing available cash. Even for organizations flush with money. And Microsoft can any time switch to streaming Office applications to laptops and put Office software service provider in a really difficult position: remote servers need to provide the same amount of computing power per user as the user has on a modern laptop.

Computing power of a modern dual core 2GHz laptops with 2G or 4G of memory and 100G hard drives represent a serious challenge that "in the cloud" providers do not have much chance to overcome. This makes for them difficult to attract individual users money outside advertising-based or other indirect models. It will be even more difficult for them to shake large organizations money loose as corporate users value the independence of locally installed on laptop applications. As well as the ability to store data locally.

Therefore Carr's 2003 vision looks in 2008 even less realistic then it used to be five years earlier. As during those five years datacenters actually continue to grow, Carr's value as a tech trends forecaster is open for review.

Another problem with Carr central "software service provider" vision (aka neo-mainframes vision) is propaganda of "bandwidth communism". Good WAN connectivity is far from being free. As experience of any university datacenter convincingly demonstrates that a dozen of P2P enthusiasts in the neighborhood can prove futility of dreams about free high quality WAN connectivity to any skeptics. In other words this is a typical "tragedy of commons" problem and should be analyzed as such.

Viewing it from this angle makes Carr's views of reliable and free 24x7 communication with remote datacenters unrealistic. This shortcoming can be compensated by properties of some protocols (for example SMTP mail) and for such protocols this is not a problem, but for other it is and always will be. At the same time buying dedicated WAN links can be extremely expensive: for mid-side companies it is usually as expensive as keeping everything in house. That makes problematic "in the cloud" approach to any service where disruptions or low bandwidth in certain times of the day can lead to substantial monetary losses. Also bandwidth is limited: for example OC-1 and OC-3 lines have their upper limit of 51.84Mbit/s and 155.2 Mbit/s correspondingly. And even within organization only a fraction of this bandwidth can be used for business purposes. In practice corporate connection to Internet is used mainly for enterpraiment as in any large organization there are always quite a few "entertainment-oriented" users, who consume lion share of available bandwidth.

Another Carr's folly is overestimation of costs of IT in large corporations. IT costs in large enterprises are already minimized (often 1-3% of total costs) and further minimization does not bring much benefits (what can you save from just 1% of total costs; but you can lose a lot). I do not see any substantial financial gains from cutting a fraction of a percent. And are risks involved in such cuttings, even if they are possible, worth risks of outsourcing your own nerve system ? That translates into the question: "What are principal differences in behavior of those two IT models during catastrophic events ?" The proper answer is: "When disaster strikes the difference between local and outsourced IT staff becomes really critical and entails huge competitive disadvantage for those organizations who weakened their internal IT staff."

That brings us to another problem with Carr's views: he is discounting IQ inherent in local IT staff. If this IQ falls below certain critical threshold, that not only endangers an organization in case of catastrophic events but instantly opens such an enterprise to various form of exploitation by snake-oil salesmen and IT consultants peddling their wares. Also software service providers are not altruists and if they sense that you are really dependent on them or became "IT challenged" they will act accordingly. In other words an important side effect of dismantling of IT organization is that instantly makes a company a donor in the hands of ruthless external suppliers and contractors. Consultants (especially large consultant firms) can help but they also can become part of the problem due to the problem of loyalty. We all know what happened with medicine when doctors were allowed to be bribed by pharmaceutical companies. This situation which is aptly called "Viva Viagra" and in which useless or outright dangerous drags like Vioxx were allowed to became blockbusters was fully replicated in IT: myth about independence of IT consultants is just a myth (and moreover, some commercial IDS/IPS and EMS systems in their destructive potential are not that different from Vioxx ;-).

Carr's recommendation that companies should be more concerned with IT risk mitigation then IT strategy is complete baloney. He just does not have any "in depth" understanding of very complex availability and security issues involved in large enterprise. Neither high availability, nor security cannot be achieved without sound IT architecture. Sound architecture (which is a result of proper "IT strategy" that Carr discounted) is more important then any amount of "risk mitigation" activities which most commonly are simple waist of money or, worse, entail direct harm to the organizations (as SOX enthusiasts from big accounting firms recently aptly demonstrated to the surprised corporate world).

I touched only the most obvious weaknesses of the Carr's vision (or fallacy to be exact). All-in-all Carr proposed just another dangerous utopia and skillfully milked the controversy his initial HBR article generated in his two subsequent books.

Save your money. This book contains nothing but an extended defense of a Utopian vision of the IT future first published in Carr's HBR article. Limited understanding of underlying IT technologies, haziness and lack of concrete detailed examples (obscurantism) are typical marks of Carr's style. Carr used focus on IT shortcomings as a smokescreen to propose a new utopia: users are mastering complex IT packages and perform all functions previously provided by IT staff, while "in the cloud" software service providers fill the rest. This is pretty fine humor, the caricature reminding me mainframe model, but not much more.

Carr's approach to IT is completely anti-historic. He forgot that IT already experienced several dramatic transformations due to new technologies which emerged in 60th, 70th and 90th. Each of those transformations was more dramatic and important then this illusory neo-mainframe revolution which he tried to sell as "bright future of IT" and a panacea from all IT ills. For example, first mainframes replaced "prehistoric" computers. Then minicomputers challenged mainframes ("glass wall" datacenters) and PC ended mainframe dominance (and democratized computing.). In yet another transformation the Internet and TCP/IP (including wireless) converted datacenters to their modern form. What Carr views as the next revolution is just a blip on the screen in comparison with those events in each of which the technology inside the datacenter and on user desks dramatically changed.

His analogies are extremely superficial and are completely unconvincing. Complexity of IT systems has no precedents in human history. That means that analogies with railways and electrical grid are deeply and irrevocably flawed. They do not capture the key characteristics of the IT technology: its unsurpassed complexity and Lego type flexibility. IT became a real nerve system of the modern organizations. Not the muscle system or legs :-)

As for this neo-mainframe vision of "in the cloud" software service providers there are at least three competing technologies which might sideline it: application streaming, virtualization (especially virtual appliances), and "cloud in the box". "In the cloud" software services is just one of several emerging technical trends and jury is still out how much market share each of them can grab. Application streaming looks like direct and increasingly dangerous competitor for the "in the cloud" software services model. But all of them are rather complementary technologies with each having advantages in certain situations.

The key advantage of application streaming is that you use local computing power for running the application, not a remote server. That removes the problem of latency and bandwidth problems inherent in transmitting video stream generated by GUI interface on the remote server (were the application is running) to the client. Also modern laptops have tremendous computing power that is not easy to match in remote server park. Once you launch the application on the client (from a shortcut ) the remote server streams (like streaming video or audio) the necessary application files to your PC and the application launches. This is done just once. After that application works as if it is local. Also only required files are sent (so if you are launching Excel you do NOT get those libraries that are shared with MS Word if it is already installed).

Virtualization promises more agile and more efficient local datacenters and undercut "in the cloud" software services model in several ways. First of all it permits packaging a set of key enterprise applications as "virtual appliances". the latter like streamed applications run locally, store data locally, are cheaper, have better response time and are more maintainable. This looks to me as a more promising technical approach for complex sets of applications with intensive I/O requirements. For example, you can deliver LAMP stack appliance (Linux-Apache-PHP-MySQL) and use it on a local server for running your LAMP-applications (for example helpdesk) enjoying the same level of quality and sophistication of packaging and tuning as in case of remote software providers. But you do not depend on WAN as users connect to it using LAN which guarantees fast response time. And your data are stored locally (but if you wish they can be backed up remotely to Amazon or to other remote storage provider).

The other trend is the emergence of higher level of standardization of datacenters ("datacenter in the box" trend). It permits cheap prepackaged local datacenters to be installed everywhere. Among examples of this trend are standard shipping container-based datacenters which are now sold by Sun and soon will be sold by Microsoft. They already contain typical services like DNS, mail, file sharing, etc preconfigured. For a fixed cost an organization gets set of servers capable of serving mid-size branch or plant. In this case the organization can avoid paying monthly "per user" fees -- a typical cost recovery model of software service providers. It also can be combined with previous two models: it is easy to stream both applications and virtual appliances to the local datacenter from central location. For a small organization such a datacenter now can be pre-configured in a couple of servers using Xen or VMware plus necessary routers and switches and shipped in a small rack.

I would like to stress that the power and versatility of modern laptop is the factor that should not be underestimated. It completely invalidates Carr's cloudy dream of users voluntarily switching to network terminal model inherent is centralized software service provision ( BTW mainframe terminals and, especially, "glass wall datacenters" were passionately hated by users). Such a solution can have a mass appeal only in very limited cases (webmail). I think that users will fight tooth and nail for the preservation of the level of autonomy provided by modern laptops. Moreover, in no way users will agree to sub-standard response time and limited feature set of "in the cloud" applications as problems with Google apps adoption demonstrated.

While Google apps is an interesting project which is now used in many small organizations instead of their own mail and calendar infrastructure, they can serve as a litmus test for the difficulties of replacing "installed" applications with "in the cloud" applications. First of all, if we are talking about replacing Open Office or Microsoft Office, functionality is really, really limited. At the same time Google have spend a lot of money and efforts creating them but never got any significant traction and/or sizable return on investment. After several years of existence this product did not even match the functionality of Open Office. To increase penetration Google recently started licensing them to Salesforce and other firms. That means that the whole idea might be flawed because even such an extremely powerful organization as Google with its highly qualified staff and huge server power of datacenters cannot create an application suit that can compete with preinstalled on laptop applications, which means cannot compete with the convenience and speed of running applications locally on modern laptop.

In case of corporate editions the price is also an issue and Google apps in comparison with Office Professional ($50 per user per year vs. $ 220 for Microsoft Office Professional) does not look like a bargain if we assume five-seven years life span for the MS Office. The same situation exists for home users: price-wise Microsoft Office can be now classified as shareware (in Microsoft Office Home and Student 2007 which includes Excel, PowerPoint, Word, and OneNote the cost is $25 per application ). So for home users Google need to provide Google apps for free, which taking into account the amount of design efforts and complexity of the achieving compatibility, is not a very good way of investing available cash. Please note that Microsoft can at any time add the ability to stream Office applications to laptops and put "in the cloud" Office-alternative software service provider in a really difficult position: remote servers need to provide the same quality of interface and amount of computing power per user as the user enjoys on a modern laptop. That also suggests existence of some principal limitations of "in the cloud" approach for this particular application domain. And this is not unique case. SAP has problems with moving SAP/R3 to the cloud too and recently decided to scale back its efforts in this direction.

All-in-all computing power of a modern dual core 2-3GHz laptops with 2-4G of memory and 100G-200G hard drives represent a serious challenge for "in the cloud" software services providers. This makes for them difficult to attract individual users money outside advertising-based or other indirect models. It's even more difficult for them "to shake corporate money loose": corporate users value the independence of locally installed on laptop applications and the ability to store data locally. Not everybody wants to share with Google their latest business plans.

Therefore Carr's 2003 vision looks in 2008 even less realistic then it used to be five years earlier. As during those five years datacenters actually continue to grow, Carr's value as a tech trends forecaster is open for review.

Another problem with Carr central "software service provider" vision (aka neo-mainframes vision) is propaganda of "bandwidth communism". Good WAN connectivity is far from being free. As experience of any university datacenter convincingly demonstrates that a dozen of P2P enthusiasts in the neighborhood can prove futility of dreams about free high quality WAN connectivity to any skeptics. In other words this is a typical "tragedy of commons" problem and should be analyzed as such.

Viewing it from this angle makes Carr's views of reliable and free 24x7 communication with remote datacenters unrealistic. This shortcoming can be compensated by properties of some protocols (for example SMTP mail) and for such protocols this is not a problem, but for other it is and always will be. At the same time buying dedicated WAN links can be extremely expensive: for mid-side companies it is usually as expensive as keeping everything in house. That makes problematic "in the cloud" approach to any service where disruptions or low bandwidth in certain times of the day can lead to substantial monetary losses. Also bandwidth is limited: for example OC-1 and OC-3 lines have their upper limit of 51.84Mbit/s and 155.2 Mbit/s correspondingly. And even within organization not all bandwidth is used for business purposes. There is always quite a few "entertainment-oriented" users, who might strain the connection of the firm to the Internet cloud.

Another relevant question to ask is: "What are benefits to a large organization for implementing Carr's vision." I do not see any substantial financial gains. IT costs in large enterprises are already minimized (often 1-3% of total costs) and further minimization does not bring much benefits (what can you save from just 1% of total costs; but you can lose a lot). Are fraction of a percent savings worth risks of outsourcing your own nerve system ? That translates into the question: "What are principal differences in behavior of those two IT models during catastrophic events ?" The answer is: "When disaster strikes the difference between local and outsourced IT staff becomes really critical and entails huge competitive disadvantage for those organization who weakened their internal IT staff."

That brings us to another problem with Carr's views: he is discounting IQ inherent in local IT staff. If this IQ falls below certain threshold that not only endangers an organization in case of catastrophic events but instantly opens such an enterprise to various form of snake-oil salesmen and IT consultants proposing their wares. Also software service providers are not altruists and if they sense that you are really dependent on them or became "IT challenged" they will act accordingly.

In other words an important side effect of dismantling of IT organization is that instantly makes a company a donor in the hands of ruthless external suppliers and contractors. Consultants (especially large consultant firms) can help but they also can become part of the problem due to the problem of loyalty. We all know what happened with medicine when doctors were allowed to be bribed by pharmaceutical companies. This situation which is aptly called "Viva Viagra" and in which useless or outright dangerous drags like Vioxx were allowed to became blockbusters was fully replicated in IT: myth about independence of IT consultants is just a myth (and moreover, some commercial IDS/IPS and EMS systems in their destructive potential are not that different from Vioxx ;-).

Carr's recommendation that companies should be more concerned with IT risk mitigation then IT strategy is complete baloney. He just does not have any "in depth" understanding of very complex security issues involved in large enterprise. Security cannot be achieved without sound IT architecture and participation of non-security IT staff. Sound architecture (which is a result of proper "IT strategy") is more important then any amount of "risk mitigation" activities which most commonly are simple waist of money or, worse, entail direct harm to the organizations (as SOX enthusiasts from big accounting firms recently aptly demonstrated to the surprised corporate world).

I touched only the most obvious weaknesses of the Carr's vision (or fallacy to be exact). All-in-all Carr proposed just another dangerous utopia and skillfully milked the controversy his initial HBR article generated in his two subsequent books.

Virtualization promises more agile and more efficient local datacenters. It also permits packaging key enterprise application as "virtual appliances". The latter compete directly with centralized "in the cloud" software service providers vision and have several key advantages: they are local, they are cheaper, and they are more maintainable. Delivery of virtual appliances to local datacenters instead of "in the cloud" software services looks to me a more promising technical approach for complex applications with intensive I/O requirements.

The other trend is a higher level of standardization of datacenters ("datacenter in the box"), which permit cheap local datacenters to be installed everywhere. Among examples of this trend are standard shipping container-based datacenters which are now sold by Sun and soon will be sold by Microsoft. They already contain typical services like DNS, mail, file sharing, etc preconfigured. For a fixed cost an organization gets ready-make local datacenter capable of serving mid-size branch or plant. This trend also competes with the idea of software service providers and for a medium size organization might be cheaper in the long run then paying monthly "per user" fees -- a typical cost recovery model of software service providers. It permits streaming both applications and virtual appliances to the local delivery point. For a small organization such a datacenter now can be pre-configured in a couple of servers using Xen or VMware plus necessary routers and switches and shipped in a small rack.

I would like to stress that the power of modern laptop is the factor that should not be underestimated. It completely invalidates Carr's dream of users voluntarily switching to network terminal model inherent is centralized software service provision ( BTW mainframe terminals and, especially, "glass wall datacenters" were passionately hated by users). Such a solution can have a mass appeal only in very limited cases (webmail). I think that users will fight tooth and nail for the preservation of the level of autonomy provided by modern laptops. Moreover, in no way users will agree to sub-standard response time and limited feature set of "in the cloud" applications as problems with Google apps adoption demonstrated.

Can we call Google experiment with creation of Net-based alternative of the Office (Google apps) a failure? I think we can: Google have spend a lot of money and efforts creating them and never got any traction and/or sizable return on investment. After several years this is not even a financially sustainable project. That's why Google is licensing them to Salesforce and other firms. And forget about dreams of denting Microsoft dominance. Office 2003 and 2007 each in its own way were a knockout for such Google dreams. That means that the idea might be flawed because even such an extremely powerful organization as Google with its highly qualified staff and huge server power of datacenters cannot compete with the convenience and speed of running applications locally on modern laptop. It also cannot compete on price: price-wise Microsoft Office can be now classified as shareware: the cost is $25 per application (Excel, PowerPoint, Word, and OneNote) in Microsoft Office Home and Student 2007. So any price wars with Microsoft can be fought only on zero cost basis and taking into account the amount of design efforts and complexity of the achieving compatibility this is not a very good way of investing available cash. Even for organizations flush with money. And Microsoft can any time switch to streaming Office applications to laptops and put Office software service provider in a really difficult position: remote servers need to provide the same amount of computing power per user as the user has on a modern laptop.

Computing power of a modern dual core 2GHz laptops with 2G or 4G of memory and 100G hard drives represent a serious challenge that "in the cloud" providers do not have much chance to overcome. This makes for them difficult to attract individual users money outside advertising-based or other indirect models. It will be even more difficult for them to shake large organizations money loose as corporate users value the independence of locally installed on laptop applications. As well as the ability to store data locally.

Therefore Carr's 2003 vision looks in 2008 even less realistic then it used to be five years earlier. As during those five years datacenters actually continue to grow, Carr's value as a tech trends forecaster is open for review.

Another problem with Carr central "software service provider" vision (aka neo-mainframes vision) is propaganda of "bandwidth communism". Good WAN connectivity is far from being free. As experience of any university datacenter convincingly demonstrates that a dozen of P2P enthusiasts in the neighborhood can prove futility of dreams about free high quality WAN connectivity to any skeptics. In other words this is a typical "tragedy of commons" problem and should be analyzed as such.

Viewing it from this angle makes Carr's views of reliable and free 24x7 communication with remote datacenters unrealistic. This shortcoming can be compensated by properties of some protocols (for example SMTP mail) and for such protocols this is not a problem, but for other it is and always will be. At the same time buying dedicated WAN links can be extremely expensive: for mid-side companies it is usually as expensive as keeping everything in house. That makes problematic "in the cloud" approach to any service where disruptions or low bandwidth in certain times of the day can lead to substantial monetary losses. Also bandwidth is limited: for example OC-1 and OC-3 lines have their upper limit of 51.84Mbit/s and 155.2 Mbit/s correspondingly. And even within organization only a fraction of this bandwidth can be used for business purposes. In practice corporate connection to Internet is used mainly for enterpraiment as in any large organization there are always quite a few "entertainment-oriented" users, who consume lion share of available bandwidth.

Another Carr's folly is overestimation of costs of IT in large corporations. IT costs in large enterprises are already minimized (often 1-3% of total costs) and further minimization does not bring much benefits (what can you save from just 1% of total costs; but you can lose a lot). I do not see any substantial financial gains from cutting a fraction of a percent. And are risks involved in such cuttings, even if they are possible, worth risks of outsourcing your own nerve system ? That translates into the question: "What are principal differences in behavior of those two IT models during catastrophic events ?" The proper answer is: "When disaster strikes the difference between local and outsourced IT staff becomes really critical and entails huge competitive disadvantage for those organizations who weakened their internal IT staff."

That brings us to another problem with Carr's views: he is discounting IQ inherent in local IT staff. If this IQ falls below certain critical threshold, that not only endangers an organization in case of catastrophic events but instantly opens such an enterprise to various form of exploitation by snake-oil salesmen and IT consultants peddling their wares. Also software service providers are not altruists and if they sense that you are really dependent on them or became "IT challenged" they will act accordingly. In other words an important side effect of dismantling of IT organization is that instantly makes a company a donor in the hands of ruthless external suppliers and contractors. Consultants (especially large consultant firms) can help but they also can become part of the problem due to the problem of loyalty. We all know what happened with medicine when doctors were allowed to be bribed by pharmaceutical companies. This situation which is aptly called "Viva Viagra" and in which useless or outright dangerous drags like Vioxx were allowed to became blockbusters was fully replicated in IT: myth about independence of IT consultants is just a myth (and moreover, some commercial IDS/IPS and EMS systems in their destructive potential are not that different from Vioxx ;-).

Carr's recommendation that companies should be more concerned with IT risk mitigation then IT strategy is complete baloney. He just does not have any "in depth" understanding of very complex availability and security issues involved in large enterprise. Neither high availability, nor security cannot be achieved without sound IT architecture. Sound architecture (which is a result of proper "IT strategy" that Carr discounted) is more important then any amount of "risk mitigation" activities which most commonly are simple waist of money or, worse, entail direct harm to the organizations (as SOX enthusiasts from big accounting firms recently aptly demonstrated to the surprised corporate world).

I touched only the most obvious weaknesses of the Carr's vision (or fallacy to be exact). All-in-all Carr proposed just another dangerous utopia and skillfully milked the controversy his initial HBR article generated in his two subsequent books.

Save your money. This book contains nothing but an extended defense of a Utopian vision of the IT future first published in Carr's HBR article. Limited understanding of underlying IT technologies, haziness and lack of concrete detailed examples (obscurantism) are typical marks of Carr's style. Carr used focus on IT shortcomings as a smokescreen to propose a new utopia: users are mastering complex IT packages and perform all functions previously provided by IT staff, while "in the cloud" software service providers fill the rest. This is pretty fine humor, the caricature reminding me mainframe model, but not much more.

Carr's approach to IT is completely anti-historic. He forgot that IT already experienced several dramatic transformations due to new technologies which emerged in 60th, 70th and 90th. Each of those transformations was more dramatic and important then this illusory neo-mainframe revolution which he tried to sell as "bright future of IT" and a panacea from all IT ills. For example, first mainframes replaced "prehistoric" computers. Then minicomputers challenged mainframes ("glass wall" datacenters) and PC ended mainframe dominance (and democratized computing.). In yet another transformation the Internet and TCP/IP (including wireless) converted datacenters to their modern form. What Carr views as the next revolution is just a blip on the screen in comparison with those events in each of which the technology inside the datacenter and on user desks dramatically changed.

His analogies are extremely superficial and are completely unconvincing. Complexity of IT systems has no precedents in human history. That means that analogies with railways and electrical grid are deeply and irrevocably flawed. They do not capture the key characteristics of the IT technology: its unsurpassed complexity and Lego type flexibility. IT became a real nerve system of the modern organizations. Not the muscle system or legs :-)

As for this neo-mainframe vision of "in the cloud" software service providers there are at least three competing technologies which might sideline it: application streaming, virtualization (especially virtual appliances), and "datacenter in the box". That means that "in the cloud" software services is just one of several emerging technical trends and jury is still out how much market share each of them can grab. Application streaming looks like direct and increasingly dangerous competitor for the "in the cloud" software services model.

The key advantage of application streaming is that you use local computing power for running the application, not a remote server. That removes the problem of latency in transmitting video stream generated by GUI interface on the remote server (were the application is running) to the client. Also modern laptops have tremendous computing power that is not easy to match in remote server park. Once you launch the application on the client (from a shortcut ) the remote server streams (like streaming video or audio) the necessary application files to your PC and the application launches. This is done just once. After that application works as if it is local. Also only required files are sent (so if you are launching Excel you do NOT get those libraries that are shared with MS Word if it is already installed).

Virtualization promises more agile and more efficient local datacenters and undercut "in the cloud" software services model in several ways. First of all it permits packaging a set of key enterprise applications as "virtual appliances". the latter like streamed applications run locally, store data locally, are cheaper, have better response time and are more maintainable. This looks to me as a more promising technical approach for complex sets of applications with intensive I/O requirements. For example, you can deliver LAMP stack appliance (Linux-Apache-PHP-MySQL) and use it on a local server for running your LAMP-applications (for example helpdesk) enjoying the same level of quality and sophistication of packaging and tuning as in case of remote software providers. But you do not depend on WAN as users connect to it using LAN which guarantees fast response time. And your data are stored locally (but if you wish they can be backed up remotely to Amazon or to other remote storage provider).

The other trend is the emergence of higher level of standardization of datacenters ("datacenter in the box" trend). It permits cheap prepackaged local datacenters to be installed everywhere. Among examples of this trend are standard shipping container-based datacenters which are now sold by Sun and soon will be sold by Microsoft. They already contain typical services like DNS, mail, file sharing, etc preconfigured. For a fixed cost an organization gets set of servers capable of serving mid-size branch or plant. In this case the organization can avoid paying monthly "per user" fees -- a typical cost recovery model of software service providers. It also can be combined with previous two models: it is easy to stream both applications and virtual appliances to the local datacenter from central location. For a small organization such a datacenter now can be pre-configured in a couple of servers using Xen or VMware plus necessary routers and switches and shipped in a small rack.

I would like to stress that the power and versatility of modern laptop is the factor that should not be underestimated. It completely invalidates Carr's cloudy dream of users voluntarily switching to network terminal model inherent is centralized software service provision ( BTW mainframe terminals and, especially, "glass wall datacenters" were passionately hated by users). Such a solution can have a mass appeal only in very limited cases (webmail). I think that users will fight tooth and nail for the preservation of the level of autonomy provided by modern laptops. Moreover, in no way users will agree to sub-standard response time and limited feature set of "in the cloud" applications as problems with Google apps adoption demonstrated.

While Google apps is an interesting project, they can serve as a litmus test for the difficulties of replacing "installed" applications with "in the cloud" applications. First of all functionality is really, really limited. At the same time Google have spend a lot of money and efforts creating them but never got any significant traction and/or sizable return on investment. After several years of existence this product did not even match the functionality of Open Office. To increase penetration Google recently started licensing them to Salesforce and other firms. That means that the whole idea might be flawed because even such an extremely powerful organization as Google with its highly qualified staff and huge server power of datacenters cannot create an application suit that can compete with preinstalled on laptop applications, which means cannot compete with the convenience and speed of running applications locally on modern laptop.
In case of corporate editions the price is also an issue and Google apps in comparison with Office Professional ($50 per user per year vs. $ 220 for Microsoft Office Professional) does not look like a bargain if we assume five years life scan for the MS Office. The same situation exists for home users: price-wise Microsoft Office can be now classified as shareware (in Microsoft Office Home and Student 2007 which includes Excel, PowerPoint, Word, and OneNote the cost is $25 per application ). So for home users Google need to provide Google apps for free, which taking into account the amount of design efforts and complexity of the achieving compatibility, is not a very good way of investing available cash. Please note that Microsoft can at any time add the ability to stream Office applications to laptops and put "in the cloud" Office-alternative software service provider in a really difficult position: remote servers need to provide the same quality of interface and amount of computing power per user as the user enjoys on a modern laptop. That also suggests existence of some principal limitations of "in the cloud" approach for this particular application domain. And this is not unique case. SAP has problems with moving SAP/R3 to the cloud too and recently decided to scale back its efforts in this direction.

All-in-all computing power of a modern dual core 2-3GHz laptops with 2-4G of memory and 100G-200G hard drives represent a serious challenge for "in the cloud" software services providers. This makes for them difficult to attract individual users money outside advertising-based or other indirect models. It's even more difficult for them "to shake corporate money loose": corporate users value the independence of locally installed on laptop applications and the ability to store data locally. Not everybody wants to share with Google thier latest business plans.

Therefore Carr's 2003 vision looks in 2008 even less realistic then it used to be five years earlier. As during those five years datacenters actually continue to grow, Carr's value as a tech trends forecaster is open for review.

Another problem with Carr central "software service provider" vision (aka neo-mainframes vision) is propaganda of "bandwidth communism". Good WAN connectivity is far from being free. As experience of any university datacenter convincingly demonstrates that a dozen of P2P enthusiasts in the neighborhood can prove futility of dreams about free high quality WAN connectivity to any skeptics. In other words this is a typical "tragedy of commons" problem and should be analyzed as such.

Viewing it from this angle makes Carr's views of reliable and free 24x7 communication with remote datacenters unrealistic. This shortcoming can be compensated by properties of some protocols (for example SMTP mail) and for such protocols this is not a problem, but for other it is and always will be. At the same time buying dedicated WAN links can be extremely expensive: for mid-side companies it is usually as expensive as keeping everything in house. That makes problematic "in the cloud" approach to any service where disruptions or low bandwidth in certain times of the day can lead to substantial monetary losses. Also bandwidth is limited: for example OC-1 and OC-3 lines have their upper limit of 51.84Mbit/s and 155.2 Mbit/s correspondingly. And even within organization not all bandwidth is used for business purposes. There is always quite a few "entertainment-oriented" users, who might strain the connection of the firm to the Internet cloud.

Another relevant question to ask is: "What are benefits to a large organization for implementing Carr's vision." I do not see any substantial financial gains. IT costs in large enterprises are already minimized (often 1-3% of total costs) and further minimization does not bring much benefits (what can you save from just 1% of total costs; but you can lose a lot). Are fraction of a percent savings worth risks of outsourcing your own nerve system ? That translates into the question: "What are principal differences in behavior of those two IT models during catastrophic events ?" The answer is: "When disaster strikes the difference between local and outsourced IT staff becomes really critical and entails huge competitive disadvantage for those organization who weakened their internal IT staff."

That brings us to another problem with Carr's views: he is discounting IQ inherent in local IT staff. If this IQ falls below certain threshold that not only endangers an organization in case of catastrophic events but instantly opens such an enterprise to various form of snake-oil salesmen and IT consultants proposing their wares. Also software service providers are not altruists and if they sense that you are really dependent on them or became "IT challenged" they will act accordingly.

In other words an important side effect of dismantling of IT organization is that instantly makes a company a donor in the hands of ruthless external suppliers and contractors. Consultants (especially large consultant firms) can help but they also can become part of the problem due to the problem of loyalty. We all know what happened with medicine when doctors were allowed to be bribed by pharmaceutical companies. This situation which is aptly called "Viva Viagra" and in which useless or outright dangerous drags like Vioxx were allowed to became blockbusters was fully replicated in IT: myth about independence of IT consultants is just a myth (and moreover, some commercial IDS/IPS and EMS systems in their destructive potential are not that different from Vioxx ;-).

Carr's recommendation that companies should be more concerned with IT risk mitigation then IT strategy is complete baloney. He just does not have any "in depth" understanding of very complex security issues involved in large enterprise. Security cannot be achieved without sound IT architecture and participation of non-security IT staff. Sound architecture (which is a result of proper "IT strategy") is more important then any amount of "risk mitigation" activities which most commonly are simple waist of money or, worse, entail direct harm to the organizations (as SOX enthusiasts from big accounting firms recently aptly demonstrated to the surprised corporate world).

I touched only the most obvious weaknesses of the Carr's vision (or fallacy to be exact). All-in-all Carr proposed just another dangerous utopia and skillfully milked the controversy his initial HBR article generated in his two subsequent books.

Virtualization promises more agile and more efficient local datacenters. It also permits packaging key enterprise application as "virtual appliances". The latter compete directly with centralized "in the cloud" software service providers vision and have several key advantages: they are local, they are cheaper, and they are more maintainable. Delivery of virtual appliances to local datacenters instead of "in the cloud" software services looks to me a more promising technical approach for complex applications with intensive I/O requirements.

The other trend is a higher level of standardization of datacenters ("datacenter in the box"), which permit cheap local datacenters to be installed everywhere. Among examples of this trend are standard shipping container-based datacenters which are now sold by Sun and soon will be sold by Microsoft. They already contain typical services like DNS, mail, file sharing, etc preconfigured. For a fixed cost an organization gets ready-make local datacenter capable of serving mid-size branch or plant. This trend also competes with the idea of software service providers and for a medium size organization might be cheaper in the long run then paying monthly "per user" fees -- a typical cost recovery model of software service providers. It permits streaming both applications and virtual appliances to the local delivery point. For a small organization such a datacenter now can be pre-configured in a couple of servers using Xen or VMware plus necessary routers and switches and shipped in a small rack.

I would like to stress that the power of modern laptop is the factor that should not be underestimated. It completely invalidates Carr's dream of users voluntarily switching to network terminal model inherent is centralized software service provision ( BTW mainframe terminals and, especially, "glass wall datacenters" were passionately hated by users). Such a solution can have a mass appeal only in very limited cases (webmail). I think that users will fight tooth and nail for the preservation of the level of autonomy provided by modern laptops. Moreover, in no way users will agree to sub-standard response time and limited feature set of "in the cloud" applications as problems with Google apps adoption demonstrated.

Can we call Google experiment with creation of Net-based alternative of the Office (Google apps) a failure? I think we can: Google have spend a lot of money and efforts creating them and never got any traction and/or sizable return on investment. After several years this is not even a financially sustainable project. That's why Google is licensing them to Salesforce and other firms. And forget about dreams of denting Microsoft dominance. Office 2003 and 2007 each in its own way were a knockout for such Google dreams. That means that the idea might be flawed because even such an extremely powerful organization as Google with its highly qualified staff and huge server power of datacenters cannot compete with the convenience and speed of running applications locally on modern laptop. It also cannot compete on price: price-wise Microsoft Office can be now classified as shareware: the cost is $25 per application (Excel, PowerPoint, Word, and OneNote) in Microsoft Office Home and Student 2007. So any price wars with Microsoft can be fought only on zero cost basis and taking into account the amount of design efforts and complexity of the achieving compatibility this is not a very good way of investing available cash. Even for organizations flush with money. And Microsoft can any time switch to streaming Office applications to laptops and put Office software service provider in a really difficult position: remote servers need to provide the same amount of computing power per user as the user has on a modern laptop.

Computing power of a modern dual core 2GHz laptops with 2G or 4G of memory and 100G hard drives represent a serious challenge that "in the cloud" providers do not have much chance to overcome. This makes for them difficult to attract individual users money outside advertising-based or other indirect models. It will be even more difficult for them to shake large organizations money loose as corporate users value the independence of locally installed on laptop applications. As well as the ability to store data locally.

Therefore Carr's 2003 vision looks in 2008 even less realistic then it used to be five years earlier. As during those five years datacenters actually continue to grow, Carr's value as a tech trends forecaster is open for review.

Another problem with Carr central "software service provider" vision (aka neo-mainframes vision) is propaganda of "bandwidth communism". Good WAN connectivity is far from being free. As experience of any university datacenter convincingly demonstrates that a dozen of P2P enthusiasts in the neighborhood can prove futility of dreams about free high quality WAN connectivity to any skeptics. In other words this is a typical "tragedy of commons" problem and should be analyzed as such.

Viewing it from this angle makes Carr's views of reliable and free 24x7 communication with remote datacenters unrealistic. This shortcoming can be compensated by properties of some protocols (for example SMTP mail) and for such protocols this is not a problem, but for other it is and always will be. At the same time buying dedicated WAN links can be extremely expensive: for mid-side companies it is usually as expensive as keeping everything in house. That makes problematic "in the cloud" approach to any service where disruptions or low bandwidth in certain times of the day can lead to substantial monetary losses. Also bandwidth is limited: for example OC-1 and OC-3 lines have their upper limit of 51.84Mbit/s and 155.2 Mbit/s correspondingly. And even within organization not all bandwidth is used for business purposes. There is always quite a few "entertainment-oriented" users, who might strain the connection of the firm to the Internet cloud.

Another relevant question to ask is: "What are benefits to a large organization for implementing Carr's vision." I do not see any substantial financial gains. IT costs in large enterprises are already minimized (often 1-3% of total costs) and further minimization does not bring much benefits (what can you save from just 1% of total costs; but you can lose a lot). Are fraction of a percent savings worth risks of outsourcing your own nerve system ? That translates into the question: "What are principal differences in behavior of those two IT models during catastrophic events ?" The answer is: "When disaster strikes the difference between local and outsourced IT staff becomes really critical and entails huge competitive disadvantage for those organization who weakened their internal IT staff."

That brings us to another problem with Carr's views: he is discounting IQ inherent in local IT staff. If this IQ falls below certain threshold that not only endangers an organization in case of catastrophic events but instantly opens such an enterprise to various form of snake-oil salesmen and IT consultants proposing their wares. Also software service providers are not altruists and if they sense that you are really dependent on them or became "IT challenged" they will act accordingly.

In other words an important side effect of dismantling of IT organization is that instantly makes a company a donor in the hands of ruthless external suppliers and contractors. Consultants (especially large consultant firms) can help but they also can become part of the problem due to the problem of loyalty. We all know what happened with medicine when doctors were allowed to be bribed by pharmaceutical companies. This situation which is aptly called "Viva Viagra" and in which useless or outright dangerous drags like Vioxx were allowed to became blockbusters was fully replicated in IT: myth about independence of IT consultants is just a myth (and moreover, some commercial IDS/IPS and EMS systems in their destructive potential are not that different from Vioxx ;-).

Carr's recommendation that companies should be more concerned with IT risk mitigation then IT strategy is complete baloney. He just does not have any "in depth" understanding of very complex security issues involved in large enterprise. Security cannot be achieved without sound IT architecture and participation of non-security IT staff. Sound architecture (which is a result of proper "IT strategy") is more important then any amount of "risk mitigation" activities which most commonly are simple waist of money or, worse, entail direct harm to the organizations (as SOX enthusiasts from big accounting firms recently aptly demonstrated to the surprised corporate world).

I touched only the most obvious weaknesses of the Carr's vision (or fallacy to be exact). All-in-all Carr proposed just another dangerous utopia and skillfully milked the controversy his initial HBR article generated in his two subsequent books.

Save your money. This book contains nothing but an extended defense of a Utopian vision of the IT future first published in Carr's HBR article. Limited understanding of underlying IT technologies, haziness and lack of concrete detailed examples (obscurantism) are typical marks of Carr's style. Carr used focus on IT shortcomings as a smokescreen to propose a new utopia: users are mastering complex IT packages and perform all functions previously provided by IT staff, while "in the cloud" software service providers fill the rest. This is pretty fine humor, the caricature reminding me mainframe model, but not much more.

Carr's approach to IT is completely anti-historic. He forgot that IT already experienced several dramatic transformations due to new technologies which emerged in 60th, 70th and 90th. Each of those transformation was more dramatic and important then this illusory neo-mainframe revolution which he tried to sell as "bright future of IT" and a panacea from all IT ills. For example, first mainframes replaced "prehistoric" computers. Then minicomputers challenged mainframes ("glass wall" datacenters) and PC ended mainframe dominance (and democratized computing.). In yet another transformation the Internet and TCP/IP (including wireless) converted datacenters to their modern form. What Carr views as the next revolution is just a blip on the screen in comparison with those events in each of which the technology inside the datacenter and on user desks dramatically changed.

His analogies are extremely superficial and are completely unconvincing. Complexity of IT systems has no precedents in human history. That means that analogies with railways and electrical grid are deeply and irrevocably flawed. They do not capture the key characteristic of the IT technology: its unsurpassed complexity and Lego type flexibility. IT became a real nerve system of the modern organizations. Not the muscle system or legs :-)

As for this neo-mainframe vision of "in the cloud" software service providers there are at least three competing technological trends which might sideline it: application streaming, virtualization (especially virtual appliances), and "datacenter in the box". That means that "in the cloud" software services is just one of several competing solutions and jury is still out how much market share each of them can grab. Application streaming looks like increasingly dangerous for "in the cloud" software services model alternative.

Streaming software applications from the Net to laptops directly competes with "in the cloud" software services. Once you launch the application on the client (from a shortcut ) the server streams (like streaming video or audio) the necessary application files to your PC and the application launches. But there is an important difference: only required files are sent (so if you are launching Excel you do NOT get the whole 300MB Office!).

Virtualization promises more agile and more efficient local datacenters. It also permits packaging of key enterprise application as "virtual appliances". The latter competes directly with centralized "in the cloud" software service providers vision and have several key advantages: they store data locally, they are cheaper, they have better response time and they are more maintainable. Delivery of virtual appliances to local datacenters instead of "in the cloud" software services looks to me a more promising technical approach for complex applications with intensive I/O requirements. For example you can deliver LAMP stack appliance (Linux-Apache-PHP-Mysql) and use it on a local server for running your LAMP-applications (for example helpdesk) enjoying the same level of quality and sophistication of packaging and tuning as in case of remote software providers. But you do not depend on WAN as users connect to it using LAN which guarantees fast response time. And your data are stored locally (but if you wish it can be backed up remotely to Amazon or other storage providers).

The other trend is a higher level of standardization of datacenters ("datacenter in the box"), which permit cheap local datacenters to be installed everywhere. Among examples of this trend are standard shipping container-based datacenters which are now sold by Sun and soon will be sold by Microsoft. They already contain typical services like DNS, mail, file sharing, etc preconfigured. For a fixed cost an organization gets ready-make local datacenter capable of serving mid-size branch or plant. This trend also competes with the idea of software service providers and for a medium size organization might be cheaper in the long run then paying monthly "per user" fees -- a typical cost recovery model of software service providers. It permits streaming both applications and virtual appliances to the local delivery point. For a small organization such a datacenter now can be pre-configured in a couple of servers using Xen or VMware plus necessary routers and switches and shipped in a small rack.

I would like to stress that the power of modern laptop is the factor that should not be underestimated. It completely invalidates Carr's dream of users voluntarily switching to network terminal model inherent is centralized software service provision ( BTW mainframe terminals and, especially, "glass wall datacenters" were passionately hated by users). Such a solution can have a mass appeal only in very limited cases (webmail). I think that users will fight tooth and nail for the preservation of the level of autonomy provided by modern laptops. Moreover, in no way users will agree to sub-standard response time and limited feature set of "in the cloud" applications as problems with Google apps adoption demonstrated.

Can we call Google experiment with creation of Net-based alternative of the Office (Google apps) a failure? I think we can: Google have spend a lot of money and efforts creating them and never got any traction and/or sizable return on investment. After several years this is not even a financially sustainable project. That's why Google is licensing them to Salesforce and other firms. And forget about dreams of denting Microsoft dominance. Office 2003 and 2007 each in its own way were a knockout for such Google dreams. That means that the idea might be flawed because even such an extremely powerful organization as Google with its highly qualified staff and huge server power of datacenters cannot compete with the convenience and speed of running applications locally on modern laptop. It also cannot compete on price: price-wise Microsoft Office can be now classified as shareware: the cost is $25 per application (Excel, PowerPoint, Word, and OneNote) in Microsoft Office Home and Student 2007. So any price wars with Microsoft can be fought only on zero cost basis and taking into account the amount of design efforts and complexity of the achieving compatibility this is not a very good way of investing available cash. Even for organizations flush with money. And Microsoft can any time switch to streaming Office applications to laptops and put Office software service provider in a really difficult position: remote servers need to provide the same amount of computing power per user as the user has on a modern laptop.

Computing power of a modern dual core 2GHz laptops with 2G or 4G of memory and 100G hard drives represent a serious challenge that "in the cloud" providers do not have much chance to overcome. This makes for them difficult to attract individual users money outside advertising-based or other indirect models. It will be even more difficult for them to shake large organizations money loose as corporate users value the independence of locally installed on laptop applications. As well as the ability to store data locally.

Therefore Carr's 2003 vision looks in 2008 even less realistic then it used to be five years earlier. As during those five years datacenters actually continue to grow, Carr's value as a tech trends forecaster is open for review.

Another problem with Carr central "software service provider" vision (aka neo-mainframes vision) is propaganda of "bandwidth communism". Good WAN connectivity is far from being free. As experience of any university datacenter convincingly demonstrates that a dozen of P2P enthusiasts in the neighborhood can prove futility of dreams about free high quality WAN connectivity to any skeptics. In other words this is a typical "tragedy of commons" problem and should be analyzed as such.

Viewing it from this angle makes Carr's views of reliable and free 24x7 communication with remote datacenters unrealistic. This shortcoming can be compensated by properties of some protocols (for example SMTP mail) and for such protocols this is not a problem, but for other it is and always will be. At the same time buying dedicated WAN links can be extremely expensive: for mid-side companies it is usually as expensive as keeping everything in house. That makes problematic "in the cloud" approach to any service where disruptions or low bandwidth in certain times of the day can lead to substantial monetary losses. Also bandwidth is limited: for example OC-1 and OC-3 lines have their upper limit of 51.84Mbit/s and 155.2 Mbit/s correspondingly. And even within organization not all bandwidth is used for business purposes. There is always quite a few "entertainment-oriented" users, who might strain the connection of the firm to the Internet cloud.

Another relevant question to ask is: "What are benefits to a large organization for implementing Carr's vision." I do not see any substantial financial gains. IT costs in large enterprises are already minimized (often 1-3% of total costs) and further minimization does not bring much benefits (what can you save from just 1% of total costs; but you can lose a lot). Are fraction of a percent savings worth risks of outsourcing your own nerve system ? That translates into the question: "What are principal differences in behavior of those two IT models during catastrophic events ?" The answer is: "When disaster strikes the difference between local and outsourced IT staff becomes really critical and entails huge competitive disadvantage for those organization who weakened their internal IT staff."

That brings us to another problem with Carr's views: he is discounting IQ inherent in local IT staff. If this IQ falls below certain threshold that not only endangers an organization in case of catastrophic events but instantly opens such an enterprise to various form of snake-oil salesmen and IT consultants proposing their wares. Also software service providers are not altruists and if they sense that you are really dependent on them or became "IT challenged" they will act accordingly.

In other words an important side effect of dismantling of IT organization is that instantly makes a company a donor in the hands of ruthless external suppliers and contractors. Consultants (especially large consultant firms) can help but they also can become part of the problem due to the problem of loyalty. We all know what happened with medicine when doctors were allowed to be bribed by pharmaceutical companies. This situation which is aptly called "Viva Viagra" and in which useless or outright dangerous drags like Vioxx were allowed to became blockbusters was fully replicated in IT: myth about independence of IT consultants is just a myth (and moreover, some commercial IDS/IPS and EMS systems in their destructive potential are not that different from Vioxx ;-).

Carr's recommendation that companies should be more concerned with IT risk mitigation then IT strategy is complete baloney. He just does not have any "in depth" understanding of very complex security issues involved in large enterprise. Security cannot be achieved without sound IT architecture and participation of non-security IT staff. Sound architecture (which is a result of proper "IT strategy") is more important then any amount of "risk mitigation" activities which most commonly are simple waist of money or, worse, entail direct harm to the organizations (as SOX enthusiasts from big accounting firms recently aptly demonstrated to the surprised corporate world).

I touched only the most obvious weaknesses of the Carr's vision (or fallacy to be exact). All-in-all Carr proposed just another dangerous utopia and skillfully milked the controversy his initial HBR article generated in his two subsequent books.

Virtualization promises more agile and more efficient local datacenters. It also permits packaging key enterprise application as "virtual appliances". The latter compete directly with centralized "in the cloud" software service providers vision and have several key advantages: they are local, they are cheaper, and they are more maintainable. Delivery of virtual appliances to local datacenters instead of "in the cloud" software services looks to me a more promising technical approach for complex applications with intensive I/O requirements.

The other trend is a higher level of standardization of datacenters ("datacenter in the box"), which permit cheap local datacenters to be installed everywhere. Among examples of this trend are standard shipping container-based datacenters which are now sold by Sun and soon will be sold by Microsoft. They already contain typical services like DNS, mail, file sharing, etc preconfigured. For a fixed cost an organization gets ready-make local datacenter capable of serving mid-size branch or plant. This trend also competes with the idea of software service providers and for a medium size organization might be cheaper in the long run then paying monthly "per user" fees -- a typical cost recovery model of software service providers. It permits streaming both applications and virtual appliances to the local delivery point. For a small organization such a datacenter now can be pre-configured in a couple of servers using Xen or VMware plus necessary routers and switches and shipped in a small rack.

I would like to stress that the power of modern laptop is the factor that should not be underestimated. It completely invalidates Carr's dream of users voluntarily switching to network terminal model inherent is centralized software service provision ( BTW mainframe terminals and, especially, "glass wall datacenters" were passionately hated by users). Such a solution can have a mass appeal only in very limited cases (webmail). I think that users will fight tooth and nail for the preservation of the level of autonomy provided by modern laptops. Moreover, in no way users will agree to sub-standard response time and limited feature set of "in the cloud" applications as problems with Google apps adoption demonstrated.

Can we call Google experiment with creation of Net-based alternative of the Office (Google apps) a failure? I think we can: Google have spend a lot of money and efforts creating them and never got any traction and/or sizable return on investment. After several years this is not even a financially sustainable project. That's why Google is licensing them to Salesforce and other firms. And forget about dreams of denting Microsoft dominance. Office 2003 and 2007 each in its own way were a knockout for such Google dreams. That means that the idea might be flawed because even such an extremely powerful organization as Google with its highly qualified staff and huge server power of datacenters cannot compete with the convenience and speed of running applications locally on modern laptop. It also cannot compete on price: price-wise Microsoft Office can be now classified as shareware: the cost is $25 per application (Excel, PowerPoint, Word, and OneNote) in Microsoft Office Home and Student 2007. So any price wars with Microsoft can be fought only on zero cost basis and taking into account the amount of design efforts and complexity of the achieving compatibility this is not a very good way of investing available cash. Even for organizations flush with money. And Microsoft can any time switch to streaming Office applications to laptops and put Office software service provider in a really difficult position: remote servers need to provide the same amount of computing power per user as the user has on a modern laptop.

Computing power of a modern dual core 2GHz laptops with 2G or 4G of memory and 100G hard drives represent a serious challenge that "in the cloud" providers do not have much chance to overcome. This makes for them difficult to attract individual users money outside advertising-based or other indirect models. It will be even more difficult for them to shake large organizations money loose as corporate users value the independence of locally installed on laptop applications. As well as the ability to store data locally.

Therefore Carr's 2003 vision looks in 2008 even less realistic then it used to be five years earlier. As during those five years datacenters actually continue to grow, Carr's value as a tech trends forecaster is open for review.

Another problem with Carr central "software service provider" vision (aka neo-mainframes vision) is propaganda of "bandwidth communism". Good WAN connectivity is far from being free. As experience of any university datacenter convincingly demonstrates that a dozen of P2P enthusiasts in the neighborhood can prove futility of dreams about free high quality WAN connectivity to any skeptics. In other words this is a typical "tragedy of commons" problem and should be analyzed as such.

Viewing it from this angle makes Carr's views of reliable and free 24x7 communication with remote datacenters unrealistic. This shortcoming can be compensated by properties of some protocols (for example SMTP mail) and for such protocols this is not a problem, but for other it is and always will be. At the same time buying dedicated WAN links can be extremely expensive: for mid-side companies it is usually as expensive as keeping everything in house. That makes problematic "in the cloud" approach to any service where disruptions or low bandwidth in certain times of the day can lead to substantial monetary losses. Also bandwidth is limited: for example OC-1 and OC-3 lines have their upper limit of 51.84Mbit/s and 155.2 Mbit/s correspondingly. And even within organization not all bandwidth is used for business purposes. There is always quite a few "entertainment-oriented" users, who might strain the connection of the firm to the Internet cloud.

Another relevant question to ask is: "What are benefits to a large organization for implementing Carr's vision." I do not see any substantial financial gains. IT costs in large enterprises are already minimized (often 1-3% of total costs) and further minimization does not bring much benefits (what can you save from just 1% of total costs; but you can lose a lot). Are fraction of a percent savings worth risks of outsourcing your own nerve system ? That translates into the question: "What are principal differences in behavior of those two IT models during catastrophic events ?" The answer is: "When disaster strikes the difference between local and outsourced IT staff becomes really critical and entails huge competitive disadvantage for those organization who weakened their internal IT staff."

That brings us to another problem with Carr's views: he is discounting IQ inherent in local IT staff. If this IQ falls below certain threshold that not only endangers an organization in case of catastrophic events but instantly opens such an enterprise to various form of snake-oil salesmen and IT consultants proposing their wares. Also software service providers are not altruists and if they sense that you are really dependent on them or became "IT challenged" they will act accordingly.

In other words an important side effect of dismantling of IT organization is that instantly makes a company a donor in the hands of ruthless external suppliers and contractors. Consultants (especially large consultant firms) can help but they also can become part of the problem due to the problem of loyalty. We all know what happened with medicine when doctors were allowed to be bribed by pharmaceutical companies. This situation which is aptly called "Viva Viagra" and in which useless or outright dangerous drags like Vioxx were allowed to became blockbusters was fully replicated in IT: myth about independence of IT consultants is just a myth (and moreover, some commercial IDS/IPS and EMS systems in their destructive potential are not that different from Vioxx ;-).

Carr's recommendation that companies should be more concerned with IT risk mitigation then IT strategy is complete baloney. He just does not have any "in depth" understanding of very complex security issues involved in large enterprise. Security cannot be achieved without sound IT architecture and participation of non-security IT staff. Sound architecture (which is a result of proper "IT strategy") is more important then any amount of "risk mitigation" activities which most commonly are simple waist of money or, worse, entail direct harm to the organizations (as SOX enthusiasts from big accounting firms recently aptly demonstrated to the surprised corporate world).

I touched only the most obvious weaknesses of the Carr's vision (or fallacy to be exact). All-in-all Carr proposed just another dangerous utopia and skillfully milked the controversy his initial HBR article generated in his two subsequent books.

Save your money. This book adds nothing to the discussion and is just an extended version of Carr's HBR article. In other words this is a typical troll converted into a book.

Complete absence of understanding of underlying IT technologies, haziness and lack of sharp definitions (obscurantism) are typical marks of Carr's style. Carr used focus on IT shortcomings as a smokescreen to propose a new utopia: users are mastering complex IT packages and perform all functions previously provided by IT staff, while " in the cloud" software service providers fill the rest. This is pretty fine humor, the caricature reminding mainframe model, but not much more.

Carr's approach to IT is completely anti-historic. IT already experienced several dramatic transformations due to new technologies which emerged in 60th, 70th and 90th. Each of those transformation was more dramatic and important then this illusory neo-mainframe revolution which he tried to sell as "bright future of IT" and a panacea from all IT ills. For example, first mainframes replaced "prehistoric" computers. Then minicomputer challenged mainframes ("glass wall" datacenters) and PC ended it (and democratized computing.) Next Internet and network connectivity give rise to modern datacenters. What Carr views as the next revolution is just a blip on the screen in comparison with those events.

His analogies are extremely superficial and are completely unconvincing. Complexity of IT systems has no precedents in human history and as such analogies with railways and electrical grid are deeply and irrevocably flawed as they does not capture the key characteristic of the IT technology: its unsurpassed complexity and Lego type flexibility. IT is now a real nerve system of the modern organizations. Not the muscle system or legs and that's how Carr treats it.

As for this neo-mainframe vision of "in the cloud" software service providers there are at least two competing trends which might move this idea to the dustbin of the history: virtualization and "datacenter in the box". Virtualization promises more agile and more efficient datacenters. It also permits packaging key application as "virtual appliances" the model that competes directly with "centralized "in the cloud" software service provider vision and has several key advantages: they are local, they are cheaper and they are more maintainable. Delivery of virtual appliances to local datacenters instead of "in the cloud" software services looks to me a more promising technical approach. Streaming software applications from the Net to laptop creating "rented application" for 24 hours or more is another competing approach.

I would like to stress that the power of modern laptop is the factor that we should not underestimate and it completely invalidates Carr's dream of users voluntarily switching to centralized software service providers. In no way users will agree to sub-standard response time and limited feature set of "in the cloud" applications as problems which Google experienced with Google apps adoption demonstrate. Can we call Google experiment with creation of Net-based alternative of the Office (Google apps) a failure? I think we can: Google have spend a lot of money and efforts creating them and never got any traction and/or sizable return on investment. After several years this is not even a financially sustainable project. And forget about dreams of denting Microsoft dominance. Office 2003 and 2007 each in own way were a knockout for such dreams. That means that even such organization as Google with its highly qualified staff and huge server power of datacenters cannot compete with the convenience and speed of running applications locally on modern laptop. Price-wise Microsoft Office can be now classified as shareware ($30 per application in student and home editions). So any price wars with Microsoft can be fought only on zero cost basis and taking into account the amount of money involved this is not a very good way of investing available cash. Even for organizations flush with money. Taking into account power of modern dual core laptops with 2G or 4G of memory and 100G hard drives "in the cloud" providers do not have much chance to attract individual users money outside advertising-based or other indirect models. It will be even more difficult for them to shake large organizations money loose as corporate users value the independence locally installed on laptop applications provide as well as the ability to store data locally. Therefore Carr's 2003 vision looks in 2008 even less realistic then it used to look five years earlier. As during those five years datacenters actually continue to grow, Carr's value as a tech trends forecaster is open for review.

Another problem with Carr central "software service provider" vision (aka neo-mainframes) is propaganda of "bandwidth communism". Good WAN connectivity is far from being free. As experience of any university datacenter convincingly demonstrates a dozen of P2P enthusiasts in the neighbourhood can prove futility of dreams about free high quality WAN connectivity to any skeptics. In other words this is typical problem of "tragedy of commons" problem and should be analyzed as such.

Viewing it from this angle makes Carr's views of reliable and free 24x7 communication with remote datacenters unrealistic. Buying dedicated WAN links can be extremely expensive: for mid-side companies it is usually as expensive as keeping everything in house. That makes problematic "in the cloud" approach to any service where disruptions or low bandwidth in certain times of the day can lead to substantial monetary losses. Also bandwidth is limited: for example OC-1 and OC-3 have their upper limit of 51.84Mbit/s and 155.2 Mibit/s correspondingly. There are always quite a few game enthusiasts, movies collectors, etc who would like to use all publicly available bandwidth.

The relevant question to ask is: "What are benefits to a large organization for implementing Carr's vision." I do not see any substantial financial gains. IT costs in large enterprises are already minimized (often 1-3% of total costs) and further minimization does not bring much benefits (what can you save from 1% of total costs; but you can lose a lot). Are 1% savings worth risks of outsourcing your own nerve system ? When disaster strikes the difference between local and outsourced IT staff is really critical.

That brings us to another problem with Carr's views: he is discounting IQ inherent in local IT staff. If this IQ falls below certain threshold that instantly opens enterprise to various form of snake-oil salesmen and IT consultants proposing their wares. Also software service providers are not altruists and if they sense that you are really dependent on them or became infotech-wise stupid they will act accordingly.

In other words an important side effect of dismantling of IT organization is that instantly makes a company a donor in the hands of ruthless external supplies and contractors. Consultants (especially large consultant firms) can help but they also can become part of the problem due to the problem of loyalty. We all know what happened with medicine when doctors were allowed to be bribed by pharmaceutical companies. This situation which is aptly called "Viva Viagra" and in which useless or outright dangerous drags like Vioxx were allowed to became blockbusters was fully replicated in IT: myth about independence of IT consultants is just a myth (and moreover, some commercial IDS and EMS systems in their destructive potential are not that different from Vioxx ;-).

Carr's recommendation that companies should be more concerned with IT risk mitigation then IT strategy is complete baloney. He just does not have any "in depth" understanding of very complex security issues involved in large enterprise. Security cannot be achieved without sound IT architecture and participation of non-security IT staff. Sound architecture is more important then any amount of "risk mitigation" activities which most commonly are simple waist of money or worse entail direct harm to the organizations (as SOX enthusiasts from big accounting firms recently aptly demonstrated to the surprised corporate IT world).

I touched only the most obvious weaknesses of the Carr's vision (or fallacy to be exact). All-in-all Carr proposed just another dangerous utopia and skillfully milked the controversy his initial HBR article generated in his two subsequent books.

Some of the other reviewers here have some criticisms of Carr's examples and I think that they are valid, if taken purely from a mechanical perspective. I think that the best part of the book is that Carr goes to great lengths to show why the analogies and comparisons are worthwhile. Whether or not you agree with his specific conclusions about utility computing (or of a specific player/technology), he is squarely pointing towards a future that is upon us now. Anyone that has an interest in how technology is likely to unfold over the next years would be well advised to read this book and consider his perspective.