I found the book absolutely fascinating, especially since I am a mechanical engineer by education and experience. To Engineer is Human covers some of the greatest engineering disasters in modern times such as the Tacoma Narrows bridge collapse, the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkways collapse and the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster.

Henry Petroski explains the engineering disaster in great detail and then explores the causes and effects. He then explores how (if possible) the disaster could have been avoided.

Well written and understandable this book is a masterpiece. One of the primary things that all good engineers do is to contemplate the "lessons learned" after any significant endeavor...whether it has good or bad results. As the old saying goes: Those who don't learn from history are doomed to repeat it!

Engineers as well as anyone else who has an interest in engineering marvels and what can go wrong will find this book entertaining, informative and well researched.

The Re-Discovery of Common Sense: A Guide to: The Lost Art of Critical Thinking

The title suggests a coherent essay on 'failure', but the actual content is a collection of essays loosely brought together by the theme 'engineering is about preventing failure'. Some chapters focus on the history of engineering, others on the nature of failure. If one essay bores you, just flip to the next chapter. The articles can be read in any order. All in all, a very thought provoking book.

This book tries to answer the question of why the stuff built by engineers break, what a stupid quesion. Stuff breaks and stops working all the time, that's why we have quality control in factories. If someone thinks we can make something perfectly the first time and every time he must've been born yesterday or smoking. Think about the first plane built or the first car, the first train, the first computer, MP3 players that stops working in a week, umbrellas that flip in the wind... Maybe people don't die when these things break, maybe they do... but this has always been how technology develops---it improves over time.

The title of the book suggests that things built by God do not fail, wrong! Humans get sick, ozone layer gets holes, species go extinct, the Old Man of the Mountain falls flat on his face, and how about birth defects, the list goes on.

Not a well thought out book. And trust me when I say the writing style puts even a true nerd to sleep.

I purchased this book at the Duke University bookstore, after the recommendation from a professor at another institution.

Petroski's prose is extremely dense and verbose. His style consists of run-on sentences which require several readings. Even if it is technically (grammatically) correct, it is extremely difficult to read. The subject matter is dry to begin with, however, Petroski does nothing to liven it. I am an engineer also, and am not threatened by the technical information (admittedly lifted from his students' term papers). I have chemical engineering textbooks that read like a novel. Hopefully the courses he teaches are clearer than this muddled prose.

Petroski is certainly an engineer. He has engineered an elegant method of making money from saps like us. I successfully engineered Petroski's book into a beverage coaster to help drown the sorrows of wasting $14 on this book.

In this book, Petroski brings up a few good points. Engineering is human. Engineers, as oppose to what some think, are not perfect. They are not able to create a perfect design for the given problem. They create what they believe is the best solution for the given design specifications. They, along with others, test their solution, in theory. The majority of these solutions are created and succeed perfectly. Although most of these designs are successful, some are not.

It seems to be most of the failures of designs happen when it deals with something big, including the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel walkways, which killed over 100 people, or the Tacoma Narrows Bridge. These failures become famous and the engineers are the first ones to be looked at.

Along with engineering success comes failure. This is a part of being human. Human engineering will always have its failures along with its successes. When engineers build something, they analyze it to determine if their solution is the best solution. Sometimes it takes a failure for the engineers to see their failures and to correct the problem. This book tries to explain this and does in most cases. In some of the cases, it leaves the reader wondering what else could have been done or what needs to be done in the future to prevent these failures.

The engineer's profession is notoriously fast-paced, and what is exciting today is ho-hum tomorrow. So it is with the failure cases outlined in this 1992 paperback. Not that these cases are dull - far from it! - but when the addendum at the end of this book was written the Challenger space shuttle had blown up and the disaster was just being figured out. Now we have seen the shuttle Columbia break up, as a result of NASA slowly forgetting the Challenger lessons.

With that problem so noted, I still strongly recommend this book as a great read if you want to find out what the business of failure analysis is. It is perfect for beginning engineers and for those who have an interest in the forensics of hardware like aircraft, bridges, and other structures.

A little wordy. Suggsted for serious work not for casual reader.

The point of the author could be made in 1/2 the pages. The detail and repeated points particularly regarding silverware is overkill and makes it difficult not to abandon the boring book.

A little wordy. Suggsted for serious work not for casual reader.

This little gem is an analysis of engineering failures, and the learning that occurs due to these failures. While he is himself a professor of engineering, Petroski uses language comprehensible to the layman making this book accessible to almost anyone. During the course of the book he argues that engineering is part art and part science, and that as a discipline engineers focus on building safe, affordable, and reliable things (from paper clips to airliners) to meet a set of requirements. He goes on to elaborate that, being human, engineers make errors and sometimes spectacular failures ensue. The key, he argues, is that once errors are exposed, engineers can glean knowledge from those problems to improve future designs.

He uses accessible examples that most people can readily relate to, from researching failure modes on one of his son's toys (the components used most frequently failed first, just like a frequently used light bulb burns out more quickly due to metal fatigue and subsequent cracking), to the deadly collapse of the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel walkways, which killed over 100 people. He also discusses easy to comprehend failures (suspension bridges in strong wind), and more intricate interactions, such as was revealed in the Chicago DC-10 accident. Throughout, he retains an aura of good humor and approachability, which makes this book far more readable than most books in this field.

My only complaint about the book is not even the fault of Mr. Petroski at all: the font in the book is very small, and combined with small borders, the book is a bit tough to physically read. Small matter, though, as once you start the book, you will not want to put it down. Well done.

With entire books on the pencil and on bookcases, Petroski has established himself as an author who knows how to make anyone look at everyday items in a different light. Whereas these books explain how objects work, in "To Engineer Is Human," Petroski cites why engineers are responsible for design flaws that cause failure. Being a professor of civil engineering, Petroski shows his expertise in this area. This book is for those who are interested in studying engineering, are already engineers, or are just interested in the "why" of accidents. To be able to understand this book, though, you should do some research on these accidents because Petroski assumes you have heard of them. These include the DC-10 accident in 1979 in Chicago, the 1940 Tacoma Narrows Bridge collapse, and the tragic 1981 Hyatt Regency Skywalk disaster, which killed 114 people.

Petroski is clever with his chapter headings, such as "Success Is Foreseeing Failure" and "When Cracks Become Breakthroughs," which could be considered good rules for civil engineers to follow. I think this is a great book for those interested in engineering, if they have done their homework before coming to class.

I read this book right after having read Samuel Florman's "The Existential Pleasures of Engineering," and it suffers somewhat in comparison. Both writers give themselves the same basic thesis: as Petroski states in the Preface, "this book is my answer to the questions `What is engineering?' and `What do engineers do?'"

While Florman's brilliant work truly does explain the role of engineering among man's intellectual pursuits, as well the passion that drives engineers (the "what" and "why" of the profession), Petroski has produced a work much more focused on the "how" or process of engineering, in particular structural / civil engineering. In this book, Petroski answers best a somewhat more mundane question posed to him by a neighbor: how could the skywalks in the Kansas City Hyatt Regency collapse in 1981?

Petroski does a decent job explaining why engineering, like any other profession performed by human beings in a universe with non-zero entropy and finite time and money, cannot achieve perfection. He fills his book with many examples of infamous structural engineering failures, from the pyramids of Egypt to present day. Almost all of these are enthralling to anyone with a modicum of interest in the subject matter; the one exception is Petroski's postulate as to the failures of his aged kitchen knives. After having read Petroski's book, the reader will understand why there will continue to be engineering failures far into the future (this is not to say that the rate of failures cannot be decreased).

Besides not achieving as broad a thesis as he may have intended, the other main problem with Petroski's book is its repetitiveness of his major lessons, namely that engineers can learn more from failures than successes, and are duty-bound to analyze failures for learning opportunities. While valuable, these lessons are repeated in almost every chapter, such that any one chapter could stand alone as an individual essay on the topic. A final issue for readers to consider is how much of Petroski's book is relevant to other branches of engineering besides structural / civil. Certainly not every engineer is designing objects whose failure could endanger human life, and many in the software profession would say that most of their lessons on how to design software come from studying algorithms and the designs of successful programs. However, by erring on the side of caution, one can claim Petroski's book applies to all engineering as well as other professions, particularly medicine.

I would recommend Petroski's book foremost to structural / civil engineers, and next to all engineers and others interested in the engineering design process.

I am not really sure how I came across this book. I think it was by following relevant links on Amazon. Anyway I bought this as well as The Evolution of Useful Things at the same time. I found this a very insightful reading in light of my occupation as a software engineer. Several of my coworkers recently had an email conversation regarding the quailty of software engineered products vs. "real" engineer's and their feats of construction, bridges, airplanes and buildings all things that Petroski covers in details.

Some additional thoughts on how structural engineering is different from Enterprise Application Software Engineering:

1. --In general software is unlimited, where as Structural Engineering has natural laws. Higher level Patterns are pretty constant, where as within the created construct of software they are reinvited (Object Patterns, EJB Patterns)
2. --structures have the added requirement of no death, where as Enterprise Software only has revenue associated with it, not as powerful a motivator as death.
3. --software is interactive with behavior, where as a bridge is a bridge

http://www.niffgurd.com/mark/books/2002.html#eng

Not many photographs or illustrations. If it is supposed to be a fun easy read - illustrations and photos would be there for the nontechnical reader. If it's going to be a professional analysis it needs to catagorize the failures and cover them in a more orderly manner. It seemed to be a confusing mixture lacking direction, very wordy with lots of digression. I was hoping to nurture my, high school junior, daughter's interested in engineering without getting one of the "text book" engineering failure books. This didn't draw her in at all, even though we had recently been talking about some of the failures that are supposed to be covered in this book.
I am returning this and going for a more professional failure analysis books that caught my interest years ago.

A deep insight into complex problem solving; it isn't done in a single brilliant step but in smaller steps while learning from our mistakes.

This isn't a very good book in my opinion, and it's a shame because it's a very strong thesis excellently presented. But all too briefly and too thinly demonstrated. A really great idea that seems to have fizzled for some reason.

The basic idea is that engineering is commonly imagined (at least by people outside of engineering) to be a matter of systematically studying a problem and crafting a great solution. The reality, as the author explains very well, is that engineering efforts viewed in retrospect are more like hypotheses or good guesses at solutions. We craft something that works, and then see the weaknesses and learn from them for the next improvement.

The point is that improvements are not simply a matter of meeting new customer demands or adding new features, nor even just correcting avoidable mistakes. Some corrections and improvements are neccessary because complex systems have aspects that really can't reasonably be predicted at design time. The mistakes don't just arise because engineers are less than perfect, but are an intrinsic part of the process of human beings engineering complex designs in the real world. There is rarely if ever even the potential for creating a flawless perfect design that anticipates all likely contingencies and second and third order causal effects of even simple changes.

Whether a "zero defect" mentality is helpful or not as an ideal, it doesn't reflect how engineering actually works, at least when complex systems are involved. The reality of human engineering is that intermediate failures are an important part of the process. Engineering methodology needs to take this into account, and make best use of it, or else lead engineers in a futile struggle for a perfect initial design and forever wonder why they fail.

Although the I think the idea is very solid, useful, and important, this book certainly lacks the depth it needed to make the point and would have made an excellent chapter in a more detailed book. There are important issues raised here, but not answered, about how to improve the engineering process based on this insight into the role of failures.

As a companion to this, I recommend Dietrich Dorner's cognitive science account of the origin of planning failure in complex systems in "The Logic of Failure." Dorner explains in more detail, with the help of his problem situation simulation research, why consequences are so difficult to forsee and plan for.