This work is a very extensive examination of the tactics used by Arab small units. It goes into vivid detail about their ambush techniques as well as other aspects of how they fight. The only serious issue I have with it is it is difficult to read at times. Mr. Poole uses many quotes especially block quotes which are very useful and come from legitimate sources. However, these quotes hurt the flow of the book and make it very choppy to read. If you can work past this flaw though it is a great resource.

This book is excellent. It should be required reading for both military Officers and Non Commissioned Officers. This book gives an ever day insight into the tatics used by Mid-Eastern terrorist.

If you want to truly understand how difficult it is to fight and win in the Middle East, then this book is required reading. Far too often we get watered-down information out of the press and on the Internet but the tactics of our Eastern adversaries go unmentioned. We know of suicide bombs, but where did this tactic originate? Which group in the Middle East is the most proficient at close-range combat? Where does Al Qaeda excel and what is the role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard? Are Sunni and Shia groups always adversaries, or will they work together when faced with a common enemy?



This book gives countless examples of diffent tactics in different areas of the world from Afghanistan to Chechnya to the Levant. It illustrates the strengths of our adversaries and addresses our own weaknesses as a "Western" army. Finally, Poole makes recommendations on how we can win this fight through better light infantry tactics and restrained use of preparatory fire and air power.



It is in my opinion the best book yet on this "4th Generation" warfare. It is an outstanding read and will make you an expert amongst your friends when discussing the current state of military affairs in the Middle East.

If you want to truly understand how difficult it is to fight and win in the Middle East, then this book is required reading. Far too often we get watered-down information out of the press and on the Internet but the tactics of our Eastern adversaries go unmentioned. We know of suicide bombs, but where did this tactic originate? Which group in the Middle East is the most proficient at close-range combat? Where does Al Qaeda excel and what is the role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard? Are Sunni and Shia groups always adversaries, or will they work together when faced with a common enemy?

This book gives countless examples of diffent tactics in different areas of the world from Afghanistan to Chechnya to the Levant. It illustrates the strengths of our adversaries and addresses our own weaknesses as a "Western" army. Finally, Poole makes recommendations on how we can win this fight through better light infantry tactics and restrained use of preparatory fire and air power.

It is in my opinion the best book yet on this "4th Generation" warfare. It is an outstanding read and will make you an expert amongst your friends when discussing the current state of military affairs in the Middle East.

If you want to truly understand how difficult it is to fight and win in the Middle East, then this book is required reading. Far too often we get watered-down information out of the press and on the Internet but the tactics of our Eastern adversaries go unmentioned. We know of suicide bombs, but where did this tactic originate? Which group in the Middle East is the most proficient at close-range combat? Where does Al Qaeda excel and what is the role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard? Are Sunni and Shia groups always adversaries, or will they work together when faced with a common enemy?

This book gives countless examples of diffent tactics in different areas of the world from Afghanistan to Chechnya to the Levant. It illustrates the strengths of our adversaries and addresses our own weaknesses as a "Western" army. Finally, Poole makes recommendations on how we can win this fight through better light infantry tactics and restrained use of preparatory fire and air power.

It is in my opinion the best book yet on this "4th Generation" warfare. It is an outstanding read and will make you an expert amongst your friends when discussing the current state of military affairs in the Middle East.

The book is a strange mix of useful info and a fiction. A lot of useful info will keep you reading even when some very strange things are read in the process. The book is based on a very limited number of sources, most of them not really objective or scientific enough to even be quoted, or simply too old to be relevant. Some perspectives are odd, to say the least - and it hurts the book's credibility. It's a pity that such an incredibly interesting subject can suffer so much from the presentation and ilogical argument. Because the errors are so obvious it is easy to filter them out and concentrate on the good stuff. Worth reading for people really interested in the subject of Islamist warfare tacticics and techniques. The reason we are still alive is that those people are as good as the book portraits them to be.

I would highly encourage any person who is Battalion staff or lower to read this book. All Army and Marine personnel should read this book on the jet flying them to Iraq or Afghanistan. This book will give a typical soldier or marine a good snap shot of how the Eastern combat mind thinks. Also, unlike much propaganda to the contrary, the Islamic soldiers fight using Eastern techniques. There is more hand-to-hand fighting than in the past. American's just can't call in their massive fire support because the targets may not be easy to hit.

This book is great for privates, sergeants, lieutenants, and captains. I don't know if the advice will be taken if it's read at the level of battalion or above. That is where the "rubber no longer meets the road". The staff disconnect from the soldiers begins.

For all war fighters this book is a must read. All ROTC departments, Marine, and Army infantry should have this book as required reading.

I would highly encourage any person who is Battalion staff or lower to read this book. All Army and Marine personnel should read this book on the jet flying them to Iraq or Afghanistan. This book will give a typical soldier or marine a good snap shot of how the Eastern combat mind thinks. Also, unlike much propaganda to the contrary, the Islamic soldiers fight using Eastern techniques. There is more hand-to-hand fighting than in the past. American's just can't call in their massive fire support because the targets may not be easy to hit.

This book is great for privates, sergeants, lieutenants, and captains. I don't know if the advice will be taken if it's read at the level of battalion or above. That is where the "rubber no longer meets the road". The staff disconnect from the soldiers begins.

For all war fighters this book is a must read. All ROTC departments, Marine, and Army infantry should have this book as required reading.

During seven months in Falluja in 2005 I spent approximately 150 days in the city. The history alone in this book showed us just how much we may have been underestimating our enemies, and that if they followed their classical influences they could have done much more damage.

The history is priceless dating back to influences of the Samarai and how it came to bring the original Middle Eastern assassins, and how today's suicide bombers are like those in the past, only they have explosives instead of knives, and do not need as much skill.

John Poole had spent close to 30 years in the Marine Corps leading men as both a gunnery sergeant (when enlisted) and a Lt Colonel (when commissioned). He saw Vietnam first hand, and left feeling that he could have done more for the men he'd led. Although the officers that are in charge of teaching battle field skills are not fast to accept his methods the men on the ground who deal with the enemies in the streets of Iraqi cities know he is right.

As a retired military officer, I think highly of Poole's books, including this one - he provides practical information that could save lives if they were required reading for our troops being sent to Iraq and Afghanistan.

This book should be read by a variety of folks that desire to understand even a little bit more about what is happening and happening to US in the middle east. It is not a book that spends countless pages complaining about the state of union. This book will enable the tip of the spear as we are so fond of referring to our fighting forces, concise and credible information with regard to the mindset of their opposing forces. I have been told over and over, that you cannot defeat an opponent unless you understand how he/she thinks. It does shed some light on how the military-industrial complex is steering the people of many countries wrong by proposing extensive, expensive weapon systems that separate the men from the battle and advertise a zero loss of life war for our side. (Both sides should just throw rocks, it'll be simpler) And above all it mentions the one issue that is generating higher and higher turnover rates, ARMCHAIR war fighters, and the military personnel system, that rewards compliance and not innovation, that condones individualist and fails to properly reward teamwork. Battles should be fought from front to back and not the reverse as we are doing. I recommend this book to all, and not just to those in uniform.

The book was very informative though appeared padded by newspaper accounts of terrorist activities which made the book longer than it really needed to be. Excellent historical background which linked the past with the present, providing a how and why of our present circumstances.

The title of "Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods" should more accurately read, "An (Overly)Simplistic Primer on Mideast Politics." For every 1 sentence that reveals actual guerrilla warfare tactics there is approximately 3-5 pages of irrelevant political bloat. I bought a book with the terms "combat methods" in the title for one reason - to learn about combat methods. What did I get? A verbose tome about the friggin' history of Hezbollah, the fundamental differences between Shiite and Sunni, blah, blah, blah. Everything but "combat methods." Where's the chapter on how to manufacture IEDs? The chapter on sniper tactics? We KNOW they use IEDs and snipers. We get that information every day on the news. Tell us specifically HOW they use them as your title promises to do!

To add insult to injury, this exercise in prolixity is written from a pro-Israel / Zionist-sympathic view. Thus, the Israeli terrorists are "soldiers" while those nasty dastardly brown-skinned Arabs are "guerillas," "insurgents," "terrorists," and the like. Anyone who uses such terms without a more discerning critical analysis of them is too ignorant to be worthy of publication. The government gives us enough rhetoric and propaganda to go around, thank you.

This book, vis-à-vis its title, is the quintessence of consumer [...]

H. John Poole takes up the banner he flies in his earlier work The Tiger's Way. He addresses the challenges of what he calls Eastern-style light infantry fighting a Western-style force with the added wrinkle of Middle Eastern guerilla/insurgency. Poole's work in Crescent Moon is needed. Westerners look down our collective noses at Middle Eastern military capability. Poole attempts to shake us out of our arrogant torpor by analyzing just how the Afghans defeated the Soviets, how the Chechens are defeating the Russians, and how the Iraqi insurgency is making progress in Iraq. Unfortunately, Poole does not offer many specific solutions. However, I can overlook this shortcoming because I believe Poole's real focus is on convincing his readers that there is a problem. No solution will be palatable to Westerners until Westerners believe a solution might be needed.

Poole's model of Eastern light infantry emphasizes low-level decision making, flexibility, and an emphasis on deception, camouflage, surprise, ambush, and misdirection. Eastern light infantry fight their Western opponents by hiding from Western firepower in the earth. Eastern light infantry fights at night using infiltration along thoroughly-reconnoitered routes. Whereas the Western commander uses map reconnaissance, preparatory bombardment, and positive control from the top, the Eastern commander sends his people to scan every inch of the target area, then solicits their input into the plan before having his infantry launch their assault from hand grenade range.

Placed in a Middle Eastern guerilla context, Eastern light infantry becomes a highly decentralized force that concentrates where and when it wishes. When circumstances aren't favorable, the Middle Eastern fighter melts away. The Middle Eastern fighter uses the ground for protection and concealment, much like his Far Eastern counterpart. The Middle Eastern fighter uses the civilian population for concealment, and he draws support from the civilians. Suicide bombers are a Middle Eastern twist that has a lengthy history.

According to Poole, defeating Middle Eastern insurgents will mean taking them and their methodologies seriously. As long as Westerners dismiss their Middle Eastern foes as unwashed Muslim fanatics, Westerners will fail to see how and why Afghans drove out the Soviet Union, Chechens have fought Russia into a bloody stalemate, and Iraqi insurgents continue to plague US forces in Iraq. Understanding the enemy is the first step towards defeating him. Poole offers us Tactics of the Crescent Moon so that we might understand who the shadowy foes of the West are.

Unlike many other reviewers, I am only interested in military affairs, not a professional. I definitely liked this book, at times.

There are really 3 parts to it:

- Review of past Muslim/Middle Eastern tactics, mostly in Afghanistan. There is excellent value in knowing what was done, just to avoid it happening to you. Not all armies fight like Western armies, especially now. Is all of it well presented and researched? Not sure, but there are surely gems to be found in the case studies, such as the practice of attacks to lure reaction units out of their base, to attack them as they come out.

- Some speculations on who is behind the current unrest in Afghanistan and Iraq. Iran is named at every turn, perhaps more than bombings against Shias in Iraq would seem to warrant. But China too??? Shaky analysis here and perhaps of limited usefullness anyway. Who cares, at the _tactical_ level, which is the book's reason for existence.

- Suggestions and criticisms of current Western tactics.

If our airforce regularly drops bombs on civilian houses to kill terrorists, do you think we have a moral high ground against someone who uses IEDs against our troops? Poole doesn't think so. Leaving asides the questions of ethics, killing enough civilians by mistake will drive other civilians to support the rebels. Do it for long enough and you will suffer more casualties than if you had opted for riskier and more surgical tactics. Besides you don't have to convince me of your moral superiority, you have to convince the Afghanis/Iraqis. Yeah, Zarqawi got what he deserved that way, but after many mistaken bomb runs. Those civilians deaths may not always make it to CNN, but you can bet they make AlJazeera's news.

Inability to foster and nurture innovation at the small unit level. Reminds of a book I read about VC tunnels and US tactics. The US tried everything - tear gas, sending men into the tunnels, etc... The one real success story seems to have been a colonel who just parked his regiment on top of a tunnel complex and shot/captured anybody that came up over a period of days. Unfortunately that tactic never came up on the Pentagon radar screen and was never followed up. Is there a process to capture tactical innovation? This is similar to what Toyota did when it allowed assembly line workers to shut off production lines in case of failure and asked for their input.

Wrong equipment/training emphasis. Face it, until/if China becomes an enemy (keeping fingers crossed that never happens), the US isn't looking at full army-to-army contests. So soldiers need to know much more about policing, investigation and crowd control. Soft skills and man to man combat, not just laser guided bombs. Guerrilla wars will be won by who best provides relief to the civilian population, while neutralizing the other side's coercions. Finally, winning will require moral leadership at the top level, to avoid line soldiers losing their moral compass in what is a much more stressful situation than any of us civilians can imagine.

Most worrying of all is Poole's warning that US/coalition forces are gradually withdrawing into fortified bases and control nothing much. When they do come out, they use heavy AFVs and choppers and end up posing little risk to rebels as long as the rebels do not try to challenge them. Canadian forces in Kandahar are now urgently asking for tactical transport helicopters to avoid IEDs. Fine for attacking identified enemy locations, probably not so good at locating those enemies in the first place though.

All my best wishes to the troops out there, who deserve our support until our governments decide their mission is over. If you don't like those wars, then change the governments.

This is an interesting read for those who are not in the military or just want an overview of terrorism or terrorist tactics. It lacks any real historical context (despite some pretences to one). The mystical/oriental slant to the book is kind of hokey to anyone who has seen real terrorists in action. There are better books around.

First off, all John Poole's books should be required reading by the Secretary of Defense down to the grunt in the field and more military units should go through his course. (Check out his website at www.posteritypress.org for more information.) Secondly, this particular book and his later work Militant Tricks: Battlefield Ruses of the Islamic Insurgent should be MANDATORY READING for every soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan. If you're headed that way buy these books! Put them in a ziplock bag and place them in your racksack. If you have a loved one who's deploying to either one of these theaters of operation and they don't know about these books buy these books for them! They may very well save their lives!

Right from the very beginning of this information-packed, meticulously researched and documented primer on the thinking, tactics, and training methods of today's terrorist threats, I repeatedly asked myself, "Why have we not heard more about this book, and why is it not required reading for all members of the Defense Department?"

Poole very clearly described the adaptive and holistic nature of the challenges posed by our adversaries in our ongoing global war on terrorism. Through historical analysis and his experienced infantryman's perspectives, Poole was able to show how low-tech, determined and fanatical small units can neutralize or defeat modern firepower-dependent high-tech forces when they combine social, tactical, cultural, societal, political, spiritual, and psychological norms and methods into an integrated strategy. Poole made a very compelling case that failure to understand this holistic strategy and a failure to appreciate the strategic value of exceptionally-trained, autonomous, light-infantry forces to combat that strategy is the perfect breeding ground for terrorists and the initial steps down the path to ultimate defeat.

Provocative and thought-provoking, Poole's questions and observations about the present state of our ground combat forces relative to our main threats are certainly relevant in any discussion of how to approach today's style of warfare (fourth-generation warfare) that has been evolving for generations:

*"In a world where unconventional warfare has become the state of the art, firepower no longer ensures victory."
*"How could Muslim guerrillas with hand-held weaponry have defeated Soviet and Israeli regulars with "state-of-the-art" aircraft, artillery, and tanks? Did those guerrillas enjoy a tactical advantage at short range? If so, will American troops fare any better against them in close terrain?"
* "...[O]ne wonders what will now happen to tactical reformers in the United States. Will their constructive criticism be construed as providing comfort to the enemy? Without admitting to an occasional battlefield loss, the U.S. military would have no reason to take corrective action. Its "top-down" bureaucracy prevents it from rapidly adjusting to guerrilla initiatives."
*"America Must Not Respond in Kind to Evil" (section title)
*"Tactics and Morality Are Not Mutually Exclusive" (section title)

If you truly want a new perspective of what is going on inside and behind today's headlines, read this book. You may not agree with Poole's perspectives, but I guarantee he will challenge and stimulate your thinking about how our military and our coalition partners are doing in the global war on terrorism, and how we can possibly do better in the years to come.

This book definitely has it's moments. It's a fun book to read and there are some good insights in it. "Insights" might be too strong of a word though. It provides good explanations of how various muslim militants fight and tries to construct an overarching, almost theoretical, framework for what they do. This is good stuff, the problem with the book is that it's rather redundant and parts of it don't seem to be that important to the central theme. The book is amateurish. On page xxiv there is a picture of a guy riding a camel with a cactus in the background. Cactuses are new world plants, there are none in the middle east or africa. To make matters worse that picture is taken from the _corel clip art gallery_. This may not affect the text content but it's a bad start. The author mentions a book "devil's guard" which he talks about like it's non-fiction but it's actually a fictional book. The author writes that lebanese hizbollah is active in Iraq, which is highly unlikely. He thinks that all muslim militant/terrorist groups everywhere are working together. This may not raise any eyebrows with a lot of the flag waving ex-military guys buying this book but it's still not true. This is would be a good book to borrow from a friend, not buy.

Every American, and more specifically every politician, concerned citizen, and American Soldier, Marine, Sailor, and Airman must read this book.

Poole tells it how it is with no strings attached. Poole is unfettered by military regulation, politics, or any other connections that might encourage a person to sustain the current established practices that ultimately get good people killed.

I have my own opinion regarding those that are overly critical of Poole's books. They most likely fall into one or more of three catagories of readers: 1) Those who have never slung lead for a living. 2)Those who don't want our people better understand the threat facing our military i.e. keeping the tip of the spear blunt. Or, 3) people who make money supplying advanced weapon systems at the highest price to the government.

Buy, read, and re-read Poole's books. Power is the correct application of knowledge.

Having read the book and been impressed with how author join Poole has distilled into a readable and understandable format, the tactics techniques and ideology of muslim fighters, I have gained a perspective on their tactical methods that I did not have or could not have learned by a generalized study.

Gunny Poole has done the hard work of research for the grunt and special operations soldier. It is a book that gives a TACTICAL perspective explaining the subtleties of the eastern (south west asia in this case) tactical mindset.

As a current Special Forces soldier who has been to both Afghanistan and Iraq I RECCOMEND THIS BOOK.

I am also humbled by the experience and knowledge of those here and elsewhere who have reviewed and reccommended Gunny Poole's books and only offer my perspective from a sergeant's and operators viewpoint.

This book is not meant to give a big picture theorist a perspective on middle eastern culture and geo politics. And rightly so. It is a thought provoking and pertinent study for the soldier on the ground. Fighting the militants (insurgent).

No military study is currently availble that gives the tactical mindset and explains it as Mr Poole has. The only other that comes close is Afghan Guerilla war, a series of vignettes in the words of the Afghan mujahideen, which the soldier then has to try to figure out their tactical method within the given context.

Gunny Poole's Book Tactics of the Crescent Moon is better way for soldiers to learn the enemy.

If you want a book about US failures and how our real strategy is land and resource aquisition as one reviewer here lamented about, look elesewhere.

This book is for the guy on the ground who will be doing the fighting and the men that will plan and lead those operations.

Having read the book and been impressed with how author join Poole has distilled into a readable and understandable format, the tactics techniques and ideology of muslim fighters, I have gained a perspective on their tactical methods that I did not have or could not have learned by a generalized study.

Gunny Poole has done the hard work of research for the grunt and special operations soldier. It is a book that gives a TACTICAL perspective explaining the subtleties of the eastern (south west asia in this case) tactical mindset.

As a current Special Forces soldier who has been to both Afghanistan and Iraq I RECCOMEND THIS BOOK.

I am also humbled by the experience and knowledge of those here and elsewhere who have reviewed and reccommended Gunny Poole's books and only offer my perspective from a sergeant's and operators viewpoint.

This book is not meant to give a big picture theorist a perspective on middle eastern culture and geo politics. And rightly so. It is a thought provoking and pertinent study for the soldier on the ground. Fighting the militants (insurgent).

No military study is currently availble that gives the tactical mindset and explains it as Mr Poole has. The only other that comes close is Afghan Guerilla war, a series of vignettes in the words of the Afghan mujahideen, which the soldier then has to try to figure out their tactical method within the given context.

Gunny Poole's Book Tactics of the Crescent Moon is better way for soldiers to learn the enemy.

If you want a book about US failures and how our real strategy is land and resource aquisition as one reviewer here lamented about, look elesewhere.

This book is for the guy on the ground who will be doing the fighting and the men that will plan and lead those operations.

To begin this look at H. John Poole's latest work, let's outline what it's not -
- Not a Middle East History tome;
- Not a guide to recent terror operations;
- Not a tactical discussion; and
- Not an approach to military reform.
No, it is not any one of the above - it combines all these into a coherent, concise guide to anyone interested in understanding our military problems in the Middle East.
Section one discusses Muslim military campaigns from Gallipoli during WWI to Israel's expulsion from Lebanon by the Hezbollah. Section two examines the different Muslim militant groups. Section three provides one of the first coherent looks at Muslim militant groups' training and tactical techniques - and tactical approaches to defeating them.
Certain themes, appearing in other works by Poole, as well as in "Tactics...", compare and contrast U.S. military traits and capabilities to our Muslim opponents', to include the following:
"Us" - doctrinally driven, top-down training environment; versus
"them" - bottom-up, experimentally driven.
"Us" - squads depend on artillery fire to advance; versus
"them" - primary groups that can move unnoticed.
"Us" - occuppies ground; versus
"them" - consolidates regions.
"Us" - training instructors stick to standardized procedures; versus "them' - training techniques developed through experience.
"Us" - enhance control by standardizing tactical procedures; versus "them" - disseminating battle-tested techniques for refinement through practice.
"Us" - handicapped by inane bureaucratic procedure; versus
"them" - copying tactical ideas from any source and experimenting under simulated battle conditions... A lot of America's adversaries, of late, seem to have these traits.
Poole also notes that to beat the Muslim terrorist in the military domain, our forces must, among other things -
- recognize the strategic significance of non-combatants and not treat them as so many expendable sacks of potatoes;
- provide the infantry squads with a much higher level of tactical training; and
- learn to evolve tactically on the primary group level.
Military reform has been bantered about in terms of "hi-tech" improvements to military infrastructure and precision "first-strike" weapons; Poole looks at the wars we fight now and notes that success will depend more on the "software" in the brain-housing groups of our infantrymen than that in our computers. Fourth Generation Warfare doesn't depend on hi-tech hardware and inexhaustible supplies of munitions - the guarantor of Western hegemony in the Twentieth Century - it depends on keen intelligence networks - humint as well as techint - agile tactical evolution of the mix of forces, their methodologies and training, and decentralized command. Most of our recent technology has facilitated ever more centralized direction of forces.
Will the U.S. war colleges and staff academies be looking carefully in Poole's recommended directions for military reform? Perhaps not - but Poole is addressing the conflict we'refighting. Anyone headed to Iraq or Afghanistan will find "Tactics of the Crescent Moon" a worthwhile read.

As a student of Middle Eastern Culture and the Arabic language as well as a someone who intends on entering the military upon graduating, I find this book very enlightening as to the tactics of muslim militants. While some explainations are very brief the book covers many different aspects of terrorist methodology. I highly recommend it to anyone interested in terrorism or 4th generation warfare.

As a Career Marine I understand tactics. Poole breaks it down so that the small unit leader can better understand and interpret intelligence. His ability to walk you through each scenario and give you a concise look into the enemy's thoughts and reasoning allows small unit leaders to train their personnel on the proper techniques to defeat the enemy. Because he has over 30 years of experience, conducts intense research and has the ability to be put it into words, he is the perfect author of a book on tactics. This book should be required reading for every member of the US Armed Forces.

Tactics of the Crescent Moon takes over 340 pages to tell us that opposing Muslim forces utilize unconventional methods to wage war. Nothing new here.

Some interesting facts have been cobbled together by Mr. Poole, but this isn't a profound work of any sort. This reads more like a term paper by a promising freshman.

The historical antidotes are interesting but brief. The references to Vietnam actually remind us that yes, history repeats itself (ah but so soon!). Mr. Poole doesn't state this, but one may realize that the U.S. is again asserting it's desire to acquire real-estate. And again it is under the pretenses of establishing democracy, as it looses the war to a primitive, yet determined force that just may be morally superior.

Despite the apparent research Mr. Poole seems to have done, very little appears in the actual text. We get brief glimpses, and assertions that little define the Muslim. (...) This is definitely not a helpful guide to commanders in the field. It's a mildly interesting book best suited for those who are far from combat. Perhaps a nice fireside read or something for the daily commuter.

Furthermore the clip art, poor illustrations and badly reproduced graphics further detract from the overall effort. The crucifix that appears on the clumsily illustrated (back) cover is cute, but will probably make the serious reader view this book as a dubious endeavor.

One glaring omission from Mr. Poole's writing is why U.S. forces are really in the Middle East. He (...) claims that America's presence is to promote peace, stability, democracy. In small part almost true but far from realistic. Indeed history supports the fact that this venture is once again for purposes of conquest and acquisition.

Once the author, our political establishment, military leaders and the American public can admit this, then we may begin to understand the determination and ferocity of our foe.

"Tactics of the Crescent Moon" is timely because of the wars raging in the Middle East. These wars include and are not limited to Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States has been targeted by Middle Eastern terrorist since the late 1960's. As long as any of these exist, the United States will face Islamic warriors on jihad: the existance of corrupt governments in the Middle East, the existance of the state of Israel, failure to convert wholesale to the "right flavor" of Islam, providing a market for Middle Eastern oil, and lack of a global Islamic empire. The United States first fought Islamic warriors at the beginning of the 19th Century, when a handful of Marines, Sailors, and mercenaries fought and routed the Barbary Pirates. Following the Spanish-American War, Filippino Moros (Muslim tribes on Mindinao) proved so fierce that the .38 caliber Colt revolver was replaced by the .45 caliber Colt automatic pistol. Thus, the Muslim irregular is an old enemy for the United States. Surviving this foe requires a comprehensive and multi-pronged strategy. Basic to a viable startegy is understanding who the enemy is, why he fights, and lastly, how. Poole concentrates on the tactical defeat of the Islamic militant.

American military units are poor at the short-range fight. Hand-to-hand combat has been neglected for reasons ranging from "why waste efforts on something of marginal effectiveness" to creating a female-friendly military environment. These lame excuses favored two groups--military careerists, and the enemy. Close combat training is difficult and dangerous. A zero-defect mentality coupled with the desire to empower women--without giving women the tools that empower--is being overtaken by current events. Units going to Iraq or Afghanistan are getting crash courses in city fighting, room-to-room combat, firing from moving vehicles, and reacting to ambush. Combat units are learning to detect and defuse ambushes before they occur. The US bases in the Middle East are hard targets, with defense in depth. Poole alludes to the timidity about sustaining casualties--it does hamper operations. Also hampering operations is the fear of inflicting collateral damage. Poole points out that skilled infantry can defeat the enemy with a minimum of casualties. This has been happening in Iraq, and the new Iraqi forces are taking over the burden of fighting the Iraqi insurgency. Unlike South Vietnam in 1968, there are not neighbors ready to pounce on Iraq with a large conventional army equipped with lots of tanks, artillery, and aircraft. And if there were, tanks and artillery and aircraft battles are the United States' strong suite. The war for Iraq will be won or lost in street battles. Poole advocates bottom-up squad-focused training and doctrine to defeat the Islamic irregular fighter threat. Because the United States is fighting a war, many of the careerists now recognize that small arms training, squad tactics, and yes, plain old brawling have to be part of the bag of tricks. Marines paid at least lip service to this new old doctrine--now the Army, the Navy, and even the Air Force are conducting realistic and rigorous squad-level training to better-prepare American service members for duty in the Middle East. Trouble is, old habits die hard. Poole recommends that the US goes further, adopting a bottoms-up tactical doctrine that is "circumstantially unique, surprise oriented, and threat compensating." This will shift a larger burden to junior leaders. The biggest shift will be to the individual soldier or Marine on patrol--currently, the capability to run each fire-team size patrol (four or five soliders) from the White House exists. There is a great temptation to do so, even though President Bush was a fighter pilot, not an infantry team leader. Poole argues that the man on the spot is better able to decide what action to take. He's correct as long as the man on the spot has both situational awareness (something that is hard or impossible to do by remote control) and has the other information needed to make the dicision. Plus one more thing--a doctrine that puts decision-making at the lowest possible level. America's most effieicnt industries do this already--the same high-quality people are in business and in our all-volunteer military. It takes time and effort to make a well-rounded knowledgable soldier.

It will be a difficult task. Saddam's minions were specifically trained in deception techniques. The laundry list Poole provides in "Tactics of the Crescent Moon" read like a James Bond movie: advanced psychological training, mind control techniques, and a ruthlessness not possible if we are to meet American societal norms and what Poole terms "moral behavior." One section of Chapter 11 is titled, "Tactics and Morality Are Not Mutually Exclusive."

The Islamic warrior can be beaten. Poole examines the tactical shortcomings of several Islamic jihad groups. A major problem with the Islamic imperial movement is that the jihadists must play first to the Islamic world. It isn't that the jihadists are ineffective playing to a Western audience--they are many times more effective at the media game against the West than the West is against the Islamic world. The guerrilla theater bombing of Madrid did cause the withdrawal of Spanish soldiers. Kidnapping foreigners and holding them hostage until a Western government complies isn't working out very well now, but held great promise while it was still novel. More effective is that the kidnappings have slowed down the flood of foreign workers into Iraq--there's more to winning a guerrilla campaign than killing American soldiers. Guerrilla war is a war of ideas and images.

Poole identifies a major weakness of American forces: movement skills. How can American infantry move through a foreign urban area unseen? The jihadists do so routinely. Some elements, such as Al Queda, have recently began losing their "invisibility cloak" because they're outsiders and don't blend in as well as the insiders. Al Queda's operations have been increasingly directed at Iraqi civilians--the US forces are bottled up in their fortified bastions and there are fewer foreign workersl By necessity of having to act, and having driven off most of the targets, Al Queda has to conduct ethnic cleansing, and is alienating Iraq as a result. The US is not only increasing its mobility when it does patrol, but increasingly the new Iraqi police and Iraqi army are becoming more effective at confronting and destroying Al Queda and other insurgency movements. The number one problem in Iraq is still criminal gangs. This fragmented opposition to the new Iraqi government is compartmented by accident and has trouble coordinating large-scale operations, but is resistant to disruption because the many elements are seperated from each other. In many cases the seperate elements are actualy bitter hereditary enemies--temporarily united to fight the "Crusader" invaders. The fragility of this alliance is off-set by the fact that all these insurgency movements are self-contained. If Al Queda was smashed today, it would be a body blow to the insurgency, but not a knock-out punch. The insurgents use the Iraqi population as a shield and data bank. US artillery crews are being used as infantry because the cannon shells are not very useful in this war, but infantry patrols are indespensible.

Will the US military establishment finally follow the model of Heinlein's 1956 novel, "Starship Trooper?" Heinlein's elite force was the Mobile Infantry, a handful of high-tech troops that applied force surgically in surprise raids that combined speed, stealth, firepower, and intelligence. When one of these four was missing, the raid came to grief. In that novel, the most dangerous enemies, the "bugs," moved underground unseen (much like the Oriental warriors in Poole's books) and defeated Earth's soldiers in close combat where the humans were at a disadvantage. The hero of that novel, a sergeant named Zim, used initiative and on-the-spot situational awareness to capture a "bug brain," winning a hard-fought campaign. Heinlein's novels showcased the strengths and weaknesses that Poole's book discusses--both American and Oriental warrior. The Islamic warrior is not as readily identifiable as Heinlein's bug warriors. The Islamic terrorist is no hive creature--and the hive in that science fiction novel proved to be crafty and innovative.

One last note--suicide warriors are nothing new for American GI's. The Japanese kamakazi was the most-organized and may be the most famous example, but he wasn't the first. Many American Indian tribes ritually purified their warrior's souls before battle--the warrior didn't enter battle to die, but was already dead. This freed him from worrying about death and made him more effective. The US cavalry was more worried about catching fleeing Indian bands than encountering "suicidal" Indian braves. In the Philippines, the Moro ritually prepared himself to enter Paradise prior to running amok with a barong among US troops. About the same time, the Boxers in China underwent pre-battle preparation that made them "immune" to bullets and was more or less funeral rites. Despite being "godless communists," the Chinese and North Korean soldiers sometimes used the suicide option, complete with body bomb. The Viet Cong and NVA were credited with doing this frequently. My question is why American soldiers are not better-prepared to face this common threat. Suicide bombers proved to be cost-effective in lives for the PLO--one truck bomb took out the Marine barracks in Beruit and killed over 240 Americans. One PLO suicide driver died. The American response was to bomb a refugee camp--two aircraft shot down, two naval aviators killed, and one captured--and zero PLO fighters were in the camp. Given the disparity in firepower, the suicide bomber seems to be a lifesaver for the insurgency movement. Non-suicide ambushes between American forces and insurgents in Iraq typically end one of two ways--the insurgents escape inflicting few casualties, or the insurgents get wiped out while inflicting multiple American casualties. One successful Iraqi tactic is to drive a car bomb into an American convoy. Because many of the drivers are now contractor personnel, the suicide bomber may only kill some poor kid from Pakistan or another Islamic country--but suicide bombers die so that the insurgency can strike blows with minimal losses. Sometimes a car bomb will kill four or five American servicemen and make headlines.

Poole mentions how the human wave attack seems to disregard human life, but actually is a smart, life-sparing tactic for America's Oriental enemies. Rather than wasting the lives of the Iraqi insurgency, suicide bombers seem to be a cost-effective way of killing the intended target, and have the bonus of psychological impact on the Western media, and the American soldier. So why is America still surprised by ruthless, violent, often suicidal close-range attack?

This is a shallow assessment of what is going on in Iraq and Afghanistan today. Too many cherry-picked and now much dated excerpts are pasted in from TIME and Newsweek to prove questionable arguments (why would these journals be considered that credible anyway?). Iraq does not equate to Viet Nam, and militant islamists, while using some similar Guerrilla tactics, are NOT the Viet Cong. Sadly, very coarse political editorialism is interspersed throughout the book, which overall reads to often like some herky-jerky stream of consciousness. This book offers excessive "if they only took my advice" commentary that is far too pessimistic of both the tactics being used and the successes being achieved in Iraq. Indeed, we need a stronger Special Ops skill set formulation across our fighting forces today. More Civil/Military, HUMINT, and Psyop-trained troops in particular need to be bolstered. In sum, given both its tone and simplistic content, I sincerely hope this book is not being used in any official military training courses.

This book is quite extraordinary, and all of the reviews are helpful in appreciating its content. The author has done a brilliant meticulous job of culling through open source references to create a thoughtful, well-structured, and superbly foot-noted document that is nothing less than "Ref A" for what must become the new "American Way of War."

Big ideas:

1) One third of the world is Muslim, and if we do not restore morality to our form of democratic capitalism, and they adopt asymmetric warfare techniques, we are toast.

2) Iran certainly, and China probably, are fostering global terror as part of their grand strategy--each with different objectives--to end Anerica's status as a super-power.

3) Pakistan, Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia continue to train and support terrorists, with North Korea, Yemen, Sudan and various other countries (e.g. Bangladesh) having diverse roles to play.

4) Hezbollah out of Iran, rather than Al Qaeda out of Saudi Arabia, is the major player in the Iraqi insurgency, and its methods (hostages, suicide bombings, disguised IEDs) are clearly visible across the Iraqi theater of operations and now beginning to appear elsewhere in the world.

5) We cannot win 4th generation asymmetric wars with firepower alone. The heart of the book is a dissection of the Muslim insurgent's inspired excellence at close and asymmetric combat, and a carefully articulated case for getting back into the business of field light infantry that has the skill to infiltrate, surprise, and defeat enemies "mano a mano"--as some of us have been saying for some time (my own phrase has been "one man, one bullet"), but this author does a fantastic job of nailing it in war-fighting terms, modern way must be won by bottom up squad-level observation and skill, not top down command and control wielding firepower that kills 10-100 non-combatants for every US life that it might save (and ultimately--the author is compelling on this point--the deaths of those non-combatants inspire more suicidal terrorists who kill more US fighting men and women than might have died if we had done it right in the first place.

6) The author outlines in detail, with absolutely first-class documentation of his many sources (this is the first book I can remember reading where a single short sentence might contain as many as six different footnotes) the tactical techniques that Muslim radicals have learned to use, to including tunnels and disguises for both themselves and their Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). I agree with General Zinni--this book is required reading for every member of our Armed Forces, from Private to General. If you have a loved one in the Armed Forces, buy them this book and send it to them immediately.

7) Light infantry, acting as a gendarme with superior human intelligence, can nail the terrorists, but unless we want to occupy the world--something impossible to do (see point one)--then we must mobilize all of the instruments of national power and dedicate ourselves to nurturing legitimate effective *indigenous* governments everywhere. That means we must stop supporting 44 dictators, and we must stop imposing immoral capitalism (carpetbagging) on South America, Asia, and Africa.

This book is nothing short of ispirational. Sadly, it will probably be ignored by the Pentagon because, as the author himself points out, the old outdated and ineffective American Way of War is based predominantly on massive firepower and a heavy contractor presence that is most profitable for our arms merchants (see General Smedley Butler, "War is a Raquet") and our beltway bandits. Consequently, I pray that this book will be bought, read, and acted upon by anyone who has every served in the U.S. military, is serving now, or knows someone now serving or likely to serve (I have three boys, the oldest will be of draft age in two years). What we are paying for now is not working and time is running out. We need a fundamental change in direction, and that will not happen absent a national uprising, or at Tom Atlee would say, "from group magic to a wise democracy."

The author gets special high marks from me for relating morality and our acknowledgement of God to being able to win at war. He is absolutely right to castigate the Supreme Court for removing God from our national fabric, and points out that the same Supreme Court once declared slaves to be non-humans. He understands, as Clausewitz did, that the moral is to the material by at least one order of magnitude--in today's information-rich era, I would double it. Morality matters, and we have lost that high ground by allowing special interests to dictate America's profiteering foreign policy, rather than letting the common sense of the American people enrich America's foreign policy for the common good of all--as the Golden Rule suggests: do unto others as you would have them do unto you.

If the public demands that its politicians attend to this author's views, and if our military leaders--both suited and uniformed--attend to this book, it will save hundreds of thousands of lives, tens of billions of dollars, and perhaps the American way of life.

Empathy with the enemy (getting in his skin) is often a key factor to success. Until we attempt to understand our enemy's cause and his worldview, we can hope for little success. Once again John Poole cuts to the essentials of doing just that-understanding. Like all of Poole's books, this one provides a depth of background along with details required to survive and win. Would that every soldier that might face "militant Muslim combat methods" had this book in his hands for preparation.

Mr. Poole goes back in history to give us a feel for the culture that produced a fierce warrior class. He then proceeds to demonstrate how that culture affects the way they fight now and the way they will likely fight in the future. He describes further how an insurgency develops and becomes more sophisticated in its methods and in so doing lets us see what might come next.

Buy it for your loved ones in the military. There could be no more practical book for the combat soldier's kit.

I rate this book five stars for the audience it was intended: warriors. This book is one of the MUST read selections in the wide array of books about the Global War on Terror. John Poole pitches this book at the level of understanding of the meanest private and he doesn't pull any punches. He calls a spade a spade.

While we are the best trained heavy infantry and armor force in the world, we are not a match for the 10 meter 4th Generation elusive enemy. John Poole clearly illustrates this thesis with many examples. Poole is perhaps the most experienced infantry trainer in America with combat experience in Vietnam. He is a student of history, and he has written 4 books on the subject of tactics at close range. He knows war, including 4th generation war, backwards and forwards, top to bottom.

If we can accept that because of our top-down directed training schedules, cram packed with road marches, mechanized gunnery tables, National Training Center/Joint National Training Center routines, are ill-spent time adhering to strict conventional doctrines and policies, it is easy to see how we become predictable to a 4th generation warrior. John Poole suggests a bottoms-up approach to training in order to begin to be able to evolve training techniques to fight this type of war. This is the only way we can adapt and evolve. It is the way that our own light infantry can get ahead of the jihaadist OODA Loop cycles with our own and drive a wedge between the jihaadists and the mass of the Islamic population.

The generals have yet to learn that this is a company, platoon, squad war and that they are cast in a supporting role. There are no Pattons on this battlefield.

The Administration has yet to learn that our high technology is in a supporting role to aid the troopers on the ground, and that there is no technical panecea.

Part of this bottoms-up training for our soldiers is an understanding of the enemy and how he trains. Poole provides Cultural Intelligence 101 in this book. The enemy has training, but not nearly as much as we do, we should have a decided advantage if we trained on the right things. We can beat him at his own game, but it will take an entirely different approach, a totally different type of training.

The jihaadist training is practical and directed, and the training center for the jihaadists has moved from Afghanistan, Sudan, and Lebanon to the battlefields in Iraq. U.S. soldiers patrolling inside vehicles are only providing the jihaadists with easy targets. Living behind Green Zones is only providing the jihaadist easy targets. And killing civilians by using our less-than-precision weapons is what they want us to do. We have to learn to fight the three block war all over with a different mind-set.

There are many many pearls of wisdom in this book, but you may not like reading some of them. If it causes you to think, however, then the effort is more than worthwhile. Read this book!

Tactics of the Crescent Moon is a survival guide for all those people that are involved in the current conflicts.
Reading this book gives you a unique insight in the way the asymmetric or guerilla opponent thinks and acts.

This book again, as all of John Poole's writing, calls out to the reader to use his best weapon - the brain.
With all the examples and bits of information in the numerous references you can learn to identify the tell tale signs of militant Muslim action.
This will help to save lives.

This book is useful to everyone;
policy and doctrine makers, tacticians, planners, trainers, commanders and leaders and most important of all - to soldiers.

In fact I thought this book to be so current that I ordered additional copies to send to our troops that are deployed in areas where the described combat methods are used.

This book is truly remarkable. In Tactics of the Crescent Moon, John Poole provides an incredibly insightful analysis of the Middle Eastern problem and our role in trying to resolve it. He explains extremely complicated issues with remarkable clarity, examining them from historical, political, cultural, military and moral perspectives. Despite the immense scope of the book, his key insights never get lost in the complexity of his subject matter. At the most fundamental level, John Poole provides detailed tactical descriptions of exactly how our Middle Eastern adversaries fight. To illuminate the big picture, he clearly shows how these tactical examples relate to the larger cultural and political issues. He goes on to propose solutions that can help American privates survive, help commanders make better decisions, help generals develop better strategies and even help politicians make better military policies. Most importantly, the book's profound morality offers insight on how to win what might be the most important battle of all, the battle for the moral high ground. We will not win this war on terrorism if we lose touch, even for a moment, with the great and noble values that make us who we are. John Poole reminds us that when Americans go to war we bring with us our honor, our compassion, our love of freedom, and our belief in the equality of all people. Our morality is our ultimate weapon.