For folks like me, that LOVE tigers and eat up any info we can find, this book is fantastic. However, I wouldnt recommend this book for the average reader, just looking for an entertaining read. its packed with stats and info but short on any exciting "tiger stories" etc.... i only gave it 4 stars because it's kind of dry but i still loved it.

The Tiger tank was designed and envisioned to be a breakthrough vehicle, leading the attack through enemy defenses and achieving victory on the operational level, much as the Panzer Corps had done in Poland, France, North Africa and Russia. All of those great operational victories had been achieved with the lowly, even obsolete at the time, Panzer III. The Tiger was at the time of its introduction and literally years afterward the most powerful tank on the battlefield, on any battlefield. Yet it never achieved the victories expected of it. What went wrong?

This fine book endeavors to explain what did, in fact, go wrong. From the very introduction of the Tiger in late Summer of 1942 through the end of the war very little went right for the employment of this mighty weapon. Meant to be employed in full battalion strength in operational offensives it rarely was even available in such numbers due to 1) low production and 2) high maintenance requirements and breakdown rates combined with 3) low recovery rates of damaged/broken down Tigers. Further the Germans found themselves on the defensive almost continuously after the disaster at Kursk in July of 1943 and the Tigers were needed in small units, barely units, groups, to counterattack or simply stop enemy armored breakthroughs. And besides, from mid-1943 onward the Germans never mounted much of what would be considered an operational offensive in which the Tiger might have proven itself.

A further reason that the Tiger never achieved its operational purpose was that it was too slow. Having achieved a breakthrough it was too slow to exploit it, even if it were not plagued with a breakdown rate often exceeding 70%. Another problem was that there was never a mine-roller type device designed for the Panzer Korps. This meant that upon encountering mines the usual method of clearing was for the Tiger tank to enter the minefield, blow some up, become disabled, and another Tiger would take the lead. While the tank itself and the crew were usually not damaged its running gear would be and it would be essentially rendered 'hors de combat'. This problem was never solved by the Wehrmacht for some unknown reason.

The Tiger was admirably suited to defensive warfare. Its big 88mm gun could kill nearly any enemy tank at great distances. But its incredibly high breakdown rate led to the majority of Tigers lost having to be destroyed by their own crews because their Tigers would simply stop running (from breakdowns or lack of fuel- they used prodigious amounts to barely get about) and they lacked the ability to easily tow these behemoths back for repair before they were overrun. It amounted to the most powerful warrior on the field having weak ankles and a bad heart.

It is ironic that the finest tank in the war could not achieve what an obsolete little tank achieved. While the Tiger gained a reputation for its own invincibility the Panzer III obtained that reputation for the entire German Army.

A rather nice over view of Tiger operations with an attempt to quantify the Tigers effectiveness in combat. Some questions remained unanswered. How many more Panthers/Jagdpanthers could have been built if Tiger production had never taken place or stopped after TigerI would have been one that I would have liked to have seen answered.

highly recommended for any fan of german armor and especially tiger tanks.

This is a terrific book, and is primarily a summary and analysis of the available literature on the combat history of the German Tiger I and II tanks of WWII. There are only a few descriptions of individual tank to tank combat, which is probably the only weakness of this book. Wilbeck instead concentrates on painting an overall picture of the effectiveness of the Tiger tanks in combat. In the end, Wilbeck concludes that despite their fearsome reputation, born out of many anecdotal tales of awesome lethality, the Tiger tanks were severely limited in what they could accomplish on a strategic level.

In tank to tank combat, the Tigers were incredibly good at killing other tanks, reaching kill ratios up to 13:1 in many cases. But, as Wilbeck points out in great detail, the end result of designing a tank with very heavy armor and extreme firepower was a tank that was very heavy and extremely expensive and time consuming to manufacture (Hitler personally ordered the specifications for the Tiger tank). The Tigers were very prone to breaking down (mostly because of their weight, which strained the entire mechanical system), could not cross most of the bridges in Europe, and had to be shipped by train to the battlefield (they would break down if they had to be driven for any great distance). There were only a few Tigers ever manufactured (1,348 Tiger Is and less than 500 Tiger IIs ), and even fewer that actually showed up on the battlefield. They guzzled gasoline, were extremely slow (with an average speed of about 4-9 miles per hour on rough terrain or dirt roads - well below the stated maximum design speed of 25 mph), and had an extremely short combat radius and duration. The high kill ratios when they did engage in combat were offset by their tendency to either run out of gas or break down in combat, which resulted in large numbers having to be abandoned (more than were destroyed by Allied tanks). Also, U.S. and British forces had superior mobility due to widespread mechanization, as well as superior artillery and airpower. Because of the immobility and limited numbers of the Tiger tanks, it was possible to avoid confronting them with tanks, and instead, Allied forces would try to bypass and isolate them, or destroy them with heavy artillery or airpower.

There were other major weaknesses - for instance, the German Army was the only one of the major armies in Europe to not have minesweeping tanks. Inexplicably, the Germans persisted in using these precious few Tiger tanks to "bull-through" minefields, a tactic that led to long trails of busted Tiger tanks whenever a unit encountered a minefield, leaving few to carry out the attack at the other end of the minefield. The Germans also suffered from a lack of sufficient retrieval vehicles that could handle the heavy Tigers. This led to the abandonment of many Tigers that could have been repaired had they been retrieved.

Wilbeck gives the statistic that each Tiger I tank cost 800,000 Reichmarks, which was equivalent to the weekly wages of 30,000 people, and required 300,000 man-hours to produce. [Note bene: at those rates, the Tigers were very much high end super-weapons, equivalent on a cost basis to something like the U.S. B-29, which cost about a million dollars apiece, or a Navy destroyer].

There is an interesting analysis in this book of Tiger ace Michael Wittmann's famous attack at Bocage-Villers. Wilbeck points out that although the battle did temporarily halt the British advance and take an appalling toll on their tanks, by the end of the day, Wittmann's entire unit had been knocked out and was combat ineffective whereas the British tanks were quickly replaced. Continuing the story, Wilbeck describes how Wittman was later killed in another attack on the Caen-Falaise road in which he unknowingly charged into battle against some 900 Allied tanks with only some 50 on his side (only 8 of which were Tiger tanks). Wittmann's Tiger was most likely flanked by a Sherman Firefly which fired the fatal round.

Ultimately, as can be seen in the demise of Michael Wittman, numbers were what won tank battles in WWII. By 1944, the technology for destroying tanks had far outstripped the ability to make armor protection. Tank losses were very high on all sides as a result.

The German Army understood the value of powerful tanks, but never took to heart the even greater importance of producing large numbers of tanks. This is what made the Tiger tank a failure - the fact that such an enormous amount of German resources went into producing so few tanks that could be so easily disabled or bypassed.

Major Wilbeck has done a great service in writing a top-notch book that is applicable to today's armor or mechanized infantry officer as it is to any military historian or Tiger tank enthusiast. At a minimum I must say it is very thought provoking. I found myself reading a few paragraphs and then pausing to analyze the author's synthesis and comparing it with my own experience with mechanized forces.
This compact and focused study effectively integrates and illustrates the development, tactics, and deployment of the Tiger tank. With historical specificity the author reveals the strengths and weaknesses of what has become a tank of legend.
Professional Soldiers will find that many of the points brought out by Major Wilbeck continue to plague us today as we move from a Heavy force developed to defeat the armored threat of the Soviets during the Cold War to a more mobile, lightly armored force tailored for swift deployment to regional hot-spots.
Adding to this book are the wonderful maps that I have come to expect from Aberjona Press.

"Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II" by Christopher W. Wilbeck is a great read for those simply curious about tank warfare as well as those more serious about their studies. Wonderfully written and seriously researched, "Sledgehammers" fulfilled all my expectations as a historical piece. My knowledge of German Tiger tanks was probably not that different than many other amateur historians - deep enough to know that most reports of battles with Tigers in "popular" historical accounts are exaggerated, mistaken and/or poorly researched, but not much beyond that. Wilbeck, in one single treatise, conveys a concise, useful and exciting history of one of the most feared tanks in the WWII. Several factors make this a great book:

One of the most positive attributes of "Sledgehammers" is its simple yet very effective organization. In the first two sections, Wilbeck gives a coherent introduction of the German Heavy Tank Battalions. By placing the development and implementation of Tiger tank battalions with the context of German thinking (doctrine), technological advances, war planning and execution, Wilbeck makes it easy of the reader to understand the real "strengths" and "flaws" of the Tiger's role in the German advances and retreats. The discussion of German heavy tank Doctrine, or Tiger Battalion Organizations, is worth its weight in gold if one is to truly make sense of the effectiveness of these battalions. As Wilbeck points out the German military leaders were very doctrinal and only in rare cases were there breaks with doctrine at high levels. Yet on the battlefield where front-line commanders had control, doctrine, while a driving force, was not necessarily law. Nor was it particularly well applied. This had both negative and positive influences on the overall effectiveness of the Tigers.

The next four sections of the books describe many of the combat missions in which Tigers were employed, from early years in the Desert when the Panzers were king, to the last battles of the war when the huge and expensive King Tigers were sacrificed in the final spasms of the Nazi regimes attempts to yoke the world. Wilbeck makes every apparent effort to confirm battle data from records of both combatants. Only in cases where the Soviets are the second combatant are Wilbeck's data weakened by lack of confirmation. Yet this is due not to a fault of the author, but rather from a simple lack of clear information on the Soviet side. In such cases Wilbeck is the first to point out the potential pitfalls. It is refreshing to read a book where the author acknowledges the historical weaknesses of ones own text. Despite this caveat (which again I point out the author makes clear exists!) these four sections represent the heart of the book and are fascinating. Wilbeck has a clear writing style that allows the reader to go through the battles with clarity and ease. The 35 maps, numerous photographs, and multiple tables of data each contribute to the enjoyable and factually rewarding nature of this book. "Sledgehammer's" publishing house, Aberjona Press, is quite possibly the finest serving the WWII historical genre with regard to this type of supplemental material.

The last two sections of the book (save the Epilogues by Viktor Iskrov and Ray Holt) try to make sense of the data. Where Tiger tanks effective tools of war or not, and why or why not? Wilbeck makes a good case for both pros and cons of the Tiger Battalions. The author demonstrates that the Tiger tank was a VERY effective killing machine, achieving an impressive average kill ratio across the entire time of its employment of just over 12 enemy lost to every 1 Tiger in battle!!! Even when the horrible mechanical troubles of the Tigers (both I and II), logistical woes, and defensive nature of many battles fought are considered the Tigers still "killed" over 5 enemy tanks for their own lost (including self destruction). Thus, the Tiger tank has to bee seen as a serious weapon of war. Yet these numbers are averages and reflect a snap-shot of the entire picture. Wilbeck makes it clear to the reader that for all of their positive attributes as killing machines the Tigers were also a burden on the German war machine. Tigers were mechanically unreliable (as compared to the Soviet T-34 or US M4-Sherman), had a small radius of action (again in contrast to the aforementioned Allied tanks), and were so large that most terrain rendered them practically useless as breakthrough weapons for which they were manufactured, if less employed, according to Doctrine. Moreover, while the Tiger was a lethal machine essentially impervious to enemy when initially added to the cannon of German war material, the Allies were remarkably quick to respond to counter both the Tiger's lethality and thick "skin".

The Prologue and Epilogue of the book also merit mentioned here. These sections were contributed not by Wilbeck but by soldiers fighting with (Prologue) or against (Epilogue) the Heavy Tank Battalions. These sections thus provide a unique perspective on this weapon and its impact.

All in all I give "Sledgehammers" five solid stars for content, presentation and overall impact. If you want solid facts and reasoned analysis about Tiger tanks and their roles in WWII this is THE book to read.