I, as with many -- perhaps most -- general readers particularly interested in World War II naval history, assumed there wasn't much earth-shatteringly new I could learn about the Battle of Midway. Having read most of the standard narratives, I tackled "Shattered Storm" expecting to simply gain a more detailed picture of the battle from the Japanese point of view. What I got was detailed to be sure, but rather than merely filling in gaps in my understanding, "Shattered Sword" shattered my neat assumptions of the entire campaign. That is exactly what Parshall and Tully intended.

The authors understood that most readers, from the general military history buff like me, to well-educated military historians, had a well-formed idea of what happened preceding, during and after the conflict, why and how it turned out as it did, and its impact on future campaigns -- indeed on the outcome of the Pacific War as a whole. Much of what we knew about Midway, they came to believe, was essentially based on a lie, subsequently perpetuated by lazy scholarship. They felt that the seminal work on Midway from the Japanese perspective, Fuchida's "Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan" (which I have not read -- yet) was a self-serving attempt to deflect blame, which for a variety of reasons, was ever after accepted at face-value by Western researchers and writers.

I personally believe most "revisionist" history is a close-cousin of UFO exposes and conspiracy theories, little more than whining or axe-grinding. Tully and Parshall avoid this trap. Their argument is that the standard picture of Midway is flawed simply because most writers on the subject simply stuck to the previously written script without doing the obviously difficult work involved in scouring and interpreting the Japanese primary sources. They set about carefully reconstructing the battle from the perspective of what the IJN was in 1942 vs. what the dimming mists of time lead us to think it was.

Approaching "Shattered Sword" felt daunting at first. I'm not a historian or a journalist -- my formal education ended with nursing school. I feared this hefty book might be too dense to wade through, but my fears were unfounded. Tully and Parshall write with a relaxed, easy narrative style, wonderfully free of the cant that so often intimidates general readers. They managed to explain technical details and arcane doctrine in a way that was easy to understand without being patronizing. They did not lose sight of the fact that, under it all, they were telling a story, one where most readers already knew the outcome, and had well-formed ideas of who the "good guys" and "bad guys" were. They managed to keep me riveted, while eliciting a measure of, if not sympathy, then empathy for the other side. They presented the facts to bck up their argument within the context of the narrative, so it flowed smoothly within the framework of their underlying story. In the end, they concisely wrapped up the facts and laid out the reasoning behind the conclusions they drew. They offered up a perspective I had not yet seen, and they articulated some nebulous ideas that had been floating around my understanding of Midway and the Pacific War. The graphics they used to bolster their arguments were clear, pertinent and enlightening.

In summary, I found this book persuasive, clear, well-organized, thoughtful (and thought-provoking), and above all entertaining. While I wouldn't recommend it to a reader with no more than a passing interest in World War II history, or to a reader who doesn't have a basic understanding of the Battle of Midway, I would highly recommend it on so many different levels to anyone with a genuine interest in the history of the war in the Pacific. I would urge those who do select this book to read it with an open mind. Certainly one of the most interesting books on the Pacific war I've yet read. I wish Tully and Parshall would put their collaborative writing/researching skills together again for a fresh look at Midway from the American perspective.

Well written from a more neutral prespective. Easy to follow narative. I have this book on my nightstand and find my self reading it when I really should be sleeping. Great Book

A very carefully researched and written account of the events leading up to and during the Battle of Midway from both sides. Reading this book almost puts one back in time and part of the story. This is an exceptional book to read that has a refreshing new perspective on a great story that by many accounts was a complex set events that is explained in a way that no other book has done.

Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully have put together a complete revision of the Battle of Midway. Using many Japanese sources we find out the underlying truth of this battle.
I have not read Mitsuo Fuchida's Midway and I cannot comment on his errors or omissions. However, in reading Shattered Sword, I learned a great deal of the mindset of the Imperial Navy of Japan in 1942. It is a fact that Japan's hubris made for the unexplained lack of professionalism in their actions of their offensive on Midway. Yamamoto's battle plan was flawed, he assumed the Americans were mentally beaten at this point in time.
As pointed out in this book and which is widely known even before the writing of Shattered Sword is that the United States had broken the Japanese code. It is fact that they knew the location of the Japanese attack.
However the battle was not won on this fact alone. What Parshall and Tully have done is to examine the points of the Japanese failures and they were many. They sent out their reconnaissance planes much too late to spot American carrier activities. They also made the cardinal sin of sending out all their planes and leaving their carriers unprotected.
At this time the Japanese were in command and were pushing forward to deal the decisive blow. They indeed failed. Japan in fact seemed to think of themselves as infallible. Even in their training exercises they created predictable scenarios in which their school solutions were indeed winners.
In fact Midway never became the ultimate solution. As Midway faded into American victory, the sun was beginning to set on the land of the rising sun.
As Parshall and Tully concluded, in reality even if America did lose Midway, it would have been unlikely that Japan would have prevailed. In conclusion the industrial might of America would have won out. All destroyed carriers and planes would have been replaced. America's fate was indeed to win the war in the Pacific. That was obvious to a real student of history even on December 7, 1941.
Great read, thoroughly researched with great photographs and diagrams. Five Stars, no problem!!

Shattered Sword by Parshall and Tully is simply breathtaking, the most thoroughly researched and lucidly thought out history of an event that I have ever read. Setting out to tell the story of Midway primarily from the Japanese side they have created the new standard of that crucial battle in the dark days of 1942 that shines as an example of scholarly effort without parallel.

First these authors clearly did their homework, and to say that they explore the battle in the utmost would be an understatement. Setting the stage for the battle with germane explanations of the geopolitical, then strategic, and then operational backdrops that led up to 4-5 June 1942 the authors then delve into the battle wielding an awesome array of salient information ranging from the psychological makeup of the senior Japanese commanders on the scene, to Japanese naval doctrine of the time, to the naval architecture of the four Japanese flat tops, to how many bomb carts each carrier had (and are thus able to derive such details as the quickest possible practical TIME, down to the minute, it could have taken to re-arm waiting dive bombers and torpedo planes in the hangar bay) to even the names of individual Japanese pilots in the CAP and when they were launched. What emerges is a picture of the battle in toto, grounded in a thorough understanding of the pacific campaign and the entire war itself, aided by a completely fresh and unbiased look (which subsequently shatters many myths about the battle) and delivers not just the most accurate picture of what happened and why during the fighting, but also what it meant in the larger scheme of how the rest of the war was fought and ultimately won (or lost by the Japanese). This is truly the stuff history is supposed to be about.

What is better yet is that the book, in a surprising cut against the grain for pieces written by more than one author, reads both like an erudite intellectual analysis and Tom Clancy-esque action thriller. Throughout the book you are taken from the strategic and coolly logical minds of senior commanders, to white knuckle seventy degree dives in the cockpits of cascading American SBD's flying through walls of flak and marauding Japanese zeros. Later you are privy to the acts of desperate survival of Japanese engineers sweating in the asphyxiating air of the engine rooms in their carriers as the ceilings above them start literally glowing red from the heat of uncontrollable fires ravaging above and blocking their only route of possible escape.

After setting the stage of the history of the Japanese naval war in the Pacific up until the time of the battle and explaining the strategies, doctrines, and technical features (i.e. carrier air wing make up, command organizations, etc.) of both the American and Japanese navies the authors place you onboard the ships of the Kido Butai for a minute by minute account. This in depth and detailed account takes you from the moment they sortie from Hashirajima bay to their ignominous retreat mere weeks later. The writing is crisp, fast paced, and clear, conveying information, tension, emotion, and action all at the same time without compromising any of those features. Told primarily from the Japanese side it is taut and disciplined, delivering information to the readers as it came in real time to Nagumo and the staff of the Kido Butai on the cramped bridge of the Akagi and under fire, instead of giving the reader a truly "God's Eye View" of the battle. There is just enough delving into the worlds and actions of Nimitz in Pearl Harbor, Flether onboard the Yorktown, Spruance onboard the Enterprise, and several other American forces to give appropriate context and understanding, but the reader is basically experiencing what the Japanese commanders were going through. This allows the reader to truly appreciate the Clausewitzian "friction" that plagues any battle, and to understand the decisions the commanders made at the time. After the fact everything is tied together by the authors to deliver a true picture of exactly what happened each minute of the battle. The scope of the battle and the author's telling of it is enormous, covering not just the more familiar strike on Midway istelf and ensuring carrier duel, but the ordeal of survivors from each carrier as they attempted, futilely, to save their ships then abandoned them, to the harried Japanese retreat and the less familiar American attacks on the Mogami and Mikuma which ultimately led to the latter's destruction.

The book sets the record straight on many things, of which I cannot mention all. When the American dauntlesses rained down upon the Japanese carriers at 1020 however it is clear that their decks were NOT full of a strike package just moments from launching to crush TF 17, this was a myth that was propagated by Mitsuo Fuchida after the war's end for self serving purposes as well as dramatic flair. VT-8's heroic and fatally doomed torpedo attack did not draw down the Japanese CAP, instead it was just one of a series of hurried and poorly organized American attacks that virtuously threw the Japanese into confusion and left them reacting to conditions rather than shaping them. The Americans were not so outmatched as is commonly believed, but still won a glorious victory ableit against a deeply flawed plan developed by the actually bullying and overbearing Yamamoto (who was restricted from leaving Kure Naval Harbor while in Japan to visit Naval General HQ in Tokyo on fear that other resentful officers there would literally kill him.)

The lessons the authors draw from this battle are applicable even today. The Japanese primarily lost the battle, and the entire war for that matter (although for the entire war the relative industrial might of the US played a far more important role than it obviously could have in this single, early on confrontation), due to an operational rigidity born of national culture and character. This rigidity left it unable to correctly learn lessons from its past operations, anticipate future operations as well as enemy capabilities and reactions to such, and, most critically, to adapt to real world circumstances when their overly elaborate plans inevitably began to unravel against determined and unpredicted enemy actions. (The Japanese expected to face a cowed, fearful, and largely reactionary and passive US Navy at Midway, and not the aggressive and ably commanded force that Nimitz actually sortied to meet them and that guided itself on the flexible principle of calculated risk rather than dogmatic devotion to operational planning.)

I simply can not say enough good about this book. It is useful to anyone with an interest in history as an example of the heights that that discipline can reach and the edifying fruits it can bear when practiced properly, to those in the military who seek a better understanding of how war actually is fought and can be fought best, to someone who wants to read about a real world battle written with the excitement and drama of a great fiction author.

HIGHLY RECOMMENDED!!

Shattered Sword by Parshall and Tully is simply breathtaking, the most thoroughly researched and lucidly thought out history of an event that I have ever read. Setting out to tell the story of Midway primarily from the Japanese side they have created the new standard of that crucial battle in the dark days of 1942 that shines as an example of scholarly effort without parallel.

First these authors clearly did their homework, and to say that they explore the battle in the utmost would be an understatement. Setting the stage for the battle with germane explanations of the geopolitical, then strategic, and then operational backdrops that led up to 4-5 June 1942 the authors then delve into the battle wielding an awesome array of salient information ranging from the psychological makeup of the senior Japanese commanders on the scene, to Japanese naval doctrine of the time, to the naval architecture of the four Japanese flat tops, to how many bomb carts each carrier had (and are thus able to derive such details as the quickest possible practical TIME, down to the minute, it could have taken to re-arm waiting dive bombers and torpedo planes in the hangar bay) to even the names of individual Japanese pilots in the CAP and when they were launched. What emerges is a picture of the battle in toto, grounded in a thorough understanding of the pacific campaign and the entire war itself, aided by a completely fresh and unbiased look (which subsequently shatters many myths about the battle) and delivers not just the most accurate picture of what happened and why during the fighting, but also what it meant in the larger scheme of how the rest of the war was fought and ultimately won (or lost by the Japanese). This is truly the stuff history is supposed to be about.

What is better yet is that the book, in a surprising cut against the grain for pieces written by more than one author, reads both like an erudite intellectual analysis and Tom Clancy-esque action thriller. Throughout the book you are taken from the strategic and coolly logical minds of senior commanders, to white knuckle seventy degree dives in the cockpits of cascading American SBD's flying through walls of flak and marauding Japanese zeros. Later you are privy to the acts of desperate survival of Japanese engineers sweating in the asphyxiating air of the engine rooms in their carriers as the ceilings above them start literally glowing red from the heat of uncontrollable fires ravaging above and blocking their only route of possible escape.

After setting the stage of the history of the Japanese naval war in the Pacific up until the time of the battle and explaining the strategies, doctrines, and technical features (i.e. carrier air wing make up, command organizations, etc.) of both the American and Japanese navies the authors place you onboard the ships of the Kido Butai for a minute by minute account. This in depth and detailed account takes you from the moment they sortie from Hashirajima bay to their ignominous retreat mere weeks later. The writing is crisp, fast paced, and clear, conveying information, tension, emotion, and action all at the same time without compromising any of those features. Told primarily from the Japanese side it is taut and disciplined, delivering information to the readers as it came in real time to Nagumo and the staff of the Kido Butai on the cramped bridge of the Akagi and under fire, instead of giving the reader a truly "God's Eye View" of the battle. There is just enough delving into the worlds and actions of Nimitz in Pearl Harbor, Flether onboard the Yorktown, Spruance onboard the Enterprise, and several other American forces to give appropriate context and understanding, but the reader is basically experiencing what the Japanese commanders were going through. This allows the reader to truly appreciate the Clausewitzian "friction" that plagues any battle, and to understand the decisions the commanders made at the time. After the fact everything is tied together by the authors to deliver a true picture of exactly what happened each minute of the battle. The scope of the battle and the author's telling of it is enormous, covering not just the more familiar strike on Midway istelf and ensuring carrier duel, but the ordeal of survivors from each carrier as they attempted, futilely, to save their ships then abandoned them, to the harried Japanese retreat and the less familiar American attacks on the Mogami and Mikuma which ultimately led to the latter's destruction.

The book sets the record straight on many things, of which I cannot mention all. When the American dauntlesses rained down upon the Japanese carriers at 1020 however it is clear that their decks were NOT full of a strike package just moments from launching to crush TF 17, this was a myth that was propagated by Mitsuo Fuchida after the war's end for self serving purposes as well as dramatic flair. VT-8's heroic and fatally doomed torpedo attack did not draw down the Japanese CAP, instead it was just one of a series of hurried and poorly organized American attacks that virtuously threw the Japanese into confusion and left them reacting to conditions rather than shaping them. The Americans were not so outmatched as is commonly believed, but still won a glorious victory ableit against a deeply flawed plan developed by the actually bullying and overbearing Yamamoto (who was restricted from leaving Kure Naval Harbor while in Japan to visit Naval General HQ in Tokyo on fear that other resentful officers there would literally kill him.)

The lessons the authors draw from this battle are applicable even today. The Japanese primarily lost the battle, and the entire war for that matter (although for the entire war the relative industrial might of the US played a far more important role than it obviously could have in this single, early on confrontation), due to an operational rigidity born of national culture and character. This rigidity left it unable to correctly learn lessons from its past operations, anticipate future operations as well as enemy capabilities and reactions to such, and, most critically, to adapt to real world circumstances when their overly elaborate plans inevitably began to unravel against determined and unpredicted enemy actions. (The Japanese expected to face a cowed, fearful, and largely reactionary and passive US Navy at Midway, and not the aggressive and ably commanded force that Nimitz actually sortied to meet them and that guided itself on the flexible principle of calculated risk rather than dogmatic devotion to operational planning.)

I simply can not say enough good about this book. It is useful to anyone with an interest in history as an example of the heights that that discipline can reach and the edifying fruits it can bear when practiced properly, to those in the military who seek a better understanding of how war actually is fought and can be fought best, to someone who wants to read about a real world battle written with the excitement and drama of a great fiction author.

HIGHLY RECOMMENDED!!

I was rather surprised that the authors make no mention of the actual prime source for the Battle of Midway that most Americans carry around in their heads: the 1976 film, "Midway." With familiar names like Henry Fonda, Glenn Ford, Robert Mitchum, Hal Holbrook and Charlton Heston, the film reinforces the popular wisdom that an under gunned American Naval task force, on June 5, 1942, surprised the main fleet of Japanese carriers bearing fighter planes helplessly exposed on the decks. Certainly I had never heard the names Yamamoto, Nagumo and Genda prior to seeing the film one rainy summer afternoon. After reading Parshall's and Tully's masterful study of the battle, I was even more surprised to learn that this enduring version of the Midway encounter came not from the understandable pride of American historians, but from the pen of Fuchida Mitsuo and Okumiya Masatake, whose "Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan" [1955] served as a template for historians, school books, and even Hollywood.

Since Japanese historiography has shaped the Midway story for over six decades, Parshall and Tully decided to address their gripping minute-by-minute account of the battle through the eyes of Japanese experience and intentions in order to restore a sense of perspective. In truth, much of Mitsuo's narrative and interpretation is not as much defective as it is deficient. Midway was the product of complicated forces; its individual tactical events at many turns had lives of their own. Thus, only by breaking the battle into dozens of microcosmic signatures could Parshall arrive at something resembling a true chronology of the encounter, though war is such a hellish psychological event that exactitude is its first victim.

The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was for the US the beginning of the beginning. For Japan it was the beginning of the end. It may not have been clear to Americans in 1941, but Japan's eastward expansion to Hawaii was something of a Pickett's Charge moment save that Japanese efforts had, for a time, a more favorable psychological outcome. Parshall's map [20-21] makes the Japanese problem crystal clear: advancing across the Pacific meant investment north and south as well as east. Japan at this point had been at war since at least 1937, first with China and then throughout Southeast Asia.

In these circumstances the Midway situation takes on a whole new look. The Empire's interest in seizing the Island had little to do with westward expansion, and much to do with protecting its holdings. Possession of Midway would allow the Japanese to cut US supply lines to Australia. Achievement of the goal was certainly within capability, given the limitations of the US Pacific Fleet, had not the ambitious Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku overreacted to recent US sorties with a complicated plan of his own for Midway. Yamamoto violated a basic tenet of war--massed force--to execute simultaneous action toward Dutch Harbor in the Aleutians. Parshall is careful to note that this Aleutian action was not a feint, as is popularly believed, though Dutch Harbor had questionable value in any strategic equation.

With two carriers off to the cold north, Yamamoto proceeded to Midway with four carriers instead of six, and just a one carrier advantage over Halsey's three. [Bill Halsey, of course, would be hospitalized with shingles and replaced by Ray Spruance for the Midway expedition.] The result is basic history, with the US destroying all four Japanese carriers with the loss of only the Yorktown. Parshall certainly does not diminish the accomplishment, nor do he and his colleague entirely deny the element of luck. More often, he takes the dramatic edge off of events, reminding his readers that in war the best schedules go awry, runways get congested, radios break, intelligence gets manhandled, and weather conditions change.

Parshall believes that that US Pacific fleet was not quite the crippled eagle it is often portrayed to be. Between the Pearl Harbor and Midway encounters the Lexington and the Yorktown had embarrassed Yamamoto on several occasions in his back yard. The US Navy had learned quite a bit about aerial warfare despite the fact that at Midway its planes were somewhat inferior. Vice Admiral Nagumo, commander of the strike force, found himself repeatedly surprised by the Americans' tactics and capabilities, though admittedly some of these tactics--with tragic and needless loss of life--were as much a surprise and shock to the Americans' own commanders.

Parshall observes that American forces did enjoy an overall edge in technology, planes notwithstanding. Photographs of the late Soryu, Kaga, Hiryu and Akagi carriers throughout the book reveal tinker-toy vessels of another generation, which in some cases were actually Gerry rigged when designers changed schemes. US carriers enjoyed greater simplicity and a much more efficient deck technology, particularly in the design of elevators which allowed for rapid turnover of planes for duty. Most notably, American carriers enjoyed much safer and more efficient fire control systems, which gave the Yorktown an added essential day. From a humanitarian standpoint, Parshall brings home the terrible suffering of Japanese sailors primarily from fires resulting from poor ship design. As a rule the rank and file of the Japanese Navy manifested an amazing courage and devotion to duty; Parshall's account puts the responsibility for their plight in the appropriate places.

Parshall's decision to write from the Japanese perspective was quite daring and very successful. As befits a military work, nearly one-third of this book is composed of maps, photos, and an exhaustive bibliography. It is hard to imagine how the author could have been more helpful with his illustrations of ship movements and time lines. And yet this is a work with a gripping story line. The revised truth about Midway is still a captivating tale, about commanders coping with strain and sailors loyal to their comrades. For all its technical information, Parshall's work can best be described as eminently human.

Haven't finished its reading yet, this book is a superb job about the battle of Midway. With every data carefully referenced and a lot of research in the JPN archives, most of them ignored so far in western bibliography, this book torpedoes a lot of myths that have risen around the famous naval battle over the years.
Reflects, in my opinion, the real "fog of war" that both navies had to fight with those days.
It is mainly focused in the Japanese side, giving credible answers to questions that had been ignored over the years by all history books that I have read.

"Fantastic" is not enough to describe this book. The research which has gone into it and the amount of details presented is absolutely unbelievable.
In the wake of this book, I don't think there will be any further need for continued discussion over the relative action of the US and IJN fleets and what really happened near Midway on that fateful day.
The explanation of Japanese tactical and strategical thought which lead to their demise is clearly spelled out and it finally lets the reader understand the how and why of the action Adm. Nagumo took at the time.
Altogether, I could not have asked for a better book on the subject.

Simply a must-read for anyone with a serious interest in what happened off Midway in June 1942, and why events unfolded the way they did. The authors explain not only what happened, but why - in exhaustive detail. And therein lies the reason I could not in good conscience give this outstanding work 5 stars.

When the subject is as complex as this battle, and the research so comprehensive, any author has a responsibility to write as concisely as possible. Doing so respects the reader's time and improves the chances of the less dedicated making it through the text. Not only is this book unnecessarily wordy, the authors sometimes use three or four paragraphs to explain a point only to spend another paragraph or two summarizing and/or providing 'in other words' alternative explanations. Frankly, the average reader may be hard-pressed to finish this work. I half expected the last page to be a submission form for three hours of credit.

With that said, the afterglow is a pleasant one for those of us with a deep interest in this battle and the patience to read through to the end. The authors do a fine job of explaining why they're explaining. For example, with great effect they use Japanese carrier procedures and doctrine as evidence indicating what was actually happening in specific timeframes. Another example is showing the real role the decimated American torpedo squadrons played, which was critical but not for the reasons most people believe. The research appears impeccable and the conclusions reached on points where absolute evidence does not exist make sense.

The authors are perhaps a bit snarky when addressing some other sources on the battle, but I believe that to be a product of their own passion for accuracy, the battle, and the Imperial Japanese Navy as opposed to any intended animosity.

Bottom line: highly recommended, but be prepared to invest some time.

I can not begin to imagine what an undertaking it was to gather the research used in this book. The author has compiled a mammoth volume of information on the battle of Midway. There are many points of the battle that have been accepted as gospel by those of us who were not there. Not only does the author boldly claim these points as false, but provides convincing facts to back up his claims.

For a parent or student looking for a point of reference for a term paper or thesis, this is an absolute MUST! Not only does it cover the events of the battle, there is also an amazing amount of background on all the major players who commanded the Japanese forces.

After reading numerous books on the battle of Midway and numerous books that include Midway, this book provided me with new insights on the battle. This is for the reader who has read a number of books on the Pacific war and Midway and also for the new reader. It provides the new insights by looking at the battle from the perspective of the Japanese. And, then based upon that perspective it debunks the "miracle at Midway" myth. After reading this book, I left with the strong belief that if the Japanese had not lost at Midway by this margin, they would have lost afterwards by the same margin, especially when the new Essex class carriers arrived. The loss, in short, was due to the failings of the Japanese naval system and the inability to learn from their mistakes. And, if the Japanese won this battle, it would not have resulted in much of a victory. Yes, the war would have been delayed, but the inevitable would have occurred when the Essex class carriers and the Hellcat fighter arrived. That doesn't reduce the heroism of the US carrier pilots because a Japanese win and a prolonged war would have resulted in more casualties. In short, this is a fascinating book and well worth the read for anyone interested in the Pacific War.

Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway I have read a number of books by authors on both sides(japanese and American)regarding the Battle of Midway but none have come close to this book. Mr. Parshall provides the reader with most intricate details on Japanese carrier technology and doctrine that in the end led to Japan's catastropic defeat at Midway.A must read of any serious historian or aviation buff. Excellent in every way.

I awarded this book "only" five stars because that is all that is allowed. This book far and away must be considered required reading for anyone who considers themselves well read on World War II, particularly the Battle of Midway. This book far outstrips even the most well thought of books on the Battle, and that includes Walter Lord's seminal work and the scholar's choice accorded to Gordon Prange. Walter Lord referred to Midway as a "victory shot with luck." After reading Shattered Sword, a more apt description would be "a Japanese defeat shot with bad luck." This is the first book written from the Japanese perspective. A book was written by Japanese authors decades ago, but as is pointed out in SH SW, the Japanese book is riddled with error. The finest accolade that I can give to this book is that it is meticulously researched, yet does not bog the reader down in mind numbing minutiae. In fact the research is neatly pointed out, interpreted, and concisely put forth for ease of readability. The initial chapters are also a fine example of military scholarship and give a very cogent backdrop to the ways that Navy's fight battles. As an aside, I communicated with one of the authors (Parshall) and found him to be a fine gentleman. I took issue with one of his conclusions based on his own research. Unlike many authors, he did not take umbrage at those who disagree with him. He stated his position in a polite way in an exchange of e-mails. He was okay with the idea that we respectfully agree to disagree.

One of the most thorough and well-researched books about warfare that I have ever read. Excruciating details of Japanese carrier operations. A much-needed examination of the events and history leading up to the tragic (from the Japanese perspective) battle. Vividly illustrates how Yamamoto wasted and misused Japan's "sharpest sword".

This was just the book I was looking for; a detailed thoroughly documented and researched account of the battle. I felt like I was watching a newsreel of the events leading up to and through the battle. The writing style is direct and clear but not dry or boring; it contains just the right amount of storytelling. You are not likely to enjoy this if you just want an overview of the battle, or if you are a casual reader; this book is written for someone who is interested in WWII strategy and tactics.

For all serious students of WW2 in the Pacific, this single book corrects all the errors, exagerations, mistatements, lies and wrong conclusions concerning what happened leading up to and during the Battle of Midway, the turning point of the Pacific war.
The authors worked for several years with documents in Japan and the USA plus interviewing living survivors as well as certain prior authors on the subject. Far different conclusions have been reached in many vital points before , during and after this battle. Vast amounts of personal egotism , face saving and self grandizement are revealed and corrected. Japanese self inflicted shame and Bushido Code behavoir which caused them to report incorrectly in many cases are revealed and corrected plus research into US military reports of the time which stated things incorrectly too frequently and lead to wrong conclusions in the post war period, which in turn mislead all postwar writers and researchers.
This book is the definitive work to date and may possibly never be updated or revised.
Dick Trenk
Pinellas Park, FL

"Shattered Sword" is an excellent analysis of the Battle of Midway which all readers with an interest in this great battle will want to read. Its main strength is its analysis of the Japanese side and its command of detail in this regard. Recommended.

Picked up my copy at the 65th Anniversary seminar on the attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. Met Parschall and found him to be very knowledgeable on his subject and very entertaining. The book's coverage of the subjects of why the Japanese carriers were so vulnerable at Midway and the Aleutian diversion theory was as entertaining as it was informative. This is one of the few revisionist history books that I really enjoyed.

This is not just another war book, but a treaties on how to evaluate a complex situation including a battle. There were lots of new material to me, as I've only read the classic book on the Lexington. But what I found most useful was looking at the battle from a "military doctrine" point of view. How does the organization plan, what happens when the plan meets reality, what happens afterward. Does anyone learn anything from the victory or the defeat? It's pretty clear that the battle at Pearl Harbor shook up the American Navy to the point of learn or die. Not so for the Imperial Navy after Midway.

Students of WWII Pacific battles will love this book whether or not they agree with the findings of the authors. About 1/4 of the book is appendices and bibliography so if you were starting to research this battle this book will lead you to many of the key sources.

I'm off to find a book on the battle of the Solomons next, and you will be too after you read this book.

Several long-standing myths of the Midway Battle are so deeply ingrained in history books that it's shocking to discover that there is a very good chance none of them are true. For instance:

1. The sacrifice of the Hornet's Torpedo 8 squadron was not in vain since it brought the Japanese fighters down to sea level and permitted the dive bombers unobstructed access to their targets.

2. The late launch of Japanese Scout 4 was the major factor in the Japanese failure to locate the US task force.

3. The US fleet won the battle against overpowering odds. The Japanese outnumbered and outclassed them, but they lost. It was pure luck.

4. Had the Japanese not decided to launch a second attack against Midway and kept their a/c armed with ship-attacking weapons, they'd have been able to attack the US fleet as soon as they found them.

5. The Japanese planes were all set to attack the fleet and were spotted on deck, fully armed and fueled, ready to go, when the US bombs struck.

6. Not only did the Japanese navy lose 4 fleet carriers, they also lost most of their front-line pilots which they were never able to replace, hence Midway was the battle that doomed Japan to defeat.

7. Midway was the last offensive effort made by the Imperial forces. Before Midway, the US never had a victory in the Pacific; after Midway, the US never suffered a defeat.

There are several more such fallacies that have been perpetuated in books by Japanese and American naval historians, and this book addresses them all and, in my opinion convincingly dismembers them.

I won't tell you how this is accomplished. The authors have worked with both American and Japanese participants in the battle and have studied, exhaustively, the techniques employed by both navies in the handling of their aircraft and their methods of conducting battle. Most details surrounding the way the Japanese managed their aircraft aboard their carriers were based on the methods employed by the Americans and/or the British, and are wrong.

This book sets those details right.

It doesn't discredit the US victory one bit. It leaves intact the notion that Midway was an amazing, decisive, and complete victory at a time when it appeared the Japanese Kido Butai (carrier striking force) had been running amok throughout the Pacific and Indian Oceans and was undoubtedly the most efficient and powerful naval air attack force in the world. What it does do is explain why the victory was not as incredible as previously supposed and spells out, in detail why and how the Japanese lost - and it was, indeed, a battle that was Japan's to lose.

It's written insufficient detail to satisfy the most statistically and fact-minded reader while retaining enough easy flow of an historical novel to maintain the interest of readers for whom the allure of WW2 naval battles is a bit more casual.

This is a book which, if you are a student of WW2 in the Pacific, is one you must not fail to read.

First of all, I think this volume is best read as a supplement to other Midway books, such as Walter Lord's classic. Parshall and Tulley's this volume mostly tells the story from the Japanese side, and as other reviewers pointed out, they spend a lot of time criticizing existing studies, which detracts from the coherence of their own book.

They did point out a few myths, such as the two sides were matched pretty equally as far as carrier and air force, the AL (Aleutian) operation was not a decoy, and the Japanese were not ready to launch an attack at the fateful 10:22 American bombing of their three carriers, etc. But all these do not really change the big picture -- Yamamoto's force was too spread out, the U.S.'s breaking of the Japanese code gave them a crucial advantage in preparing for the Japanese attack and setting up the ambush and counter-attack, the late launch of the Japanese scouting plane exacerbated the lack or delay of intelligence, the repeated (though futile) early U.S. attempts to attack the Japanese carriers disrupted Nagumo's preparation for counter-attack, etc.

So, overall, after reading the book, I feel like I came away with a few good points from this 500+ page volume, but it really did not change much of my understanding of the battle. One bright spot is that this book has a good collection of photos, and some high quality computer generated drawings of the Japanese carriers and planes.

If one has to read one book about Midway, I think Walter Lord's book is still the one. True, Lord probably exaggerated a bit by saying that "they had no right to win", "they were hopelessly outclassed", but it was a fact that the U.S. naval force was inferior to that of the Japanese at that point of the war. It was Yamamoto's folly to spread out his forces that contributed to his downfall. Also, Lord actually did not say the AL operation was a feint. In the big schema of things, that is really irrelevant. What is relevant is that Yamamoto *did* spread out his forces instead of concentrating them in one blow. Lord's book tells the whole story and it is remarkable that after 40 years it is still a mostly faithful and accurate depiction of the famous battle.

One final note, I too find the prevalent use of Japanese words (not just proper names) annoying. It is as if the authors were showing off their familiarity of the Japanese language. Is it really necessary to refer to "Striking force" as "Kido Butai"? More ridiculous is to refer to "air officer" as "sho-hikocho", etc. This is a book in English after all, we are reading history, not to learn a foreign language.

This book adds immeasurably to our understanding of the Midway battle; the authors are to be commended for their research which debunks some Japanese myths--many of which were propagated by Fuchida. For this, it rates 4 stars. However, the authors use this research to take creative license in reinterpreting the battle in a way that diminishes the "Incredible Victory" or "Miracle At Midway" theme of other Western authors. On this score, I think the authors go too far in their revisionist interpretation...Nagumo's fleet and aircrews, compared to the American's, were just too good. Midway was more akin to a college football team beating a seasoned professional team.

American aircrews without question demonstrated considerable bravery and determination in their attacks on Nagumo's carriers, but did not demonstrate much skill. The brilliant exception was the critical 1020 attacks by Yorktown/Enterprise, which Prange had described previously as an "uncoordinated coordinated" attack. That Enterprise's Dauntlesses attacked simultaneous to the Yorktown's combined torpedo/dive bombing attack was most fortunate--perhaps even "miraculous"--given the piecemeal massacre of just about all other American aircraft that morning. The American's--with the exception of the Yorktown's air group--couldn't or wouldn't coordinate attacks even though their lives greatly depended upon it. This demonstrated weaknesses in American tactics/doctrine/leadership (Browning/Mitscher??) that could have been just as self-defeating as those that Parshall/Tulley illustrate and deplore of the Japanese. The US Army, for example, could have filled the sky with hundreds of B-17s bombing from 20,000 ft, and the result probably would have been the same--no hits. The Yorktown's aircrew unquestionably were the Pacific Fleet's "A" team; the Enterprise's aircrew were something less. The Hornet's aircrew--with the exception of Waldron's VT-8--hardly seemed fit to be in the battle. If American marksmanship failed to deliver ordinance accurately on Nagumo's carriers, it didn't matter how screwed up the Japanese operational plan was revealed to be in the postmortems--they would have won anyway.

Consider that the first dive bombing counterstrike against TF-17 by Hiryu's Kobayashi--launched "piecemeal" at 1057--by 1211 had temporarily disabled the Yorktown despite radar/lack of surprise, fierce CAP, and formidable anti-aircraft fire. They did this with 7 aircraft scoring three direct hits and 2 very near misses, "an enviable rate of accuracy in anyone's book". The American's never came close to this marksmanship. The authors question why it took so long for Tomonaga's even smaller torpedo strike to launch from Hiryu at 1330 (page 283-284) following Kobayashi--the much bigger question is why hadn't Spruance/TF-16 followed up their 1020 attacks to prevent Tomonaga's 1330 launch in the first place? Was Spruance/Browning twiddling their thumbs or what? "Scouting" hardly seems a reasonable explanation for delay because of the short distance between the fleets and the smoking beacons of the three burning Japanese carriers. This allowed Tomonaga's 10-plane torpedo strike to disable Yorktown for good at 1445, with 2 hits from the 6 torpedoes launched in the face of ferocious resistance. Two small but successful strikes launched by Hiryu...while TF-16 didn't even get one followup strike in the air. This should be scandalous.

The Americans by all accounts had surprise, quantitative parity at the point of attack, and good intelligence. But without the marksmanship of aviators like Richard Best--who singlehandedly took out the Akagi (this act alone seems somewhat of a "miracle")--the much more competent Japanese undoubtably would have won the day. Parshall/Tully minimalizes this too much for my tastes.

There is no doubt that Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway is a landmark piece of revisionist history that adds great depth to our understanding of this pivotal battle in the war of the Pacific. Thanks to the efforts of co-authors Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully, readers will get to see far more of the Japanese side of the battle than has been heretofore presented in English. In addition to disposing of a number of long-standing myths about the battle (e.g., Japanese carrier decks loaded with aircraft, the Tone scout plane, etc) the authors make a major effort to define the unique features of Japanese carrier operations and how this contributed to the battle's outcome. In these terms, the book is a great success. However, the authors seemed unsatisfied with merely writing a groundbreaking history and instead over-extended by presenting a hypothesis that claims that faulty Japanese doctrine was really to blame for their defeat. After achieving a dazzling success in the first two-thirds of their book, the author's then pound their credibility into dust in the last third in a futile attempt to prove their hypothesis.

Up front, I must note that the maps, charts, tables and photos that support this work are superb. It is rare in a military history text that readers are presented with this kind of detail that leaves room for few follow-up questions. The 24 chapters are well arranged and the narrative flows well, at least concerning the battle itself. Both authors are to be applauded for meticulous research and attention to detail.

Unfortunately, the main hypothesis that the author's continually try to peddle is a house of cards. In essence, the authors argue that Japan developed a carrier doctrine that called for massing all available airpower into a massive, coordinated multi-carrier strike that could inflict devastating results. The authors say that mass was more important to Japanese carrier leaders than speed and that they blew their chance at Midway when they did not launch whatever they had available when the first US aircraft carrier was spotted. By waiting to mass their forces, the Japanese took too long and were ultimately smashed by the faster, but weaker US carrier strikes. Thus, the authors argue that faulty doctrine was the root cause of the Japanese defeat. There were other factors as well - a poor operational plan by Yamamoto, an inadequate air search plan, sloppy tactical mistakes - but it was allegedly faulty doctrine that is marked as the main culprit.

I have to admit that I am uneasy when I see civilians discussing military doctrine and this book fosters that kind of apprehension. Many civilians have difficulty accepting the concept of military doctrine and tend to see it as a straitjacket, rather than as a series of useful guidelines. Simply put, there really are no military doctrines that are faulty, although they may be employed improperly. By definition, doctrine is a group of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) that have been successfully demonstrated to most efficiently accomplish a given task. If a given set of TTPs failed in combat, they would not be adopted as `doctrine.' Does anyone believe either now or in 1942 that "mass" is not one of the principles of war? While it might be true that had the Japanese launched whatever ready aircraft they had on 4 June 1942 against the first US carrier contact that they might have landed the first blow, this is a situation-dependent conclusion not a doctrine-related issue. As the author's make small note of, the Japanese did precisely that at the earlier Battle of the Coral Sea - send out most of their planes against the first contact - and ended up sinking a US oiler and destroyer, not a carrier group. As any old hand at intelligence work could attest, the first spot report is usually wrong and to develop a doctrine based on committing your main strike force against the first report in is asking for trouble.

The authors make a lot of good points about the inadequacies of the Japanese combat air patrol and their inadequate flak, both of which contributed greatly to the success of the main American dive-bomber attacks. Yet Japanese carrier doctrine was no more faulty on June 4, 1942 than French `methodical battle' was faulty in May 1940 - they were just executed under the wrong conditions. Attacking an island with a large, alert air garrison was really not a job for Kido Butai (the Japanese carrier fleet) in the first place. Once the possibility of American carriers intervening became feasible, Japanese doctrine became even more inappropriate since it would have to deal with too many potential missions at once. Just like the French, the Japanese doctrine was suited to a methodical action where they could anticipate the battle rhythm, mass their forces and hurl them in great strength against a single target at a time. It was ill suited to the free-flow brawl at sea that actually ensued.

The author's also tend to use a great deal of Japanese terminology in this book. That's great when you get details in a foreign language right, but here I'm afraid they either didn't check with a Japanese speaker or relied on machine translations, since there are a number of ungrammatical usages in Japanese. Even with four years of college-level Japanese, I went and checked my Kenkyusha's Japanese-English dictionary and found a number of "non-words" in play here. All in all, Shattered Sword is a very good book but the author's inability to comprehend the nature of military doctrine and the principles of war lays waste to much of their hypothesis and their Japanese language gaffes diminish their credibility somewhat.

This is simply the best book yet written on the subject of the battle of Midway. Period!

A word of warning, however. It presumes the reader has read previous books on the subject. In order to get the most out of this book possible, one should read Fuchida's "Midway: the Battle that Doomed Japan," Prange's "Miracle at Midway," and Lord's "Incredible Victory," as considerable space is devoted to analysing and debunking those works.

The discussion of how the Japanese carrier force conducted its flight ops, Japanese naval doctrine, and the quandries faced by VADM Nagumo during the course of the battle are top notch. The accounts of Hiryu's afternoon attacks on Yorktown are also the best I've yet read, though I have not read Lundstrom.

The outstanding feature of this book is putting under a microscope the thinking that went into the planning of the "Battle of Midway" from the Japanese perspective. We see information that changes our picture of 'things we thought we knew.'
One of the more interesting features of the book is a study of how aircraft carriers operated, and the differences between the American carriers and the Japanese vessels.
There is also a clear picture of the structure of the Japanese aircraft command, and of the way in which the American pilots flew.
My favorite of all.......

This book provides an account of the Midway battle from the Japanese perspective, and sheds light on previous works and accounts which have long been considered accurate. I was looking for one, complete, definitive book for this battle, and this is definitely the right one. The amount of new information presented (as of 2005) on an event that took place over 60 years ago is incredible. Kudos to Parshall and Tully for their research and presentation. This book is one of the best I have read in years. I highly recommend ii!

A great deal of this book comes from research into various Japanese sources that are not well-known in this country (such as the official Japanese history), but that provide a much more in-depth account than Mitsuo Fuchida's "Midway: the battle that doomed Japan." This book is a necessary read for anyone studying the Battle of Midway; there is so much incredibly useful information, including the overthrowing of various myths about how Japanese carriers operated early in the war, and the relative importance of Nagumo's decisions on the outcome of the battle. For instance, the Aleutians operation was intended as a separate acquisition of the Alaskan islands rather than as diversionary operation for the seizure of Midway, contra many previous accounts.

_Shattered Sword_ is also a pleasure to read. The authors begin their analysis of Yamamoto's plan for the Midway operation with the words "The reader may wish to take a stiff drink" before dissecting its almost unbelievable complexity and folly, and the prose quality is high. The book is well-structured and exciting.

This is probably the most important study of Midway to appear since (and perhaps surpassing) Gordon Prange's _Miracle at Midway_ or Samuel Eliot Morison's volume in the US Navy official history.

Highly, highly recommended.