Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military provides powerful and thoughtful insights specially for the Pakistani youth brought up during the heyday of "islamization".

Haqqani commences with an intense vivisection of the "ideology of Pakistan", arguably the most overused, misconstrued and manipulated version of Pakistan's history. An academically inclined audience might consider the first chapter a rehash of views already presented by noted historians like Ayesha Jalal, but his contribution lies in cleansing the literature of its academic complexity and having the audacity to be clear and simple. For the majority of Pakistani youth meticulously reprogrammed in schools to believe that the "two-nation theory" traces its roots to the conquest of Mohammad bin Qasim; the book is nothing less than an "insolent heresy". Haqqani struggles to place the popular war song, "Aay Rah-e-Haq kay shaheedon" in unfamiliar surroundings.

Though fueled by a captivating start; the book spirals into a monotonous chronology of events. Later chapters, lack the broader analysis and at times the reader would find himself painstakingly sifting through a poorly indexed "encylopedia".

Overall, Husain Haqqani has done a very good job. Surely not for the well informed but highly recommended for students interested in knowing about Pakistan's jugglery with religion.

Given Haqqani's close relationship with several recent Pakistan governments, I had been looking forward to reading his text.

On the pluses, the book is well researched, with several interesting insights and facts which maintained my curiosity. For instance, it was surprising to learn of the ISI's active interest in Afghanistan which began in 1973 (6 years before the USSR's invasion). Then there were the specifics about Benazir's foreign policy options during her first prime ministerial office being largely curtailed by the army.

On the minuses, Haqqani failed on the book's higher conceptual thinking - specifically he failed to adequately relate the interesting facts with enough of a meaningful conceptual framework. The book feels like a laundry list of events, a boring chronology book (not even a history book, let alone a European IR text) when it really needed to explore the core concepts more powerfully. The book is after all supposed to be focused on the relationship between Pakistan's 'Mosque and Military'.

My guess is that the author rushed the book. Students who have had to write a thesis may appreciate my next comment more easily than others. This book gave me the impression that the author had written the first draft, proofed for typos and run to the printers. I would have thought that if he had allowed a gestation period, even a few weeks, he would have been able to self-reflect that little bit more and push the conceptual dimension.

Mr. Haqqani's views about his mother country are very dubious. The only question I have for the author as he served in some very corrupt governments as their partner...What has he done for his home land? Nothing!!! This book in waste of time.

Mr. Haqqani's views about his mother country are very dubious. The only question I have for the author as he served in some very corrupt governments as their partner...What has he done for his home land? Nothing!!! This book in waste of time.

After listening to the author speak on NPR, I purchased this book.

It is an eye opener and troublesome to know what really goes on in the mosques and their connection to terrorism.

This book is both troublesome and worrisome for the reader, but I can think of no better qualified source to write from the perspective of inside of this regime and government.

Cause for concern? Read it.

This is quite simply the best book on Pakistan that has ever been written, for it finally pierces the veil of deception which the Pakistani military has succeeded in drawing over the true nature of its long-term strategy. The book documents in great depth and detail that behind its "deny, lie, smile" foreign policy, Pakistan's military has: 1) Fomented and conducted a vicious insurgency in Kashmir; 2) Supported anti-American jihadist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the Taliban to first conquer and now destabilize Afghanistan; 3) Nurtured and manipulated Islamist parties to help destabilize and dismiss elected majorities in the Pakistan parliament; and 4)Used these same Islamist factions as a recruiting base for terrorism directed against India and Afghanistan, creating a threat to the West as well.

Author Haqqani doesn't address the issue of how America let Pakistan get the bomb. Let's hope he is working on another book to deal with that US foreign policy fiasco!

Between Mosque and Military should be read by Secretary of State Rice, and the book's findings should lead to a change in our policy toward Pakistan.

This is a well researched book and offers a new perspective on Pakistan's history and politics. Haqqani's main thesis is that the Islamists and the military in Pakistan have always found it beneficial to cooperate with each other. The main reason for this relationships dates back to the creation of Pakistan when the circumstances forced the early leaders of Pakistan to adopt a tripod strategy. The pillars of that strategy were Islam, hatred against India and reliance on American aid. Haqqani argues that this strategy has not changed over time. In conclusion, he asks the American policy makers to stop assisting the military in Pakistan and help Pakistan move from an ideological state run by the mullah-military alliance to a functional one run by the people of Pakistan.

The major weakness of the book lies in its conclusion. It appeals to the American policy makers to do some thing to solve Pakistan's problems. It is the same mistake that Pakistan's military dictators have always made and that the two exiled Pakistani leaders (Mr Nawaz Sharif and Ms Benazir Bhutto) are making now. Rather than appealing to the people of Pakistan to rise up to the occasion and to understand that if Pakistan becomes a democratic, liberal and progressive state they are the ones to directly benefit, Haqqani seeks the solution in the Capitol Hill and the White House.

The problem is that a majority of Pakistanis is still not fully convinced that a truly democratic Pakistan will serve their interests better than the one run by mullah-military alliance. However, it is for this very reason that scholars like Haqqani should come forward and tell the people of Pakistan what is good and what is harmful for them. The scholars should educate ordinary Pakistanis and show them what the propaganda machinery in Pakistan is not letting them see. In the same vein, it will be a good idea to publish an Urdu translation of this book and make it available at a low price in Pakistan so that more Pakistanis can read and benefit from Haqqani's research.

When I began this book, my knowledge of Pakistan was the sum total of various sound bites, short conversations with Pakistani co-workers and articles I had read. This resulted in a vague and conflicted perception. Such is no longer the case. The time spent reading Haqqani's book has acquainted me well with the personalities, issues, history and indeed the phenomenon which is Pakistan.

This outstanding work provides the kind historical analysis only available from someone who was there to live the history of which he speaks. As an advisor to three of Pakistan's prime ministers, an acquaintance or personal friend of several influential generals, and as Pakistan's ambassador to Sri Lanka, the author writes with authority from first hand knowledge. He provides a close-in view of the personalities, relationships and complicated intrigue behind many of the events which comprise the story which is the history of Pakistan.

Concerning political intrigue: I think it's fair to say that since its inception, Pakistan has taken that phenomenon to a new level. The interplay and opposition between the military (whose aim is always to control the government), the civilian government (who at times dares pursue ends unsanctioned by the former entity) and the islamist extremists (whom the former seeks to manipulate to help them control the latter) results in a pervasive and ongoing tension. The media is correct to speak of Pakistani politics as "shadow games". Indeed, much goes on in the shadows, behind the scenes where none are supposed to see. The military - and intelligence service (the ISI) exercise an amazing ability to manipulate events, perceptions and ultimately the sentiments of the masses in order to further their own agenda. While reading the book, I expected the level of shenanigans to eventually subside into a fairly smooth running government... Although on the surface, Pakistan has had such periods, the background intrigue never ceases.

The author is amazing in the level of detail he is able to provide. His long personal involvement with the players and institutions of which he speaks, as well as his learning, enable him to present a cogent and engaging account of a complicated subject which - in other hands - could easily be cumbersome and a burden to read. Instead, I found my interest never at a wane. The book reads like a good novel - except it's true. Once again my personal perspective is vindicated: why read fiction when so much of human history is "stranger yet"..!! For those who wish to understand the phenomenon which is Pakistan, I heartily recommend this book.

I think Indian intellectuals should read this book... There are some perspectives explained in length that are essential to understanding the Pakistani position...especially the times and events of the Paritition... of how Pakistan came into being - a very insecure and resource-starved young nation. Indians so often fail to appreciate this fact.

An able discussion of the topic by an Author who is obviously well versed in his subject.

Democracy, with its compromises and corruption, its unkept promises and overblown rhetoric, can be a messy business. Those can-do guys in starched uniforms sometimes look like a darned good alternative to the squalid world of electoral politics. Don't be fooled. In this badly needed book, Husain Haqqani shows how Pakistan's military elite has run a once promising country into the ground. Never questioning their own motives, they have repeatedly sowed political discord behind the scenes and used the resulting instability to justify overthrowing elected leaders. And yet they are incompetent once they're in charge. They lost East Pakistan. They have repeatedly provoked unwinnable wars with their bigger neighbor, India. They have spent billions to arm themselves and house themselves in comfort while spending next to nothing on education and healthcare for their impoverished people. They have entered into unholy alliances with militant Islamists to marginalize secular democratic politicans who might offer Pakistan's people a chance for something better. Haqqani shows that, contrary to popular belief, the military-mullah alliance is nothing new. It started decades ago. Gen. Pervez Muhsarraf, who seized power in yet another coup six years ago, is reading from the same playbook as the dictators who came before him. Sad to see America falling for the same old tricks.

In the present war against terrorism, the Muslim societies in general have been defensive, in providing an explanation. Regarding the rise of militancy, various apologetic arguments are presented by the analysts of these societies in general and Pakistan in particular. This book has a different approach.
The author, Husain Haqqani was closely associated with an Islamic party, when he was a student at Karachi University and therefore is better equipped to understand the psyche of such groups. Nevertheless, a distinction has to be made within these Islamic groups. On the one hand, there are those that have remained a part of the political process in Pakistan, while others rely purely on sabotage, killings, hate and bigotry. The latter does not believe in a peaceful participation of country's political process and therefore can be categorized as extremists or even terrorists.
Husain Haqqani is correct in saying that the main problem is the military, with their record of ruling Pakistan for more than half of its history. In the "democratic phase" between 1988 and 1999, the military generals continued to indirectly rule Pakistan, as the Afghan policy; Kashmir policy and the Nuclear policy were strictly under the preview of the army.
One would agree with the author that it were the army generals that encouraged militant groups to operate as an instrument of Pakistan's foreign policy. Even after 9/11, Pakistan army generals followed the same trends, while showing another face to the western world. These generals are part of the problem, when it comes to militancy in the country, with its serious ramification, elsewhere in the world.
'Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military' is a book that can provide an insight to the reader, about the Pakistani power groups and their interaction with each other.

Prof. Dr. Syed Farooq Hasnat
Columbia, Maryland

I recommend reading this book; however, I am afraid, many Westerners who are far removed from religion in their daily lives and Indians who are anti-Pakistan may draw wrong/tainted conclusions against Pakistan.

1): Whatever Haqqani writes in his book, one must understand military and mullahs can not be separated because Pakistan is primarily a Muslim country and military is a subset of it.

2): Military, an aggressive institution by nature, will remain close to mullah parties (such as Jamat-e-Islami) because these parties are hawkish and anti-India.

3): Since the military brass knows that Pakistan must remain a forward looking country, the same military which seeks the help of mullah-parties does not want mullahs to rule the country. Thus the double game of sleeping with mullahs while supporting a secular minded government (Muslim League/PPP/MQM) which takes into account the geopolitical issues of Pakistan.

4): Military has/had run into extreme distrust with Benazeer for hanging his father, Altaf Hussain of MQM for first propping him against PPP and then cracking him, and Nawaz for getting too close to Vajpai. Until there is a trust between secular minded party leaders and the military, the military would continue to support mullahs for a long time.

5): One view is that military should keep Benazeer, Nawaz, and Altaf out of the country while making deals with their party leaders. Hope this works and a trust is developed between secular minded parties and military.

6): Acquiring nuclear deterrent against India and confidence building measures such the construction of the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline would help reduce military reliance on mullahs.