Subtitled //The psychological cost of learning to kill in War and Society//. Col. Grossman made entry into his revised work difficult with a self congratulatory introduction. Apparently his ideas have had some positive feedback since 1995. I would have preferred a statement of intent to prove something rather than a claim of success in doing so. And I'm not very impressed with PTA-style condemnation of violent computer games. The sheer difficulty of breaking instinctual/societal constraints against fatality-causing violence is well covered here, with some good statistical and graphical presentation. However, the presentation contains a bit too much evocative poetry and drama, and not enough coherence. I failed to detect a connecting thread to make it pull together, though I struggled to do so. And the focus shifts abruptly, from one theory to another, without really resolving or integrating any of them. The Colonel's treatment of the phenomenon we call PTSD these days was thorough, and thoughtful; his research on the unique nature and effects of prolonged modern war and its effects on the human psyche deserve respect. Though //On Killing// was a difficult read, I will keep it on my shelf.

Reviewed by David Sutton

This is a very important book, as important as Freud's groundbreaking work on the frequency of child sexual abuse. Freud retracted under pressure, which I'm confident LTC Grossman won't. I'm a civilian mental health professional with many military members as clients. This work contains excellent research and has been extremely helpful to me in my work. I've had great discussions about it with other counselors. Don't know if LTC Grossman reads these reviews?!? I missed your presentation in Norfolk VA a couple of months ago. Hope to meet you elsewhere.

"Societies which ask men to fight on their behalf should be aware of what the consequences of their actions may so easily be."

The above quote is included in this book and, I think, sums up why everyone should read this. We so easily (and thoughtlessly) accept sending our men and women to war and we give little, if any, thought to the toll killing in battle takes on them. Grossman's in-depth research teaches us how much damage is caused by our indifference.

This is the first book on the psychology of killing from a military point of view and, as such, it is ground-breaking and extremely important, especially to the extent to which it pierces the veil of complicit silence that surrounds one of the strongest taboos in our culture.

Military buffs will be thrilled at the psychological secrets it reveals about various strategies have sought to counter man's innate resistance to killing throughout history. Who would have suspected that up until Vietnam (according to battlefield archaeology) soldiers had a tacit understanding amongst themselves not to shoot to kill, or even fire at the enemy at all. Apparently, before WW II only about 10% of soldiers fired their weapons at the enemy, and only 2% (natural born psychopaths) could kill easily without adverse psychological consequences.

However, this "military psychology" is to psychology as military music is to music. The author's heavy reliance on behaviorism, leavened with a crude rendition of psychoanalysis, leads to shallow analyses and sometimes wrong conclusions. He worries, for example, that modern youngsters are being conditioned to kill by violent video games. He explains away the lack of statistical evidence for this by asserting that these deaths are masked in official statistics by advances in medical technology. In one place he naively states that he thinks that the psychopaths in the military (who are the only one's willing or, indeed eager to kill) are benign. This is contrary to everything that is known about psychopathy.

Elsewhere, he describes the plight of Vietnam vets, who have one of the highest and most debilitating rates of PTSD because they faced a kind of "perfect storm" of insensitivity and mismanagement. First, most of the recruits were very young; they were subject to new forms of training to get them to shoot and kill at historically unprecedented levels. They were assigned to units on a replacement basis so that they never developed the kind of mutual supports which soldiers who train together typically develop. The counter-insurgency nature of the war--where it was difficult to distinguish enemies from friends--was highly stressful and prone to tragic errors. When they began to exhibit stress and "battle fatigue," their symptoms were managed with anti-depressants and other drugs. They were returned home without any chance to debrief or decompress, and they walked straight into an unsympathetic society which viewed them (not always unjustly) as war criminals. Instead of using this information to point out the unacceptable costs of engaging in unnecessary and unjust wars, and the unconscionable lack of regard for the soldier's basic humanity, Grossman suggests that perhaps a little historical revisionism is in order. He suggests that we tell Vietnam vets that the war did make a difference in thwarting the spread of communism (which it most emphatically did not).

These examples seem to reveal a kind of willful blindness bordering on moral tone-deafness that makes one wonder if this sort of thing should even be studied at all. What is missing is any sense of the social, psychological and moral career a person undergoes from ordinary citizen. To get the necessary theoretical perspective I recommend reading another book back to back with it--Lonnie Athens' "Dangerous Violent Criminals." No amount of "conditioning" is going to turn a decent man into a killer; his decency has to be removed by a distinct sequence of events which advance him on a kind of "moral career." Once you realize what it is, you also realize that it is a thing to be avoided by any civilized society.

This book was written before 9-11, so is overdue for an update. If the past is prologue, we may be facing the most traumatized and dysfunctional group of vets yet returning from Afghanistan and Iraq.

Many books about war, but, not about killing and those who will kill and what this means. This book has opened new dimensions to consider, and an interest to continue to study this topic.

This book covers some very pertinent points on the pschology of killing. I am a writer and found it beneficial research. If I had a mild critisism, it would be that there is some repetition in the book, and the author goes into more detail than necessary to make his points. But his points are excellent and on the money. A very good book.

Brilliant study into the phychology of taking a fellow mans life. Grossman's thesis is that human beings are predisposed with a tendancy to not kill eachother. He uses extensive research and events in previous wars to support this theory. He also supports this through the training of militants throughout history. He shows that men must be extensively trained or "conditioned" in order to pull the trigger and kill another human being. Even with this extensive training, many men find it difficult to do so; some cannot. Then he shows the after effects of killing. How and why many men feel guilt even in the most justifiable of situations.

Many of the lower rated reviews disagree with his premise by using historical atrocities or wars in which men seemed to kill eachother easily, and with unspeakable brutality. Even killing women and children. However Grossman addresses this rather well.

Grossman clearly shows how men can kill without any guilt or remorse. Most intriguing was Section III, "Killing from a Distance". He considers distance in many different ways; Distance from target, emotional distance, cultural distance, social distance, and Mechanical distance. With the actual distance from target, grossman studies the different psychological impacts from droppoing bombs or sniper fire, where one can "Pretend they are not killing human beings", to Mid-range where "you can never be sure it was you", and close range to knife fights and hand to hand combat where one is personally resposibe for taking specific lives. He shows how the psychological effects are enhanced as the actuall distance in fighting becomes closer and more personal. Emotional distance, cultural difference, and social distance can be seen thought the history of warfare. This is the proccess of distancing ones self from the enemy and begin to dehumanize them and see them as inferior. Japs, krauts, palefaces, and haji are all names some force has applied to its enemy in order to dehumanize them. Whether it's the enemys way of life, language, or even skin color, Grossman shows how it is much easier to kill those one would consider lower than humanity. He uses nazi consentration camps and My Lai as examples of this. Moral distance refers to one side believing their cause is one of morality. Simply justifing actions "for the cause". Mechanical distance refers to "video game combat" as Grossman names it. This makes it easier to kill from a video screen or even from a night vision scope because it tends to dehumanize the target. Simply put, through these definitions of distance "you don't look anything like a friend".


Grossman goes into many other issues regarding war and killing while also providing advise to keep men combat effective while going through the effects of killing others. He realizes that militants that kill easily is effective in war and should be highly valued by the military, but if they're trained to dehumanize an entire population or thier behavior progresses, atrocities such as killing civilians are inevitable. Overall great insight into the human mind. Great read; continued to fascinate me throughout. Left with nothing but great respect for Lt. Col. Grossman.

If you have spent time, or plan on spending time, in situations that require the use of deadly force, you MUST read this book to mentally prepare yourself.

This book is a brillantly composed collection of information, studies and insights regarding the impacts of our training, emotions and after effects in regards to killing another human being. It should be required for every psychologist and physichiatrist specially those working with Viet Nam veterans and PTSD.

For the veterans of war themselves, understand why you did what you did and understand how you were manipulated to that point. It is a healing tool beyond any others I have seen. I highly recommend it to all combat veterans regardless of theater.

I bought it, I read some of it, and I put it aside. I won't give the book one star because Grossman IS an engaging writer and the material IS interesting. Interesting, yes, but Grossman's interpretation is massively flawed. He has once again reminded me that NO ONE who has not been in combat can understand what it's like.

First let's explore Grossman's view that American soldiers can't shoot straight because they don't want to kill the other side: South Vietnam, June 1970. My very first shoot-out in Vietnam. I am an 18-year old Army private, newly arrived in-country. I am excited to be there... lots of new sounds and sights... and smells. I am sitting up on the bunker line of a fire base, talking quietly with another, more experienced soldier, when a trip flare out in the wire goes off and about a hundred voices shout, "Gooks in the wire! Everybody on the line!!!"

It is the defining moment in the life of very American G.I. who ever saw a war. And it was all over in about 10 minutes. Well,the sappers made a quick retreat, we fired up the night, they fired back...no one was hurt. But when the thing was over and I had managed to pop a Lucky (GP-13 WARNING: Soldiers smoke a lot of cigarettes) into my lip, a Lucky that my new friend had to light for me because I was shaking too hard to hit the end of my target, my new bud, just as calm as you please, asked me (actually shouted, we were both deaf from the gun fire) this: "Vidaurri, did you happen to notice all the tracers in the air?"

"Yeah... so what?"

Well, you ain't gonna see any 12-foot gooks over here. SO KEEP YOUR FIRE LOW."

So much for Grossman's more sensitive view of the American G.I. in action.

So, moving right along: Soldiers in combat are frightened...they will kill anyone anytime so as to survive. And they do not spend a great deal of time agonizing over it afterwards. That is just nonsense. As for long term personal and societal effects: well, think for a moment of all the WWII, Vietnam, Korea, Gulf, Iraq, Afghanistan....veterans that you've ever known. Have you ever been taken hostage by one of them?

And as long as we are on the subject: There was little practical difference between ground combat, or the American ground combatant, in Vietnam and any other American war in the tropical Pacific. Same climate, same terrain, same gooks. And that goes back to the Philippine Insurrection. Yes, the Army handled the rotation scheme badly, and yes, lots of soldiers found themselves back in civilian life only days after having been in combat, but Grossman cannot make a case that this caused any long-term psychological harm.

And I have news for you, Mr. and Mrs. Taxpayer. PTSD is, largely speaking, a fraud. Yes, the condition exists, but it is extremely rare (HINT: it is more than just a bad attitude) difficult to diagnose, and no more prevalent from one war to another. The reason you hear so much about PTSD in connection with Vietnam Veterans is singular: someone told us the VA was handing out $ for bad dreams. Enough said on THAT subject.

Now for the crux of the matter: The Army goes to no particular trouble to prepare soldiers for life-and-death struggle. It never has, I'm not sure why, but I think it's a good thing that it doesn't. Why? Well, what would they tell a guy? What COULD they tell him? NOTHING that would do any good, that's what.

And finally, Grossman, probably because he didn't think to ask, says nothing about the G.I. who ends up liking it. Every army, every theatre, every war produces a certain number of men who like the life - not the killing, because no one likes that, but the rest of it. I happened to me, I turned 19 and then 20 over there, and it happened to plenty of others. The reasons are various and complex, and that's another story.

Richard Vidaurri
Americal Division
The U.S. Army in Vietnam
197-1972

Author: The Gates of the Shadow

I bought the book because someone suggested that it would be a good source of psychological background for my own book about Vietnam.

And, boy, was that someone wrong.

I bought it, I read some of it, and I put it aside. I won't give the book one star because Grossman IS an engaging writer and the material IS interesting. Interesting, yes, but Grossman's interpretation is massively flawed. He has once again reminded me that NO ONE who has not been in combat can understand what it's like.

First let's explore Grossman's view that American soldiers can't shoot straight because they don't want to kill the other side: South Vietnam, June 1970. My very first shoot-out in Vietnam. I am an 18-year old Army private, newly arrived in-country. I am excited to be there... lots of new sounds and sights... and smells. I am sitting up on the bunker line of a fire base, talking quietly with another, more experienced soldier, when a trip flare out in the wire goes off and about a hundred voices shout, "Gooks in the wire! Everybody on the line!!!"

It is the defining moment in the life of very American G.I. who ever saw a war. And it was all over in about 10 minutes. Well,the dink sappers made a quick retreat, we fired up the night, they fired back...no one was hurt. But when the thing was over and I had managed to pop a Lucky (GP-13 WARNING: Soldiers smoke a lot of cigarettes) into my lip, a Lucky that my new friend had to light for me because I was shaking too hard to hit the end of my target, my new bud, just as calm as you please, asked me (actually shouted, we were both deaf from the gun fire) this: "Vidaurri, did you happen to notice all the tracers in the air?"

"Yeah... so what?"

Well, you ain't gonna see any 12-foot gooks over here. SO KEEP YOUR FIRE LOW."

So much for Grossman's more sensitive view of the American G.I. in action.

So, moving right along: Soldiers in combat are frightened...they will kill anyone anytime so as to survive. And they do not spend a great deal of time agonizing over it afterwards. That is just nonsense. As for long term personal and societal effects: well, think for a moment of all the WWII, Vietnam, Korea, Gulf, Iraq, Afghanistan....veterans that you've ever known. Have you ever been taken hostage by one of them?

And as long as we are on the subject: There was little practical difference between ground combat, or the American ground combatant, in Vietnam and any other American war in the tropical Pacific. Same climate, same terrain, same gooks. And that goes back to the Philippine Insurrection. Yes, the Army handled the rotation scheme badly, and yes, lots of soldiers found themselves back in civilian life only days after having been in combat, but Grossman cannot make a case that this caused any long-term psychological harm.

And I have news for you, Mr. and Mrs. Taxpayer. PTS is, largely speaking, a fraud. Yes, the condition exists, but it is extremely rare (HINT: it is more than just a bad attitude) difficult to diagnose, and no more prevalent from one war to another. The reason you hear so much about PTSD in connection with Vietnam Veterans is singular: someone told us the VA was handing out $ for bad dreams. Enough said on THAT subject.

Now for the crux of the matter: The Army goes to no particular trouble to prepare soldiers for life-and-death struggle. It never has, I'm not sure why, but I think it's a good thing that it doesn't. Why? Well, what would they tell a guy? What COULD they tell him? NOTHING that would do any good, that's what.

And finally, Grossman, probably because he didn't think to ask, says nothing about the G.I. who ends up liking it. Every army, every theatre, every war produces a certain number of men who like the life - not the killing, because no one likes that, but the rest of it. I happened to me, I turned 19 and then 20 over there, and it happened to plenty of others. The reasons are various and complex, and that's another story.

Richard Vidaurri
Americal Division
The U.S. Army in Vietnam
197-1972

Author: The Gates of the Shadow

This work is the most insightful I have encountered since Konrad Lorenz's book, "On Aggression" which I read in the early 1960's. Man's reluctance to indulge in face-to-face homicide must be viewed as a Darwinian response shared with other species, even reptiles. It leads me to wonder, why did it take so long to articulate this basic element of our nature? It was quite illuminating. It was required reading for my son who is being deployed to Iraq this week as an Army major to a part of the world where humiliation of one's enemies is the cultural norm, and killing is "colllateral damage", as in 9/11.

I bought this book for my husband and he enjoyed it. We are both had the great opportunity to see Dave Grossman at a conference. He had your total attention at all times. What he had to say was Invaluable ....if you have the opportunity to see him, Do It !!!

Throughout the book, solid examples are sited from interviews conducted by others, and actual personal accounts from interviews by the author. The author's personal military experience, where valid, is also used to strengthen the case and stories.

I've wanted to read this book for some time and finally took it on. Content-wise it's a roller-coaster of interesting personal anecdotes from subjects then seemingly academic research or quotations from studies. The book seems like it would be a nice companion to a college-level psychology course, but as readable non-fiction it takes a committed reader.
I give the author respect for tackling this topic and for being a man of service to our country. The book could easily be abridged for the average reader simply interested in finding out more about the current state of violence in society and in modern warfare.

Great read about the implications of society's actions with regard to violence--specifically killing.

Anyone interested in a sociological study/look into the human cost of violence (both in war and in general) ought to read this book.

I came to the book as a researcher in political science interested in learning more about the effect of conflict on those who experience it. There is a surprisingly small amount of non-specialist information on the subject, so this book is a really a gem. While it isn't perhaps the most scientific approach to the subject and the author is sometimes a little redundant in making his point, it is a point that bears repeating: The vast majority of people resist killing, even well-trained, committed, brave soldiers. And, many of those who have killed - even when it was entirely justified - retain that experience for the rest of their lives.

This book provides anecdotes, broad overviews and more specific case studies to make its point, but that shouldn't keep away the average reader who wants to learn more about what engaging in combat is like. While the author admits that he has never experienced conflict (nor have I, for that matter), and this makes him somewhat like "a virgin studying sex", he is a serviceman and a counselor who has extensive experience working with those who have. No doubt this, in addition to the depth of his research, has made him a reliable authority on the subject.

In the end, this is a well done book that I highly recommend for anyone interested in the subject, particularly service members and those who know them, who are willing to read beyond the surface level about PTSD and combat stress.

Has some good points to think about when in theatre but can be edited to only a couple dozen pages.

LTC Grossman's book is highly overrated by far too many readers. His book does offer some valuable information on the combat efficiency of people over time on the modern battlefield. There is also some excellent insight into post-traumatic stress disorder. He suggests that in the past soldiers had more time to reflect and examine their experiences before returning to peaceful lives back home. Either armies had to march home, which could take days if not weeks, or they had to take a ship, which could take a similar amount of time. Our current policy of rapid reintroduction of soldiers just out of a combat zone as a cause of problems today is an important one.

The rest of his book, however, is flawed and should be taken with a grain of salt. To begin with, he takes modern assumptions and assigns them to all eras and epochs of the past, as if people of the past all have the same outlooks and reactions that we do today - they just wore different clothes. His assumption that people are somehow inherently predisposed not to kill each other and only do so with great mental conditioning leading to psychological harm flies in the face of the obvious lessons of history. A reading of history suggests our ancestors often waged aggressive and enthusiastic war with little trouble. Even more importantly, they did not need video games or death metal to encourage them to do it. The society and its views of war, I think, has more to do with reactions of soldiers than any innate mental disposition.
Some items he mentions show a poor understanding of practical matters. He suggests that centurions simply stood around encouraging their soldiers to fight, while a student of Roman warfare would recognize that the centurions were often in the thick of the fighting and doing so by fighting. They often led just as much by example as by shouting orders. The author also asserts that the reason thrusts with a sword are not used much is related to some psycho-sexual mental block. This only proves he has little concept of weapons through the ages, not to say the fact that he has never seriously used one. He also fails to comment on the development of specialized thrusting weapons in the late middle ages or the development of rapiers. That these weapons were used for several hundred years and thrusting the accepted technique for inflicting damage shows a poor understanding of swords, not to say weapons of the past in general. I wonder how he addresses the spear, the most common weapon for thousands of years?

Even more troubling is his use of SLA Marshall's work Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command to justify many of his positions. He quotes Marshall's famous firing rate: less than twenty-five percent of a unit would engage in combat with the enemy. The first problem is: He ignores Marshall's reason for this occurring. Marshall felt a lot of this had to do with the way soldiers were trained - only to fire their weapon if they could see a target. In modern war, a target is not always visible, hence the soldiers did not shoot when shot at. The soldiers who did shoot often were armed with BARS, machine guns, flame-throwers, etc. That is weapons that are meant to be used against an area as much as against individual targets. The second problem is that recent research has suggested that it is very likely Marshall simply made up this figure. His methodology was more focused on recreating the battle experience, not obtaining specific pieces of information for statistical purposes. With doubt cast on Marshall's firing rate, doubt has to be cast on LTC Grossman's conclusions and arguments which stem from it.

Another problem with LTC Grossman's book is that despite saying he conducted over four hundred interviews, he quotes from these very little. In fact, he tends to quote from the same couple of works, Soldiers: A history of men in battle by John Keegan and Richard Holmes and Acts of War: Behavior of Men in Battle by Richard Holmes, over and over again. Because of the repetition and limited sources, many of his assertions seem poorly supported and to rely entirely on the works of other people. If he conducted all these interviews, why does he not reference them more? Also to consider, just because modern people have certain reactions in battle, it does not mean that this is how it has been through time immemorial. This reviewer highly recommends the works of Richard Holmes and John Keegan as an alternative to this poor work.

Finally, when he is given information that runs contrary to his views, he glosses over it or attempts to make it fit his conclusions. The most prominent example regards the guilt officers feel when men under their command die following that officer's orders. Essentially, he says none of the officers he interviewed expressed any guilt. Rather than concluding that maybe they really do not feel guilt, he concludes they must all be suppressing it. This is just absurd - a blatant attempt to make the facts fit a preconceived notion that the author has.

It is unfortunate that this book is accepted so uncritically. His work has affected the work of others in a detrimental manner. The subject is an interesting one, but unfortunately poorly researched. Grossman did do a service in pointing out the importance of the topic. His arguments and conclusion, however, are flawed and poorly thought out. Despite his claim to a history degree, he seems to have a poor grasp of the subject and its study. And in the end his book becomes a screed against violent video games, movies, and music, as if this is to blame for all our problems. My advice is to avoid this book if at all possible.