Well written and timely. According to my son-in-law who is a Lt. Col. in the Marine Corp it pretty much tells it like it is.

Having spent sometime in two of the units in this book a "few" years back, I enjoyed reading it. For non-military readers I could see where it would come off slow at first, especially if you were looking to dive right in and start reading about some of the firefights. This book would be an excellent resource if you wanted to understand why the U.S. strategy was what it was in Afghanistan during the time after the fall of the Taliban.

After 9/11, the US attacked Afghanistan to knock out the Taliban - which they did very quickly with US Special Forces and an alliance to Afghani tribes that hated the Taliban. This operation takes place in March 2002, the bad guys are on the run and we are ready to deliver the knock out blow.

What starts off as a promising and conclusive finish ends up in being a laundry list of Murphy's laws - what can go wrong will. Too many different branches of the US were involved - the CIA, SEALs, US Army to name a few and everyone had their own agenda. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, managing the war from the Pentagon put limits on the troops involved (Vietnam vets - that sound familiar?) Compromises were made in the planning that would later come back to haunt the operation and cost US lives.

This is a tough book to read, it unfolds like a horror story. You want to scream - NO, haven't you learned your history? Don't do that, but like a snowball going downhill, no one can stop it once it is in action. And action there was. We walked into a hornets nest, killed a lot of bad guys, but ultimately failed in the main objective. The author puts you there at every step and makes you feel the pain and frustration of the guys who had to execute this operation.

A must read for all military planners, anyone with the responsibility of sending our men and women into harms way - learn from the mistakes of others. An excellent read for all those who are interested in seeing what is going on in this war torn country, the reasons why we are where we are now.

the book describes well the story and its internal fights. the description of the battle is vivid and accurate.

"Not a Good Day to Die" by Sean Naylor is the story of how American forces planned and executed OPERATION ANACONDA, a major battle to dislodge Taliban and Al Qaida forces from the Shahikot Valley in Afghanistan. Naylor tells the story with the sensationalist flair of a seasoned journalist, which is no surprise since he is a regular contributor to the Army Times.

OPERATION ANACONDA violated one of the Clausewitzian principles of military operations - Unity of Command. Naylor does an excellent forensic analysis of how the planning went wrong, which simply boiled down to identifying who was really in charge. The first few chapters of this book are devoted to this subject, and it is an excellent case study in what went wrong.

The core issue was a military operation that relied on three command structures for it's proper execution. The main effort of the operation was to be executed by Afghan fighters with Special Forces advisors. Supporting this effort was a combined 101st Airborne Division and 10th Mountain Division conventional force; and the third piece was a second special operations force providing reconnaisance of the battlefield. Missing from this organization was a cohesive command structure tying them all together. Naylor does an excellent job of forensic analysis as to how the planning failures led to execution failures on the battlefield. While it was an American tactical victory, the Americans had the opportunity for a large strategic win.

Naylor devotes the last third of the book to the actual battle itself. This section could be loosely associated with Mark Bowden's book "Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War". Both books feature the harrowing combat of US Rangers.

Despite his excellent analysis, I have some serious issues with the book. Naylor states in his introduction "When it became clear that I knew more than they wished, officials launched an internal investigation... The investigation's ostensible purpose was to probe the alleged release of classified material, but it's real goal was to punish those who may have helped me compile the facts and to send a message to others tempted to break ranks and tell the truth." Information is classified for a very specific reason - its release could cause the loss of someone's life; or in the case of intelligence collection, its release could cause the adversary to react in such a way that intelligence method would no longer work. A responsible, patriotic journalist would have worked with the military to ensure that information published would not cause either of the above to occur. Since Mr. Naylor choose to move forward with irresponsibly publishing portions of this book, he has ensured his place on the Pentagon's guest list right behind Jane Fonda, and Wolf Blitzer.

My second complaint is Naylor's obvious disdain for the Navy SEALS. It would have been sufficient to report on their activities without adding in the unattributed sophomoric comments that obviously came from only one side of the naturally competitive culture of special operations forces. This failure to represent both sides of an issue, and to rely on unattributed sources is what separates this journalistic work from a credible historic books.

The final shortcoming of the book is the failure to analyze what changes have taken place in Afghanistan since Anaconda. The book ends with the forces leaving the Shahikot valley without any insight into the doctrinal changes that have been effected since the battle.

This is a well-written book, and you should read it. I suggest Mr. Naylor donate proceeds from this book to a veteran's organization; or to the widows and widowers of the men & women who have been killed because of his overzealous reporting of things that would have been better off unwritten.

Although this book drags in a few places, it provides such vivid insight into military politics that one is compelled to keep reading. If you are interested in the post 9-11 military response, this is a book for you. Naylor really tells it like it was and he takes no prisoners in the process.

In every war there are specific battles we come to remember, game-changers that cause those involved to question their assumptions, tactics and strategy. "Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda" gives us a glimpse into one of those battles. In March of 2002, after several decisive victories over the Taliban, American forces narrowly escaped disaster in Afghanistan's Shahikot Valley fighting a severely underestimated Al Qaida. Author Sean Naylor, a senior writer for the Army Times, goes into great detail revealing both the incredible heroism of many young soldiers, as well as, the shocking breakdowns in planning and execution among the highest levels of military leadership.

He describes a battle that showed the deadly limits of technology when operating in unfamiliar terrain, against an unconventional force, and under the watch of military commanders who had been lulled into a false sense of battlefield awareness. As an eyewitness, Naylor's account provides the type of scrutiny and on-the-scene reporting that makes generals queasy. But, don't get this confused with a sterile news story, "Not A Good Day to Die" has all the hallmarks of a, "Black Hawk Down"-style narrative with plenty of intense action.

Initially stymied by a deal struck between U.S. Central Command and U.S. Special Operations Command that banned personnel from discussing Operation Anaconda with media, the author had to maneuver one bureaucratic roadblock after another, admitting in the forward that this book was not an easy one to report.

"Researching and explaining a complex and controversial operation fought by a dozen task forces was always going to be a challenge, despite the advantage I enjoyed having been present at the rehearsals for and some of the combat during Operation Anaconda. But even I, after thirteen years of covering the military, had not expected to find so many obstacles placed in my path by a handful of individuals with reputations to protect." pg. xi

What happened in the Shahikot Valley that made leaders so unwilling to talk? That's exactly what Naylor sets out to explain. First, was the huge intelligence gap that no one grasped until it was too late. Despite constant UAV coverage, hi-tech signals reconnaissance and multiple NSA resources being directed towards piecing together an accurate picture of the enemy and battlefield, the soldiers went in extremely blind to the realities of what they would be facing. The big takeaway, a glaring lack of reliable human intelligence and a terribly inefficient system to share intelligence among the various services and branches involved.

Second, the people making most of the decisions where the ones furthest away from the battlefield. Rather than trusting the men on the ground to lead the fight, generals glued to live predator feeds thousands of miles away felt qualified to direct various forces of which they had very little contact or understanding. A centralized command structure trying to keep up with a constantly changing enemy spelled disaster from the beginning. Take for example an episode on the eve of battle where Major General Franklin "Buster" Hagenback, 10th Mtn Division commander requested additional air strikes based on new intelligence from the field.

"General Hagenback said, `Hey, bomb these frickin' things,' recalled Mikolashek, who was also in the VTC. This request provoked what Mikolshek described as `a little consternation' on the part of CENTCOM participants in general..."Hey, you guys said you wanted this many targets bombed, and not it's all of a sudden this many. What are you doing?' was how Mikolshek characterized Renuart's response...In the end Renuart and Central Command said they would try to arrange the additional air strikes. But Renuart's initial reaction suggested that Central Command was not postured to quickly adapt to changing battlefield circumstances." pg. 187

As often happens in war, the Captains and Sergeants were called upon to not only defeat the enemy, but overcome the lackluster planning of their superiors. And to this end they did remarkably well. If half of this book is about the failures of those at the top, the other half is a glowing report of the courageous and cool-headed conduct of those on the front lines.

Between various Spec Ops recon teams that climbed thousands of feet into "unpassable" mountains to gain critical intel, to CIA members stationed in-country who impressed everyone with their intricate knowledge of the area, to Air Force Pararescuemen like Senior Airman Jason Cunningham who was posthumously awarded the Air Force Cross for his exemplary conduct in helping save the lives of 10 wounded soldiers, to members of the 101st Airborne and 10th Mountain Division that acted with lethal professionalism as they were flown into clouds of bullets - this book shows the best of our military as well. It is a fitting toast to those who risk their lives on a daily basis and a story that will be told for many years to come.

Excellent book, an inside look at a significant US military battle. The book describes the courage and dedication of our armed forces and the gut-wrenching reality of armed conflict. This battle represents a lesson that has had to be relearned to many times: Unity of Command is essential to combat success.

This is a riveting book that will produce the full range of emotions from sheer anger to bittersweet sadness to total pride and awe for the soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen who did their deeds; often with incomplete information to the best that they could under very chaotic and extreme conditions. The book chronicles Operation Anaconda that occurred in Afghanistan in March of 2002. It can be read on numerous levels. As a battle account it reads like another classic, We Were Soldiers Once and Young. It provides many lessons on communication between different organizations, planning, Chain of Command (and what can happen when that becomes convoluted) and the results of micromanagement from overly politicized higher ups in air-conditioned rooms far away in safe areas.

The book is very detailed and the author did a great job of researching it from as many perspectives as possible. In fact, some of the information bordered on Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, that might have been better left not discussed, used by some of our most secretive units such as the AFO of DELTA and even the Special Mission Unit known commonly as "The Activity" that did signal intelligence work in the Area of Operation.

The value of hard realistic training on basic soldiers skills such as marksmanship, fire and maneuver, battle drills, and battlefield medicine shines through in how well the participants did under fire in what was for many of them their first combat engagement. Another element that impressed me was how good the opposition performed. They were brave fighters who gave no quarter and appeared to fight their battle as best as they could. In fact, if the AFO had not prepared or shaped the battle space as well as they did prior to the first Air Assault the whole Operation could have been disastrous. I would highly recommend this book to those interested in modern battle, Special Operations Forces and any aspiring leaders looking to learn from the experiences of others. For those interested in reading more on Army Special Mission Units the book Killer Elite is also a very informative read.

1. as per my title, i think those with a strong military background especially army will like this book for the level of detail it provides. for others, it will probably prove to be an overly detailed (ie boring) book, all the made worse, by lack in a strong coherent narrative.

2. furthermore, regardless of where you stand in regards to one's level of military knowledge, the book leaves one actually wanting for more information. information such as what ever happened to the seeming incompetent leaders, was there are responsibility taken for the poor communication which likely resulted in needless loss of life, what was the actual findings of the official investigation etc... if the author was concerned about the narrative as much as he is about the myriad of facts, he would have probably attended to this basic of story telling concepts.

I saw in doing research for this review that Amazon has 103 reviews of this book already so I am probably not going to break any new ground here by writing a Von Clausewitz style tactical and strategic analysis cum book review. I'll provide instead my impressions of the book and the writing style and leave the deep military and political questions to those more capable of it than myself.

Impression 1:
A reader could safely skim or even skip the first hundred pages. They are a contextual build-up for the actual story of combat operations in the mountains of Afghanistan and the war stories of the men who fought them. A detailed description of the CentCom command structure or how night vision goggles work, or the difference between Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and CIA jargon and slang wasn't all that interesting to me.

Impression 2:
Unity of command is vital. Ignore it at your peril.

Impression 3:
The Navy SEALs don't come out of this looking very good.

Impression 4:
The Army lost two helicopters and half a dozen Airmen, Army Rangers and Navy SEALs killed and many more injured in order to "rescue" one guy who they knew or should have known was already way beyond help and probably dead. The "no man left behind " idea needs some rethinking and context applied to it IMHO.

Impression 5:
This is a good 300-page book that goes to over 400 pages. Brevity is the soul of journalism in my opinion. The book should have been more concise and better edited.

With all that said I would recommend this book as the definitive story of Operation Anaconda.

The book is an excellent reading material-the author was "on the ground" and was first witness to Operation Anaconda.

Having worked in and around Gardez and into Khwost in early 2003, most of us were aware of Operation Anaconda;perhaps the last opportunity to kill high value targets (HVT) prior to escaping to Pakistan. Many migrated down from Tora Bora previously and were awaiting spring weather to move back into the tribal areas of Pakistan.

That said, the presumption the "bad guys" would flee once US forces attacked the Shahikot Valley. This was a totally incorrect assumption. The bad guys had secured the high ground with overwatch allowing for indirect fire (both mortar and arty) into the attacking US forces. The tactical employment of US used the "hammer and anvil" operational plan with the ANA as the "hammer" and a mix of the 101st & 82nd ABN as the anvil.

The other fatal flaw in the assumptive planning was the Afghan National Army (ANA) would be the attacking force with units of the 10th MTN(L) and 101st ABN (Air Assault) as the blocking or anvil component to the operation. The entire operation was dependent on the ANA in its leadership and tactical audacit.

The movement of the ANA under the leadership of 3rd SFG (Special Forces Group) CWO Harriman commenced; shortly thereafter into the operation moving into the valley, an AC-130 Gunship fired on Harriman's convoy of Afgh troops in truck (commonly called "jingle trucks"); Harriman was evacuated and died at Bagram hours later. Therefore, the main effort of Operation Anaconda was already compromised to "friendly fire" incident killing a US Special Forces WO plus wounding a number of ANA soldiers. The main effort was already compromised. The bad guys now knew what was coming and prepared for a sustained engagement.

But, perhaps the most troublesome of the operation was the insertion of a SEAL team atop Takur Ghar, a mountain top with ideal observation of the entire valley-this was key terrain. The intelligence personnel at Bagram AB told the commanders this terrain was most likely held by the Taliban or foreign fighters-the recommendation to NOT insert was neglected onto this mountaintop proved to be an horrific mistake.

As such, and as the book indicates, a QRF of Rangers inserted atop Takur Ghar with the thought of rescue of the SEAL team, yet the team had ex filled down the mountain with their wounded.

The Rangers landed in the mist of very heavy automatic crew served weapons (12.7mm), RPG and AK direct fire weapons. The Chinook helicopter took direct fire and the pilots executed a "controlled crash", whereupon the Rangers (2nd Rangers) exited the back with two of the Rangers killed prior to touching the ground. A total of seven (7) US personnel were killed including US Army Rangers and US Air Force personnel.

One would ask the following questions:

(1) Was the assumption the bad guys would attempt to escape the incorrect assumption? Did the US planners and intelligence personnel incorrectly make the fatal mistake, as in Para 1: enemy course of action and composition?

(2) How could it be that the AC-130 Gunship could fire on Harriman's convoy of the US's main effort? With state of the art communication, "glint" panels for identification, maps and GPS result in the question of How and Why did this happen.

(3) At the top of Takur Ghar where seven (7) US died was a donkey tied to a pine tree (about 16 inches in diameter). The AC-130 was asked to "thermally", using high tech thermal imaging equipment to "see" if anything was atop the Takur Ghar. How did the crew miss the fact, not only heavily armed bad guys but a 1400 lb donkey in full view was atop Takur Ghar. Had the Air Force crew or perhaps a UAV seen the donkey..is it possible another COA in lieu of inserting US personnel would of saved seven (7) very brave Americans. Perhaps!

(4) Why did the commander of the 101st ABN soldiers not continue to demand the use of arty; the only indirect fire was provided on the second lift (60mm, 81mm & 120mm). Had the infantry been supported by artillery as is tactically mandated, the condition on the ground and the eventual outcome would of been much different.

Many fundamental issues with command and control plus unity of effort resulted in less than expected results. Hopefully, in future actions the After Action Report/AAR from Operation Anaconda will lay the corrective foundations to avoid many issues as noted above.

Brilliantly written. They say the mistakes of Vietnam are not being repeated. Read this and see if you still agree with that. Being an Emergency worker I have commented on this book to my colleagues. "Change the context and the type of job and we've been to that.." Excellent study also for Command and control. Must have.

This was an exceptional read. While reading through the story, it becomes easy to draw conclusions as to who failed the Soldiers on that field of battle. Unwise restrictions from General (Ret) Franks level to the equally unwise command relationship problems. Should be mandatory reading for all senior military officers. I would ask that we never repeat the mistakes here.

Unlike some of those who paid and gave this book bad reviews, I had the foresight to check it out at the library instead. I must say, I am impressed.

This book (written by Army Times correspondent Sean Naylor) is basically split into two parts: the first revolves around the planning and politics involved in a major operation such as Anaconda; the second focuses on the operation itself.

I find the book to be very interesting and well-written. Some may be put off by the large amount of acronyms present, and the continuos discussion of military bureacracy involved. My advice: hold strong until you get to the second half, it picks up a lot. Still, for those interesting in the whole deal, it's worth the read. And for those who get bored by endless walls of text, there's quite a few very good pictures in the middle. Definitely recommended for anyone interesting in the early days of the Afghanistan war.

Before I read this book, I was able to talk to one of the book's central figures. The book is well-researched and objectively written. The critical elements of command, control, and communication are evident, as well as leadership issues, which I believe (from talking to others who have participated in operations in Iraq as recently as 2007) are still not as well managed as they might/should be. The feeling of being "in the action" is portrayed very well, and the book should be read and analyzed by military students, and by anyone who wants a better understanding of the results of excellent leadership, as well as the consequences of less-than-ideal performance of critical duties.

This book is in two halves. The first half is hard to get through -- it's a catalogue of the people and planning that went into this military operation. It probably could have been done better, but it is worth plowing through in order to get to the second half, which is outstanding. It's the story of how many things went wrong -- and how a few things went right -- in a battle with al Qaeda that the U.S. did everything it could to lose. You come away with huge respect for the soldiers and midlevel officers involved, and a lot of doubts about the top leadership.

The story somewhat picks up like the beginning of Carlito's Way. Al Pacino is dying at the beginning and you go back to what got him there. In the book, it starts off with the soldiers ready to run out of a helicopter and start hunting. Then it takes you back to the planning, training, and finally the landings. My biggest frustration with this book was the excessive number of people Mr Naylor has to revolve the mission around. There are just waaaay to many names and nicknames to try to keep up with. What makes Black Hawk Down better by quite a few klicks, is that it revolved around fewer characters, even though a lot were also involved. Mr Bowden did an outstanding job of getting to the heart of the story and did not sacrifice narative nor characterzation. Mr Naylor has about 5 to 10 people in each mini-chapter and keeps shifting from group to group. As I wrote earlier, it was quite frustrating trying to keep up with so many of the people involved. It just bogged down the flow. Also, he seems to have too many quotes from people he might have interviewed in what seemed out of context. He would be in a paragraph writing about something, and bam, a quote that didn't fit in. But I'm sure someone said it to him. Also, unlike Eric Haney, author of Inside Delta Force, he seems to blame this guy or that organization for messing this up or not catching the signs of this or that. In Mr Haney's book he continually praises the individuals he worked with: CIA, FBI, SeALs, US Marshalls, ATF, Secret Service, etc. Not a bad account of the operation, but too many characters to try to keep focued.

Hard to follow all of the characters, and the author or his sources have an obvious bias against the Navy SEAL teams, but very interesting and educational read.

Many people have reviewed this book on this site so I'll just focus on a few key points. First, as many have commented, this book delves into the force structure details to a great extent. However, these details set the context for the problems the operation later encountered. I also read Robert's Ridge right after this book and it clearly lacks that context that would elevate it from the equivalent of an action movie.

The book appears to be thorough and meticulously researched. It covers the subject well.

The biggest flaw, in my view, is that the author felt entitled to engage in judgment throughout the book. He particularly makes sweeping, one-sided judgments about the people involved, their competence and their motivations, and sometimes seems to slant his reporting to support his judgments. Much, if not most of the time, there is little or no support provided for these judgments, good or bad.

He is overly harsh with respect to the SEALs. Some of them made mistakes no doubt but the reader can decide that for him or herself based upon a fair presentation of the facts. For example, he clearly leads the reader to judge the actions of a SEAL nicknamed Slab. Robert's Ridge offers details about Slab's decisions that may not completely counter balance the negative judgments but certainly provide a more complete picture of his decisions.

I found one particularly galling example to be the case of John Chapman, the combat controller who died when he went back with the SEAL team to rescue Neil Roberts. The author suggests that he was still alive when the SEAL team abandoned the ridge, thereby leaving him to fend for himself against overwhelming numbers. The author mentions that an official investigation concluded Chapman probably died before the SEAL team left him but he seems to steer the reader to the conclusion that the investigation must have been a white wash.

In fact, it wasn't until I read Roberts Ridge, and the accompanying notes, that I found out there was credible evidence suggesting that Chapman probably died immediately from his wounds and, if correct, could not have occupied a bunker to fight on. Of course, there is evidence to the contrary and unfortunately we'll never know. That's where the readers should be left - to form their own conclusions.

My other minor quibbles are that more and better maps collected in one section are needed, more pictures of the individuals would be useful and a timeline would help readers keep track of the many details. Curiously, despite the author's focus on details before the operation began, he provides little in the way of information about the aftermath.

It's really a shame the author approached this topic the way he did because the topic is fascinating and it's important. There are many lessons to be learned and not only for those planning combat. Still, it's a good book overall and worth reading.

There's not much I can say that hasn't been spelled out in the 80+ reviews before mine, but I'll add my 2 cents nonetheless. Naylor's account, as many have indicated, IS a pretty heavy on minute details, but that's not a bad thing in and of itself. The problem I had was following the incredible number of names and ranks that were spit out that were NOT on the battlefield. It's not all that difficult to follow the major players in the story, but some of the background people are really hard to track. I also need to echo the reviews that point out that Naylor was seemingly overly harsh on the SEALs involved. While this isn't so apparent in the beginning, and he does have some kind things to say about a few SEAL operators, once the story progresses to the Takur Ghar section he seems to have a real axe to grind with the Navy and I think his Army loyalty is exposed. Many of the "mistakes" or decisions the SEALs made were no different from ones the Army made earlier in the operation, (Blue on Blue bombing killing U.S. troops, anyone?) but Naylor treats every mis-step in this part of the story as if the mistakes were unique to the Navy. It gets pretty old after a while. Those gripes aside, this was still an excellent read and especially worthwhile if you have read or intend to read "Roberts Ridge". Naylor's book should probably be read first, just because it gives a lot more background for why "Slab's" superiors were so insistent he and his team go when and where they did. Overall highly recommended.

I really liked this book for the exact reasons that many others didn't -- the detail. As someone who served in Afghanistan on two occassions, I am less interested in the 'blood and guts' battle scenes and more in the behind-the-scenes stories that go into intelligence and planning. Granted, the story at times gets bogged down in seemingly insignificant details, but I felt the overall pacing was good. The backgrounds and personalities of the individuals portrayed gave a good sense of the men who were fighting, planning, and organizing Operation Anaconda. From what I understand, many people at SOCOM hated this book because of the details provided which means Naylor hit a homerun in getting his facts straight.

Definately not a book for all tastes, but if you like books that focus on the minutia, then this one is for you. For good combat action, read 'Blackhawk Down' or 'Ambush Alley'.

I feel like the author should somehow reimburse for the time I wasted on this book. In additon to providing the reader with endless obscure details about every officer in the military NOT involved in the fighting, he actually manages to make the few combat sequences boring! It might read something like this:

"Task force Hammer got shot at by some terrorist guys-they shot back. Meanwhile, back headquarters, command was arguing about whether to use 1" or 0.75" margins on the TPS 145 ZX2 forms. The 1" advocates prevailed."

If you are planning a congressional investigation into Operation Anaconda and want every, single brain-numbing detail, buy this book. If you want the perspective of the soldiers actually fighting, BUY SOMETHING ELSE.

One of the best books I've read on Operation Anaconda. Loaded with a lot of information, to some people it may be to much information.Its not your Black Hawk Down or Ambush Alley type of read.Very well written and engaging.

A look into the way the modern military operates (or, in this case, fails to operate). The first few chapters do alot of name dropping so be prepared to spend alot of time reading through the logistical and command-decision backstory before you reach the 'action' accounts of the mission itself. However, learning this information is vital to appreciate what the guys on the ground had to go through, and more importantly, *why*.
The book kind of trails off at the end, and the end of the book came a bit abruptly, I was expecting more of a post-op report, but that isn't included, which felt a little "odd" considering the amount of time devoted in the pages to the set up of the action. Still, a very informative read, I enjoyed it.

Great detail. A lot of research and unfortunately a lot of classified information was published.

At the very beginning of this book and without having any previous knowledge of Operation Anaconda, the feeling was that its content was about one of the innumerable account of a very successful performance carried jointly out by mainly U.S. armed services.
With the onset of the plan for that Operation, there is a growing realization that things cannot go on as smoothly as you believed at the opening and could clearly become worse when interactions within services or forces are quite difficult to not say unfairly problematic. A spiralling trend of actions and, in certain cases, misbehaviours are putting an enormous strain on the units, which are already under a considerable stress because of the teething troubles they are trying to overcome during the execution of their operation.
All accounts reach a crescendo, keeping you tied to the increasing uneasy developments, as you could have been involved in that same Operation. Even though, who covered the story is far from being allowed to have full access to classified information, the description of the events has been anyway very detailed and has given a clear picture of how certain dangerous circumstances are at an ever growing risk of human weakness.

Vittorio Lipari
San Giorgio
Italy

Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda is a well researched and written book. It kept me engaged. Highly recommended!

This account is outstanding, it's command of the facts, the authors' grasp of their significance and of course in the tension and pace of the writing. For anyone who wants to know a little of what unfolded in Anaconda, and will not settle for sub-amateur telivision journalism, this book is a must. I was astounded by the polarity between the bravery and sheer guts of the men in the field, compared to the lack of performance (often utter negligence) from the Brigade level of command, and up. As someone more than familiar with Israel's participation in the Second Lebanese War, (Operations officer of reserve infantry battalion) I was struck by the similarities: the curious belief of senior command that a battle can be managed via plasma screens from far, far away, and the valour, sacrifice and the waste of good men. The incoherence and obtuse Command and Control and the subsequent effort by the High Command to dress it up as a victory - mainly by riding on the valiant and gritty fight put up by the men in the field. If America's generals sincerely believe that this was a success, then unfortunately, more of the same will come, and it will likely be much worse.

I recently completed the outstanding book Not a Good Day to Die by Sean Naylor, detailing the events surrounding Operations Anaconda, unknown to most Americans, including myself, prior to reading the book. A few points:

1. The book is a real tour de force of the art of the possible, detailing the combined actions of some the world's most elite forces: Delta Force, Navy Seals, Army Special Forces, Army Rangers, elite US Light Infantry (101st Airborne Division and 10th Mountain Division), Austrialian SAS, elements of the CIA and NSA, and Afghani militias allied to the United States.

2. Those lacking a military background may find the first 100 pages confusing, as Naylor details the various command structures and personalities that engineered the operation. Personally I found this section fascinating. Recommend skimming through this section if you just want to get to the direct fire battle.

3. While highlighting the amazing accomplishments, bravery, and sheer audacity of these units, it also illustrates the absolute necessity of an established chain of command, regardless of the types of units being commanded, the necessity to understand both the capabilities and LIMITATIONS of special operations units-one cannot become so enamoured with these units that they are sent on missions without proper planning and fire support (the initial insertion of the Navy Seal Team Mako 30 on Takur Ghar as described in the book), and last, the importance for any ground commander to understand how to coordinate and use both indirect fires and close air support.

4. Overall, an incredible read. Despite the anger this book has obviously created in certain parts of the Navy Seal community, I salute Naylor for the obvious work and research that went into creating this book. It's no exaggeration to say that under most circumstances, this book would have never been written.

Highly recommended.

The writer takes you behind the scenes of the one of the biggest sustained fights in the Afghanistan conflict. You can almost feel the bullets fly by in the coarse, direct account of the Anaconda battle. It makes you proud of our military and makes you shake your head at the same time. A marvelous book.

Sean Naylor was inbedded with some of the soldiers in Operation Ananconda, a mission in March 2002 to find and kill Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan's Shahi-Kot Valley. So he is qualified to tell the story of the most successful botched mission since The Battle For Mogidishu. The book tells of the operation from it's creation in CIA station in Kabul, all about it's planning stages, and then execution. The moral of the book is mostly 'when generals argue, joes die'. There were many problems with the mission, starting with a lack of a solid chain of command, many of the generals and colonels argueing about every little detail instead of cooperating. The task force was a grab bag of seperate subordinate units thrown together, a hidge podge of Navy SEALS, 10th Mountain, 101st Airbourne, Rangers, ect all together for the first time for the mission, many of them never having trained together, and because of the friction at the top of the chain, the mid level officers and NCOs couldn't get along with each other either (I guess they forgot they are an 'Army of One'). All of the units wanted to be the heros and that caused a lot of fighting and resentment. All of this was before the mission actually started too. When it did kick off there was lack of communications, radio messeges never got through to the troops on the ground (and sometimes orders were withheld by rear officers who wanted the troops on the ground to do something else), and as a result they were shread to peices. Another huge mistake was that of intelligence. Much information was not passed on to those who needed it the most. The number of enemy fighters in the valley was never really set in stone, though in the end it was thought to be somewhere around a 1000 or so. The enemy was expected to cut and run, but it turned out they were better armed and more determined to stay than Coalition Forces expected. The worst came on March 3rd when Navy Seals and Rangers were stuck on Tukar Ghar, were many soliders were killed and several air craft were shot down when a bad desicion was made to land right on top of the enemy. I admire Naylor for writing about how horribly planned the mission was, about the pettiness of it's senior leadership and how it got a lot of brave soldiers killed. He wrote in the beginning of the book about some of the obsticles he faced while trying to write the book, and about his sources that had to be left vauge because of Army retribution. That added an air tof truth to the book than if he had the full cooperation ofthe soldiers involved. I wasn't there myself, but this is about when I head myself from the guys who returned from that fateful mission. What is so scary about this book is that the men who created and 'lead' the mission is still commanding troops today in Iraq and other War on Terror hot spots. This is a good book if you're interested in how modern military missions are planned becase the first third of the book is dedicated to the planning stages; inded it is required reading for Army officers.

Your service was great - got the book quickly and the condition is perfect - I will continue to purchase from you - Thanks -

I've ready many/most of the most popular books on our recent engagements in the War on Terror, but this is by far the most outstanding effort I've come across so far. We're all aware that most of the administration's (read that as Rumsfeld/Cheney) actions since 9/11 have placed us in more danger, not less. However, what's been discussed obliquely, but often overlooked, is the complicity that Tommy Franks shares during this period. While "Not a Good Day..." is not a direct study of Franks, it is still a reflection of the problems that trickle down from the Rumsfeldian method of armed engagement (as opposed to the Powell Doctrine) where there is the enforced perception that the "best fighting force in the world" is more machine than man, and as such is composed of interchangeable parts. Franks allowed this mistaken approach to become practice, both in Afghanistan and Iraq. While true to some extent, it is more true that our military is a product of training, and that the training is multi-faceted in the bringing together of different disciplines and systems. One of the most important aspects of that training is learning how those that you train (war-game) with operate, learning in the process how to best interact as a team. When pieces of these well-oiled machines are torn apart and reassembled willy-nilly the results are predictable...

Just as Tora Bora was a failure, so was Anaconda. For all the success in body count (and there were a few folks that never stepped out of that valley again), the high-value targets (hvt) probably skipped away through gaps in the perimeter. The author speculates about two particular hvt's that most likely did get away. And this against a backdrop of a plan that was completely designed specifically to entrap all the enemy combatants...

I highly recommend this book to anyone that would like some insights into what we do well and what we don't. Sometimes they are the same things, but undertaken by different folks (compare the performances of the Delta teams to the Seal teams - and if there are Seal supporters out there, and we know there are, then speak up in defense of a reasonable rebuttal to the authors assertions, especially with respect to the performance of the teams on Tahkur Ghar, both that of Mako 30 as well as the team that "guarded" the exfil LZ).

This may be the best-reported book I've ever read. Sean Naylor labored for two years to document Operation Anaconda, the botched March 2002 attempt to capture or kill several hundred al-Qaida guerrillas in eastern Afghanistan's Shahikot Valley. He succeeded brilliantly, despite the attempts of the military brass to thwart him. And you quickly understand why they were so desperate to conceal the truth. The operation was undone by self-inflicted mistakes from the top: a confused chain of command; deliberate decisions to limit the numbers of troops, weapons and helicopters in the field; jaw-dropping examples of miscommunication between the patchwork of units assembled to carry out the attack; overconfidence on the part of Pentagon officials who were already moving past Afghanistan and preparing for a war with Iraq. Naylor strives to be fair, but doesn't hesitate to draw conclusions and make judgments about who was to blame for putting U.S. troops in an uphill (literally) fight against a bigger-than-expected and surprisingly well-armed enemy force. He also provides inspiring examples of individual heroism: pilots who took big risks to get the wounded to safety and provide close air support for troops trapped on the ground; special forces operators who prevented what could have been a military tragedy by scaling mountains and trudging through snowdrifts to gather intelligence on al-Qaeda positions; inexperienced NCOs who proved themselves under fire; medics who worked through their own wounds to tend to fallen comrades. The downside of Naylor's authoritative reporting, however, is an excess of unnecessary detail. Especially in the first half of the book, he seems to unload his notepad, describing almost every planning meeting and listing the participants. He also is a bit too fond of military jargon and acronyms, referring for example to the video-teleconference, familiar even to many of us who don't wear fatigues, as a "VTC.'' But these are symptoms of a man on a mission, determined to provide the authoritative account of Operation Anaconda. Mission accomplished.

Lots of detail and well researched. A classic with a wealth of info and perspective. Read it and be grateful to those who are out there fighting for us.

Sean Naylor is an establishment hack Army Times writer who in "Not a Good Day to Die" feeds us the typical we-are-screwed-up-but-look-how-heroic-we-are account of early Special Forces (SF) and light narcissist infantry U.S. operations in Afghanistan "Operation Anaconda" that failed to get much of any Al Queda or Taliban sub-national foes much less their mastermind, Osama Bin Laden. First off, if he were not expected to put a status quo worshipping "spin" to events, the Army would not have invited him to "embed" in Afghanistan. Like Operation Anaconda which went wrong, the Army having Naylor write a book went wrong; because they didn't figure on that he just might report accurately what took place---that readers not willing to excuse away incompetence and bad force structures---might conclude that accepting self-created screw-ups is not AOK even if heroically done. As a Stryker truck apologist with no military experience, Naylor has shown himself over the years as a willing mouthpiece to the Army "party line" yet he must have had developed some journalistic integrity to write about events truthfully as seen in his book. Maybe its by accident and he thinks he is glamorizing how heroic everyone is when they create their own difficulties? Perhaps Naylor will take a step back and come to grips with all he has written which shows clearly that wheeled trucks in mountainous closed terrain are dismal failures that constantly set our Soldiers up for "failure events" which his book is filled with from cover to cover.

One "failure event" on pages 197 to 206 is Task Force Hammer led by SF Chief Warrant Officer 2 Stanley Harrison. Their mission is to transport Northern Alliance fighters in wheeled pick-up trucks into the Al Queda enemy and flush them out into blocking positions that will be taken by the 101st Air Assault Division "Screaming Eagles" after they fly in by CH-47 Chinook heavy lift helicopters. The self-serving rationale for being in these unsafe, gasoline powered, brightly colored civilian pick-up trucks is that THEY WILL LOOK LIKE THE TRUCKS THE ENEMY RIDES IN so somehow they will be ignored and allowed to drive about and not be attacked. The result is that TF Hammer not only looks like the enemy THEY ARE JUST AS HANDICAPPED AS THE ENEMY, U.S. troops are not going into a fight with the deck stacked in their favor, they are fighting the enemy even or "symmetrical". With all the DoD buzz word talk of wanting to do "asymmetric warfare", the macho SF narcissist chooses instead to drive around in a wheeled truck not because he wants to blend in with anybody, but because HE WANTS TO LOOK DIFFERENT from the cursed heavy units of the U.S. Army who are adapted to the realities of high explosive weapons on the battlefield by being in light, medium and heavy ARMORED TRACKS. Nevermind that planet earth's closed terrain demands light tracks that create their own path over soft, uneven and rocky terrain and are in use by smart "special" forces around the world. What drives SF to be in wheeled trucks is not realities on the ground, but fashion politics back at home in the U.S. to prop up their egos. TF Hammer will pay dearly for its choice of vehicle fashion.

As TF Hammer drives towards its objective, high overhead in the night sky is an AC-130 gunship crewed by the USAF, which is nearing the end of its fuel with daylight approaching. They are eager to take out enemy targets because U.S. Army ground forces do not have any fixed-wing gunship close air support during daylight hours because AC-130s are too vulnerable to enemy ground fire and the USAF brass doesn't like the ugly A-10 getting the limelight so they are often not on the scene as was the case during Anaconda. Call sign, Grim [reaper] 31 has an inertial navigation system malfunction in flight, reboots its computers and spots a force of "enemy" trucks and troops on foot near TF Hammer. Grim 31 radios the TF Hammer convoy and verifies its not them in their sights and even shines infared light to "glint" the target trucks to see if they were American ones that would have reflective tape. Not adept at mounted operations, the dismounted mentality SF Soldiers did not think of changing their vehicle formation into an obvious, identifiable shape or turning on an infared strobe light to identify themselves to the AC-130 crew. Receiving no shine back, Grim 31 opens fire. As 105mm shells begin exploding, CW2 Harriman was hit with all his other team mates and 12 Afghan fighters. One of the SF Soldiers grabs a hand-held AN/PRC-148 MBITR radio and screams for a cease fire; "Chief is dying! Chief is dying!". Grim 31 doesn't hear the cease fire call. Fortunately, Grim 31 had to leave or else the entire truck "force" would have been finished off. TF Hammer had stopped far short of its objective and Chief Harriman would die despite a CH-47 crew picking him up after dropping the Rakkasan Sky Soldiers and flying at 200 mph---above what any conventional helicopter should fly---to get him back to base and professional medical care. We all know Bin Laden & any of his key subordinates easily escaped---if they were even in the area in the first place.

What's lost in the narrative is that CW2 Harriman didn't need to die nor the other Afghan fighter nor did the mission have to fail; they could have and should have been in M113 Gavin light armored personnel carriers whose armored hulls would have protected them from high explosive shrapnel attacks even if there was a "friendly fire" mistake. However, it goes beyond just armor protection, had Harriman's men been in Gavin tracks THE AC-130 GUNNERS WOULD HAVE CLEARLY SEEN THAT THEY WERE NOT ENEMIES IN WHEELED TRUCKS, by their distinctive appearance not just hoping that tape and panels will still be attached and visible after hours of bumpy driving over rocky Afghan terrain. A force in tracks would be clearly AMERICAN because it would be in tracks seeking OVERMATCH---an ASYMMETRIC advantage over the enemy not trying to fight him even M16 versus AK47. A M113 can carry thousands upon thousands of rounds of ammunition, to include missiles, rockets and mortars with the necessary range to reach the distant enemy in a mountain fight and not have to beg for fire support from the reluctant USAF who only want to operate sexy fighter-bombers that fly too fast to see targets on the ground. By being clearly visible in tracks even an USAF fighter jock in a F-15E Strike Eagle could see they were not Taliban-in-trucks; Grim 31 wouldn't have even opened fire on Harriman in the first place. Moreover, in light armored tracks, the SF force need not stick to roads/trails lest they pop a tire and get stuck nor worry about losing a leg to a toe-popper land mine left over from the Soviet Afghan misadventures years before. In fact, the SF force can use those "silver wings on their chest" to parachute themselves and their M113 Gavins from C-130s into positions instead of driving into them to catch the enemy into traps instead of trying to stampede vehicles sending dust clouds visible for miles away that alerts the enemy to laugh and be long gone by the time we arrive. With advanced scouting, stretches of road can become C-130 runways to pick the SF Gavin force up to fly them back to base.

The Afghan National Army (ANA) has recently been upgraded with early-model M113A2 Gavin light armored tracks and is now more combat capable than all of the U.S. Army's Special Forces, Rangers, 82nd Airborne, 101st Air Assault, 10th Mountain and 25th Tropic Lightning "light" forces. All they had to do was ask for some M113s from storage (hint, hint) and they got them. They have no trouble using a LIGHT armored track for LIGHT infantry to be mobile in CLOSED terrain where only light tracks can be mobile away from ambush-prone roads/trails which are man-made strips of open terrain. SF says they want to "look like the people they are with". Now what is their excuse for remaining in their "look-at-me-I'm-sexy" trucks? The Afghans they are advising (FID/CW) are smartly using M113 Gavin light armored tracks. How can you advise someone to do something you don't do yourself? "Special" should mean DOING WHAT IS SMART THAT OVERMATCHES THE ENEMY and that's what the founder of Army SF, Colonel Aaron Bank intended when he sought misfits from throughout the conventional army who had unconventional ideas about fighting, being "different" meant having a superior fighting edge over the enemy. Sadly, over the years we now have a SF bureaucracy that only wants to look different from the rest of the Army while embracing parity with the enemy and stumbling into failure event after failure event from Mogadishu in 1993 to the present day that even non-co-operation with pro-Army status quo writer Naylor cannot hide.

The book deserves 5 stars, the CONTENT deserves less than 1 star.

This is a pretty good book. It loads you down with details and gets boring sometimes. Other than that pretty good. It really reveals how dysfuntional our Army can be and how silly people act when in a position of power. Hello Donald Rumsfeld.

I do not agree with reviewers who said that the first 100 or so pages are a waste of space and could therefore be shortened. Yes, I admit that it was very slow reading in the beginning, having to deal with so many characters, task forces and commands. But all this information is crucial for understanding what follows. One of the main reasons for the many blunders the US Army committed was the complex and ambiguous command and control mechanism of Operation Anaconda. The big egos of some commanders were to blame too. The account of the battles is very well documented, being both detailed and vivid. Even before reaching the D-day stage, you will find it hard to put down the book. I am a big fan of military history, and this is one of the best stories I have ever read. One thing that strikes me in particular is the ineptness of some Navy Seals who took part in the operation.

While "Not A Good Day To Die" succeeds in informing the reader about the 'forgotten' war Americans are fighting in Afghanistan, there is no doubt that it could have benefitted from more reasoned editing. The first 200 pages of the book are devoted to an exhaustive and numbing recitation of the administrative and managerial squabblings among the melange of Army, Air Force, and even Navy (!) units participating in the Operation Anaconda campaign of March 2002. As a result, the actual combat narrative doesn't begin until one -third of the way into the book. Once he finally turns his attention to the actual fighting, Naylor does a good job of communicating the ferocity of close-quarters combat between the US forces and the Al Qeda guerillas inhabiting the bunkers and foxholes arrayed on the mountains of the Shahikot Valley. Unfortunately, the end of the book comes rather abruptly, and leaves the fate of many of the injured soldiers unclear. As well, last-chapter analysis and commentary as to what the battle in the Shahikot implies for the war against Al Qeda in Afghanistan, as it nears its fifth year in the Fall of 2006, are glaringly absent. Truncating the first section of the book to a quarter of its present length, and devoting the cleared pages to expanding the end chapter, would have been a real improvement.

As seems often to be the case, micromanagement by high-ranking officers far removed from the field of combat (an Air Force general named Trebon is particularly inept) ensures that some of the US operations suffer from fatally poor planning. Naylor shows that time and again, the courage and dedication of the enlisted men and junior officers is decisive in turning what could be defeat, into survival and even victory.

The book contains a good number of maps and a nice selection of b & w photos.

This book recounts the battle in the Shahikot Valley, in which the US Army and Navy Seals fought the toughest battle they'd seen since the battle of Mogadishu in 1993. The idea was for a newly formed unit of Afghan Military Forces (AMF) soldiers to push into this valley from the west while two battalions of the 101st Airborne (Air Mobile) Division, and one battalion from the 10th Mountain Division, landed on the far slopes of the valley with the hope of blocking the escape of the Al Qaeda forces thought to be hiding in the valley. Special Forces teams would be infiltrated into the valley from various directions, taking up observation posts on positions that gave them good overviews of the surrounding terrain.

The whole thing went wrong from the start. The AMF fell apart while approaching the valley, and never entered it until after the real fighting was over. When the American forces helicoptered into the valley, they discovered that instead of the Al Qaeda and Taliban forces hiding in the villages as expected, they were instead on the slopes of the ridges that surrounded the valley. One of the original groups of soldiers had to move out after the first day, taking too much fire from things such as mortars, which they couldn't counter because they only had their rifles and machineguns. The only heavier weaponry they had was a few mortars of their own, and air support.

The fighting went reasonably well at first. One Special Forces operator (as a soldier member of this elite unit is typically known) was killed in a friendly fire incident by an Air Force gunship, and a number of soldiers were wounded, but generally casualties were light. Unfortunately, halfway through the battle the higher-ups decided to change who was in command of the Special Forces involved. The new commander was a Seal determined to get his guys into the fight, and in a tragedy (you can't call this a comedy) of errors, the Seals tried to land on top of one of the highest local hills, where apparently pretty much everyone knew there were a lot of enemy soldiers and weaponry. The result was predictable: helicopters were shot down, men killed, and utter confusion reigned. After the Seals got into trouble on top of the mountain, the Army's Quick Reaction Force, a platoon of Rangers, was sent onto the same hilltop, and of course things just got worse. By the time things were sorted out 9 men were dead, more wounded, and three helicopters had been shot down, one not even leaving the hill itself.

Author Naylor obviously knows whereof he speaks. An Army Times reporter, he was embedded with troops who participated in the fighting, sat in on conferences where the operational plan wsa discussed, and interviewed a large number of participants at both the command level, and among the "trigger-pullers". Naylor spends a lot of time discussing the planning of the operation, from the composition of the task force involved to the chain of command to the presence (or absence) of various types of unit during the battle. Just about exactly half of the book is devoted to the planning and recconniasance of the valley. While the author takes issue with some of the decions made by the commanders, he is (contrary to some of the other reviewers on Amazon) pretty even-handed in his treatment of the Navy Seals who participated in the battle. He makes the point that they don't train for exactly the same sort of combat as the Army's Special Forces do, and that this somewhat weakened them, but he also gives credit where credit is due: one of the Seal teams started the fighting by knocking out an enemy DshK heavy machinegun which was in position to shoot down the helicopters full of troops entering the valley.

The author makes several good points about the way the fight was managed. First, the command structure was completely ad hoc, with a stripped down brigade staff controlling one battalion of its own and two from another division, groups from two services (Army and Navy Seals) attempting to coordinate with the regular soldiers, and everyone trying to coordinate their actions with the Air Force and the AMF, who were unused to fighting in the American style. The result was at times a complete disaster when it came to coordination and control, and left everyone frustrated.

A lot has been made of the comparison between this book and Mark Bowden's book Blackhawk Down. Frankly I think the comparison a disservice to both books. Bowden's book is a gripping you-are-there sort of thriler, with little on the larger aspects of the fighting. Bowden's a reporter for a civilian publication, and while he's a good writer, his understanding of the military isn't that much more than superficial. Naylor, by contrast, isn't quite the writer that Bowden is, but his understanding of the military and especially the army is much better. This gives him, and therefore his readers, a good understanding of the intricacies of Army and Pentagon politics, and how they effect what happees in the field.

For those as well as many others, this is a valuable book on Operation Anaconda, and the things that went wrong in it. I would recommend it.

If you haven't spent time in the military or reading military history, if this was your first MHB (military history book), then you were bogged down from the get-go. The other complaint that Naylor held a bias against Seal Team 6 is unfounded with a close reading of the book. Naylor gives plenty of credit to the first team that went in on D-Day and took out the heavy machine gun pointed at the 101st air route into the valley, also to the recce Seal Team that replaced the Delta operators on the India pos. There are numerous examples of the outstanding job done by the Seals. The bias Naylor presents is the typical interservice type gained from interviews of the participants. A close reading of the book shows how the Takur Ghar team was destined for failure when the battle was no longer managed by the guy with eyes on the ground.

This is great objective study of the Anaconda Operation.

This book starts off slow if one knows nothing about special operations. Hidden in all that jargon is very eye-opening. These people are our very elite forces and are better than any other country's best SF troops. This book shows how even the best have a very difficult tasks ahead of them. It also reveals the inner politics of a joint and multi-national war, and how these factors cost the frontline troops dearly. The point I got out of the book is when at war, never let one's ego get in the way. The other point that comes to mind when reading this book is to never underestimate the enemy. I thoroughly enjoyed this book although, because of my background and my habit of highlighting points in books, I may have to lock up my copy.

Think of this work, particularly the first half, as studying, rather than reading. I have read several reviews here and those that criticize this book like "This is the most tediously boring book I have read" and so forth, in my opinion, are of the 'immediate gratification' generation, just clowns who want to be entertained... NOW. Any serious student of warfare will find the first half of this work very important to REALLY understanding the last half.

Not a good day to die??? Is there such a thing? Please Mr. Naylor let me know when a good day to die is so I can book my appointment.

This is the most tediously boring book I have read (well, almost read since I couldn't finish it.) in quite some time.

The mundane and repeptitious talking about planning, and planning to plan, while thinking about planning, was just too much. I gave up around the page 150 mark. Sad because I hate, absolutely hate to start a book and not finish it. That may tell how bad this was.

If anybody wants a copy they can have mine.

This book is most tedious and boring--my goodness, what a waste of good money and time. The book goes on and on, endlessly about every single person who was ever in the military, plus their dogs and all their family histories--you need a computer just to keep them straight. Politics and more politics, and then some more. And the obligatory passages about how tough and how skilled everyone is. I'm not really sure where the book discusses the "untold story of Operation Aconda" since I keep falling asleep whenever I try to read it. This is the worst book and I am very disappointed, and a little angry about the sales pitch. Don't buy this--you can have my copy!

The book is broken into four sections: the leadup to the operation, the first contact, the ranger battle, then conclusion. The first section is about 180 pages and is a bit of snoozer. The author explains, what appears to be, every single aspect behind every decision made prior to Anaconda. He goes into excruciating detail about the "office politics" between the various military groups. At one point, it starts sounded like a soap opera as various loyalities and internal factions are explained. It was bad enough for me to skim a few pages. It feels like the author had to fill some pages and pad the book.

One thing that stuck out was how LONG the prep work for the operation took. The book starts off "in the first weeks of January." The operation kicked off on 2 March. That seems like a long time to this untrained observer.

I did like hearing about the local Delta operator and how he planned and ran the three recce teams. He was bold and daring.

Things start picking up during the second section, "Reaction to Contact." As the first troopers hit the ground, the author reeled me in with vivid details of landscape, battles, and the troopers. The insider report of the friendly-fire incidents boiled my blood. When the author talks about the Afghan trucks driving across the mountainside in the dark and WITHOUT lights, I was shocked. Descriptions of the landscape are detailed. At one point, I lost track of all the different units moving around.

The third section is the climax. It deals with the battle on Takur Ghar. That was the payoff. Once I reached that section, I couldn't put the book down. When the SEAL commander sent the first helo to an LZ on TOP of the mountain, I was stunned. The author communicates the troopers frustration with the poor communication clearly -- I actually got mad when the General Trebon took command of the battle on Takur Ghar. There are some details about that battle that didn't make it into the newspaper accounts I read. For that alone, it is worth the read. Gritty, gripping, and packed with suspense.

The author does great work explaining how the battle on the mountain unfolded and the actions of all the troopers. Reading how the SEALs dragged their wounded comrades down a mountain or how the second QRF had to scale a mountain with a 70 degree slope while wearing 100lbs of gear...wow. The Ranger commander should have gotten a couple of medals for his bravery.

The pictures in the book were brilliant. There are a couple from Takur Ghar that, when viewed after reading the corresponding section, are just stunning.

All in all, it was a good read, despite the first section.

The first half of this book consisted of hugh amounts of trivia to me, the author will probably not agree, however he needed a lot of information to fill some pages.

The last half of the book got down to the real facts of what happened out there and why on an hour by hour basis. This part was a particularly good read.

One principal point is made over and over and that is our Armed Forces and the CIA, FBI, and so on do not comunicate well. This is to the detriment of our guys on the ground. In fact, the arrogance of the top brass is sickening. It just does not appear to get better with time.

All in all, I would buy the book again.

Too many Chiefs...

And definitely, due to micro-management of the battlefield, not enough of our Indians. "Not a Good Day to Die," by Sean Naylor is just a terrific battle-book. It's almost overwhelming in detail, but Naylor is a fine writer, taking you with effective prose, to the mountains of Afghanistan. You as a reader are there as an Al Queda warrior studies mysterious ATV tracks in the mud while nearby he's being marked by a special ops sniper. You are there on the slopes, as a few brave guys, struggling for air in the high altitude, battle an Al Queda bunker complex.

The battle itself is a mess, highlighting all the problems, a lot of them self-inflected, on the modern battle-field. The plan for Anaconda was suspect anyway, with its reliance (due to politics) on Afghan fighters driving, at night, with no headlights, down a bad road into enemy country. To some extent Naylor soft-peddles this. But as events turned out, this was not an operation killer, as terrific recon work had our forces holding the high ground, while our troops in the Shahikot valley occupied static (but hot) positions. With air strikes taking a toll, the killing time of Al Queda had begun. But military technocrats a thousand miles away (Air Force General Gregory Trebon in particular) wanted a piece of the action. As a result, Americans died due to a series of bone-headed decisions by Trebon and his on the ground man, SEAL Vic Hyder. Don't get me wrong, Anaconda was a "victory." but it could of been more. What is amazing, is how Naylor is able to plot all of this, the various calls from troops on the ground and in the air, wrong transmissions, screw-ups, heroism, virtually every moment of the battle is there for the reader. What cuts against the effectiveness however is the dizzying use of acronyms - without a good glossary, and what seems to be an incomplete index. For example, the above General Trebon is last referenced on page 94, even though his (notorious) role goes on pretty much until the end of this 377 page book. And after checking out the paperback version, I saw this has still not been corrected. One other caveat, Naylor really seems to have something against the SEALS, who come across as whiney cowboy / prima donnas. I'm not sure I buy that, it just comes across as something personal and beyond the lines of the story. Finally, as much as you come away disliking Hyder and Trebon's roles in all of this, their silence in this account leaves you feeling you've not yet heard the full story - though as it stands now, the indictment is formidable.

Good reading, provides insight into what went wrong that resulted in the deaths of seven miltary men in Afganistan in March of 2002.