There was always something fishy about the story the Associated Press published in September 1999 about a massacre at No Gun Ri, South Korea, in July 1950.

Anyone who has studied military history knows you cannot understand a small unit infantry action without a detailed terrain map, and there was no map.

Maj. Robert Bateman, who taught history at West Point, saw additional problems that wouldn't have been obvious to civilians. The AP account "did not jibe . . . with the things I knew as an infantry officer."

Before becoming a teacher, Bateman had been a company commander in the same unit -- 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment -- whose earlier incarnation was accused of slaughtering perhaps 400 refugees over (accounts varied) a few minutes to four days.

He knew and considered a friend the man the AP relied on most for confirming the claims of alleged Korean survivors, Ed Daily.

While other journalists began investigating Daily's bona fides, Bateman approached the mystery from a military historian's perspective: Could he reconstruct the events of the last days of July 1950, when American and South Korean armies and masses of civilians were retreating, sometimes in panic, from a North Korean attack?

It turned out to be easier to determine what could not have happened than what really did happen, but in "No Gun Ri: A Military History" Bateman presents a well-documented, coherent story.

Simultaneously, the South Korean and American governments opened their own investigations.

Eventually all these investigators proved several things. The one that got the most public attention was that Daily and all the other veterans who endorsed the South Korean allegations were frauds.

But there were other discoveries that put the AP story in even worse light. Not all the AP's inaccurate statements were just mistakes.

Bateman proves that what the AP called a "division order" to kill refugees was not a division order, could not possibly have been known to the 7th Cavalry and wouldn't have been a legal order if it had been. As Bateman says, majors don't give orders to colonels.

It was already obvious, but the AP reporters were incompetent and Bateman demonstrates this in a dozen ways.

It was not only that the AP reporters and editors did not understand how to read military reports. They made mistakes that no city editor in the sorriest tank town weekly in the country would have accepted, notably by alleging 400 murders without supplying, even tentatively, a name or a home village for even one victim.

But when it comes to atrocity stories, the usual rules often are not applied. The Pulitzer Prize committee, which has often been hoaxed, awarded the AP its prize.

Later, the committee said its duty did not include verifying the authenticity of the report, but that does not explain why it ignored holes in the AP report that wouldn't have been overlooked in a story about a one-alarm fire.

In the second half of his book, Bateman explores "the story of the story," and then things turn out to be much worse than they appeared, which was bad enough.

Quoting the AP reporters, he shows contradictions in how they claimed to have done their work. Worse, he proves that "AP used these accounts (by fake witnesses) despite its knowledge of the problems with witness credibility."

What is still very much in question is how many, if any, civilians were killed at No Gun Ri.

There is no grave to show there was even one death. Aerial photographs taken a few days after the supposed massacre show no evidence of any deaths.

Bateman thinks that perhaps six to 35 Koreans were killed by Americans, first in a mistaken mortar attack, then by rifle and machinegun fire from the 2nd Battalion after two South Korean Communist guerrillas who were among the refugees opened fire on the Americans.

Obviously, these figures are just a guess. Americans who really were at No Gun Ri that day claim to have killed two North Korean regulars (which Bateman says were South Korean irregulars) and recovered their weapons, which were duly registered later by the regimental supply officer.

Almost certainly some helpless villagers were killed, too. But between Bateman the historian and the honest reporters who followed up the AP, there can be no doubt now that the story of a massacre was a hoax.

There was always something fishy about the story the Associated Press published in September 1999 about a massacre at No Gun Ri, South Korea, in July 1950.
Anyone who has studied military history knows you cannot understand a small unit infantry action without a detailed terrain map, and there was no map.
Maj. Robert Bateman, who taught history at West Point, saw additional problems that wouldn't have been obvious to civilians. The AP account "did not jibe . . . with the things I knew as an infantry officer."
Before becoming a teacher, Bateman had been a company commander in the same unit -- 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment -- whose earlier incarnation was accused of slaughtering perhaps 400 refugees over (accounts varied) a few minutes to four days.
He knew and considered a friend the man the AP relied on most for confirming the claims of alleged Korean survivors, Ed Daily.
While other journalists began investigating Daily's bona fides, Bateman approached the mystery from a military historian's perspective: Could he reconstruct the events of the last days of July 1950, when American and South Korean armies and masses of civilians were retreating, sometimes in panic, from a North Korean attack?
It turned out to be easier to determine what could not have happened than what really did happen, but in "No Gun Ri: A Military History" Bateman presents a well-documented, coherent story.
Simultaneously, the South Korean and American governments opened their own investigations.
Eventually all these investigators proved several things. The one that got the most public attention was that Daily and all the other veterans who endorsed the South Korean allegations were frauds.
But there were other discoveries that put the AP story in even worse light. Not all the AP's inaccurate statements were just mistakes.
Bateman proves that what the AP called a "division order" to kill refugees was not a division order, could not possibly have been known to the 7th Cavalry and wouldn't have been a legal order if it had been. As Bateman says, majors don't give orders to colonels.
It was already obvious, but the AP reporters were incompetent and Bateman demonstrates this in a dozen ways.
It was not only that the AP reporters and editors did not understand how to read military reports. They made mistakes that no city editor in the sorriest tank town weekly in the country would have accepted, notably by alleging 400 murders without supplying, even tentatively, a name or a home village for even one victim.
But when it comes to atrocity stories, the usual rules often are not applied. The Pulitzer Prize committee, which has often been hoaxed, awarded the AP its prize.
Later, the committee said its duty did not include verifying the authenticity of the report, but that does not explain why it ignored holes in the AP report that wouldn't have been overlooked in a story about a one-alarm fire.
In the second half of his book, Bateman explores "the story of the story," and then things turn out to be much worse than they appeared, which was bad enough.
Quoting the AP reporters, he shows contradictions in how they claimed to have done their work. Worse, he proves that "AP used these accounts (by fake witnesses) despite its knowledge of the problems with witness credibility."
What is still very much in question is how many, if any, civilians were killed at No Gun Ri.
There is no grave to show there was even one death. Aerial photographs taken a few days after the supposed massacre show no evidence of any deaths.
Bateman thinks that perhaps six to 35 Koreans were killed by Americans, first in a mistaken mortar attack, then by rifle and machinegun fire from the 2nd Battalion after two South Korean Communist guerrillas who were among the refugees opened fire on the Americans.
Obviously, these figures are just a guess. Americans who really were at No Gun Ri that day claim to have killed two North Korean regulars (which Bateman says were South Korean irregulars) and recovered their weapons, which were duly registered later by the regimental supply officer.
Almost certainly some helpless villagers were killed, too. But between Bateman the historian and the honest reporters who followed up the AP, there can be no doubt now that the story of a massacre was a hoax.

A U.S. military perspective of the proceedings at No Gun Ri during the Korean War is a welcome one, and offers an interesting contrast to the human rights tone of "The Bridge at No Gun Ri." However, Bateman is extremely one-sided in his research, fitting facts around his argument rather than the other way around. His objective is to not to supply an accurate historic acount of what happened at No Gun Ri; instead, it is to argue blindly for his version of the story. As a Korean American, I was offended that Bateman took so little care in his research that he identified Chung Eun Yong's (Eunyong Chung) last name as Yong; I question whether someone with a legitimate background in East Asian Studies would make such an egregious error. Overall, the premise of the book is a good one, but Bateman's narrow vision turns this book into a radical diatribe rather than an objective academic work.

I think Mr. Bateman only tells his side of the story; he almost totally ignores the other side. Mr. Bateman presents himself as a historian, but I think it's unacceptable for a historian to present such highly prejudiced material to the public. I have several reasons for saying this and I'll just make a few points here:

1. If he had paid a slightest attention, he wouldn't have been confused with the Korean names. He thought, for example, Chung Eun Yong's family name was Yong, despite the fact that Chung Eun Yong spelled his name as Eunyong Chung in his 1997 letter to President Clinton, and there were many Chung's in the list of No Gun Ri victims. Had he asked just one Korean American nearby, he would have been corrected. It appears that Mr. Bateman didn't give much thought on victims. In my view, he was only interested in presenting his prejudiced views for whatever reasons.

2. He says, without speaking to any Koreans or visiting the actual location, that the South Koreans' memories refer to other incidents and were conflated with the No Gun Ri incident when a South Korean author gathered them together into a 1994 novel. It's amazing that he could positively say this while he had very little understanding of Koreans. In my opinion, each person would have told his or her own story thousands of times from 1950 to 1994; it would have been pretty obvious to everyone if one suddenly changes his story in 1994.

3. He says without doubt that there were guerillas among the refuges. But I know the fact that by the start of the Korean War the guerillas were largely controlled. I think there still were some remnants, but generally deep in the Chiri Mountains, much farther south. No Gun Ri is on the nation's most important artery of rail lines (which was the only practical means of public transportation that time), where the South Korean government would have made sure to be free of guerillas. I lived near a secondary rail line (with only a single track) and much more mountainous and much closer to the Chiri Mountains, but there were no guerillas there that time. In fact many of village people (including my father) had been absent from home for a few years after the October 1946 riots nationwide, but they had all come home sometime before the war. Even if there were a few guerillas, it was highly unlikely that they possessed Soviet-made machine guns and foolish enough to shoot from the tunnel to GIs scattered throughout in the fox-holes. It doesn't make any sense.
4. I reviewed the arial photos of August 6, 1950 many times, and have widely different view of what might have happened there than what was described (very midly) in this book.

I have lived in America for more than 30 years and I understand that it's best to protect our government position and understand why Mr. Bateman, as a soldier and army historian, wants to protect the U.S. government position. However, publishing a historical book with incomplete research doesn't seem appropriate.

No Gun Ri was a tragic incident for the victims and their families, but under the circumstances, I understand why American GIs acted that way and even if the higher authorities had ordered to shoot innocent civilians, I can sort of understand why. Koreans themselves did worse things to their own people. And the Korean War was tragic for all Koreans as well as for all American GIs who fought in the war, their families, and the American people who had to foot the bill. I appreciate President Truman for sending the troops. But the indiscriminate bombings were very wrong. Perhaps the Korean War was inevitable, but it was the super-powers' fault to divide the innocent Korea into two (instead of dividing Japan like they did Germany).

In light of the Iraq War, we must think all the consequences, not just our own solders' lives, before ever going to a war. No matter how you cut it, a war is a messy business for all involved, especially for the innocent and helpless civilians.

This is an excellent piece of military history in general and Korean War history in particular. Only Appleman's East of Chosin dissects the anatomy of a tragedy in Korea with as much sense of impending, inevitable doom and finality as Bateman's book does. Bateman achieves something few authors and historians do: weave diverse social, political, and military events so that they can hep us understand a major event.

Other authors would be content enough to 'merely' point out that Daily, Flint, and Hesselman weren't even near No Gun Ri at the time the alleged atrocities occurred. Thats the 'what did he know, and when did he know it' school of journalism. But Bateman has a much more powerful message. It begins as follows:

--American soldiers were never made aware that this area of Korea was rife with guerrilla battles between South Korean communist sympathizers and Rhee's army and militias. They never knew many civilians were armed and aligned with the NKPA.

--The American army had no recent experience conducting combat operations in their rear areas. They often left a task to the ROKs, who were notoriously brutal for slaying prisoners. The US army complained they did this so swiftly there wasn't even time to obtain intelligence from the guerrillas!

--While infiltration was probably not a tactic used all that often by the NKPA, nonetheless American outrage against its use was not based on racist views. It was based on the moral conviction that it was not a 'legitimate military ruse.' His contrast of German infiltration at the Battle of the Bulge, with that of the Koreans in the Naktong battles, is powerful and moving. It is part of a larger subsection Fear and Military Reality which is an excellent discourse on the moral conflicts presented by the combatants and noncombatants in a military theater.

--The famous order 'no refugees to cross front line. Fire everyone trying to cross front line' was never widely disseminated. It was a phone call that never reached the men at No Gun Ri.

There is much more. Lack of training at the Battalion level or higher meant the forces were easily dispersed and communications disrupted. The stripping of the units NCOs and Officers (for the 24th infantry division) meant there were not experienced men on site to keep the units coherent and issue their own orders. Commissioned officers would be able to distinguish between legal and illegal orders such as the one above.

All this makes his speculation about what happened at No Gun Ri more credible than Hanleys'. Bateman doubts an 'execution style massacre' occurred. Certainly mortar fire was a mistake, but 'two way fire was exchanged' between the Korean refugees and US Soldiers. Calling in an air fighters to strife the refugees? Impossible, says Batemen: US soldiers FM radios could not talk to fighter AM radio sets. Even if an unintentional strafing occurred, says Bateman, casualties would be nowhere near the hundreds Koreans claimed. Nor could a bombing run have 'bent the railway like still chopsticks.' Aerial photographs after US forces left the area revealed it compeletely intact. And by the way, where are the bodies?

The rest of the book returns to the larger story behind this No Gun Ri incident. It is almost amusing to watch Bateman peel apart Daily's military record. Flint and Hesselman weren't present at No Gun Ri either, though their stories are less colorful. Bateman's chapters on the media, its evolving concept of 'free press' and relationships with the military are helpful in making clear to the reader just how a story like Hanley's can take on a life of its own. Bateman's liner notes state he 'expressly rejects the notion of media bias.' The reader might ask, why? Isn't it clear between the lines the glee Hanley felt in having 'nailed America' with committing an atrocity? Isn't it similarly clear that Haneley is steeped heavily in contemporary journalism's contempt for the west? How else do you explain reporters culling six witnesses from a pool of 130 simply because the former 'supported the thesis put forward' by the Korean claimants? Why didn't the Associated Press scour the same Service records Bateman used to reveal Daily was an imposter?

All of the material presented in Bateman's book is designed to do two thing First, explain why an event like No Gun Ri would be inevitable in the course of a war such as that fought in Korea. Second, explain why it was unlikely that such an event, if it occurred, would be an intentional act by US soldiers. Compare that with Hanley's forays into US foreign policy, US 'arrogance' and meddling in Korean 'internal' affairs, fond wishes by Korean farmers that the NKPA would arrive any second to liberate them from Rhee henchmen, ad nauseum. What has that got to do with the agony suffered in the vicinity of that trestle? In the books 'Afterward' the statistical and survey methods necessary to obtain unbiased reportage on an issue of this magnitude are made clear. The reader begins to see the sophistication and patience, the thoroughness and contemplation necessary to assemble an interpretation of 'facts' fifty years after an event occurs. Pay particular attention to Bateman's focus on the comments of Colonel Nist, and the dignified process by which he interviewed veterans of this War. The former shows how sharp he is as a detective; the latter shows how trained he is as a researcher. I think you will be tempted to reach the same conclusion Bateman and the US government did:

"neither documentary evidence nor US citizens statements reviewed by the US Review Team support a hypothesis of deliberate killing of Korean civilians."

The so-called _Skeptical Inquirer_magazine (Sept-Oct 2002 issue) has a review of this title, which shreds the story about the phony massacre at No Gun Ri during the Korean war. As those of us still hot under the collar know, the parties behind this phony story won the Pulitzer for it and wouldn't give it back when they (and their "source") were exposed. No wonder more and more people turn to the Internet or to Fox News Network to find out what is going on.

Recommended reading:

-:- Tank by Patrick Wright (0670030708)