This is one of the best books I have read for a long time. The level of detail is extraordinary without being boring and enables an almost personal intimacy with the four.

This is a brilliant study of the wartime cooperation between Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt, and their military commanders, General George C. Marshall and General Sir Alan Brooke. Roberts makes good use of the previously unused verbatim notes of War Cabinet meetings taken by Lawrence Burgis (assistant secretary to the Cabinet office) and the reports of Cabinet meetings made by deputy Cabinet secretary Norman Brooke, released in 2007. Roberts also uses the diaries of 27 senior figures and the unpublished papers of another 60.

After the battle of Britain, the USA and Britain had the luxuries of time and space. With Britain no longer under threat of imminent invasion, they could choose when and where to deploy their forces. The Soviet Union had no such freedom. The US and British governments were relying on the Soviets to win the war for them, or at least to weaken the German army enough to make D-Day possible.

Marshall and the US Chiefs of Staff wanted to concentrate the entire US-British war effort on the key point of the battlefield, Northwest Europe, as soon as possible, that is, in 1942 or 1943. But Churchill and Brooke saw a premature landing in France as the greatest danger.

So Churchill said that he agreed, writing to Roosevelt in April 1942 of a Second Front in September 1942 or even `before then'. Instead though, he continually proposed other operations, in North Africa, Italy, the Balkans, Norway ...

Marshall said that Torch, the North African campaign of 1942-43, `represented an abandonment of the strategy agreed in April'. Roberts adds, "and of course he was right." Roberts writes, "Churchill and Brooke had deliberately misled Roosevelt and Marshall into thinking that if the United States poured troops into the United Kingdom in 1942 they might be used to attack France that year, when in fact they had no intention of allowing that to happen."

In June 1942, Churchill and Roosevelt promised Molotov, in writing, the Second Front: "we expect the formation of a Second Front this year." After his meeting with Molotov, Roosevelt issued a communiqué: "Full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent task of creating a Second Front in Europe in 1942." On 3 February 1943, Churchill said to Stalin, "We are aiming at August [1943] for a heavy operation across the Channel."

Yet there was no D-Day until 6 June 1944. But there were plenty of diversions. As Roberts points out, the Italian campaign of 1943-44 was `largely a waste of effort after Rome'. Operation Anvil, the invasion in the south of France in June 1944 was also a waste of time - the Allies should have focused on freeing Antwerp, not Marseilles.

Roberts sums up the Soviet Union's decisive role, "it was the Eastern Front that annihilated the Nazi dream of Lebensraum (`living space') for the `master race'. Four in every five German soldiers killed in the Second World War died on the Eastern Front, an inconvenient fact for any historian who wishes to make too much of the Western Allies' contribution to the victory."

This is a splendid book. It's really two books for the price of one. First, it's a wonderful history book; it is the back-story of the War in Western Europe.

But, second, the book is a great story - an epoch story! It has larger-than-life characters, characters who develop and grow as the story unfolds; it has dramatic conflict; it has intrigue; it shows its characters under extreme pressure, sometimes responding with brilliance and nobility and sometimes with petulance and even nastiness- and all of it is played out across a great plot line - World War 2.

Those of us who have studied the War are familiar with George Marshall's statement, quoted in the book:

"Our greatest triumph really lies in the fact that we achieved the impossible, Allied military unity of action."

This book gives life to that statement. It might be seen as something of a miracle that, given the endless conflicts and competing agendas among the main characters, Germany was defeated. Actually - and I think that this one of the themes of the book - the extreme adversarial relationship among the drivers of the Alliance was the reason for its ultimate success and saved the Alliance from the kind of huge mistakes that might have altered the outcome.

The author observes that the German military was superior to those of the Allies. But Hitler lacked the partnership - either with allies or with his General Staff - that could have filtered out the blunders that he made. We are all lucky that he didn't.

Most of the information in the book is available elsewhere, but the author does gather this scattered material on one place, adds some amusing sidelights, and draws his own conclusions from all of this. The book will interest anyone who wants to know how World War II was managed, or mismanaged, by those who made the big decisions. How those decisions affected those at the bottom who were stuck with them is another story, many times told and retold. This book adds another dimension to the whole.

Masters and Commanders

It is commonly asserted that about two-thirds of business mergers ultimately fail, usually because of an inability to mesh the cultures of the new partners. True in business, that seems also true in politics, especially when several nations, each with its own interests, attempt to work together in war to defeat a common enemy. Thus it was no easy task for the British and Americans to merge their forces in order to defeat their deadly foes in the Second World War. In this meticulously documented, but engagingly written book, Andrew Roberts explains how the two heads of state, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, and their two senior military advisers, Generals George Marshall and Alan Brooke, charmed and debated and disparaged each other, but ultimately arrived at a consensus that allowed them to set out consistent policies and, ultimately, to win the war.

Roberts is British, and his account has a British perspective perhaps, but that is understandable since the two democracies began their alliance before America had been attacked, and when the immediate threat came from Nazi Germany, which had almost effortlessly gobbled up western Europe and was preparing to swallow the "sceptred isle" as well. Much emphasis is given to the development of the "Germany first" policy, which was a tough sell to America after the assault on Pearl Harbor.

Roberts does a good job of describing the character and traits of his four protagonists, none of them a shrinking violet. They emerge from his pages as powerful personalities who did not submerge their own ideas readily, but could eventually put the broad interests of their military enterprise ahead of personal pride. Their German opponent, Adolf Hitler, considered himself omniscient and never had to defend his ideas against the differing opinion of a subordinate. He ruled supreme, commanded without regard for his generals' apprehensions and concerns, and...lost.

The author has recently published (in Britain, not yet in America) The Storm of War, a one-volume account of the Second World War. Masters and Commanders makes an excellent prelude to the new book. For those who enjoy the first book as much as this reviewer, it will be pleasing to know there will be another, for dessert.

After studying WW II over the last 30 years, I must admit that I agree with most of Robert's conclusions about the strategic controversies that arose during the war. However, I have come to the unpopular conclusion that the British were able to survive WW II in spite of Churchill and not because of him. He certainly wasn't a genius, anymore than Brooke was a strategic wonder boy. Moreover, the book was way too long for the redundant information that he was offering us. Also, I was very disappointed that the scope of his book was so narrow. The professional and personal conflicts between Ike, Monty, Patton, Bradley, De Gaulle, and the other commanders were very much a part of their deliberations with their own staffs, along with the estimates of Hitler's intentions. Anyway, it was an excellent book, but somewhat disappointing in its scope.

So few Americans and perhaps even fewer Britons understand the state of the democracies in 1939 when Germany launched what became World War II in Europe. Poland fell in a matter of weeks. Then the Lowlands and Norway. Then it was France's turn. In a matter of weeks, the glorious French were reduced to a German vassalage.

Only Britain remained of the European democracies - and things didn't look too hopeful with the United States still officially a non-belligerent.

This huge (720 pages) and slow-reading history focuses on the relationships of four men. The political masters: President Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the Unite States and Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister. And their commanders: General George C. Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of staff and Alan Brooke, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff.

"Masters and Commanders" is the story of how these four truly remarkable men came together to shape the strategy that ultimately defeated the Germans in Western Europe.

Contrary to the impression the publicists fostered, the relationship was not smooth. Roosevelt and Churchill, despite their natural personal liking for each other, schemed to get their own way. Marshall and Brooke maintained a correct working relationship, but frequently clashed.

This history provides more detail on the often contentious relationships than any other, due largely to the uncovering of several personal diaries which heretofore were not available.

The very detail of this history is also its undoing: while Andrew Roberts is a competent writer, his style is conducive to slow and occasionally difficult reading. There is so much detail that it is wearing and, much of it could have been edited out without harming the book.

For those who can deal with it, the rewards are rich - an unparalleled look at how these four titans, as they are accurately described, ran the war on a day to day basis and hammered out the strategies that would ultimately prevail. But as every history buff knows, it was not a smooth process and some of the strategies did not bring success.

It is surprising, in fact, that this quartet survived the rigors of the war. (Roosevelt, of course, died in April, 1945, before the end of the war. It is an eternal disappointment to the student of history that he kept no diary or other independent record of his thoughts.)

Part of the reason for the tediousness of this book is that it is a record of the often tedious work of staffs. It was they who put together the plans that allowed the field commanders, like Eisenhower, to reap the publicity as the conquerors in the field. But it was Marshall and Brooke who decided where the overall strategy, with the approval and often the interference of Roosevelt and Churchill. While Marshall went on to enhance his fame as U.S. Secretary of State, Alan Brooke is little remembered: the fate of the staff officer.

Yet these two men together with Roosevelt and Churchill authored the plan that saved Western democracy. In the early years of the war, that was far from a certain outcome.

Overall, for the very serious student of World War II, this is an invaluable contribution and essential reading. But be prepared to spend a great deal of time plowing through it.

Jerry

I think the reviewer who complained about the price has a point. My solution was to read the Kindle sample which I loved and buy the hardcover at Amazon

This is one of the most enjoyable reads on history that I've had in years. As a veteran of many bureaucratic wars, it's wonderful to behold a book which exposes that even in the midst of total war in which everyone is doing his or her best to do the right things that humanity cannot be turned off.

In popular history, Churchill, Roosevelt, Marshall and Brooke moved with brilliance and coordination to smite those nasty Nazis. As a long time reader of books by Churchill and other popular fantasies on how theses titans stood shoulder to shoulder and supported each other through thick and thin and how they delegated to brilliant and intrepid subordinates and behold freedom triumphed over evil; what a great fairy tale, so thanks for this little gem.

It's refreshing to see from their own words that these giants at times could be back biting nasty men capable of the most juvenile behavior possible even as their world faced its gravest test. But despite their failings, they hung together as best they could and defeated an enemy truly inspired by evil.

As Roberts points out Brooke and Marshall are suffering the fate of most top strategists and are fading in history while their masters and the battle commanders shine even more brightly with passing of decades. Marshall, one of my long time heroes, gets the best marks from the author, although he's clearly far from perfect. Brooke, whom I barely knew from history and personal remembrance, is considered the brains of the quartet, but he was often a mean spirited back biter. Churchill who looms so large in our minds and hearts is brought down a peg or two as a bully and b.s. artist. Roosevelt, of course, escapes Roberts as he does all historians, and it is only grudgingly near the end of the book that he is given credit for being the eight hundred pound gorilla and most important western leader.

Roberts tries to hide his bias for the British side, but when all the Americans who say nasty things about their UK counterparts are Anglophobes while those on the other side who criticize unfairly are merely good boys under great stress this Yank felt that we got the short end. And his well mounted arguments that the Brits were truly champions of the Normandy invasion don't quite cut it.

In the end, it doesn't matter that Roberts failed to make his case concerning this four man merry-go- round, and he more than made up for this minor deficiency with wonderful insights into the personalities of these great men. As in any bureaucratic struggle, these four giants constantly cast about among themselves and elsewhere to gain support for their ever shifting positions. It was a wonderful thought and this is a wonderful read; I highly recommend it.

This is a wonderful book covering the interpersonal dynamics at the highest levels of command betwen the British and Americans in World War II. It is NOT for the casual reader, except that many of Roberts' presentations should become common knowledge among all those interested in World War II.

The author in an Englishman, and the book is written in British English. He must be commended for his even-handedness as I could detect in only a very few places a slight pro-British bias. An example would be in his discussion of Dragoon (which the author felt was unnecessary) that the effort should have been made in the Scheldt estuary to open up Antwerp, but then he fails to mention that the Scheldt could have been opened immediately after Antwerp was captured and that it wasn't was strictly due to Montgomery's negligence. There are other small items missing (can't cover everything in only 585 pages) such as why the British were on the left flank in Normandy (that was then used as the reason why the British would gain control over Northern Germany.) The planner who put Montgomery on the left flank was General Frederick Morgan, the British General in charge of the planning for the cross-Channel invasion while Eisenhower and the armies were slaving away in the Mediterranean.

That being said, there is so much good here I don't know where to begin. The problems in running the Allied show were immense and almost every other book on World War II simply skates over the very real problems between the British and Americans as if we were always one big happy family. The truth is that Churchill often subordinated military reality to political fantasies, Roosevelt was a mediocre intellect who was influenced by cronies who were very pro-Soviet (and even Soviet agents,) Brooke was a general who had never won a battle but felt he knew everything and that Americans were all idiots, and Marshall (like Eisenhower) had never commanded troops in battle. That they struggled through to victory seems like a miracle. How that came about is the subject of this book.

In short, the American plan was to build up their forces as rapidly as possible and strike across the Channel into France at the earliest opportunity. Marshall and Roosevelt felt the shortest path to victory lay through France to Germany with the Soviets coming from the East through Russia and Poland into Germany. The British had known only defeat by the Germans until October, 1942, and wanted to nibble around the edges of the Germany conquests until the German Army lost much of its combat effectiveness. This approached was supported by all the post-war analyses of effectiveness that have shown that the German soldier was clearly better than his Soviet, British or American counterpart by as much as fifty percent. Brooke, in particular, seemed to overrate the Germans to the point where it eliminated aggressiveness on his part (but only toward the Germans -- he retained it toward the Americans.)

The British talked the Americans into Torch, the invasion of North Africa, against Marshall's better judgment (even to the end of the war.) The conference at Casablanca was seen by the Americans as a British victory, one which they would not allow again. In a very large sense, Churchill and Brooke overplayed their hand as experts among innocents, and after obtaining American agreement for Husky and the subsequent invasion of Italy (and the mission creep up the Italian peninsula), the Americans hardened and paid the British back with interest. Churchill's much-loved diversions like Norway, the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean were simply discarded out of hand by Marshall and Roosevelt when they came up.

Eventually, of cource, the United States carried the lion's share of the fighting and as early as the summer of 1944, Great Britain could no longer supply replacements to maintain its fighting strength. Brooke's many battles to delay Overlord and divert troops into areas to serve British imperial interests ultimately came to grief. After the spring of 1944, the American planners were totally dominant, and British influence on strategy became minimal. In retrospect it seems incredible that Brooke expected to be named Supreme Commander in Europe when ultimately two-thirds of the forces would be American.

There are many interesting side elements in this work such as the British using large numbers of Canadian troops, resources and financial support without giving the Canadians a seat at the planning and control table. In fact, the British spoke for all the Dominion forces, Australian, Indian, South African and New Zealanders without sharing power while usually including them in tabulations of British strenght. And when a Dominion government went against the British as did the Australians in calling for their two divisions to be returned from the Middle East to defend Australia, Churchill became angry beyond control. It was no small wonder that the American planners felt that the British were just using everyone else to defend or regain their empire. Americans would do everything they could to defend England but not British interests throughout the world.

Oh gosh, I could go on and on like this for many pages -- there are so many issues fully discussed in this work. The subjects come alive through their diaries and post-war writings, much of which the author quotes with the comment that they were unfair, misleading or untrue. Yes, both sides lied to each other, sometimes angrily and with great passion. Unfortunately, Roosevelt generally refused to have notes taken at his meetings and then never got the chance to present his side in print. Nonetheless, the author has managed cover Roosevelt's input and decisions very well.

In conclusion, this is an extremely valuable work and destined to become a classic on World War II. I recommend this work without reservation and commend the author for his fine writing and scholarship. We are all the better for his work.

Andrew Roberts presents a perspective, masterful in itself, that few authors of the leading figures of World War II have previously captured. While many volumes have been written on the interaction between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, Roberts gives us an insight into the extent that these were influenced by -- and that they in turn influenced -- two of their principal military men, George Marshall and Alan Brooke. Indeed, one comes away with a sense that if Hitler had allowed the kind of disputatious wrangling that led to the Western Allies' critical decisions instead of using his megalomaniac power to bully his generals and admirals, then the outcome might have been considerably different. A "must read" for anyone who has attempted to analyze the role of civilian governance in military affairs from the time of Thucydides in ancient Greece to the present day.

Good and thorough examination of the interactions between the 4 principals architects of the Western Allies' grand strategy during WWII. Roosevelt and Churchill (the Masters), Marshall and Brooke (the Commanders) all are depicted vividly, as well as the constantly changing interpersonal dynamics that determined which strategies were implemented.

It's fascinating to follow the complicated, multi-year dance between the four, all extremely strong personalities with their own views on how best to win the wars against Germany and Japan. Each needed the support of at least 2 of the others to get his way on a particular issue. Roosevelt, the canny politician, was the only one to never have the other three united against him.

This book, and all accounts of these events, suffer from a major hole in the record - Roosevelt's perspective. Churchill, Brooke and Marshall all got to tell their sides of the story after the war was over, but of course due to his untimely death Roosevelt never got the chance.

This is especially unfortunate, because as Roberts states in the book's conclusion: "Of the four Masters and Commanders...the man who most influenced the course of the war was...Franklin Delano Roosevelt." He was "the ultimate arbiter between the competing strategies of Marshall, Churchill and Brooke." What a loss to history that we never got to hear FDR's perspective on these events.

The book was received on time and in perfect condition. It will be a wonderful addition to my military library.

A book for those with a serious interest in the formation of the grand military strategy that eventually led to victory in Western Europe during World War II.

Andrew Roberts focuses on the battles fought, not in the field, but in the war planning rooms and wartime conferences between the U.S and U.K. sides, with the major focus being placed on Generals Marshall and Brooke and political leaders FDR and Churchill. Mr. Roberts profitably makes use of contemporary diaries of various direct participants to weave his interesting history.

This is not a book for readers seeking a general history of World War II: Combat generals rarely are mentioned; the war with Japan is only brought up when it might have affected resource allocations for the European theatre; Russian and German fighting is in the background.

Again, quite a very good book for the reader seeking to understand how the two great English-speaking allies worked--and often disputed--at the pinnacle over the greatest of political and military stakes.

(One question: Who wrote the caption for picture 13, which specifically points out General Patton's "pearl-handled revolver"? I have always understood the general's hand weapon to be ivory-handled since "only a New Orleans pimp would carry a pearl-handled gun.")

In "Masters and Commanders", British historian Andrew Roberts combines the availability of several private memoirs and diaries with the official record and published accounts to evaluate the US-UK strategic partnership that produced victory in the West during the Second World War. Roberts focuses on the complex relationships between President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill as heads of government with each other and with their senior military advisors, General George Marshall and General Sir Alan Brooke.

Roberts reconstructs the formal and informal interactions of Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff from their first conference in Newfoundland in 1941 to their last at Yalta in 1945. He examines the contentious debates over strategy, resources, and politics with an eye to the way personality and professionalism shaped the outcomes between strong-minded and capable leaders. In the process, he provides welcome sunlight on the contributions of Marshall and Brooke, overshadowed in history by more publicized leaders such as Eisenhower and Montgomery.

Roberts very capably captures the shifting dynamic of the US/UK alliance between 1941 and 1945, as initially superior British experience and forces in being eventually gave way to the maturing strategic thinking and far vaster resources of the Americans. In the process, Roberts closely reviews a number of topics of enduring interest to students of the Second World War, including the timing of OVERLORD, the efficacy of the Mediterranean strategy, and the influence of post-war considerations on the invasion of Germany.

"Masters and Commanders" walks an intriguing line between serious scholarship and popular history. At over 500 pages, the length may discourage the general reader, despite the accessibility of Roberts' narrative. The knowing student of the Second World War may find few startling revelations in Roberts' even-handed conclusions, but much to enjoy in the details. "Masters and Commanders" is highly recommended to students of the strategy of the Second World War.

I am very interested in one day buying and reading this book on my Kindle. Unfortunately, that won't happen until the price becomes more reasonable. It's just crazy (and shameful) for the Kindle cost to be virtually the same as the Hardcover price. Let's see... no distribution costs and no physical costs (paper, glue, storage etc) for a digital version. Flows naturally that the digital version would cost basically the same as the Hardcover. Too bad.

Andrew Roberts was always just ahead of me as I wrote my own book (WINSTON CHURCHILL: THE FLAWED GENIUS OF WORLD WAR II). The great team at the George C Marshall Archive that I met were people who looked after him just as well and gave him a great Virginian Thanksgiving Dinner. While I don't always agree with Roberts book - I think more highly of the fighting prowess of the average American soldier, like my wife's uncle who fought in the Battle of the Bulge, nevertheless it is vital to understand that two of the most important people in World War II were the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir Alan Brooke and the American Chief of Army Staff General George C Marshall, someone whom even Churchill recognized as the man who organized victory. Roberts' book and mind complement each other, as his is more from a British angle whereas mine tends to be more pro-American, even though I am British myself! Enjoy both our books and decide for yourself whether Brooke or Marshall was more important. Dr Christopher Catherwood, Marshall Lecturer at the George C Marshall Foundation of the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington VA in 2009 (online at the Marshall Foundation: http://www.marshallfoundation.org/ChurchillLecture2009.htm) and author of WINSTON CHURCHILL: THE FLAWED GENIUS OF WORLD WAR II, available on Amazon (Berkley Caliber imprint of Penguin 2009)