"You may fire when you are ready, Gridley." This famous quotation is known by plenty of people who don't know who Gridley was, or who gave the famous order, or what the battle was. One of the reasons the quotation is famous is that it was uttered by Commodore George Dewey, who after his rousing victory in Manila in 1898 became a naval hero to every true American at the time. One of the reasons the situation for the quotation is obscure is that Dewey's effort was part of the Spanish-American War, about which even its most famous participant, Teddy Roosevelt, said, "It wasn't much of a war but it was the only war we had." But the war was no negligible comic-operetta conflict. Its two main naval engagements are the subject of _Manila and Santiago: The New Steel Navy in the Spanish-American War_ (Naval Institute Press) by Jim Leeke. Yes, it was a little war, especially compared to the big Civil War before and World War One after. And yes, victory got us involved in the Philippines and in Cuba in ways that may have caused us more difficulties than the victory was worth. But Leeke, a Navy veteran, journalist, and historian, has shown how the war brought the U. S. Navy onto the world's stage as a real player, and how the Navy learned lessons that were going to pay in not only the First but also the Second World War. Leeke also brings into focus a forgotten part of the war; the victory of Dewey at Manila was celebrated and is still remembered, but who remembers the possibly more important victory of Sampson at Santiago?

The Union Navy had played its role in the Civil War; it was the most modern fleet in the world. The war won, the Navy "started disintegrating into a rotting, impotent force that would have been hard-pressed to defeat a fifth-rate banana republic." With Theodore Roosevelt acting as the secretary of the navy, Dewey assumed command of the Asiatic fleet, and after the sinking of the _Maine_, he steamed into Manila. He was lucky; the Spaniards put up a gallant fight, but their ships were older, smaller, weaker, and wooden hulled. The unexpected, speedy, and total victory proved to be a sensation for national pride. The victory of the Atlantic squadron in Santiago, Cuba, was just as decisive and influential, but it was far less dramatic. Rear Admiral William Sampson was in charge of the fleet that blockaded the fortified harbor of Santiago, where the Spanish cruisers had taken refuge. There was some rivalry between different commanders in the fleet, and some confusion because Sampson was beginning to show what was probably early Alzheimer's, but the main lack of drama was because of the inherent static nature of a blockade. After two months, the fleet of the Spanish Admiral Cervera was ordered (against his better judgement) to leave the harbor, and American ships quickly scuttled the Spanish ones. Cervera was an interesting character; he had impressed the Americans with his polite note to them assuring them that American prisoners he had taken were safe and had his admiration for their bravery. After his defeat, he was congratulated by the victors for his heroic fight, and when he was transferred later to Annapolis and to New York to wait out the end of the war, he was a celebrity. Americans respected his gentlemanliness and courtesy, and gathered on the streets to shake his hand. He returned to Spain, became a senator, and had a soft spot toward America for the rest of his life.

The naval victories validated the Navy to be the Big Stick which Roosevelt would brandish when he became president. As Leeke's entertaining and thoughtful analysis shows, the great effect of the war was a new elevation of the Navy's status. In evaluating naval performance during the war, tacticians found that greatest of its shortcomings was its poor gunnery performance, with something like 2% of shells hitting their targets; the guns succeeded because those of the Spaniards performed even worse. The Navy was to begin applying the gunnery principles of British Admiral Scott, instituting regular target practice and innovations in shipboard ordinance. The battles at Santiago and Manila had shown convincingly how essential a robust Navy was to an America taking its part among other nations, and Congress quickly authorized new cruisers and battleships, all of which would become part of Roosevelt's celebrated Great White Fleet. The war with Spain may not have been much of a war, but it was the start of a new and modern Navy.

This is one of the best written books abouth The US Navy during the Spanish American War that I have ever read. It is told with references to the key officers ad politicians that shaped the navy in the period from the Civil War to The Spanish American War.It's only problem is that most of the pictures are of the individuals of the action in Manila bay than of ships or the battle off of Santiago,though that is not altogether a bad thing the picture section could have been better

The origins of the Spanish-American War lay in American support for the independence of Cuba from Spain. Spain's brutal suppression of Cuban insurgents horrified the American public. The U.S. government sought a diplomatic solution, but the explosion and sinking of the USS Maine in Havana harbor on February 15, 1898, while on a goodwill mission, made a successful diplomatic outcome problematic. President McKinley ordered the U.S. Navy to blockade Cuba on 21 April, and Congress declared war on April 24. The U.S. Navy had started planning for a war with Spain in 1895, whyen the NWC began an exercise to identify the options available to the Navy. These options were seen as: a direct attack on Spain; an attack on Spain's Pacific colonies of the Philippines and Guam; or an attack on Spain's colonies in the Caribbean, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. Over the next several years, the options were reworked with an input from ONI and reviews by a planning board that reported to the Secretary of the Navy. In this process, the first option of a direct attack on Spain was ruled out. Jim Leeke's Manila and Santiago places the reader in these crucial battles that firmly established the United States as a world power and established the validity of Mahan's The Influence Of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783. An outstanding account-Lt. Colonel Robert A. Lynn, Florida Guard

This is an excellent treatment of these two famous naval battles of the Spanish American War. It provides good detail and in depth treatment of the battles and what led up to them. My only criticism would be that I would have liked to have seen more information on the ships involved as well. But this is only a minor point. The history treatment is excellent. If your naval history libray is lacking for resources on this period this would be a good addition.