As such, it is a valuable collection of primary source material and sheds light on many of the command decisions that went into the battle. The primary contribution of the book is to completely strip away any lingering portions of the myth that had the Germans kept pressing they would have won the battle. In fact, the reports plainly show that the Germans were never even close to achieving victory.

Additionally, Newton's notes, analysis, and the reports themselves demonstrate that many of the German failures were due to bad tactical decisions. This convincingly strips away some of the sheen from German tactical commanders, who generally are portrayed in histories as being of uniform excellence. Newton's book shows that some commanders, particularly on the south face, made some extremely poor decisions. The attack of the Panthers in Grossdeutschland's sector gets attention in other sources mainly due to the popularity of that tank and its teething troubles. Newton instead focusses on the poor tactical handling of them, which single-handedly almost derailed all of Grossdeutschland's attack. Poor decisions in Army Group Kempf also get attention (e.g. the dismantling of an infantry division near Belgorod), as do the decisions to delay taking of key hills overlooking Soviet positions until just before the attack (when they could have been useful as artillery observation and intelligence positions). Another valuable addition the book provides is that the German command had from the start planned to "turn" units attacking the southern face to the north-east prior to proceeding north, in order to deal with expected arrivals of Soviet reserves. This lead to the clash at Prokhorovka, which thus was not necessarily "unexpected" by the Germans. The problem for the Germans turned out to be a lack of infantry divisions as well as the slow progress of Army Group Kempf. The reports also reveal the failure of using increased artillery, airpower, and new armored vehicles to make up for the deficiencies in infantry units.

Newton's book also hammers home the point that Citadel was doomed, particularly in the north, because the 9th Army had insufficient protection on its flanks. When the Soviet offensive was launched against the Orel sector, 9th Army was immediately forced on the defensive (it had already bogged down anyway). Soviet offensives in the south forced the application of the few German reserves (including the SS Wiking Division), thus sucking them away from being able to reinforce Citadel. Newton's book leaves the reader with the clear impression that German tactics were flawed in many respects, that the Soviets were able to disrupt the flow of the attack, and that the Germans were never near accomplishing the goals of Citadel, even though units in the south did continue to press northward after meeting the 5th Guards Tank Army in front of Prokhorovka. An excellent book to accompany the Soviet General Staff Study, but not one for the general reader as Newton's book assumes familiarity with the details of the battle.

As such, it is a valuable collection of primary source material and sheds light on many of the command decisions that went into the battle. The primary contribution of the book is to completely strip away any lingering portions of the myth that had the Germans kept pressing they would have won the battle. In fact, the reports plainly show that the Germans were never even close to achieving victory.

Additionally, Newton's notes, analysis, and the reports themselves demonstrate that many of the German failures were due to bad tactical decisions. This convincingly strips away some of the sheen from German tactical commanders, who generally are portrayed in histories as being of uniform excellence. Newton's book shows that some commanders, particularly on the south face, made some extremely poor decisions. The attack of the Panthers in Grossdeutschland's sector gets attention in other sources mainly due to the popularity of that tank and its teething troubles. Newton instead focusses on the poor tactical handling of them, which single-handedly almost derailed all of Grossdeutschland's attack. Poor decisions in Army Group Kempf also get attention (e.g. the dismantling of an infantry division near Belgorod), as do the decisions to delay taking of key hills overlooking Soviet positions until just before the attack (when they could have been useful as artillery observation and intelligence positions). Another valuable addition the book provides is that the German command had from the start planned to "turn" units attacking the southern face to the north-east prior to proceeding north, in order to deal with expected arrivals of Soviet reserves. This lead to the clash at Prokhorovka, which thus was not necessarily "unexpected" by the Germans. The problem for the Germans turned out to be a lack of infantry divisions as well as the slow progress of Army Group Kempf. The reports also reveal the failure of using increased artillery, airpower, and new armored vehicles to make up for the deficiencies in infantry units.

Newton's book also hammers home the point that Citadel was doomed, particularly in the north, because the 9th Army had insufficient protection on its flanks. When the Soviet offensive was launched against the Orel sector, 9th Army was immediately forced on the defensive (it had already bogged down anyway). Soviet offensives in the south forced the application of the few German reserves (including the SS Wiking Division), thus sucking them away from being able to reinforce Citadel. Newton's book leaves the reader with the clear impression that German tactics were flawed in many respects, that the Soviets were able to disrupt the flow of the attack, and that the Germans were never near accomplishing the goals of Citadel, even though units in the south did continue to press northward after meeting the 5th Guards Tank Army in front of Prokhorovka. An excellent book to accompany the Soviet General Staff Study, but not one for the general reader as Newton's book assumes familiarity with the details of the battle.

Having been at the receiving end of a T-34's 76 mm gun, I am missing out on many a thing; as I said, the Big Picture never was mine. What astounds me is the rather poor editing when it comes to the German titles or names: the 1st WSSD, the "Leibstandarte der SS Adolf Hitler" is constantly misspelled (Liebstandarte sounds rather weird in German and could well be misunderstood by persons who are intimately knowledgable in German).

This book is more for scholars accustomed to slogging their way through dry-as-dust recollections that, after all, are sixty years old by now. For those, it is a most valuable addition to accounts by the lower ranking officers and enlisted men. Buy it and treasure it if you are a historian, read it from the public library if you are interested. Forget it if you expect the dirty, muddy, and high-pucker-factor experience of the Landser,

Students of Operation Barbarossa will find this collection of German material on Kursk indispensable to their study of the campaign. While Glantz and others have carved out a large niche describing the entire action, Newton has opted for a more limited approach, pulling together various high-ranking primary German sources rarely if ever used in their original form.

After a detailed and thoughtful Introduction, Newton presents the edited "papers," adding priceless footnotes and commentary from his deep well of knowledge on the subject. Every German perspective is corps level or close to it. The last 30% or so of the book is a collection of valuable chapters on a wide variety of subjects, all penned by Newton. He is clearly less enamored with German apologists who claim that a few more days would have scored a major tactical and strategic victory. The battle was completely avoidable and should never have been fought. (His insightful chapter on Hoth's orders/intent is worth the price of the book.)

The book's quality of production, editing, etc. is very high. This is a book to buy, read, and put on your shelf. It is definitely a keeper.

Beware: The book is not for neophytes. The detail is deep and the going is often tedious. The maps at the back of the book help wade through the chapters. Stick with it. When you close the book, you will feel a real sense of accomplishment--and know a lot more about Kursk then you knew going in. And the battle will never look quite the same.