I talk weekly over coffee with two friends who served in Special Forces in Vietnam. Top of books they recommend me read to understand the war is "Hell in a Very Small Place". I first read a copy autographed by my friend and read before his first tour of duty in 1967. My friends say the parallels of the American experience in Iraq and the French in Indochina push the book high on Americans' "must" reads to understand the Vietnam War and our current conflict. The more I learn of Fall, the more regard I have for "Hell in a Very Small Place" and his courage as a writer. A riveting true story.

This is a great book but to get a better idea of what led to Dien Bien Phu, I recommend "Street Without Joy" of the same author.

I knew virtually nothing about Dien Bien Phu other than the standard types of things that it was the pivotal battle of the First Indochina War, effectively ended French colonialsim in SE Asia, etc. and decided to buy this book to learn more. In short, if you have any interest in military history, French or US history, or are just looking for a good read, don't hesitate to buy this book. There is an ENORMOUS amount of detail about the battle in this book, but it is wonderfully written with a deft prose. This is not some dry scholarly work that will require discipline to finish. You will feel the agony of the French soldiers as they continue to hold on while the Viet Minh are slowly squeezing them. I literally could not put this book down.

The book starts with a description of the initial parachute drop into Dien Bien Phu, then backtracks a bit to set the stage and introduce the players. Fall then describes the build-up by the Viet Minh through a horrendous jungle supply line, and the preparation of the position by the French. The bulk of the book describes in great detail the siege. Outlying positions are reduced and pressure is slowly but steadly put on the central position until it is finally overrun. There is an incredible amount of detail here, the battles are often described (from the French side at least) at the platoon level. Perhaps the most interesting chapter is the discuss of Great Game politics between the US, France, and Britian as DBP is slowly being strangled. One thing that I never realized is that there was an intimate link between the French war in Indochina and the US/UN police action in Korea.

There are several specific points made in this book that may be of general interest. First, Fall does not specifically blame one individual or decision for the catastrophe at Dien Bien Phu, but he does point out errors. He also dispells several myths that have grown up around the battle. For example, the French made several key errors in judgement by overestimating the effect of their own artillery, underestimating the effect of the Viet Minh artillery, not having a clear goal as to why a battle was being fought at Dien Bien Phu in the first place, among a host of other. One of the most interesting things stated by Fall though is that Dien Bien Phu was a failure of combat engineering. French intelligence knew that the Viet Minh were transporting 105 mm howitzers to the battle area. The fortifications required to defend a fixed position against such artillery were well known from WWII. The airlift capability of the French Air Force was in no possible way capable of delivering the required materials to protect 10,000 men. Fall discounts the idea that French intel failed (they predicted the size of the Viet Minh army at Dien Bien Phu to 10%). Fall also states that only a relatively small fraction of the Legionnaires at DBP were Germans. From other research, this claim seems still to be controversial, but there is a myth that many of the defenders of Dien Bien Phu were former German/SS soldiers.

I strongly disagree with one of the reviewer Paul Conners on several counts. First, this is not the `definitive' work on the battle. Fall wrote this book in the mid-60s and had no access to Viet Minh records. He did have some access to soldiers who fought on the Viet Minh side, but the complete story can only be told once full access to Viet Minh records is given to (Western) professional historians. This is, however, one of the best works of military history ever written in my view, even if it is not complete. Second, this is not an all encompassing account of the First Indochina War. Fall does put the battle into perspective of the larger war at some level, but this is certainly not his emphasis. Having read this book, I'm left with the feeling that I need to put it into a larger perspective. Don't let these small criticisms of the book (or of Mr. Conner's otherwise excellent review) prevent you from buying the book. I simply wanted to clarify a few points.

Finally, several of the reviewers used their reviews to take shots at the French soldiers and officier (cowards, incompetent, etc.). I think after reading this book you will have a new appreciation for the French soldiers. Yes, mistakes were made by the French leadership in many aspects of the battle, but to call them cowardly or incompetent shows that these reviewers have no idea what they are talking about. Are General Navarre and his staff any less incompetent than General Westmoreland a decade later, or the current US (political and military) leadership in Iraq? Read the book, I think you'll develop an appreciation for the martial qualities of the French Army.

I would give this book six stars if I could. One of the best, most detailed, yet readible books in military history ever written.

Most books like this -- tightly focused on a single, poorly-known battle -- are dry and techical. Hell in a Very Small Place is an absorbing volume, something that comes off feeling half novel, half "I was there" newspaper report. Fall understands the feel of Vietnam and makes sure it comes through. At every point, this book is both personal and detailed, making it a good choice for the technician or the reader interested in personal stories.

Most books like this -- tightly focused on a single, poorly-known battle -- are dry and techical. Hell in a Very Small Place is an absorbing volume, something that comes off feeling half novel, half "I was there" newspaper report. Fall understands the feel of Vietnam and makes sure it comes through. At every point, this book is both personal and detailed, making it a good choice for the technician or the reader interested in personal stories.

I came of age during the Viet Nam War. It was a time of turmoil and discontent as a nation. The "lessons" we learned then now seem to have been faulty in many ways and the mistakes of the past are influencing the present. However, before America had to face the Vietnamese dilemna, it was France that first faced the challenge. As a youth, I knew of the critical battle of Dien Bien Phu but, until I read Bernard Fall's "The Siege of Dien Bien Phu", my understanding of that battle was as faulty as my understanding of the American Vietnamese experience.

I had known that Dien Bien Phu was a battle that saw a technologically challenged Viet Minh army riding bikes to the remote location while superiorly trained French forces looked to carry the day. The ability of the Viet Minh to surprise the French with their numbers and armaments led to a quick demise that saw the French army surrender in shame. Well, now I know better. Like the book "We were Soldiers Once...And Young", "The Siege of Dien Bien Phu" is a masterfully told acount of a battle with keen insight as to what went wrong and what could have gone right. The litany of errors made by the French led to more and more setbacks until only a miracle (in the form of massive US Air Force involvement) could have rescued the day. What impressed me the most after finishing this book, was the heroics of both sides and the ability of the French to nearly pull out a victory. In the end I was dismayed to discover that far more French soldiers died in captivity than did in battle. In another Asiatic "Long March" reminiscent of the Bataan Death March, many weakened fighting men died and even more died once they got to their prison camps. Brave fighting men of both sides deserved better fates and we know of the bravery because of Fall's excellent focus on the day to day ebb and flo of the battle. The roughly 53 day long engagement is told in an exhaustingly realistic narrative. I found myself wondering how anybody, especially the French forces, could ever get any sleep in that "Hell in a Very Small Place". I also found myself bewildered as more and more French paratroopers were airlifted into battle on a daily basis. It is true courage to knowingly go into harm's way when you know that harm holds the winning hand. The greatness of "The Siege of Dien Bien Phu" is Fall's ability to bring such heroics to life while always maintaining a focus on the ongoing events.

At times the book bogs down briefly while examining the international political negotiations surrounding the battle. However, I came to appreciate the tedium of those few sections in the book by understanding the soldiers perspective; the soldiers were living day to day while the diplomats were taking their own sweet time.

I can't say enough about the impact that "The Siege of Dien Bien Phu" had on me. Like "A Bridge Too Far" it is a book that showcases the gallantry of the best of 20th Century warriors. War is Hell, as Sherman said, and the hell is ever present in the book. Yet we come to realize that civilizations survive by the extra-human efforts of such men as are presented in this book. France had much to be angry about after the battle ended but it had nothing to be ashamed of...nor did the Viet Minh soldiers.

Mr. Fall did a nearly-faultless job of analyzing one of the two great military sieges in modern history. With Dien Bien Phu, American policymakers had to ponder the risk of getting involved--again--with Red China only months after the costly Korean stalemate. They had to weigh whether saving a remote, and apparently-doomed airhead--of a less-than-reliable WWII ally--would serve any useful purpose. Could they have reconciled a (attempted) bailout of French colonialism with Containment? Mr. Fall did a wonderful job of covering this complex situation.

Mr. Fall did a nearly-faultless job of analyzing one of the two great military sieges in modern history. With Dien Bien Phu, American policymakers had to ponder the risk of getting involved--again--with Red China only months after the costly Korean stalemate. They had to weigh whether saving a remote, and apparently-doomed airhead--of a less-than-reliable WWII ally--would serve any useful purpose. Could they have reconciled a (attempted) bailout of French colonialism with Containment? Mr. Fall did a wonderful job of covering this complex situation.

I just finished Hell in a Very Small Place on the recommendation of the Wall Street Journal. It was a really outstanding--kept me up at night. My only complaint was that the maps could have been better and/or centralized--I felt like I was constantly flipping back and forth. Overall, though, it was great.

simply the best book i have read covering the vietnam conflict whether it be american or french . It reads like a war novel at its best, the difference being this account is fact. The book covers the reasons why,the build up,the complacency and finally the tragedy . One cannot but marvel at the tenacity of both sides aswell as the strength to endure such hardships. Why the americans had the arrogance to think it would be any different for them is disturbing as parralels can again be seen between the vietnam conflict and the current war in iraq.

This is a truly remarkable book. I read it on a series of airplane flights this Autumn, and to be honest it has been much on my mind ever since. Here we have a day by day (smetimes hour by hour) account of one of the key engagements of the twentieth century written by someone who was intimately aware of both the landscape, the players, and the culture of the conflict. Even a quick read will reveal the author's intent of drawing attention to the relationship of the follies of the occupying power in the First Indochina War to those of the different-but-related occupying power in the Second -a conflict which, alas, the author did not survive- but what I couldn't get out of my mind is the striking similarity in ATTITUDES between the French in Vietnam in the 1950's and the U.S. in,say, Iraq in 2005. Yes, the wars ARE very diferent, yes, the landscapes and some of the local tactics are also very different, but in both settings we have the enormous hubris of the occupier, the stubborn reliance on technology, and the equally stubborn refusal of a foe to just give up and settle for what the occupier is willing to offer. Here is a really important book that should be rewquired reading for policy wonks and officers young and old.

i found the arrogance & ignorance of the french quite amazing.

Bernard B. Fall's "Hell in a Very Small Place" is undeniably a classic of military history. It has at one time or another been an assigned text at the U.S. Naval War College and West Point. Fall had an unusual career as an academic who conducted field research by accompanying first French forces and later Americans into combat in Indochina. Such dedication to his work eventually cost him his life.

"Hell in a Very Small Place" is the definitive account of the battle at Dien bien phu -- a debacle that ended the French empire in Indochina. It is a sad tale of folly. The arrogance and stupidity of French political and military leaders are only partially redeemed by the valor and esprit of their soldiers -- French, Vietnamese, and Legionaires. They made a mistake fatal to many throughout history by underestimating the enemy. French generals believed their firepower, air support, and professional soldiery would allow them to annihilate the Viet Minh in open combat. Vo Nguyen Giap displayed the strategic vision, logistical flexibility, and the tactical determination to turn the tables and instead destroy the French Union's elite forces.

Fall's book is not only well written and readable, but also authoritative. His research is thorough, using both primary and secondary sources. In 1966 David Schoenbrun said of "Hell in a Very Small Place" that "future historians will be using Fall's book as their main source material." Thirty nine years after publication, that statement is still true.

French colonialism in Indochina has a long and entangled past.

Having first arrived as Jesuit missionaries in the 17th century, and rising as colonial powers in the mid-19th century, the French were established on the Indochinese peninsula for nearly three-hundred years when the Second World War brought forth Japanese expansion into South East Asia. With Europe attempting to stem the blitzkrieg, and France soon to fall to Nazi Germany, the French colonies in Indochina were quickly consumed by the Japanese war machine.

Following the Japanese defeat in WW II, a power-vacuum emerged in South East Asia. In order to fill the vacuum, the nationalist Viet Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh, attempted to create a sovereign nation. France, attempting to regain control of its lost colonies quickly sent troops to re-establish control. Thus began the First Indochina war.

Rather than concentrating on the entire conflict, Dr. Fall discusses in depth, perhaps the most defining moment of the war, the siege and fall of Dien Bien Phu.

Based upon countless interviews with active participants and careful analysis of innumerable government documents, Dr. Fall pieces together an amazing history of the battle in nearly minute by minute description. Not only does he discuss the actual battle but also the subsequent political implications that made Dien Bien Phu one of the most decisive events of mid-20th century, comparable to the Cuban Missle Crisis or the end of the Korean War.

Dr. Fall's account is highly readable, dividing the work between strategical analysis and an extensive description of the myriad and strikingly unique men participating in the battle, from the Commander-In-Chief of French forces, to the individual strong point commanders.

Indeed, Fall has produced a seminal work of a watershed event that will remain for sometime the peerless account of Dien Bien Phu and the resulting end to French colonialism in Indochina.

This is military history at its best, packed full of information yet never lacking in the human dimension. My only gripe is the racist slant of the author, wherein all white soldiers were heros, and Southeast Asian and Africa mercemaries of the French Expedionary Force, other than the Foreign Legion, were lesser mortals and shirkers(other than a brief mention of some German deserters from the Foreign Legion, it seems that no one white soldier had surrendered or been captured before the very end). Also the author whilst glorifying the heroics and self sacrifice of the para/legion officer mafia, had chosen to omit the fact that most of the para/legion officers never fought in the trenches, but opted to stay in the HQ bunker, and most of them were captured alive and unwounded, as attested by period photos. Most of the officer casaulties (and those who suffered most were from the infantry and tank branches, rather than the elites like paras and legionnaires) were self inflicted (suicide) or caused by some well aimed artillery hits on top of a dug out/bunker.

Whilst not denying the bravery of the ordinary soldiers there, I will hesitate to eulogise the French officers, whose negligence, cowardice and incompetence were just too obvious to ignore.

I will also like more reserach on the "Rats of Nam Yum", those shirkers and deserters who refused to put up a fight. Who were they? Fall implied that they were the Vietnamese, Algerians. Sengelese and Morrocans. But who can be sure?

Great book by all accounts. Gripping alright, and I couldn't put it down even through the "build-up" stage which some readers (I gather from the reviews here I've read) find boring. Once the battle starts you just won't go to sleep. It also (and this is very important) stays true to the facts and I find Fall an honest historian, which is rare and refreshing. I recomend some further reading on some of the main protagonists in the battle like Dr.Grauwin (wrote a book himself), Godard, Giap, but aspecially Bigeard who went on to greater things in Algeria and elsewhere and ended up a full general. The man is still alive.
I found the book interesting for other reasons too. I'm not French, American or Vietnamese. I spend six months each year in the United States and observed the last year's anti-French campaign there. I found it destasteful. I hope Americans who read this book will reject the portrayal of the French as cowards, for what the French paratroopers did at Dien Bien Phu and how they fought was nothing short of heroic. I also hope that these readers will go on to read other books on history of France and study them carefully. They will find that the French are not just good soldiers (in fact, just as good as anybody), but a truly interesting and great nation too, perhaps closer to you, Americans, than it would appear. After all, they fought for your independence too.

Many will be surprised that Bernard Fall is considered by the French to be an American. He is perhaps the most well known of "French" authors of the period simply because he was among the very few writing in English. As for his book, it is certainly long, occasionally hard to read, but an important account of this politically significant battle.

Dien Bien Phu was not the first time that the French high command had tried to lure the Viet Minh battle corps into committing itself to a fight. De Lattre had done so at Hoa Binh in late '51 through early '52, and had found himself forced to withdraw French forces back to Hanoi after Giap shut the Black River and Colonial Route 6 main supply routes down. Giap emereged from Hoa Binh the winner, at least in the eyes of the junior officers who fought there. Later that year, the French tried the air-land base concept at Na San, further up the Black River on the road to Dien Bien Phu, but Salan was intelligent enough to declare victory and get out before the rainy season began in earnest.

It was Salan who launched the Dien Bien Phu operation, ostensibly for building a CGMA guerrilla base, who thereafter took his entire staff home and left Navarre and his newbies on the hook. Both sides still bitterly debate who really made the fateful decision to draw the line at Dien Bien Phu. What subsequently took place was the destruction of the French Strategic Reserve, not the French Army in Indochina itself. But, akin to our own Tet-68 battle, this translated into a Viet Minh victory in the political arena. The peace conference then convening in Geneva, gave them ample opportunity to exploit that.

Jules Roy's book, the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, is another fine work, and while pertinent, both had very little to offer U.S. tactical fighters of the 1962-72 period. Our problem was that the "down in the trenches view" of that war, which would have been very useful, had yet to be penned by the Trinquiers, Loustaus, Cabiros, and Denois de St. Marcs, all of whom had left Indochina to go on to a further via-crucis in Algeria, followed by the 13 May 1958 revolt, the April 1961 Putsch, and either exile, jail, or early retirement into obscurity.

Theirs were the experiences that we really needed to study.

Hell In a Very Small Place is a masterful and, I felt, at times moving account of a classic battle. Superbly researched and well written, the book was hard to put down. A must for military history readers!

2004 marks the 50th anniversary of the epic battle of Dien Bien Phu, easily one of the most significant military engagements of the 20th Century. It marked the end of French dominance in Indochina and the French Empire itself; propelled the aggressive USSR/Red Chinese backed Viet Minh into power in North Vietnam, then into conflict with the U.S. and its South Vietnamese ally; on to conflict with Cambodia and its former ally, China; and contributed to generally increased Cold War tensions from Korea to Germany; North Africans who fought for the French in Viet Nam were soon fighting against them back in Algeria.

I read the entire book, which is something of a challenge since there is arguably too much information in this 500 page, small type face work. The days of the pre-battle preparation and the 58-day siege itself are told in great detail and with dozens of similar-sounding small unit abbreviations and difficult-for-most-Americans to remember French and other foreign names. It's almost overwhelming and one is tempted to skip a lot of it, but the hundreds of details and vignettes give the reader a cumulative impression of the thousands of actual details and vignettes experienced by the combatants (from the French forces' perspective) that actually comprised the unimaginable, for anyone without infantry experience, hellish experience.

The approximately 20,000 men in the French Forces' represent a startling diversity of nationalities. It was, after all, a colonial French force. The initial garrison had only 13% French Mainland troops, although since a third of the volunteers who jumped in as replacements during the siege were French the total French Mainland representation was about 18%. The largest number of troops were Foreign Legion (26%, mostly German, Eastern European and Spanish) and Vietnamese Regulars (27%), followed by North Africans (18% of the initial garrison, almost none of the volunteer replacements, mostly Algerian and Moroccan) and the remainder were Vietnamese "auxiliaries" (upcountry ethnic groups, 10%) and less than 2% sub-Saharan Africans. The North Africans sustained the highest casualty rate, 68% of their numbers were killed, missing or wounded and the Foreign Legion casualty rate was nearly 60%. French Mainlanders who were only 18% of the battle force comprised 25% of those killed. There were about 12,000 total casualties before the 360 mile death march to POW camps and many more deaths.

Clearly, the besieged troops fought gallantly and fearsomely - Viet Minh casualties were perhaps four times higher - but the initial French strategy, if you can call it that, of drawing the Viet Minh to a remote battlefield with little strategic importance seems idiotic and the logistical execution was, at best, mediocre. French fortifications were pathetically inadequate and only after the battle began did officers request instruction manuals for building fortified trenches! The initial Viet Minh artillery barrage was so unexpectedly overwhelming, despite surprisingly accurate pre-battle intelligence about Viet Minh capabilities, that the French artillery colonel who bragged Viet Minh guns would never touch French Forces committed suicide shortly after the battle started.

A few French idiosyncrasies will astound American veterans. Within the fortress throughout the battle were two official French Army Mobile Brothels, one with Vietnamese women and the other with Algerians. Although they couldn't bring in enough engineering materials to properly fortify their positions the French made room on pre-battle supply flights for 45,000 gallons of wine, and then airdropped additional French Army-developed wine concentrate during the battle itself, causing troops to mount aggressive missions into Viet Minh lines to liberate wine concentrate that fell outside the fort!

Both sides fought with American equipment. Most of the French artillery, radios, vehicles, aircraft and even one aircraft carrier that supported the garrison came from the U.S. The Viet Minh got lots of American artillery and other supplies the Chinese had captured in Korea, where a cease fire occurred less than nine months before the battle started. During the battle about 10% of the Viet Minh ammunition came from air drops that fell into Viet Minh lines, often from C-119s piloted by American civilians.

As the situation deteriorated the French begged the United States to unleash B-29s to carpet bomb the Viet Minh. More than 60 bombers plus jet escorts staged on Okinawa and in the Philippines (some reportedly repainted in French colors), USAF officers made planning flights over the battlefield, and two U.S. carriers deployed to what 10 years later would be called Yankee Station in the Tonkin Gulf. In the end Eisenhower, as well as the British, declined to intervene in support of the French, a fact that contributed to France all but dropping out of NATO.

In a section about the French forces' experience in Communist POW camps Fall describes how during the battle Viet Minh political commissars gathered prisoners every morning to tell them details about how badly the battle had gone the prior day for French Forces. POWs who agreed to sit in a special section and cheer each time a piece of bad news or casualty count regarding the French forces was read got extra food and medicine and did not have to work so hard. The Communist captors awarded such prisoners who cheered their own side's losses with the title of "progressives." It reminds me a little too mcuh of some self-styled "progressives" in the U.S. in 2004.

The grainy black and white photo reproductions are interesting, especially seeing the pictures of some of the warriors - man, some of those French generals had big noses! Sketch maps throughout the book supposedly illustrate the battlefield and how the lines evolved over time but I found them incomprehensible.

Highly recommended for military history and Cold War buffs or military veterans. Anyone who thinks things aren't going so well in Afghanistan or Iraq needs to read this for a sense of perspective.

Together with Fall's earlier book 'Street Without Joy' (Rue Sans Joie), 'Hell In A Very Small Place' is indispensable to understanding the Indochina wars of the twentieth century. Even the general historian should not be without this book.

On the subject of the Indochina wars there is only one shame in the world: that, owing to their slavishly politicizing everything they recount, former Viet Minh and the Peoples Army of Vietnam have not produced a single book measuring up to Fall's two superb volumes.

Fall's two books are the best accounts of the 1946-54 French experience in Indochina. Indeed they're among the best accounts of warfare in any epoch.