This book is a disappointment. For the happy few it might be an interesting read, but for someone intereted in the general ramifications of the Greenspan era it is a huge dissappointment.
The book seems to be a blow-by-blow vendetta of the author against Alan Greenspan. And while the author clearly has an authority on the whole subject, he fails to engage his reader by not clarifying the details on why he rants againts Greenspan. Sometimes too much knowledge can be a hindrance.

This is a truly invaluable book. Fleckenstein shows,beyond any doubt, that Alan Greenspan has been a disaster for the country and the economy. Even before becoming Fed chairman, Greenspan had demonstrated his incompetence (Read the beginning where Greenspan's predictions as one of President Ford's advisers would drastically miss the mark). Unfortunately, Greenspan would be confirmed as Fed chairman and begin a nearly twenty year career of gross mismanagement.

Fleckenstein quotes Greenspan repeatedly, demonstrating the Fed Chairman's inability to predict the stock market or housing bubble (or anything else for that matter). Greenspan comes off as completely incompetent in Greenspan's Bubbles. Perhaps some day the Federal Reserve will be abolished and the economy will not be subject to the whims of mediocre men like Greenspan and Bernanke. If that day comes, it will be because of thoughtful experts like this book's author. I also recommend Ron Paul's analysis of Greenspan in his recent book--Paul points out that Greenspan once supported sound money but changed his views as the lure of great power as a central planner seduced him.

Greenspan will be forever linked to the global financial meltdown of 2008. History will not be kind to the Bubble Boy.

In this fascinating book, financial journalist William Fleckenstein studies the record of Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve from 1987 to 2006.

Between 1937 and 1987 there were no bubbles, but Greenspan helped to create two bubbles in ten years - in stocks and then in real estate - by holding interest rates too low, punishing savers. He helped to make the American people worse off by redistributing wealth to the rich, the bubbles' boosters and sponsors.

Greenspan viewed new technology expenses as assets. So he thought that productivity and profits were higher than they really were, that inflation was overstated and that stocks were understated. In 1998 firms spent $95 billion on computers. After Greenspan's `hedonic adjustment', this came out as $352 billion, adding 2% to US GDP.

Governments want to understate inflation and overstate growth, productivity and incomes. So now, most price rises seem to be way above the rate of inflation.

Greenspan's rate cut of 15 October 1998 triggered the stock market bubble. By 1999 the stock market was valued at 180% of US GDP. (In the last bubble, in 1929, it was 85% of GDP.) In 2000-01 this bubble burst - the new technology miracle proved to be a mirage. In 1992-99 there was zero productivity growth in 99% of the US economy, and growth only in 1%, computer hardware.

In 2001-03, housing `saved' the US economy from the aftershock of the stock bubble. De-regulation led to lower lending standards with more `creative' financial instruments, like the $500 trillion worth of derivatives, which Warren Buffett described as `financial instruments of mass destruction'.

So from 2003 to 2007 there was a real estate bubble, based on huge debts. Mortgage-equity withdrawals created half US GDP growth between 2001 and 2007. By 2006, household debt was 97% of GDP: mortgage debt was $13.3 trillion. Total US debt in 2007 was 325% of GDP.

This ocean of debts rested on a falling real estate market, a sinking economy and a weak currency. Where could the next economic rebound come from? Capitalism has destroyed production and destroyed the housing market: it is running out of options.

The author attacks Alan Greenspan for setting interest rates too low and thus causing all out economic problems. Why did Greenspan do this? He did not see the bubbles (that he himself created) because he was blinded by the "concept of technological driven productivity miracles." The author repeats this idea many many times. But from reading the first five pages you might wonder if Mr. Fleckenstein is the best person to launch a bubble attack like this. On page 3 the author leads you to note 2 (page 189) where he writes: "Determining that a bubble exists is somewhat subjective, though not terribly difficult." A couple of pages later on page 5, the author admits: "I saw the stock market bubble building and concluded it would end in disaster -- about four years too soon!" Should Fleckenstein not have disqualified himself from documenting forecasting failures at the Fed at this point? Taking strong action to stop a bubble based on the author's forecast could have driven us into a deep recession. In these first pages Fleckenstein proves with personal experience the validity of Greenspan's statement on page 99: "I don't think we can know there's a bubble until after the fact. To assume we know it presupposes that we have the capacity to forecast a imminent decline in prices." On page 162 in a confusing paragraph Fleckenstein seems to agree with this by writing: "What would be correct to say is that one can't exactly know what action might be required to stop a bubble." This not say that Mr. Greenspan is blameless.
The author quotes his column from 1999 to judge Greenspan without the benefit of hindsight. In this column he writes that the increases in stock prices are "breathtaking" but never uses the word, bubble, before it burst. He uses the word, bubble, in column on September 17, 2001 after it is bust. Even I did better than that. In my book, "How to Invest in Condominiums" I use bubble twice and tell my readers how to to avoid them (I finished writing the book in 1999). Yet Fleckenstein is the one who has the nerve to attack the FOMC for not using the word often enough. This book is all about criticism with the benefit of hindsight. There are no lessons learned. We have to take it on faith that tighter money applied here and there would have been better. He does not attempt to demonstrate his forecasting ability and help Chairman Ben Bernanke by telling him how big the bursting real estate bubble is and when it will hit bottom, so that the Fed can set the "correct" rate. But no, on page 184 the author indicates that Ben Bernanke would make the same decisions as Greenspan. When we finally know how big and bad the real estate bubble was, say in 2013, Ben Bernanke (if he is still there) and the FOMC are sure to get flack from Fleckenstein for allowing the bubble to end so badly. The FOMC will be unaware of this incoming flack or wisely ignore it. This negative evaluvation (or well documented rant) deserves three stars for providing an insight into how difficult the task the FOMC has is and why in the long run the value of our paper money will always erode.

A friend at work turned me on to Fleckenstien's articles during the peaks of the housing bubble, and all along he predicted the housing market crash. The only thing he had wrong was the timing as thought it would happen sooner. This book sheds light on Greenspans role in two ecenomic bubbles and does so with Felckenstien's unique sense of humor. It is tough to make subjects like this interesting, but this book is a good read. Felckenstien predicted both "bubble bursts" in his columns when everyone else was screaming about the next tech stock that was going to take over the world or talking about how "real estate never goes down." If he says the sh-t is going to hit the fan and you are standing in front of the fan, you should probably move.

Why is this country in this mess? Thanks to you, Mr. Greenspan. Just read Fred Sheehan and Bill
Flekenstein's book. It's is written well and explains why... Greenspan.

The book appears to contain a few things of substance, but you have to look so hard to get past the vitriole it's almost not worth the effort. I'm not a big Greenspan fan and certainly not his apologist, but Fleckenstein appears to be pissed beyond reason. I get the impression Fleckenstein thought he should have been appointed Fed Chair and hasn't gotten over it yet. If Greenspan was as imbecilic as Fleckenstein tries to paint him, he wouldn't be able to find his way to the men's room without a GPS. Come on Fleck, get over it. You've got something to say. Could you possibly say it without all the name calling and innuendo. Why not take Greenspan out on the playground and you two can duke it out? Take a deep breath. Count to ten. Have a glass of wine.

It's taking me a long time to read this because I become so angry that I have to put the boook down. This well-documented collection of mistakes at the highest financial levels, and the following "spin", demonstrates that the bigger the job, the more likelihood of error, and the greatest likelihood is that the person in charge maintains arrogant ignorance and shovels it out to the unsuspecting public.

In fall 1999, six months before tech stocks went into free-fall, the bestselling book "The Internet Bubble" was published. In it, the authors described how the financial foodchain of entrepreneur, venture capitalist, investment banker, and public stock speculator created the tech bubble. The authors also did the math to show how grossly over-valued Internet companies were.

For most of this rampant speculation, Alan Greenspan was enabling the process by expanding the money supply and cutting interest rates. The authors of "Greenspan's Bubbles" document, in Greenspan's own words, why they think the Chairman was doing this. Greenspan's utterances--especially those behind the closed doors of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) that the authors were able to access up until 2001--prove, the authors say, that it was because Greenspan drank the "new economy" Kool-Aid and thus didn't think there was a bubble.

Other critics feel that Greenspan's statements, both private and public, were merely a cover to try to maintain the legitimacy of the Fed as long as possible....

http://www.itulip.com/forums/showthread.php?p=2405#poststop

Readers will have to decide which theory they find most feasible.

Shocking!! Great facts supporting the book. Truly shocking to see how irresponsible Greenspan acted in cuting rates when there was no evidence to support these cuts. From this book you can understand how Greenspan's ego created long term troubles for the US economy which could have resulted in shorter recessions. He even encourages fellow Americans to seek adjustable rate mortages (p. 155). Unbeleivable!!!

Quick and easy read, I knocked it out in one night. I could not put it down once I got started. The book only furthers my opinion that it is time for the abolishment of the Federal Reserve. It is time to put Mr. Greenspan on trial for the crimes he has committed against American Citizens.

This book is hardly cozy, bedtime reading, but its short length (194 pgs.)
makes it fast reading. Author Fleckenstein takes the former Fed Chairman's public pronouncements over the course of the 1980s into the 2000s, and contrasts them with the Chairman's statements during Fed deliberations from the same period, the transcrips of which have recently
been releassed. In my opinion the result shows that Greenspan's reckless policies are directly responsible for the recently-popped lending and housing bubbles that we'll all end up paying for via monetary inflation.

Reading this book (among others) makes me want to move to Switzerland where I can be out of reach of results of inflationary Congressional action about to take place to bail out builders, borrowers and bankers.

This book states the argument of those who oppose Alan Greenspan, the former chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve. William A. Fleckenstein and Frederick Sheehan, who sometimes seem to go a bit over the top in the intensity of their attacks, write that Greenspan, despite his reputation, was no "maestro." Instead, they report he was a poor manager with a habit of either deception or self-delusion. The authors support their argument by drawing heavily on extensive quotations from Greenspan's testimony before Congress and on minutes of the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee meetings. Although getAbstract might wish for less fervor in this presentation, it forwards this book to policy makers, financial services executives and others who wish to understand the downside of Greenspan's policies and how he may have contributed to the U.S. economy's current dilemma.

The problem with this book is that Alan Greenspan wrote it without a thorough fact-checker to keep him honest.

My impression in reading this is that Alan is trying to shape history's opinion of himself, and he is an active shaper of the 'truth' to suit his purposes.

It was a waste of time. It will be better to read books about his Fed chairmanship from writers dedicated to forumulating an objective look at the Greenspan style of central banking.

From almost the first page of the book, you know William Fleckenstein is NOT a Greenspan fan. Through the course of the book his bias against Greenspan is apparent, as he shifts from characterizing Greenspan as either ignorant, arrogant, naive or lazy in his stewarship of the Fed. That being said, Greenspan has given him much data to back up his assertions, and while a more balanced view might have left this reader more confident that the facts weren't skewed, the details of Greenspan's many misses are laid out over the tech and housing bubbles in stark tones. The fact that Mr. Greenspan has spent much recent time second-guessing the current Fed actions while attempting to burnish his own legacy makes the book welcome counterbalance.

This is an easy to read attack on the Fed and it's former chairman. This book provides strong evidence that Greenspan (and the rest of the Open Market committee) of the Fed played a crucial role in creating both the stock market bubble of the late 90s and the housing bubble of recent years. The author also provides several examples of Greenspan's conflicting statements regarding his opinions of these events before, during, and after they occured. Makes you wonder what Greenspan actually believes or even understands.

Investors in the late 90s read the signals the Fed.'s monetary policy that there was no stock market bubble and proceeded to inflate it further. After that bubble blew, the Fed lowered interest rates so far that consumers followed the money and inflated the housing market. Then Greenspan told everyone they should be taking ARM loans just before the Fed started raising rates and stuck it to those borrowers. Simply amazing!

Of course, the Fed isn't the only culprit here. As a society, Americans want to continue their irresponsible practices, then expect government (in these cases, the Fed) to bail us out. Where does it end?

Greenspan's Bubbles: The Age of Ignorance at the Federal Reserve
There seems to be too much blame to spread around for the sub-prime issue.
It's like "teflon", slides off everyone enough so no one gets ..... And this book does not pin it down, helps for the future... maybe.
J.J.R

Regardless of what you think of Greenspan before you read this book, you'll no doubt feel differently toward him when you put it down. The book is well documented. In fact, it uses Greenspan's own words to prove his failures and lies.

For example, "Moreover, attractive interest rates have bolstered the sales of existing homes and the extraction of capital gains in home equity that those sales engender. Low rates have also encouraged households to take on larger mortgages when refinancing their homes. Drawing on home equity in this manner is a significant source of funding for consumption and modernization."

The above words were spoken by Greenspan himself. How clearer could he be in saying he was the cause of the housing bubble?

But there's more. The man who set the nation's interest rates told congress that homeowners were too timid in taking out fixed rate mortgages. They should take out adjustable rate mortgages, he opined. Mortgage companies and banks should use creative financing, he offered. This from the man who would set the interest rates and break the backs of millions of homeowners!

In addition, the Greenspan years, his policies and missteps, caused the dollar to lose value. Long the reserve currency of the world, it's now worth less than most all major currencies and may not be the reserve currency much longer.

He damaged the country and all of us. Greenspan may go down in history as the person who did more harm to this country than any president or business person or criminal who ever lived.

The author does a great job in writing and documenting everything he says about Greenspan. Fact is, he lets Greenspan use his own words to show what a total failure he was and how he created the current ugly economic situation.

Highly recommended.

-Susanna K. Hutcheson

Simple and entertaining, a quick read. This book explains how Greenspan has been the architect of disaster over the last 20 or so years. The facts presented in this book highlight how badly served this county is by the news media. This book doesn't even discuss how Greenspan defrauded 99% of the nation when he "solved" the social security crisis in the the 1980's. That one didn't work either.

I fall on the side of tighter monetary policy and read this book hoping to find arguments and information to support that perspective. But this book is a waste of time for serious students of economics.

Fleckenstein would have you believe that 5% short-term rates were foundational for the 1999 runaway speculation on internet stocks. He offers no logical arguments whatsoever to support his assertion; and historical periods with similar rates didn't lead to similar speculation, so his conclusion that the Fed's policies largely drove this speculation is hardly obvious.

He also argues that the Fed should have done everything in it's power to squelch this speculation but offers no cost-benefit analysis whatsoever to justify the cost of what probably would have required substantially higher interest rates and margin requirements. Would the likely resulting slower economic growth, higher unemployment and lower home ownership have been worth the alleged, although unsubstantiated, benefit of less internet related financial speculation and attendant entrepreneurial risk taking? It seems hard to believe. But rest assured, this book provides no insights on this matter whatsoever.

The author takes a similar tact with the housing bubble, blaming it all on the Fed (even though it has clearly been a worldwide phenomena), without connecting any of the dots with economic logic. The case should be easier to make with the credit bubble than the internet bubble but easier still, I guess, to merely assert it.

If short-term rates alone govern the value of assets (Fleckenstein brings no other factors to bear) why didn't rate cuts from 6.5% to 1.75% between 2000 and 9/10/01 revive the stock market then (or the debt markets now)? Perhaps for the very conclusion Fleckenstein's partner reaches on page 123, "...it has become increasingly clear that he (Greenspan/the Fed) does not control the economy." Had Fleckenstein asserted that in the first sentence he could have sparred us all what amounts to little more than unsubstantiated ranting.

Yes, the author does present evidence of the obvious - there was speculation. But even if his thesis is true, he provides no evidence it was caused or largely caused by the Fed. And, he offers no evidence whether the Fed can or should squelch speculation with the brute force of monetary policy. Don't waste your time.

Here are some impressions I had:

1). My experience in reading the book exactly matched that of the reviewer who said it was slow going in the early chapters and then excellent and engaging in the middle and late chapters. The early part came across to me as muddling through the early part of Greenspan's reign in what I found to be a somewhat disjointed manner. Also, it seemed to me the author did not make a compelling case showing gross ineptitude on the part of Greenspan during that period. Probably there is not too strong a case for that.

2). As the story entered the mid to latter stage of the tech bubble and subsequent housing bubble, it became thoroughly engaging and I was unable to put the book down. And in this material the author built an unassailable case that Greenspan's performed his job with virtually total incompetence. And, as the author amply substantiates, Greenspan adds insult to injury by promiscuously redefining himself and his past in order to immunize himself from responsibilty for the wreckage he has caused to the economy.

3). Judging from the other reviews, there is unanimous agreement as to Greenspan's incompetence. The one main controversy is to what extent the Fed Chairman is responsible for the bubbles and to what extent are other players (e.g. other regulatory agencies, investors, analysts, speculators, whatever) responsible. I would say on this matter that the author to some degree took it as self-evident that the Fed Chairman's actions were the primary causes of the bubbles. That is not unreasonable since it is widely accepted that the powers wielded by the Federal Reserve have a dominant influence on the macroeconomy. (certainly, that is the INTENT of those who created the Fed) However, it does seem that it is a legitimate matter for debate as to whether, for example, certain interest rate shifts during the tech bubble were as significant as Fleckenstein appears to believe.

4). A couple of interesting issues that were raised in the book are:

a). The adjustments made to Consumer Price Index formulas that are highly suspect. Fleckenstein indicates that three changes were made. One was to go from arithmetic to geometric compounding, which seems to me to be a correct change to have been made. The other two are questionable:

- Substitution
- Hedonics

I don't fully understand how those two are implemented but both do appear highly suspect.


b). Much of the basis for Greenspan's nonchalant attitude toward the tech bubble was his notion that it was justified by massive productivity growth created through the use of new technology. Fleckenstein provided persuasive evidence that that productivity growth was in fact bogus, based on faulty analysis.

I knew essentially nothing about the Fed back then, and so most of the events discussed in the book are ones I was not particularly tuned into at the time, but I do remember all the brouhaha about the massive productivity gains we were experiencing, and I guess it was Greenspan who was the one most vocally peddling that (apparently erroneous- as just about everything else he has ever said) message.

Jim from NYC, Mr. Fleckenstein is not a reporter doing all this research after the horse has left the barn. Long time readers of his column have been elightened of the risks of Greenspans flawed policies for years. His weekly columns exposing what was going on and what was going to happen are amazingly accurate if you go back and look at his past columns. To say he is merely a reporter stating this after the fact when it is too late to help anyone is silly. I read his columns regularly and could not wait to read the next one to get some refreshing and original insight on a phenomemon when the rest of the media just regurgitated Greenspans comments and made him look like an infallible god. I sold my house near the peak of the bubble several years ago due to a relocation and have been renting ever since while waiting for the housing market to complete its fall. Fleckensteins articles about the Housing ATM were so dead on, I advise you to go back and research his old articles. A lot of this book was based on those articles. I applaud him for fighting against what was then an invincible tide. I just read his latest article and agree wholeheartedly, wait until the banks start enforcing the LTV (loan to value) on mortgages, it will affect all borrowers. I remember him arguing why the Fed did not enforce some of the tools at his disposal like increasing margin lending requirements during the stock bubble and doing something similar for banks or Fanny Mae during the height of the housing bubble. Anyways, good book, good articles, and great insight on this before it all collapsed.

I have been a reader of Mr. Fleckenstein's MSNBC column and a member of his blog for quite some time. A number of years ago I purchased gold, silver, and oil before it was fashionable at Mr. Fleckenstein's recommendation. (At the time some people questioned my sanity)

Thanks to him I am now sitting pretty. I'm laughing all the way to the brokerage firm.

Most of the other reviewers got it right. Greenspan is either a completely incompetent central banker or a very despicable human being. He messed up everything; we are simply waiting to pay the very high price. Those of us who have been reading Bill's writing since the late 90's will readily attest to Bill's efforts to pull back the curtain on Greenspan. These long-time readers will find this a pleasant walk down memory lane; there is nothing new, but the collection of Greenspan quotes is still awe inspiring when viewed in total. For those who wonder why the reviewers all seem to hate Greenspan so much, read the book. The man was a menace to society, and history will write a very ugly chapter. I believe Bill's motivation was not money; he is probably very wealthy. His motivation was more likely to be, quite simply, to document Greenspan's Blunders for posterity.

"The reason I wrote this book was so that the average person could understand the scope of the housing bubble, and what its bursting was going to mean and...where blame should be placed...at Greenspan's Fed, specifically," posits William Fleckenstein, who has keenly observed Mr. Greenspan's comments and actions in lucid daily commentary on the economic environment and investing practice for over a decade. By the end of Fleckenstein's crisp account, I craved that "The Maestro" had succeeded a fraction as well in HIS calling: Fleckenstein makes the story accessible to the average American, and his clarity stands in bold contrast with Greenspan's oft-obfuscating "Greenspeak."

Given the current state of the housing market, readers of 'Greenspan's Bubbles' might be prompted to ask whether Greenspan feels any culpability for luring unsuspecting homeowners into adjustable mortgage rates. Fleckenstein observes, "Greenspan was extolling the virtues of floating rate mortgages when interest rates were at the lowest they had been in over 50 years," suggesting that Greenspan ought to, even if he does not.

Certainly, today Greenspan expects Americans to believe he really didn't mean what he said when he endorsed ARMS. However, this book asserts that Greenspan blew serial bubbles in the stock market and real estate by keeping rates too low too long, thereby inviting reckless speculation.
Fleckenstein likens normal cycles of economic ups and downs to going to a party, imbibing in a few drinks, and feeling kind of shaky the next day. However, Greenspan's take on the economy was to entice Americans to throw down fifty metaphorical shots of tequila to keep the party going.

There's got to be a morning after, and 'Greenspan's Bubbles' helped me connect the dots between Greenspan's career at the Fed and the pain of duped Americans losing their homes, well-qualified hopeful homebuyers being shut out from credit, and the lowering status of the U.S. dollar- which has been the world's reserve currency for almost one-hundred years.

"Lucky" for him he squeaked through his tenure right before the tequila hit the fan.

This book is a fairly concise play-by-play of the errors and follies by our "esteemed" Central Bank. In the coming years, this book will increasingly become relevant as the full extent of Greenspan's ridiculous policies now come to light.

A clear and concise explanation of how the stock market and housing bubbles formed. Manditory reading for anyone who wants to understand the recession of '08.

This is a very good review of Greenspan's and the FMOC's performance for nearly 20 years. Easy to read and well organized.

Greenspan was clueless, arrogant and impervious to self reflection or self doubt. Unfortunately, not only was he complicit in radically mismanaging interest rates for almost 20 years, but he also left a written and verbal legacy behind just waiting for the likes of Fleckenstein and Sheehan to uncover. A wonderful book about a seriously flawed man.

Fleckenstein(F) and his co-author establish beyond any doubt that the transformation of the American economy ,from one of production,entrepreneurship,enterprise,and investment into one of speculation,more speculation,and much more speculation ,has been taking place from the time that R Reagan became President in 1981,although one can clearly see that the Carter administration is the one who started the trend to speculation and away from enterprise in the first place in 1979.F shows,using the transcripts of the Federal Open Market Committee(FOMC),the quasi-private ,quasi-public heart of the Federal Reserve System ,that Greenspan continually opted for a very easy ,expansionary monetary policy generally from July,1987,when Greenspan took over the helm of the FED from Paul Vocker, up until June,2004,when Greenspan received a call from the head of the Chinese central bank complaining about the very low interest returns that was being paid on U S government bonds,that resulted in a U turn in monetary policy.F shows that this policy continually promoted a turn toward allowing commercial banks to collaborate with the giant Wall Street investment brokarage firms in marketing highly speculative loans and other financial practices supporting leveraged buyouts and takeovers by private equity firms looking to manipulate a corporation's financial balance sheet to extract profit without production.Greenspan's very easy money policies constantly bailed out the Wall Street speculators every time their imprudent risk taking got them into trouble.This ,of course,would lead to further increases in speculative behavior on the part by the private commercial banks,now allied with the big Wall Street investment banks/brokerage firms.THe question is how much of this can be laid at Greenspan's door ? I would argue that he can be held to be no more than 25% responsible for the current fiasco resulting from subprime mortgage backed loans and collateralized debt obligations.H ignores the fundamental responsibility of three other types of regulator.These other important cogs in the machine needed to prevent speculative bubbles are (A)the Comptroller of the Currency,(B) the head of the Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC),and (C) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation(and Federal Savings and LoanInsurance Corporation).These 3 regulatory agencies were heavily staffed with libertarian and Austrian analysts, who do not know the difference between enterprise and speculation,starting early in the Reagan administration.None of the three bubbles identified by H could have occurred under the watch of a Bill Casey at the helm of the SEC.

H could have improved the book substantially if he had devoted a chapter showing how both Adam Smith and John Maynard Keynes had arrived at exactly the same conclusion regarding the severe negative costs that speculation imposes on an economy,be it either from loans made by banks to speculators or,even worse,if the banks themselves become active speculators,which is what has happened in the USA.Smith and Keynes warned about the cosequences that result when the aggregate savings of the population is lent out to either Smith's "projectors,prodigals,and imprudent risk takers "(Smith,Wealth of Nations,1776,pp.339-340,Modern Library(Cannan)edition)or Keynes's" speculators" and "rentiers"(General Theory,1936,pp.321-327,338-353,374-377)-the result is that the savings of a country will be " wasted and destroyed ".Everything that has occurred since 1981 confirms the Smith- Keynes warnings.

Greenspan's mistakes caused the following:
* The stock market crash of 1987
* The Savings & Loan crisis
* The collapse of Long Term Capital Management
* The tech bubble of 2000
* The feared Y2K disaster
* The credit bubble and real estate crisis of 2007

Absolutely not! Each crisis has its own origin and consequence. Each case is a long Ph.D. thesis or more for the economist to do more research.

Y2K is not a disaster. Everything that might go wrong, worked out well. Yes, the real estate 2007 bubble is still a problem. But like anything else, there is always a buyer when the price is right. In Manhattan, there is no real estate bubble. Prices are still going up.

America is still the leading country for investments for everyone. Brazilian, Russian, Indian, and Chinese (BRIC)companies are all coming in the next few years to set up plants, buying our companies, stocks, bonds, mutual funds,hedge funds, using soverign wealth fund, cash, equity, debt financing, etc. Jobs will be created and prosperity continues.

Greenspan or Bernanke is just one person. He cannot control or cause the bubble. I agree that the title is good for selling books. For that, I give two stars for W. Fleckenstein. But I disagree with your analysis
completely.

Bill Fleckenstein and Fred Sheehan de-sanctify the deity, Alan Greenspan. The absolutely absurd influence this man has had over our economy for the past 2 decades is astounding. The final chapter regarding the current housing crisis really hits home! Greenspan truly is the master of bubble blowing.

Bill Storey, San Antonio,TX

Those with at least a bit of intelligence realize that Greenspan has caused so many financial problems. Yet, it has been the media (including MSN Money) that have worshipped him. While this book certainly does place blame (and rightly so) with Alan Greenspan for 3 asset bubbles and many over atrocities, the fact is that it's a bit too late to help investors now. Finally, why didn't the author write these things when Greenspan headed the Fed?

There have been quite a few books that have been previous written already saying many of the same things in this book so it really represents no new material. Still, the book was well-written and might serve to help wake the media up so they stop listening to the Fed, Wall Street, Cramer, Kudlow and others. They have always been wrong in the past and they will continue to be wrong in the future.

Instead of crying about it now, I would have liked to see the author help guide investors through this mess. But alas, he is merely a reporter. A much better book exists that details Greenspan's role in the collapsing US economy. This book provides a comprehensive view of the future and guides investors how to profit from Greenspan's mess. And it was written by a financial expert with NO vested interests (he doesn't run a firm and is not trying to get new investors or sell you gold). The book is "America's Financial Apocalypse: How to Profit from the Next Great Depression." It's the most revealing investment related book I have ever read. America's Financial Apocalypse: How to Profit from the Next Great Depression

all pure hogwash. years from now we will all know the truth... greenspan is god.

I was intrigued by Alan Greenspan in that his mistakes seem to be impacting so many Americans yet people are failing to recognize his role in their financial distress. Greenspan's Bubbles explain the former fed chairman's role in a way that one does not need to be an economist to understand. The book is easy to read and entertaining but is certainly satisfying reading. I would recommend the book to anyone who is watching his debt rise, incapable of affording to fill his car with gas and is wondering why.

Bill Fleckenstein makes it painfully clear that former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan bumbled our economy as badly as he mumbled his own words. This book is an eye-opener in that it systematically exposes Greenspan's own hubris and successive wrong turns in managing the U.S. economy. Oops! Too late to take it back. The dollar is on its way to parity with the peso and the Fed is caught with little wiggle-room to keep the economy propped up in the face of two bubble busts.

Managing a $13 trillion economy is an awesome responsibility. Surely we need a Fed Chairman who has exhaustively studied fiscal history and who can recognize important inflection points so that he can maintain economic moderation and stability. Sadly for us, Greenspan wasn't that guy. It was Greenspan's loose monetary policies - the Greenspan Put! - that spawned the right conditions for bubble development. And we didn't have just one bubble -- the stock market bubble that burst in 2000 was the first we'd had in over fifty years -- we had two, a stock market bubble AND a real estate bubble . . . and they were both enormous! We'll be feeling the effects of Greenspan's irresponsibility for a long time to come. As Fleckenstein explains so well, the current subprime debacle is yet another example of bubble fallout. This is why this book is invaluable. If you truly want to process how we arrived at this juncture, then here's your guide.

Fleckenstein is a colorful writer. For what could have been a boring, complex, and even technical dissertation, Fleckenstein manages to make it understandable in a wit + candor style. The first two chapters are somewhat tedious and might I even suggest, "numbing," but don't let that dissuade you. The content rich middle and concluding chapters absolutely sing. The book is informative, thought-provoking, and just the right amount of information to digest. To me, that's five-star worthy.

Bill Fleckenstein makes it painfully clear that former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan bumbled our economy as badly as he mumbled his own words. This book is an eye-opener in that it systematically exposes Greenspan's own hubris and successive wrong turns in managing the U.S. economy. Oops! Too late to take it back. The dollar is on its way to parity with the peso and the Fed is caught with little wiggle-room to keep the economy propped up in the face of two bubble busts.

Managing a $13 trillion economy is an awesome responsibility. Surely we need a Fed Chairman who has exhaustively studied fiscal history and who can recognize important inflection points so that he can maintain economic moderation and stability. Sadly for us, Greenspan wasn't that guy. It was Greenspan's loose monetary policies - the Greenspan Put! - that spawned the right conditions for bubble development. And we didn't have just one bubble -- the stock market bubble that burst in 2000 was the first we'd had in over fifty years -- we had two, and they were both enormous! We'll be feeling the effects of Greenspan's irresponsibility for a long time to come. As Fleckenstein explains so well, the current subprime debacle is yet another example of bubble fallout. This is why this book is invaluable. If you truly want to process how we arrived at this juncture, then here's your guide.

Fleckenstein is a colorful writer. For what could have been a boring, complex, and even technical dissertation, Fleckenstein manages to make it understandable in a wit + candor style. The first two chapters are somewhat tedious and might I even suggest, "numbing," but don't let that dissuade you. The content rich middle and concluding chapters absolutely sing. The book is informative, thought-provoking, and just the right amount of information to digest. To me, that's five-star worthy.

Many laud Alan Greenspan as a master of the modern economy. Fleckenstein, however, sees Greenspan as nothing less than a serial bubble-blower - the market crash of '87, the Savings and Loan crisis, the crash of the Russian ruble and Long Term Capital Management, the 2000 tech bubble, the supposed Y2K disaster, and the credit bubble and real estate crisis of 2007. Prior to Greenspan's arrival, excluding the brief mania for commodities and precious metals in late '79 and early '80, the U.S. had been bubble-free for over 50 years.

"Greenspan's Bubbles" points out that he supported S&L deregulation as a paid consultant for Lincoln S&L (costing over $100 billion for taxpayers to bail out). During his '87 confirmation, Senator Proximire pointed out that Greenspan's forecasts at the Council of Economic Advisors were way off, and in some years, the worst of all.

Greenspan helped cause the mid-90's stock market bubble by lowering interest rates when it was not required; instead of admitting this as a mistake, Greenspan declared the market's level as indicative of Wall Street's wisdom on new ways to value stocks. Further acerbating the situation, Greenspan participated in and led efforts to change inflation measures (lower), thus appearing to call for less money tightening.

Contrary to Greenspan, former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker observed in 1999 that the stock market's growth was dependent on 50 stocks - half of which had never reported any earnings. (Definitely a "bubble-seer.")

In 2005 Volcker also pointed out that the housing market had become a vehicle for borrowing as much as a source of financial security. Greenspan, however, saw rising subprime loans as the "benefit" of increased lender productivity through the use of new technology.

Fleckenstein concludes that Greenspan created a 24% drop in the dollar's value vs. a basket of other currencies, and a greater increase in the price of oil than most other nations had experienced (eg. 3X increase in European nations, vs. 5X in the U.S. over a 5 year period). Another unhappy income (for most) was the transfer of wealth from the middle-income segment to the highest income group.

A lasting legacy of Greenspan is that investors have learned to "invest" without fear - the Federal Reserve will bail them out if enough money is involved. And monetary policy has become more set by populist demand (eg. the rants of Jim Cramer, Lawrence Kudlow, Steve Forbes, and the greedy Wall Street brokers) than rationality.

Many laud Alan Greenspan as a master of the modern economy. Fleckenstein, however, sees Greenspan as nothing less than a serial bubble-blower - the market crash of '87, the Savings and Loan crisis, the crash of the Russian ruble and Long Term Capital Management, the 2000 tech bubble, the supposed Y2K disaster, and the credit bubble and real estate crisis of 2007. Prior to Greenspan's arrival, excluding the brief mania for commodities and precious metals in late '79 and early '80, the U.S. had been bubble-free for over 50 years.

"Greenspan's Bubbles" points out that he supported S&L deregulation as a paid consultant for Lincoln S&L (costing over $100 billion for taxpayers to bail out). During his '87 confirmation, Senator Proximire pointed out that Greenspan's forecasts at the Council of Economic Advisors were way off, and in some years, the worst of all.

Greenspan helped cause the mid-90's stock market bubble by lowering interest rates when it was not required; instead of admitting this as a mistake, Greenspan declared the market's level as indicative of Wall Street's wisdom on new ways to value stocks. Further acerbating the situation, Greenspan participated in and led efforts to change inflation measures (lower), thus appearing to call for less money tightening.

Contrary to Greenspan, former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker observed in 1999 that the stock market's growth was dependent on 50 stocks - half of which had never reported any earnings. (Definitely a "bubble-seer.")

In 2005 Volcker also pointed out that the housing market had become a vehicle for borrowing as much as a source of financial security. Greenspan, however, saw rising subprime loans as the "benefit" of increased lender productivity through the use of new technology.

Fleckenstein concludes that Greenspan created a 24% drop in the dollar's value vs. a basket of other currencies, and a greater increase in the price of oil than most other nations had experienced (eg. 3X increase in European nations, vs. 5X in the U.S. over a 5 year period). Another unhappy income (for most) was the transfer of wealth from the middle-income segment to the highest income group.

A lasting legacy of Greenspan is that investors have learned to "invest" without fear - the Federal Reserve will bail them out if enough money is involved. And monetary policy has become more set by populist demand (eg. the rants of Jim Cramer, Lawrence Kudlow and the greedy Wall Street brokers) than rationality.