Very much an in-depth history of our times. This book describes activities that were lightly or never reported in the news yet had and have extreme bearing on US policy and current conditions in the Middle East. Well researched book with lengthy reference list.

"Ghost Wars" is an excellent, exciting, and very carefully researched and footnoted documentation of how the United States government, from the time of Reagan, supported and encouraged the forces that became the Taliban. The writer, Steve Coll, is a Pulitzer Prize winning journalist and writer who was managing editor of the Washington Post from 1998 to 2004.

This is very important information for understanding why and how international relations have become so very complex and violent, and why simple yes/no and us/them declarations miss the point entirely.

Should be required reading in high school and college, immediately.

An excellent book for those interested in the politics of The Afghanistan - Russian conflict and its out come setting the seeds for 9/11.

This was a great novel, go buy Detained Differences by J. Robert Rowe. It is about Detainee Operations inside Afghanistan.

"Ghost Wars" is a very good, well documented, presentation of facts leading up to 9-11, focusing mainly on the CIA's involvement in Afghanistan starting with the anti-Soviet rebellion in the early 1980's.

What comes through very clear is how complex the situation was, presenting very little options which could ever work out well. Probably the USSR would have broken apart even if we weren't involved in Afghanistan. Plus, in the early 80's the US was so paranoid of Afghanistan going communist and therefore a secular society, we were distributing CIA-printed Korans to the Afghan rebels. Muslim jihadis must have been laughing at us.

As the book points out, the real reason we wanted to be involved in Afghanistan was because of eventual control of a proposed Afghan oil pipeline, where the oil company, Unocal, was front and center in influencing our actions, even wanting in the late 90's to negotiate and partner with the Taliban.

One thing kind of funny in it is when Bush was campaigning before the 2000 election, reporters/journalists were asking Bush pop questions to see his responses. One journalist mentioned "Taliban". Bush just shook his head in silence. Then the journalist gave him a hint, and Bush said something about repression of women in Afghanistan, but then said he first thought it was a band.

This book definitely belongs in one's collection of books trying to understand things related to 9-11 and as a basis for understanding the 'War on Terror'.

This detailed and interesting story will really open your eyes to why 911 happened. It's a fascinating story. Shocking in its openess.
For another good read check out Eva-Christ

Steve Coll has done an outstanding job in presenting the history of our relationship with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the Afghan freedom fighters and shows how that history foretells what is occurring in the world today.

Many other books about the rise of Osama Bin Laden are out there but this gives an honest depiction of who he was and is, how he came to power and what he uses to retain that power. It gives the reader a better understanding of the tribal nature of Afghanistan, the machinations of the intelligence services in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and how the Taliban came to rule after the Soviets were chased out. It also shows how the United States in the administration of Bill Clinton dropped the ball numerous times in understanding and dealing with terrorism. From the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 to the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000, Clinton did little to forestall further such events. The reader will see what roles Sandy Berger and Richard Clarke played in advising the president and yet the terrorism continued.
A few heroes are introduced- mainly from the CIA and Afghan tribes.

Steve Coll is an excellent writer and captures the reader with his excellent prose and command of the players and facts of the times

on 9/12/2001 i figured that i should take a stab at getting a better picture in my head of the political turbulence that storms through the middle east. but i'm a lazy person. and such an undertaking seemed a chore. i have enough chores in my life, so i procrastinated. i bought a small stack of books on the topic over the years, but they only served to make me feel bad, because i really didn't want to read any of them. but this month, about 6 years later than it should have been, i took the plunge. I picked up steve coll's "Ghost Wars," and started reading the thing. well, lo and behold it was not a chore at all. the first 475 pages flew by with ease, pulling me along eagerly. mr coll builds a narrative momentum here, while threading complex strands of people, countries and events into a coherent whole, that is superlative. his portrait of the saudi, afganistan, and pakistani governments, and their interactions with the united states government was particularly well done and fascinating. my only complaint (and the reason i give this book 4 stars instead of 5) is that after the bombing of our warship in yemen by bin laden's group, the narrative suddenly grinds to a halt and becomes bogged down in about a hundred pages of overly detailed description relating to unsuccessful plots to get bin laden himself. since we all know that bin laden was not caught, this long stretch of failed planning simply takes up too much space at the end of the book, and is not all that interesting. that said, by all means read this book for the excitement and enlightenment cast in the first 475 pages or so. i believe this book to be about as good a place to start as any for someone looking to better understand the road that led us to 9/11.

Interesting. A must read. I hope Mr. Coll writes the next segment of Afghanistan's history from September 11, 2001 onward.

The book covers a lot of ground and is lengthy, but is well written and reads quickly. Coll outlines the people and policies (or, the lack thereof) from the Soviet chapter in Afghanistan until the day before September 11, 2001. Throughout the historical narrative, the book covers and addresses scary amounts of money flowing in and out of Afghanistan, the conflicts between the CIA, the State Dept. and other U.S. agencies/policymakers in addressing issues related to Afghanistan, the Taleban, Al Q, and Bin Laden, and who understood what and when related to Al Q, Bin Laden, et al. Coll also critically addresses the roles of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in U.S. policy considerations, and those countries policies toward Afghanistan/knowledge of Al Q and Bin Laden.

Beyond the headlines, I was not very well informed on the history of Afghanistan. This book will bring the reader up to speed very quickly.

Don't be scared away by the 600+ pages. It flows freely and is really a riviting historical read. It provides quite a narrative on the history of this area and the difficult political and military situations that the US, Pakistan, Soviet Union and other influcencal Middle East countries had in this area of the world..

Ghost Wars is an account of U.S. assistance to the mujahedin during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and U.S. attempts to curtail Osama bin Laden's influence. Ghost Wars focuses on the CIA but author Steve Coll, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist who covered Afghanistan for the Washington Post between 1989 and 1992, also covers the interagency policy making process in Washington.

The U.S. policy of helping the mujahedin in Afghanistan harass and ultimately defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan was, of course, a success. U.S. officials realized that the contending forces in Afghanistan were unlikely to form a unified national government after the Soviet's departure, but the United States was in Afghanistan to hurt the Soviet Union, not to build a new nation in Afghanistan. U.S. assistance efforts in Afghanistan were advanced by two allies, in particular, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Coll argues that, while the allies' interests coincided in containing Soviet expansion, U.S. interests were hurt by the efforts of Pakistan's intelligence service (the ISI) to strengthen radical Islamists after the Soviet collapse in Afghanistan and by Saudi Arabia's unwillingness to confront radical Islamists at home and in Afghanistan.

Coll criticizes U.S. policy in Afghanistan on several grounds. First, the United States relied heavily on the ISI to deliver assistance to the mujahedin, despite the ISI's preference for radical jihadists. Second, the United States' reliance on Saudi oil made it too hard for the United States to confront its ally over terrorism policies. Third, the United States missed opportunities to engage India as a democratic ally in South Asia. Fourth, the United States failed to develop "a strategy for engagement, democratization, secular education, and economic development among the peaceful but demoralized populations of the Islamic world."

U.S. policy toward bin Laden, in particular, could also be criticized for a lack of coherence. Coll's narrative describes a reluctance to give unambiguous instructions to kill bin Laden, even though capturing him alive would have been nearly impossible. Numerous opportunities arose to attack bin Laden but policymakers always demurred because they were reluctant to offend other governments or risk civilian deaths. At one point, referring to bin Laden, CIA director George Tenet announces that "We are at war," but the resources and single-minded determination that this announcement implies never materialized.

For any soldiers, or other war on Al-Qaeda junkies this is the book for you.

Loaded with excellent facts, and amazing events that took place from 1979 to 2001.

Important read for any one in the national security- corporate security-police - military- or the intelligence field.

Death to Al-Qaeda, and may God bless America.

This book is very long in reading. It does not follow any folw to be seen but jumps around. It is informative on a historical view however, to get to the few usfull items the reader has to read one mans musing.

To think that all this information was available to both the Clinton & two Bushes. Three administrations all ignored the warnings of their own staffs. Makes one wonder -- was there anybody home at the White House
from 1989 to 2002 (and after)?

I would reccomend this book to anyone who is interested in America's role in the middle east. Steve Cole lays down alot of facts and he does not have a biased opinion. This book says alot about how America's role in recent-history shapes events in it's future to sometmes catostrophic proportions. All American History buffs need to pick up a copy, it's hard to put down once you get into it.

I recommend every American read this book. It most likely won't change your mind about what we should or shouldn't do, or who we should or shouldn't vote for. But it will educate you as to what already happened.

It is an informative book. It should be mandatory reading for fans of stupid conspiracy theorists like the "Loose Change" idiots, or the "Israel/ Bush planned the whole thing" nutters.

The book is also a good chronology of the failures of the CIA in Afghanistan. The same Afghanistan that was also the one of the CIA's greatest successes.

The CIA after years of making mistakes and not seeing the threat did come around, and then it was politicians and the State Dept that foiled the CIA's efforts and failed the people of Afghanistan and the US.

The Clinton white house engaged Bin Laden the same ineffectual non conscientious way they engaged North Korea. They also ineffectually engaged the genocide being committed by the Serbs in Bosnia, and then later by the Serbs in Kosovo. As well as ineffectually engaging Iraq.

OBL declared war on the US and all US citizens in the 1990's. It wasn't a secret declaration of war. And it came as no surprise to US allies in Afghanistan who were enemies of the Afghan Arabs and the Taliban. They had been trying to tell us the same for years.

The CIA told the white house that there was a war declared on us. The CIA was slow, but with each attack;
The attack on the USS Cole.
The attack on the Embassies in Africa.
The attack on the Air Force Barracks in Saudi Arabia.
Various attacks on CIA personnel in Yemen and Afghanistan.

With each attack the lower levels of the CIA became more outspoken. After the embassy bombings, one CIA employee tearfully told Tenet that the blood was on his hands. Guys at the CIA knew an attack on American soil was coming. By the late 90's even the reluctant CIA director had come around (though he never endorsed any of his people's plans against Osama or the Taliban). Tenet did warn his buddy democratic congressman to avoid air travel and to not congregate in public at the end of 1999 because of the imminent Al Qaeda threat. They were a big enough threat to warn a congressman that his life might be in danger around large amounts of US citizens that might be victims. But Al Qaeda was apparently not big enough a threat to warrant helping their opposition the Northern Alliance. Not big enough a threat to OK a strike against them.

Well one of the CIA's many suggestions was taken. A cruise missile attack was launched on the day that the FBI came back with the DNA evidence on Monica Lewinsky's dress. Unfortunately the Pakistanis were told about the upcoming cruise missile attack and they in turn told the Taliban, who informed their main benefactor OBL.

When the Bush administration came into office, they had in mind to unscrew many of the many many many mistakes of the previous administration (and perhaps some of the mistakes of the administration of the elder Bush).

As everyone knows, they did not act swiftly enough. And as I read the book that thought loomed over my head. And truthfully, even though Clinton probably understood the CIA when they told him that an attack were coming, there was not much he could do with an uncooperative military, and a congress that did not trust him on either side of the isle.

Clinton knew the CIA was right when customs had the good luck of interdicting a car bomb destined and capable of destroying a third of LAX. The FBI and other agencies were able to thwart attacks of the new millennium. And Clinton understood when the various agencies told him that it was luck alone that had enabled them to stop that Millennium attacks, and that they would most likely not catch the next one. Even if Clinton had done all the right things at that time, still the attack that was 9/11 was already launched. Killing bin Laden at that time would have unlikely stopped anything.

When the Clinton cronies left over in the white house told the new occupant, the Bush administration, of the Danger of bin Laden, they did not warm up to the facts fast enough.

Like the Clinton administration before it the Bush administration were told of the very likely upcoming attack. I think it was Richard Clark who told them; "act now like you are going to act after the attack, treat our uncooperative allies of Pakistan and the Gulf States, as if the attack had already happened". He said that or something like it. From all accounts I read sometimes Clarke was spot on, but other times he was a selfish toolbag.

Condoleezza Rice did eventually push for all the right decisions to be made. She did finally decide that the Taliban was our enemy, and that it was unlikely that any amount of diplomacy was going to change that. Nor was any amount of diplomacy going to make Pakistan and the various Gulf States realize that the Taliban and Al Qaeda were our enemy with our current policies.

By the time that Rice decided that Al Qaeda was our enemy, about a decade and a half of various of our Afghan allies constantly pleading to us the same thing. Rice agreed for the CIA to help Ahmed Shah Massoud and a coalition of other Afghan opponents of the Taliban genocide, and their extremist Wahabbi interpretation of Islam. The US finally agreed to help our allies against our sworn enemies, about the same time the Al Qaeda finally figured out how to kill the wily, brilliant and elusive Massaud.

It should be noted that despite all the rhetoric of the injustice of the Palestinian situation. That was not the cause of 9/11. The Arab jihadists held the Palestinian cause as an afterthought at best.

Also not a motivation for the attack was any Afghan policy that we had. If anything it was a lack of a US policy in Afghanistan that caused the attack. We stood by and did nothing while the most extreme elements in the Middle East and Pakistan funded and equipped a faction in Afghanistan foreign to Afghans and Afghan history. We even did some standing by while Pakistan used our money to fund our enemies.

The main motivation of the 9/11 attacks was our policy of containment in Iraq.

Also I'd like to note that one of the reasons that the Clinton administration did not want to help Massaud, even when it became clear the abuses that the Taliban were inflicting on women, and even after it became clear that Al Qaeda had attacked US already over seas, and was planning an attack on US soil. The main reason that Clinton did not want to help our ally fight our enemy is the pariah of American liberty, the drug war. To compete with the funding of oil Sheikhs, and the funding and assistance of the Pakistani military, Massaud was benefiting off of the number one cash crop in Afghanistan, opium.

If there is one thing today that will ensure that our enemies in Afghanistan stick around a little longer than they should, it is our attempt at eradicating the poppy fields. We are driving the vast profits of the drug trade away from the legal government, and to whoever will oppose us. We are probably not going to stop a single European drug user from getting his fix, and I don't know why we are trying.

This book is the best modern (pre-September 11th) history of Afghanistan that I found. It gives valuable background and insight into how that region of the world operates as well as how we (the US) have traditionally dealt with it. I've seen Steve Coll used as a source for many subsequent Osama Bin Laden/Al Qaeda/Afghanistan documentaries on TV and his analysis is consistent. He comes off as very knowledgeable and seems to have a lot of 'inside' information. He doesn't get overly political, just tells it like it was, which is hard to find these days. At times, this approach causes the text to be a little dry but I prefer this to the alternative (i.e. rewriting history for entertainment value). If you are interested in the war on terror, this is a must read.

This book is the best modern (pre-September 11th) history of Afghanistan that I found. It gives valuable background and insight into how that region of the world operates as well as how we (the US) have traditionally dealt with it. I've seen Steve Coll used as a source for many subsequent Osama Bin Laden/Al Qaeda/Afghanistan documentaries on TV and his analysis is consistent. He comes off as very knowledgeable and seems to have a lot of 'inside' information. He doesn't get overly political, just tells it like it was, which is hard to find these days. At times, this approach causes the text to be a little dry but I prefer this to the alternative (i.e. rewriting history for entertainment value). If you are interested in the war on terror, this is a must read.

This book is in one word: Superb. It is an easy to read, well-researched, in-depth and amazing account and historic background of how international terrorism on the Islamic front developed, evolved, was linked to agencies
and policitical decisions. If you ever wanted to understand why Afghanistan is where it is today, who bin Landen is and where he came from, which ties exist between the US and Saudia Arabia, how Islamic fundamentalist terror is justified - you get it all in this one book. Highly credible, authentic, gripping. A must-read by all means.

A great background of Afghanistan leading up to OEF. The author just presents the facts and doesn't offer his own political opinion.

Ghost Wars is a very well researched account of the events leading up to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11 2001. It illustrates how the attacks were the culmination of the worst failure by the US intelligence community since Pearl Harbor in 1941.

Here is a sobering description of how it was a failure at all phases of the intelligence cycle, from the setting of priorities and tasks, through the gamut of collection activities, to the analytical, assessment and dissemination processes. As the book illustrates, it encompassed not only the traditional national security and military intelligence agencies but also the myriad law enforcement and specialized agencies involved in counter-terrorist activities.

"The opportunities missed by the United States on the way to September 2001 extended well beyond the failure to exploit fully an alliance ...indifference, lassitude, blindness, paralysis, and commercial greed too often shaped American foreign policy in Afghanistan and South Asia during the 1990's." P 570

"Nor did the United States have a strategy for engagement, democratization, secular education, and economic development among the peaceful but demoralized majority populations of the Islamic world. ...In this way America unnecessarily made easier, to at least a small extent, the work of al Qaeda recruiters." P 571

In retrospect, there is much which could and should have been detected before September 11. This is a work that is well worth reading for a better understanding of how we can fix the intelligence and foreign policy issues.

Coll's book is so well researched. I believe that although "Charlie Wilson's War" is more sensational, it is also worth a look. Also, if this material interests you, Cooley's "Unholy Wars" is also valuable, as it was written in the pre-9/11 era, yet sets the stage for those with eyes to see and ears to hear...

If you want to understand the background of U.S. involvement in the Middle East and South Asia, get a copy of Ghost Wars. Scholarly writing backed up by heaps of footnotes and sources, Coll is exceptionally readable and the material is gripping. Don't listen to current media and admininstration rhetoric without understanding the past.

In the 19th century, the British and Russian empires played what Rudyard Kipling called the 'Great Game' in southwest Asia: an intriguing blend of two-faced Machiavellian diplomacy, manipulation of tribes north of the Indian subcontinent, and constant, savage warfare.

Steve Coll's richly detailed, superlative narrative history relates the modern version of the 'Great Game.' In this one, Afghanistan became, to its ruin, a surrogate battleground for U.S. - Soviet conflict, and thereafter an incubator for a toxic Islamic jihad that invaded the West and ultimately destroyed the World Trade center.

The parties and candidates have been blaming each other of late for the rise of bin Laden, but Coll's account shows that there is probably blame to go around. The complex, cash-filled, and often cynical and corrupt relationship between the CIA and the Pakistani ISI helped drive the brutal Soviet dictatorship out of Afghanistan after its 1979 invasion. The first Bush Administration's abandonment of Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal helped that country become a failed state. The author's account of the CIA's and Clinton Administration's increasingly intense but sometimes blundering pursuit of bin Laden pains the reader. In the end, through what must have seemed at the time like politically responsible choices, Bill Clinton did not carry out attempts to assassinate or kidnap bin Laden because of the danger to civilians in bin Laden's Tarnak Farm camp.

An informative, compellingly written account of the secret history of how and why we became embroiled in that "unlucky country," Afghanistan, that should inform our political decisions.

One of the best books written about the emergence of religion based terrorism directed against several causes and several societies.

Steve Coll provides a balanced dispassionate analysis and profound insight into the new menace that is powerful enough to challenge peace everywhere.

United States has two kinds of friendships in world politics:
(a) Friendships founded on shared values
(b) Friendships founded on shared interests

Friendships founded on shared values (such as those with UK, Canada, Australia, Germany and Japan) last forever. The friendship does not leave a trail of destruction behind.

Friendships founded on shared interests (such as those with Iran under the Shah, Philippines under Marcos, Pakistan under Zia, Saudi Arabia above oil) last short periods of time but leave a trail of destruction somewhere.

US friendship with two such shared interests has created a monster that is likely to be a greater challenge to peace and security everywhere than anything humanity has seen so far.

Saudi Arabia has been funding radical Islamic groups around the world to appease its domestic constituency of religious right. Saudi donations helped create radical Islamic groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan to attract, train and equip youth who are willing to kill and willing to die.

Pakistan provided an intelligence service that could orchestrate insurgency against a conventional army; provided a limitless supply of youth willing to die for holy causes; and an efficient supply chain of high tech arms.

The Reagan Administration joined hands with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to contain Soviet expansionism. The mission was successful.

But there were unfortunate side effects. US lost interest in the region after the collapse of the Soviet Union. CIA station heads in Islamabad began to dictate US policy in the region instead of the Administration.

The Jihadists, assembled against Soviet Union, did not go home to become investment bankers and stock brokers. They stayed and sought new causes. Fight for Palestine. Fight against America. Fight against the House of Saud. Fight for Islamic rule in Afghanistan. Fight for liberation of Kashmir.

Pakistan had a field day. The ISI could use the jihadists for its favourite causes: Hekmatyar, Taliban, Kashmir. State sponsored terrorism was born. Funding was available from Saudi Arabia and from narcotics trade. State sponsored terrorism gave way to a multinational radical Islamic terrorism when Pakistan tainted every political objective with a religious colour (a lesson learnt from the jihad against Soviets).

It is now possible for a Mullah in a village in Pakistan to issue a fatwah by fax that could motivate a young British Muslim to enroll in an ISI sponsored terrorism training center in Pakistan and undertake a mission to destroy social fabric in a nation that is probably busy with a super bowl.

A foreign policy shaped by shared interests is probably not that good an idea.

This book provides a well researched insight into the rise of radical Islamic terrorism. The best on the subject. Easy to read. Disturbing to think about.

Shall look forward to the next book from Steve Coll.

In the 19th century, the British and Russian empires played what Rudyard Kipling called the 'Great Game' in southwest Asia: a blend of intrigue, two-faced Machiavellian diplomacy, manipulation of tribes north of the Indian subcontinent and constant, savage warfare.

Steve Coll's richly detailed, superlative narrative history relates the modern version of the 'Great Game:' how Afghanistan became, to its ruin, a surrogate for U.S. - Soviet conflict, and thereafter an incubator for a toxin called "jihad" that invaded the West and destroyed the World Trade center.

The complex, cash-filled, and often cynical and corrupt relationship between the CIA and the Pakistani ISI helped drive the brutal Soviet dictatorship out of Afghanistan after its 1979 invasion. The first Bush Administration's abandonment of Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal helped that country become a failed state. The author's account of the CIA's and Clinton Administration's increasingly intense but sometimes blundering pursuit of bin Laden pains the reader. In the end, through what must have seemed at the time like politically responsible choices, Bill Clinton did not carry out attempts to assassinate or kidnap bin Laden because of the danger to civilians in bin Laden's Tarnak Farm camp.

An excellent account of the secret history of how and why we became embroiled in Afghanistan that should inform our political choices.

This is a superb book and at 738 pages it is a long read and full of information and facts but if the reader can stick it out it is well worth it. Plenty of notes and an impressive bibliography ensure the reader it has been well researched.

The first chapter starts with the attack on the USA consulate by an angry mob in Pakistan in 1979, where the Pakistan military is slow to respond and eventually no one is held accountable leading to much bitterness in the consulate, as the USA Government bends over backwards to accommodate the Pakistan Govt. This trend happens often throughout the next couple of decades leading up to 2001.

This is essentially an excellent account of the history of the CIA in Afghanistan from 1978 until 09/11, with information about the Saudi and Pakistan Intelligence Services involvement in Afghanistan and the cooperation, double dealings and mistrust between the three agencies as each sought to impose their agenda on Afghanistan. However they all agreed that the Soviets had to be booted out of Afghanistan. As one CIA operative said in the early days of the Soviet Union occupation, we will supply weapons in Afghanistan to kill Soviet soldiers; a measure of revenge for Soviet Union involvement in Vietnam of course, of course!!. However this strategy eventually backfires somewhat years later as some USA supplied Stinger missiles end up with the Taliban and other anti USA groups! (including probably Iran of all countries, what kind of deadly game the USA played here). Ironically Gorbachev, before the Soviet withdrawl from Afghanistan tried to warn the USA of the clear danger of Islamic fundamentalist and sought USA co-operation, but was ignored.

Coll also provides an excellent account of the history of the Taliban, Bin Laden, Al Qaeda and the unsung hero of Afghanistan Ahmed Massoud, leader of the Northern Alliance. It is ironic that Massoud saw the threat of Islamic terrorism and Arab jihadists in Afghanistan many years before 09/11 and pleaded for USA help against the Taliban but was brushed off with little assistance as the CIA and the USA Government failed to grasp the significance of what was happening in Afghanistan. As the CIA allowed the Pakistan intelligence to distribute most of the money and weapons supplied by the USA, Massoud unfortunately obtained little of it as the Taliban was favored by Pakistan! Alas the USA rarely challenged Pakistan or Saudi policy in Afghanistan and missed the opportunity of working with Massoud who was a natural ally against Al Qaeda. Were the CIA and USA leaders asleep at the wheel in foreign policy on Afghanistan for too many years? The author thinks so.

With so many competing interests in the world on USA foreign policy l can empathize with it on how difficult the situation in Afghanistan was to manage and make decisions about. Clinton finally saw the threat of Al Qaeda and Bin Laden and did his best to eliminate him but the book mentions several lost opportunities that went begging as the author implies that Clinton was not up the task of forcing the Pentagon to pursue military options, but it is easy to be critical after the event. A few USA officials, notably from the State Dept did see the danger in the CIA policy and action in Afghanistan but their views did not prevail

Coll states that the bells were ringing loud and clear in the months before 09/11 that an attack on US citizens was imminent.

Australian troops over the last two months been involved in their most intense fierce battles since the Vietnam War in search and destroy missions of the Taliban in the Chora district of Southern Afghanistan, with USA airborne fire support. The battle still goes on!

I probably have never been so depressed about the world after reading this excellent (with good footnotes) account of our CIA/FBI & 'State dept' dealings with terrorism. Very depressing but all sides get hammered here. No partisan hack, (the author) for sure.
RIVITING!!!! He gets inside some of the incidents. Couldn't recommend it highly enough!
barb

Ghost Wars is a very long read. The reading is fast because it is well written but the book is simply long in length. It is very well researched and it never lost my attention. I now have a better understanding of the history of that part of the world. Overall a very impressive book. Highly recommended!

I found Steve Coll's account of pre 9/11 not only as comprehensive as one could probably get, but he pulls this massive feat off by keeping you turning the pages. Hats off. Ghost Wars is an absorbing must read, laid out in a way one can grasp the complex connections of our post cold war world.

This is a great book. Another great example of a prize winning book making a complex subject matter approachable. If you're like me and read a lot of history books, you have no doubt come across those that are just cumbersome. You can get good info from them, but it is like pulling teeth! One minor thing the author does is repeatedly remind you of who people are (e.g. position in gov't) so that you aren't repeatedly flipping back and forth.

Much of the book focuses on the Soviet invasion of Afganistan. I think that just can't be avoided because that set the stage for the rise of the Taliban, our relatoinship w/ Pakistan, etc.

Nothing is included on the events of 9/11, so if you want that go elsewhere. If you've read other books like this (e.g. Charlie Wilson's War) you'll find this interesting to see the same characters revisited from different angles.

First time I really understood the behind the scenes of the Soviet invasion and aftermaths in Afghanistan of the Taliban, Bin Laden and the help Pakistan and Saudi Arabia give these extremist. I would make this book required reading to anyone interested in our problems with the Muslims.

I came to this book via several recommendations. But in the end - I was unhappy with the product. I believe the author was able to collect limited data on the topic, but the final content lacked depth of thought and depth of research.

Most of the chapters have limited information; data easily found in other books. There's nothing new in this book that you won't find elsewhere. This further leads to a lack of good analysis and conclusions.

I compare this book to Imperial Hubris, or 'Al-Qaeda' by Jason Burke, where the Author was on the ground, interviewing Afghani's, and Osama himself. There the data is factual, intelligent, and provides very thorough analysis of the situation.

The chapters jump back and forth and appear to be written like a Tom Clancy novel. The author, makes personal judgements at certain parts of the book and thus further removes from the book, a level of objectivity.

I recommend anyone interested in this topic to check out "Al-Qaeda" By Jason Burke. By far, better analysis and information. This book is probably a decent primer for someone new to the subject. But - it wasn't what I was looking for.

If you are well read on Afghanistan, then this book will provide very little value.

This is, by far, the best written and most objective account of the recent history and US involvement in Afghanistan. If There is only one book that you should read, this is it. The authors research is extensive and the work is nothing short of astounding. The author easily takes the complex web of players and events and presents this extremely complex story with an astounding level of clarity and insight.
The book is nothing short of Substantive. The book will keep you riveted and is extensive in its explanation of how we came to such systemic and systematic failure in our Foreign Policy. This is truly a classic story of "Blowback" and how a failure in analysis and understanding can lead to gross miscalulations, and worse, the unforeseen severity of unintended consequences. Truly a magnum opus on Afghanistan, the Taliban and the GWOT.

Terry Tucker,Adjunct Prof Military Studies/History
CSTC-Afghanistan, Trainer and Doctrine Developer to the Afghan Army

Steven Coll has produced an authoritative masterpiece. Though I found the number of densely worded pages a little intimidating (588 pages of text, in addition to nearly a hundred pages of notes/bibliography along with a copious and useful index, several maps and more), it was well worth the effort. I agreed with the numerous laudatory quotes from newspapers around the US that the book was "Objective and terrific... finest historical narrative so far on the origins of al Qaeda" (New York Times), "of the more than one hundred published books dealing with the September 11th attacks... none approach Mr Coll's work for clarity and insight into the [CIA] itself" (Seattle Times), and that "Coll's... access to senior officials of all the principal countries involved in Afghanistan is nothing short of astounding" (Toronto Globe and Mail).

Coll's narrative went from interesting to fascinating for me when he started writing about the involvement of Texas Congressional Representative Charlie Wilson in procuring money for and drawing attention to CIA aid to Afghan mujahedin. Wilson abused his position to impress a series of beauty queens (with exciting names like Miss Sea and Ski and Miss Humble Oil) during tours the Afghan frontier. He also became an advocate for the mujahedin in Washington and channeled cash, mostly earmarked for fancy weapons systems, to the CIA's Afghan budget. Coll had other interesting comments about the CIA's relationship with Congressmen visiting Afghanistan including the rule passed on from the CIA to Mohammed Yousef - Pakastani Intelligence's Afghan point man from 1983 to 1987 - "Never use the terms sabotage or assassination when speaking with visiting congressman". In other words, with fighting for freedom, like making laws or sausages - it's best not to show outsiders the specifics on how things are done.

I was particularly outraged to read that the CIA had been dealing with aerial plots since at least as early as 1995. Early that year Filipino police uncovered a plot (reported to American investigators) to suicidally crash a plane into CIA headquarters. Later that year a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on terrorism was circulated to Clinton's cabinet. It speculated on future attacks and assessed that "civil aviation will figure prominently among possible terrorist targets in the United States". The Estimate also drew attention to the " domestic aviation security system [whose weaknesses have] been the focus of media attention". This is especially maddening in light of Condoleeza Rice's comment on 17 May 2002, when she said that, "I don't think anybody could have predicted that these people would take an airplane and slam it into the World Trade Center, that they would try to use an airplane as a missile - a hijacked airplane as a missile." Rice's words are absurd not just when viewed alongside the 1995 NIE but also in light of Tom Clancy's two bestselling books featuring the use of an airplane as a missile.

"The CIA's annual budget was a Pentagon rounding error", mentioned while explaining the need for the CIA to balance its relationship with and placate the Pentagon, "The CIA did not typically work inside the American legal system... CIA espionage and paramilitary operations overseas were conducted in secret and not subject to review by American courts... The CIA was created to prevent another Pearl Harbor." Well, maybe they succeeded on other occasions we never heard about.

This story does not put the FBI, the CIA, the Clinton administration or the Bush administration in a positive light. It shows lots of good intentions and many smart folks who saw at least part of what was coming but were marginalized or ignored. It doesn't seem as though enough has been done to keep something like this from hapenning again.

Steve Coll gives us a focused, detailed analysis of U S inertia in dealing with the building crisis of terrorism, as manifested by Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization, in the decades running up to 9/11. Mr. Coll's balanced and well researched presentation aptly illustrates the dynamic tension which existed among the agencies and actors, countries and their leadership, and the varied and fluid Afghani factions.

In particular the interworkings of the CIA, White House, Defense Department, FBI and related committees and leadership groups, across Democratic and Republican administrations, are methodically scrutinized. The struggle for consensus produced the policy logjam which seemingly left the U S defenseless against bin Laden's 9/11 terrorists.

Although he falls short of making an outright assertion, the author ably demonstrates that 9/11 could have been prevented if the institutional inertia of the US government could have been overcome.

Overall an excellent book.

Tremendous book. Reads at times like a great adventure/thriller fiction novel. Steve Coll has really hit the mark with this book. Clearly there has been exhaustative research made on the subject and Coll's personal experiences have made this a thoroughly enjoyable experience to the reader. The CIA's changing roles post and pre coldwar are certainly significant enough to influence history in that region. The effects of this agency's regional / foreign policy through different administrations continue to be a major factor in world politics well into the coming future.

This book was really interesting and engaging to read, not boring at all. It did a lot to also help explain the development of terrorism and Middle East politics. I encourage anyone to read it.

This is one of those books that you'll read, and take away a lot from afterwards. Steve Coll writes with authority and confidence about a number of aspects of the United States' involvement in Afghanistan from the Soviet invasion til 9/11. He covers many aspects of the war, from the war in Afghanistan, the subsequent civil war, and negotiations with and between such actors as the CIA, US Defense and State Department, various Afghan groups, and the Pakistani army and government. From spies with suitcases of cash meeting their contacts in the Pakistani countryside to cruise missiles hitting Osama's compound, the book covers every aspect of the conflict itself. From the CIA and the Air Force arguing over who should control and pay for the Predator drones that were used to look for Osama, to Pakistan's various coups and the Taliban's indifference to outside opinion, Coll also pays considerable attention to the political events behind the actual conflicts.

This is a long, involved book that has a huge amount of information in it. It's detailed, carefully written, and very comprehensive. The tone of the book, while somewhat serious and scholarly, isn't really biased in any particular direction. The author, for instance, pays a great deal of attention to Ahmed Shah Massoud, but he doesn't sugarcoat his portrait of Massoud, making clear that he was partially responsible for the Mujaheddin Government's fall in the mid-90s, and also noting that he financed his movement with heroin sales to Russia and Europe. He examines each of these issues dispassionately and carefully, looking at every angle he can think of.

If I have a criticism of the book it's the lack of conclusion. The author appears to want to let history speak for itself, and avoids judgments. This is in some ways good: we're probably not going to be able to make this sort of judgment about the Clinton or Bush administration for years, not objectively anyway. But the book starts in the Carter administration, and even there he presents a narrative of what happened without comment. He also often tells you both sides of the story, recounting first the State department's view of the CIA's reluctance to do something, then giving you the CIA's version of events, so that you're unsure which side he's on, let alone which side the facts are. It's a bit unsettling, though perhaps that's because the events themselves are unsettled, too.

I enjoyed this book, learned a great deal from it, and apart from its length would recommend it. It's relatively well-written and very informative.

Whatever your political view this is a good read and in great detail of our CIA's involvement in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the 80s and 90s. It provides much of the complex story leading up to 911. I believe it to be an objective work with no agenda other than getting the facts out.

I use this book in my Master's class. The student who choses it always groans over the size of the book, the amount of difficult names, and the complexity of the details. However, when they give their report to the class, they are enthused by the book, recommend the book for all to read, and the class comes away with a much clear knowledge that the world is a much more complex place than they realized. It is very difficult to teach young people that most of the world is different than the United States. Cultures, religions, core values, political systems, geographic makeup and so forth is not the same. Cell phones don't exist. And if they did, they wouldn't work. This book does a wonderful job making it not only real but chilling real.

No one reads history. If they did we wouldn't be in the mess we are in Iraq. This is the book everyone should read.

I can see why Mr. Coll won the Pulitzer for this work. The presentation is clear and well paced - not unduly scholary or polemic in tone. The movement through a complex cast of characters and events is always forward looking and seldom repetitive. I found the Cast of Characters section particularly useful and referred to it often. I recommend this book to anyone with an interest in the subject.

I was anxious to read this book since I knew very little about Afghanistan. Prey to many expanding empires over the past thousand years, this country has nevertheless maintained its identity and traditions. Strategically located between two major oil regions (southern Asia and the Middle East), Afghan civilians became victims of political, religious and economical disputes, a perfect environment for aspiring ideologies...

Steve Coll's book sparked my curiosity by providing an excellent background and introducing the most important players of the area. During the first half of the book, I was really absorbed by the characters' descriptions, the government and intelligence entities and military/religious groups. The complexity of international relations and the workings within the US bureaucracy certainly helped explain why the Government was slow in preparing for the rise of terrorists.

Unfortunately, the author dragged on detailing these complexities. The incessant squabbles between the various departments of the American Government were overemphasized and could have been summarized more efficiently. I am not arguing the value of the research: the details presented made this book an incredible source of information.

The book provided little analysis of the United States' involvement in Afghanistan after the Soviets departure and on the rise of anti-American sentiment in the Middle East. In terms of form, this book didn't grip me very much. It got to a point where I felt I was reading the newspaper. Many non-fiction books present historical material in a vivid, riveting way. This one is not one of them.

This is a fantastic book. I thought it provided a very clear perspective into the history of US involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan. My only complaint is that the author did not provide as cohesive a story when documenting the internal US discussions from the late 90's to 9/11. It felt as if he was throwing everything he could from the 9/11 commission into the book.

Other than that, it was fantastic.

For those willing to take the time, this well-researched book brings one up to date on US activities in Afghanistan since the Russian invasion; and gives valuable insight into the mechanics and turf wars within government. Revelations of government uncertainty and political fear leading to the entrenchment of Bin Laden in Afghanistan and the ultimate tragedy of 9/11 leave one depressed but enlightened.

This book deserves all the accolades it has received. Steve Coll's account of the CIA and its activities with Afganistan from the Soviet invasion until 9/11 provides a clear-eyed and detailed account of missed opportunities and maddening bureacratic failures to address the growing threat posed by Osama Bin Laden prior to 9/11.

But the book is also written with a sympathetic appreciation for the fact that hindsight is 20-20. Coll reveals Clinton and Bush administrations focusing primarily on other things--in particular, the enormous, existential threats posed by rogue regimes that had or could obtain weapons of mass destruction. The threats posed by comparatively small and less massively armed terrorist groups which, prior to 9/11, had killed relatively few Americans, was somewhat reasonably not as high of a priority. And the book makes clear that the Clinton administation, at least, appreciated that even precision targeted military action invariably poses risks to innocent men, women, and children.

But still, the government's failure to act coherently and decisively in dealing with this known and growing threat is truly exasperating and sad in retrospect. It is an important story, and one that Coll tells well.

As a student of terrorism and intelligence-related materials, I found Steve Coll's book to be an outstanding open-source reference guide and historical accounting for those with an interest in U.S. intelligence capabilities, particularly vis-à-vis the CIA, and the greater U.S. government's actions in general in the years leading up to September 11, 2001.

I have read a great many books which purport to have some insight on Coll's topic, but rarely have I seen something that covers it so collectively, yet in a fashion which does not shove the author's politics down the throats of prospective readers. Further, Coll's book is authoritatively researched, articulate and compelling; it has, at times, the feel of an adventure novel, while managing to offer significant facts of interest to a serious student of intelligence, bereft of political spin. If you really want two good, if long, primers on the major aspects of 9/11, and the government's efforts and (sadly) gaffes in the time leading up to the attacks, get yourself a copy of the 9/11 Commission Report along with Steve Coll's book.

Mr. Coll has done his research and gathered his findings into a detailed and fascinating account of the CIA in Afghanistan prior to 9/11. He points out glaring failures by the bureaucrats in Washington and the challenges faced by those on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Except for the most ardent partisans on either side, readers will come out with a better understanding of how politicians on all sides can really screw things up. For example, while Richard Clarke, Sandy Berger and some Clinton White House aides blew a chance to kill bin Laden prior to 9/11 because they worried about offending (and maybe killing) some Arab sheikhs that hosted the terrorist at their hunting camp in Afghanistan, Gary Schroen asked "What is it going to come down to- when is he going to take a leak?" the CIA wanted to just blow them up and take the heat for any collateral damage. Washington did not have the guts and we saw the results on 9/11. Ironically, they blame the CIA for the missing WMD in Iraq. Great read.

Other reviews have well described the content and significance of this book.

The style is characterized by even paced and well-structured expository prose that develops clear knowledge. Time after time the author presents succinct and riveting descriptions of important sequences of events, and examples of typical affairs.

As to sources, Coll relies heavily on statements of anonymous officials who may have their own version of events to promulgate, true or not. But he also includes information from his many interviews with key people involved in the events, and copious references to books and news articles of the period, and to official documents.

The book also reveals that the internal workings of the US government in determining policy and actions are not as generally reported in the mainstream corporate news media, nor as understood by the public. In that sense it is a comprehensive insider's report, from a dedicated researcher.

It is difficult for this reader to understand the lack of team spirit that is shown among the US government agencies. Could this ultimately be a cause of ruin of a great nation, or does it form part of a checks-and-balances approach to government, or will it always be part of the corrosive environment of war and covert action?