Now, I introduce a Review on this book which was sent from
Young Ki Moon, a amateur Miltary Aviation Researcher,Seoul,Korea.
Ihave personally many interests on Air Battles during WW11,
korean War and Vietnam War.
During Vietnam War,there were many crucial Air Battles
between US representative fighter,F-4 series and Soviet's representative
MIG-21 series which had backup of their National mobilizations,such as
most advanced Technology of Raders, missiles,AAA and GCISystem,etc.
Also, this Air Battle compairing between powerful,heavy, missile oriented
F-4 series and light,small,cannon oriented MIG series.
MIG serie beame easily revised from MIG-15,MIG-17 and MIG-19, to different
delta winged MIG-21.
In F-4 srriesdesin development,USN's attention started from successor of
navy fighter F3H-G/H Demon to F-4 for Carrier based intercepter against
attacking enemies for Carrier protection. on the otherhand, At that time,
USAF seeked successor of F-101 Vodoo. NAVY accepted F-4 PhantomII from
prototype,F4H-1. Army accepted F-4C modification of Phantom II.
After collision of US destryer Maddok from attacking from N.Vietnamese
torpedo boat on 2,Aug,1964,Crucial Air Battle started.
F-4C/D became ground use after slight modifications.
F-4D is 2-enginned, 2-seat interceter,grounnd attacking,deffense, multipurpose fighter.
engine power 2x17,000lbs( MIG-31MF 1X14,307lbs)
Max. speed: 1,75knots/40,000ft(MIG-21MF 1,204 knots/42,640ft
Range: 429 nautical miles with 2xexternal tanks(MIG-21MF 400 nautical miles with 2x external tanks)
climb: 49,oooft/min. (MIG-21MF 21,1000FT/min)
service ceiling: 59,650ft (MIG21MF 56,740ft)
Armament: at first USN oriented Air-to-air missile 4xAIM-7E Sparriow missile(infrare red to Rader guided, long ranged)
Air-to-Air missile 4xAIM-9 Sidewinder(heat seeker, shorter range missiles)
**** they persistet missile oriented reason mighty from endanger from additional cann.

From commbat experience such as missile failuere, failure from fast tlght turn of enemy fighters,and
inability of shooting missiles within sort range, F-4C/D needed Cannon or machine guns.
F-4C,from 1965,The lack of an internal gun,M6 IAI vulcan rotary cannon into SUU-16/A gun pod on to the central pyron.
F4D:put into a 6 baralled 20mm vulcan rotaey cannon->SUU-23A gun pod.this extra gun pad with existing gun sight made incomplete effect.

F4E:Finally 1XM61A1'"Gatling" 6 baralled vulcan rotary cannon in the nose part of fuslage.
F-4D has good maneuverbility with tight turn( but inferior than MIG-21PF),using superior low level maeuver and superior
vertical flighing(MIG-21MF has superior high altitude maneuver and superior horizontal fligt), loweraltitude Air Combat
is neccessary.
In MIG-21 series,MIG-21F-13 was only the type of Soiet deliverd. in MIG-21F-13 Type,R-3S 'Atool",S-5 and S-24 are used
in MIG-21PF with more powerfule engines.MIG-21MF and MIG-21bis has 2x extra wing pylons at first, MIG-21 had only 1x 30mm NR-30
cannon, later changed with 1x2barreled GSh-23.
Generally, MIG-21 waited at low levei, then maximum approaced to bombing bombers, then escape for avoiding escorted fighters
--so called "Hit and Run"technique.
i
I like introduce a brilliant,respectful,festy characterd,his feisty character,intolerance toinappriate USAF polices,-Col. Robin Olds.
He try to improve for depressed pilots,teaching 1)Revvenge ! engagement of battle-> Fighting-> kILL !.
2)`Team work
3)Individual training of "Dogfighing"-US Thougt no more 'Dogfighting on missile oriented war.
compare with rouine "Dogfighting"traing of Soviet pilots.
****note: "Top Gun"Training with small, maneuverable fast fighters.
Col.Robin Old's "Operation Bolo"--1) F-105D fighter- bomber group formation start flying with a QRC-160(Electric Counter Measure) attached F-105D.
2) F-4C/D/E fighter's( with same Call Sign, same flight location, same Radio frequency) regular time intervaled
formation start
**QRC-160's made malfuntions of AAA,SAM missie, GCI controlled Intercepters.
3) scheduued bombing without enemy's proper counter measures.

( Quoted from 1)"DOGFIGHTS",complete series,DVD, History Channel,2008.
2) MIG-17 and MIG-19 units of the Vietnam War,by Istvan Toperczer.

Peter Davies, who co-authored the excellent USN/USAF MiG killers volumes, evaluates the F-4 and MiG-21 in their duels over North Vietnam in this interesting 2008 Osprey 'Duel' title. Much was expected on the F-4 over NVN and how it - and its MiG-21 opponent - fared and why make for fascinating reading.

In standard Duel format, Davies recounts each jet's development, technical specs, training received by the pilots/aircrews, the strategic background (i.e. the Rolling Thunder/Linebacker campaigns), opposing units, combats between the two and analysis. The eminently readable text is complimented by photographs, color profiles, maps and combat scenes.

It would have been great if Davies could have included the Navy's F-4 experiences against the MiG-21. Yet, realistically, that history is at such odds with the Air Force experience that he COULDN'T have covered both in 80 pages. Oh well.

If possible, I would have given Davies' book 4 1/2 stars. I thought he needed more analysis as to the ultimate 'winner' of the 'duel.'

As it stands, F-4 PHANTOM II VS MiG-21 is a fairly good comparison of two of the prime aerial 'movers and shakers' in the Vietnam air war. The combination of text and artwork make for an interesting summary and a good read. Recommended.

*****
NB. Since Navy F-4 crews only downed 13 Fishbeds, I doubt that Davies will be covering that in a subsequent 'Duel' title. For details on those - and all other - USN kills, see my MIG KILLERS OF YANKEE STATION.

This volume in Osprey's Duel series covers the aerial combat between U.S. Air Force F-4 Phantom II fighters against North Vietnamese MiG-21 fighters in the period 1966-1973. As with the rest of the volumes in this series, the author begins by describing the development of each aircraft, its technical specifications, pilot training, the strategic situation that provided the backdrop for the duel between these two opposing weapon systems and then examples of combat between the two. Overall, this volume fulfills this purpose admirably and it contains more balance in regard to the North Vietnamese half of this story than some earlier books on this subject. The only weak spot in this volume is that the author chose to ignore the contributions of U.S. Navy F-4 pilots against MiG-21s, resulting in a narrative that is skewed heavily to the USAF perspective.

The opening section on design and development of the F-4 and the MiG-21 was very well written and I have found that this section is often the best value in Duel series volumes because it defines the choices that each side made in fielding their weapons. The next section on technical specifications is also rather good and lays out the different variants of each aircraft that were used over Vietnam. Two excellent full-page profiles of each aircraft and sidebars on their armament are tucked into these sections. In the section on strategic situation, the author notes that at the opening of the air campaign over North Vietnam, the USAF was concerned about the threat posed by North Vietnamese MiG-21 fighters, but confidently expected their F-4s to achieve a 3-1 kill ration. In fact, they struggled to achieve a 2-1 kill ratio. The author also uses this section to illustrate that while the F-4s had a wide variety of tactical missions, the MiG-21s only had one - point defense. Thus, the North Vietnamese developed simple but effective `slashing' tactics that allowed their MiG-21s to conduct attacks usually only when circumstances were most favorable for themselves. However, the USAF F-4s (forgetting the USN contribution) typically had a 6-1 numerical edge over the tiny force of North Vietnamese MiG-21s - which rarely exceeded 45 operational aircraft -forcing the Vietnamese to minimize their exposure.

In the section on the combatants, the author does note that the US Navy F-4 pilots used more effective tactics than the USAF F-4 pilots, who were primarily trained for air-ground missions. This section also paints the North Vietnamese pilots as cunning opponents and it may overstate the case a bit (while it true that they didn't rotate home like US pilots, the fact remains that none of these men had a few years experience flying while many U.S. pilots had been flying for over a decade). This section has profiles of one US and one NVN pilot and also discusses Operation `Bolo' in 1967, where Colonel Robin Olds turned the tables on his enemy, resulting in the shoot-down of 7 MiG-21s. The 20-page section on combat gives some interesting vignettes on tactical F-4 vs MiG-21 combat, but again ignores the US Navy role except in passing. The final sections on statistics and analysis is disappointing for its lack of analysis, not even bothering to list the numbers of F-4s and MiG-21s shot down in aerial combat. The author does mention that the USAF lost 36 F-4s to MiG-21s, but fails to note that USAF F-4s shot down 67 MiG-21s. USN F-4s shot down another 15 MiG-21s. A table is provided showing the leading MiG and Phantom killers on each side, but with no real comment or analysis. In the US chart, it is apparent that nine USAF pilots shot down 43 percent of all MiG-21s claimed by the USAF. No USN pilots are listed in the chart, but it does include a USAF pilot who shot down no MiG-21s. In the Vietnamese chart, the total number of Phantoms claimed by these 13 pilots is 86, which is odd considering that both the USAF and USN lost fewer than 50 F-4s to Mig-21s during the war. Either the Vietnamese counted everything as a Phantom or the author is accepting propaganda claims as fact. If one assumes that these 13 pilots were the best and accounted for about half the Phantom kills, that would imply that none of them actually scored more than 2-3 victories (not 8-9 as the chart claims for 4 pilots) over Phantoms. Particularly given the author's narrative, which describes the very high attrition rate - up to 30 percent losses in one year - I think that idea that the North Vietnamese had 13 MiG-21 aces and the USAF had 2 F-4 ace crews is ipso facto absurd. Nor does the author ever try to answer the larger question of who won the aerial duel over North Vietnam, but it is abundantly evident that the USAF achieved its mission objectives on a regular basis and that North Vietnam's MiG force was too weak to seriously contest air control even over their own capital. Indeed, Hanoi's MiG force was more of a `guerilla air force' that was capable of inflicting losses when the U.S. made mistakes, but it was incapable of conducting a real duel for air supremacy.

This is an excellent treatment of the combat history and performance of the F4 Phantom vs. MiG 21 during the Vietnam War. Peter Davies packs in a lot of info in 77 pages of text, and the colored illustrations / battle scene illustrations by Jim Laurier, Tom Tullis, & Gareth Hector are excellent.

The book is very simple to follow and well-organized:

I. Introduction
II. Chronology (of the Vietnam air war)
III. Design & Development (of both the F4 and the MiG 21)
IV. Technical Specifications (the different variants of the F4 & MiG 21,
the armament, and performance of both aircraft)
V. The Strategic Situation (brief history of Operation Rolling Thunder & Linebacker)

VI. The Combatants (the aces on both sides, along with how they were trained; brief profiles of NVAF ace Nguyen Van Coc and USAF Robin Olds)

VII. Combat (Brief overview of the aerial engagements in the Air War)

VIII. Statistics and Analysis (how many aircraft shot down by both sides, along with leading "ace" pilots)

IX. Aftermath (Brief summary of the lessons learned from the Air War)

X. Further Reading
XII. Index

Peter Davies concludes that a well-coordinated command and control operations were vital to the effectiveness of the combat performance for both sides (along with the training & experience of the combat pilots).

Although brief, this book offered one of the best comprehensive overviews of the combat engagements of the F4 and MiG 21. Highly recommended!!