A better title for this excellent book might be "Maintaining the Chaos". The author is probably right in his assessment of US mismanagement of war, aid and influence in the Middle-East. How could it be otherwise though? The region is populated by hordes of people stuck in prehistoric, tribal mentality. Modern American leaders and policy makers stand about zero chance of knowing how to positively affect the outcome of events there. I doubt that we could dig up anyone in the West who could do much better than what has been done. Our history is not good, no matter who is in power.

If, however, some boys and girls in Afghanistan, or other countries in the region, get the chance now to go to school where they might not have otherwise, the world has made a little progress.

This is the second book from Ahmed Rashid I have read. In the first book, "Taliban", Ahmed Rashid raised the caution about Taliban back in 1998 when few in the world knew much about them. In this recent book, Ahmed Rashid has provided a detailed analysis of how did Taliban take advantage of USA's diverted attention due to its involvement in Iraq. And how did other powers in the region shielded them for their designs.

Much of the book is scholarly treatise, with ample references to reports and quotes. It also mentions inconsistencies in the work by other authors on Taliban.
In some sections, the book goes into minute details which prompts the reader to skip over pages.

In its entirety, however, it is a must-read book for anyone who wishes to explore the root causes of Taliban resurgence and the approaches to contain it.

I am headed over to Kabul in a couple weeks to work in NATO's security assistance force. I have been reading a ton about the region over the past several months. Ghost Wars stands alone as the best read out there, but its narrative ends abruptly on Sept 10, 2001. For me this book can serve as a worthy sequel since a great deal of it deals with events since 9/11. The author is extremely thorough and detailed, but he also manages to hold the reader's interest by addressing themes instead of providing a straight chronology, which would have been painful given everything he includes here. Be forewarned, the author is very critical of US policy in the region, and seems to frequently overstate the degree to which the US policymakers can drive reform around the world. But I will say he spreads his criticisms fairly to other quarters...such as Karzai's government, and ultimately his opinions are articulated well enough to actually add something to the book. A totally objective, unimpassioned text would have been very dry. The author is a Pakistani journalist with incredible access and sources in that part of the world, and his text includes extensive notation. It should also be said that the incoming commander of Central Command Gen David Patreaus is a fan of this book. He recently brought the author onto his 100-member strategy review team dealing with Central and South Asia. So if you want to quickly become 'well read' on the area, pick up this book. It's extremely relevant at this point and time. I'm going to bring this over with me because I'm expecting it to serve as an excelent reference for regional people and place names.

Ahmed Rashid is a brilliant Pakistani journalist who has visited much of Afghanistan and understands the relationships between Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. He explains how Pakistan can be both for and against the Taliban, and how the war in Iraq is vitally changed by the tension between Pakistan and India over Kashmir. It's not an easy read, but if you want to understand what's going on in South Asia and the Middle East, his insight is invaluable.

We are so used to hearing about the failures of the war in Iraq that we seldom pay attention to the progress (or lack thereof) of the war in Afghanistan. However, as Obama points out, the Afghan-Pakistan border area is really the central front in the war on terror. Ahmed Rashid's book is THE guide to the past 7 years in the region. With expert insight and access to the key players (he is a personal friend of Afghan President Hamid Karzai), he provides a complete picture of regional politics and U.S. policy in the area. Some key surprises that should shock even the most hardcore Obama supporters include:

1. Rumsfeld was adamantly opposed to the U.S. addressing the rising opium problem, which funded the Taliban and has undermined our nation-building efforts. This short-term approach has led to a huge missed opportunity to rebuild Afghanistan and prevent it from becoming a terror safe-haven again.

2. U.S. intelligence knew that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence was continuing to help the Taliban, but still allied with Musharraf. After the U.S.-backed Northern Alliance retook Kabul, the U.S. let the ISI evacuate thousands of Taliban soldiers and terrorists to appease Musharraf. Thus, in effect, Bush allowed the biggest rescue operation for terrorists ever.

I can only hope the foreign policy advisors to the new president read this book.

This is a good read and is full of interesting and enlightening details. However, it suffers from some serioius conceptual flaws. For example:
1) The author does not properly define "neo-conservative." He ends up using it as a catch-all perjorative for all hawks that he doesn't like. As a consequence, it is not always clear how his own hawkish beliefs (he argues that we should have invaded Afghanistan before 9/11) differ from those whose policies have clearly failed.
2) He tends to describe "nation building" as though it were a branch of engineering, i.e. something that definitely can be accomplished if we devote enough resources and experts to the problem. At one point, in a momenty of clarity, he admits that, with the exception of the extraordinary examples of Japan and Germany, no nation-building has ever succeeded in producing a viable nation.

These and other conceptual flaws prevent his arguments from ever getting off the ground. Yet the book is still very much worth reading--a good source of information.

This well researched and well written book provides in depth insights into the turmoil that is Afghanistan and Pakistan. The author, Ahmed Rashid, has written extensively on the history and sociology of this region and his presentation and development, especially of recent history, is unparalleled. As (if) we leave Iraq, the expectation is that we will increase our military presence in this area; therefore, the insights of the author and the information he presents continue to be timely. If the Bush administration had scratched the surface of this information before invading Afghanistan, and heeded President Vladimir Putin's admonitions based on a very painful experience, the approach and outcome most certainly would be much different. As becomes very apparent from Rashid's detailed and clear discussion, we have been pouring money into a pro-Taliban military dictatorship in Pakistan that has consistently impaired our progress, with no change foreseeable. I should note that the history of this region is very complex and not at all consistent with Western paradigms. Consequently, as with many histories, this one can be dry and seemingly overly detailed at times as the author addresses this tension. Push through those moments - you will be deeply enriched.

Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid is a friend and supporter of Afghanistan's president Hamid Karzai. Rashid warns that Afghanistan is facing state collapse, Pakistan is in meltdown, and the five Central Asian states are dictatorships. He claims that the most important thing in the world is to rebuild these nations.

He shows that President Karzai's regime depends on warlords and drug barons, who are backed by the CIA. Britain's forces there are supposed to be helping to cut opium production, but their policy of paying farmers to destroy their opium crops has been `disastrous'. Opium production soared from 4,000 tons in 2005 to 8,200 in 2007. Half of this was grown in British-occupied Helmand, where the rest of Afghanistan's opium was sold.

The USA is allied to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, which are al-Qaeda's main sponsors. The USA has given more than $10 billion to Pakistan's President Musharraf. Bush backed him even after he tore up the constitution, sacked the judges, imprisoned more than 12,000 people and muzzled the media. This `created immense hatred for the U.S. Army and America'.

The USA's torture of POWs has further increased this hatred. As Rashid writes, "By following America's lead in promoting or condoning disappearances, torture, and secret jails, these countries found their path to democracy and their struggle against Islamic extremism set back by decades. Western-led nation building had little credibility if it denied justice to the very people it was supposed to help. It could well be argued that over time Islamic extremists were emboldened rather than subdued by the travesty of justice the United States perpetrated. The people learned to hate America. ... The deterioration of human rights in each country became linked to that government's proximity to the CIA."

So the USA's wars have increased the al-Qaeda threat, particularly in Pakistan. Rashid also notes that US interventions have failed in Yugoslavia and East Timor and made a hell-hole of Iraq.

And then - after all this - Rashid calls on the USA, not to get out of the region, but to get deeper in. More sanely, he also calls on the peoples of the region to take responsibility for moving their nations towards democracy.

Written with great understanding of the political and economic struggle in the region. The enigma of Islam in the mind of ordinary person in the west. The misleading factor that puzzles the 'Think tanks' in Washington DC
on how to win Bush's war against terrorism. Most experts probably read it just not to show their ignorance and
have no desire to learn from their continuing mistakes in the region.

I enjoyed this book from one of my favorite authors. The book covers a lot of historical events. The author has high credibility, and I couldn't put the book down. Some of the material is fragmented, but it was still very interesting.

I'd highly recommend this one.

sb

Great read. Keeps you thinking, and realizing how much we the people do not know.

The quote by Lord Curzon in the begining of this book that foreshadows the role Afghanistan would play "a hundred years hence" is chilling. Once you begin even the most cursory study of Afghanistan you start a journey of thousands of years where this country has stood at the crossroads of all the world's civilizations and religions. And now we come full circle.

Ahmed Rashid has made a life's work of studying Afghanistan and you cannot read this book without that sense of history, and the insight it affords one, from rising up from every page. It's an authentic and masterful study. It's poignancy is real. It will perhaps become the definitve work on the US failure to take advantage of effecting real change by conducting what most retired general officers now call "the worst stragetic mistake in US foreign policy" in Iraq, instead of rebuilding Afghaistan and influencing Pakistan, the only Islamic nuclear power in the world: a country ruled by a military, without real democratic institutions and fighting an internal battle with the same fundamentalism that produced the 9/11 attacks.

The abject poverty of both countries, their lack of social institutions and the filling of this void with religious fundamentalism created the breeding ground for the fanaticism of Al-Qaeda and provided legions of uneducated muslims looking for self-fulfillment by taking up jihad, thousands of young men who never knew the company of women and so felt no compunction to shutting them away. Throughout the short history of the modern world there was no greater opportunity than the one presented to the US and its allies-in-waiting than to correct the course of terrorism by rebuilding Afghanistan following the defeat of the Taliban and directly influencing the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the North West Frontier Province and, most importantly, Pakistan itself.

We have fought a war in Iraq for over six years and achieved nothing because we left the enemy behind in Afghanistan to export the same fanaticism to Iraq and to continue to destabilize both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Until we solve the problems of Pakistan, who incidentally has exported not only plain vanilla terrorists but nuclear terror in its commercial sales and exchanges with North Korea, Iran and Libya and teeters constantly on the brink of nuclear war with its neighbor India, we will always be fighting this war. And since Pakistan's only foreign policy is proxy control of Afghanistan, we will never be at peace until we rebuild that country with the same kind of resources we threw into Iraq.

Ahmed Rashid has long been a leading expert on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Muslim states of Central Asia that were once part of the Soviet Union. In 2000, the year before 9/11, he published 'Taliban', a book which politicians rushed to read after the attack on the Twin Towers; and if Central Asia catches fire, they will doubtlessly rush to his following book, 'Jihad', first published in 2002, which is an equally authoritative account of the dangers lurking in that area.

After a brilliant introduction of 21 pages, the first three chapters of the present book give the story of American involvement in Afghanistan before 9/11. The characteristic unreliability of American policy is brought out: help given to the Islamic forces and to Pakistan while the Soviets were in Afghanistan; then a total lack of interest in the period after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, when Afghanistan was first torn apart by competing war-lords and was then overrun by the Taliban.

No longer in need of Pakistan, the USA then imposed sanctions on that country because it, like India, had carried out tests of nuclear weapons.

The next 15 chapters are essentially a sequel to the author's Taliban, and chronicles in great and sometimes in dense detail, right up to early 2008, the story of Afghanistan and Pakistan after the expulsion of the Taliban at the end of 2001 and the installation of Hamid Karzai as interim President. The victory had been not only been swift (it took two months), but had also been cheap for the Americans. They had fought the campaign from the air, leaving the land fighting to the war-lords of the Northern Alliance. The Americans lost just one man killed. Karzai was installed as interim president. This easy victory led the Americans to believe that it could be copied in Iraq, an attack on which the neo-cons had planned even before the Afghan war. Once the Iraq war began, the Americans concentrated on that and paid much less attention to Afghanistan, on which they wanted to spend as little money as possible. Rumsfeld was explicitly not interested in `nation building': helping Afghanistan to develop a healthy infrastructure..

From this all sorts of mistakes arose:

1. It seemed easier to use the armies of the war-lords than to build and train an Afghan National Army.

2. Karzai, a Pashtun, had no control over the Tajik and Uzbek war-lords. They refused to disarm or to let their men be integrated into a national army. Occasionally they fought each other; they collected tolls which they refused to hand over to the government; and they alienated the Pashtun majority. For a long time Karzai dared not confront them. When eventually he managed to form a new government without them in 2004, he proved indecisive in implementing a programme of reform.

3. He was unwilling to stamp out the cultivation of opium and the drug-lords, one of whom was his own brother. Drug dealing corrupted the entire administration and the police. The Allies did not provide money for planting alternative crops and would not allow their armies to interdict the drug trade for fear of alienating the tens of thousands of farmers who depended on it.

4. The worst problem is Pakistan. Osama bin Laden and the Al-Queda forces, as well as the fleeing Taliban found sanctuary in the tribal areas of Pakistan. These were already home to what would become the Pakistani Taliban, who helped them to rebuild their forces and joined them in incursions back into Afghanistan.

For a long time the Americans were not interested in the Taliban and did not take it seriously; but they did want Al-Qaeda people handed over, and for this they needed Musharraf's help. Musharraf did this (if he could find them!), and in return sanctions on Pakistan were lifted. For a long time the Americans did not realize the close connections that had been built up between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. But Musharraf, the Pakistani Army and the ISI (the intelligence service) protected the Taliban and gave it much covert help and even direction. This was largely because they saw Karzai as a potential ally of India. Karzai pleaded with the Americans and the British to pressurize Pakistan to give up supporting the Taliban; but these found the alliance with Pakistan too important, and pretended to believe Musharraf's denials, aided, as these were, by the ISI very occasionally giving them information about the whereabouts of Taliban leaders.

But while this was just enough to appease the Allies, it was also enough to enrage the more extreme sections of the Taliban, who in any case were egged on by their al-Qaeda allies to attack Musharraf and his police as American lackeys. Musharraf emerges from this book as being as devious as he is foolish.

5. When the Americans focussed on Iraq, NATO took over as the Western instrument in Afghanistan. But each of the 37 countries which provided troops drew up its own rules about what these troops could - or more importantly: could not - do. Some confined them to reconstruction and humanitarian work; some were specifically prohibited for fighting the Taliban; some were not to interfere with poppy growing; those stationed in the more peaceful north were prevented from helping the hard-pressed - and always insufficiently numerous - troops in the south. Of the 45,000 troops stationed in Afghanistan in 2006, only 15,000 were available for fighting. In the absence of a unified command, it is not surprising that the Taliban began to reestablish itself in large areas of the East and South from 2003 onwards and have been gaining in strength ever since.

There is much more in this troubling book - for example a comparatively brief account of the danger of al-Qaeda and other Islamic organizations establishing themselves in the Uzbekistan and the other secular Central Asian republics, where tyrannical and corrupt governments are propped up by the Americans simply because these, too, suppress Islamic (along with all other) groups.

A very good read on how the Bush, Cheney et al continue to support a two faced and corrupt Pakistani miiltary and government to the determent of America and its citizens. Read it and weep. Thank you Ahmed Rashid.

Rashid tells us that in the first few years after the U.S. went into Afghanistan, 905 of the population welcomed foreign troops and aid workers. We failed to take advantage of it, however. Meanwhile, in Pakistan a major political crisis has arisen along with a spread of Islamic fundamentalism, dictatorships rule the five independent states of Central Asia (the "stans") since the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union, and an Islamic extremism thrives underground in those nations. Anti-Americanism (created by our 2007 support of Musharraf) is undermining Pakistani's reaction to democracy, modernization, and the struggle against extremism, and the U.S. attack on Iraq helped convince Musharraf that the U.S. was not serious about stabilizing the area - hence it was safer for Pakistan to clandestinely give refuge to the Taliban.

Rashid asserts that the U.S. made the same mistakes in Iraq that it had in Afghanistan - not enough troops, no postwar planning to resuscitate the areas, and no coherent strategy (reviving the warlords in Afghanistan, dismantling the army and bureaucracy in Iraq). Most experts believed rebuilding Afghanistan would cost $4-5 billion/year for ten years - cheap, compared to Iraq.

Part of the U.S. problem is that we don't work well with others. We have never taken part in U.N. peacekeeping operations (though have funded and otherwise supported many) - out of 15 in 2007 involving over 100,000, only ten U.S. soldiers were involved. (Pakistan provided 10,000.) Another part is that we're spread too thin - over 250,000 troops on 725 bases in 38 countries BEFORE 9/11.

General Franks refused to put any U.S. troops on the ground in an attempt to accept a major Taliban surrender, leading to the deaths of thousands at the hands of the Northern Alliance and the escape of their top leaders; several weeks later similar reticence allowed Osama to escape at Tora Bora. (The U.S. actually flew every Pakistani and many Taliban leaders out of Afghanistan in the first instance.)

The real factor in the U.S. victory in Afghanistan was $100 million in bribes given to local warlords. Conversely, at Tora Bora, 600-800 Arabs were escorted into Pakistan for an average bribe of $1,200.
After installing Karzai the U.S. continued to pay off the warlords as an easy means of keeping the peace; this also undermined central government authority and recreated conditions for another Taliban resurgence. Warlord power was further boosted by giving them contracts for providing U.S. operations with fuel and rebuilding materials, allowing them to grow heroin, and their collection of about $500 billion in customs fees - of which only about $80 million went to Kabul. Pakastani elections put Islamic extremists in charge of the NWFP. U.S. presence in the "stans" to support Afghanistan operations made both Russia and China nervous regarding the threat of permanent bases on their borders.

Afghanistan had been devastated primarily by internal strife. International aid provided oafter the Taliban rout was largely humanitarian relief, not reconstruction. Successes included launching a new currency, restarting education and opening it to girls (Afghanistan has a 54% illiteracy rate, and the U.S.' $100 million spread over 5 years was unable to counteract the 12,000 madrassas), and reopening and expanding media. U.S. projects were very heavy in overhead, and lacked knowledge of the Afghan situation. In any case, U.S. funding was cut back again after the '04 Presidential election.

The Pakistani army repeatedly supported border-crossing Taliban and their training, as well as their training. Meanwhile, the U.S. angered locals with prisoner abuses - just as in Iraq. Putting a higher priority on torturing prisoners and keeping access to a new base drove Uzbekistan back into Russia's arms.

NATO, originally riled by Rumsfeld's arrogant ignoring their offers of help in Afghanistan, and further angered by U.S. withdrawing troops in Afghanistan to add in Iraq and failure to address Pakistan's duplicitous Taliban support, became increasingly reluctant to help in Afghanistan - both in numbers of troops and in the restrictions placed upon the use of those troops (eg. no fighting, after-dark activities, involvement in disputes between warlods, etc.).

Bottom Line: Afghtnistan and Pakistan have slipped into greater Taliban control because of U.S. failure to nation-build; the failure continues.

Rashid tells us that in the first few years after the U.S. went into Afghanistan, 905 of the population welcomed foreign troops and aid workers. We failed to take advantage of it, however. Meanwhile, in Pakistan a major political crisis has arisen along with a spread of Islamic fundamentalism, dictatorships rule the five independent states of Central Asia (the "stans") since the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union, and an Islamic extremism thrives underground in those nations. Anti-Americanism (created by our 2007 support of Musharraf) is undermining Pakistani's reaction to democracy, modernization, and the struggle against extremism, and the U.S. attack on Iraq helped convince Musharraf that the U.S. was not serious about stabilizing the area - hence it was safer for Pakistan to clandestinely give refuge to the Taliban.

Rashid asserts that the U.S. made the same mistakes in Iraq that it had in Afghanistan - not enough troops, no postwar planning to resuscitate the areas, and no coherent strategy (reviving the warlords in Afghanistan, dismantling the army and bureaucracy in Iraq). Most experts believed rebuilding Afghanistan would cost $4-5 billion/year for ten years - cheap, compared to Iraq.

Part of the U.S. problem is that we don't work well with others. We have never taken part in U.N. peacekeeping operations (though have funded and otherwise supported many) - out of 15 in 2007 involving over 100,000, only ten U.S. soldiers were involved. (Pakistan provided 10,000.) Another part is that we're spread too thin - over 250,000 troops on 725 bases in 38 countries BEFORE 9/11.

General Franks refused to put any U.S. troops on the ground in an attempt to accept a major Taliban surrender, leading to the deaths of thousands at the hands of the Northern Alliance and the escape of their top leaders; several weeks later similar reticence allowed Osama to escape at Tora Bora. (The U.S. actually flew every Pakistani and many Taliban leaders out of Afghanistan in the first instance.)

The real factor in the U.S. victory in Afghanistan was $100 million in bribes given to local war lords. Conversely, at Tora Bora, 600-800 Arabs were escorted into Pakistan for an average bribe of $1,200.

After installing Karzai the U.S. continued to pay off the warlords as an easy means of keeping the peace; this also undermined central government authority and recreated conditions for another Taliban resurgence. War lord power was further boosted by giving them contracts for providing U.S. operations with fuel and rebuilding materials, as well as allowing them to grow heroin.

Pakistani elections put Islamic extremists in charge of the NWFP. U.S. presence in the "stans" to support Afghanistan operations made both Russia and China nervous regarding the threat of permanent bases on their borders.

Afghanistan had been devastated primarily by internal strife. International aid provided oafter the Taliban rout was largely humanitarian relief, not reconstruction.

Rashid tells us that in the first few years after the U.S. went into Afghanistan, 905 of the population welcomed foreign troops and aid workers. We failed to take advantage of it, however. Meanwhile, in Pakistan a major political crisis has arisen along with a spread of Islamic fundamentalism, dictatorships rule the five independent states of Central Asia (the "stans") since the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union, and an Islamic extremism thrives underground in those nations. Anti-Americanism (created by our 2007 support of Musharraf) is undermining Pakistani's reaction to democracy, modernization, and the struggle against extremism, and the U.S. attack on Iraq helped convince Musharraf that the U.S. was not serious about stabilizing the area - hence it was safer for Pakistan to clandestinely give refuge to the Taliban.

Rashid asserts that the U.S. made the same mistakes in Iraq that it had in Afghanistan - not enough troops, no postwar planning to resuscitate the areas, and no coherent strategy (reviving the warlords in Afghanistan, dismantling the army and bureaucracy in Iraq). Most experts believed rebuilding Afghanistan would cost $4-5 billion/year for ten years - cheap, compared to Iraq.

Part of the U.S. problem is that we don't work well with others. We have never taken part in U.N. peacekeeping operations (though have funded and otherwise supported many) - out of 15 in 2007 involving over 100,000, only ten U.S. soldiers were involved. (Pakistan provided 10,000.) Another part is that we're spread too thin - over 250,000 troops on 725 bases in 38 countries BEFORE 9/11.

The author of this book is based in Pakistan and is one of the leading journalists in the world covering Pakistan and Afghanistan. You may not agree with everything he says but you should pay close attention because he has sources throughout the region. One of his main points is that America has failed miserably at becoming informed about local realities and is trying to impose a vague concept of a "war on terror" on long term regional political realities that are far more complex. For example, how many Americans understand that the "border" between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the "Durand Line" an absurd creation of British imperialism. This left a good part of the Pashtuns living in Pakistan instead of Afghanistan. You might also want to read Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, the author's excellent history of the Taliban. Another good book is Kabul in Winter: Life Without Peace in Afghanistan

America needs a greater sense of humility in dealing with Central Asia. Afghanistan is one of the oldest places in the world. Alexander the Great campaigned in Afghanistan. There is good military history of the place called Afghanistan: A Military History From Alexander The Great To The Fall Of The Taliban I have more books in my Listmania list on Central Asia for those who are interested.

The author of this book is based in Pakistan and is one of the leading journalists in the world covering Pakistan and Afghanistan. You may not agree with everything he says but you should pay close attention because he has sources throughout the region. One of his main points is that America has failed miserably at becoming informed about local realities and is trying to impose a vague concept of a "war on terror" on long term regional political realities that are far more complex. For example, how many Americans understand that the "border" between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the "Durand Line" an absurd creation of British imperialism. This left a good part of the Pashtuns living in Pakistan instead of Afghanistan. You might also want to read Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, the author's excellent history of the Taliban.

This timely and critical book gives and experts overview of the current situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan and should serve as a wake uo call for policy makers interested in the region and people interested in the threat that instability and renewed Islamism pose. Here we are walked through the current unending war in Afghanistan and given a tour of the history of the American relationship with Pakistan before the author plunges into the nitty gritty of what is taking place. The book examines both the opium crop in Afghanistan and the renewel of the Taliban and their offensives against coalition and government troops. We are given an account of the rise of Islamism and the endurance of Al Quiada in the tribal areas of northwest Pakistan and the coming apart of the Musharreff consensus in the wake of the death of Bhutto.

As a last vignette we are taken to Uzbekistan where the author asks 'who lost this country?' In fact this last part is where 'central asia' comes into play but it should have been beefed up. Instead of one chapter detaling the problems in Uzbekistan the book should have included discussions of the rest of 'Central Asia' which appears in the subtitle. What of Kyrgizistan and Turkmenistan and Tajikistan and the threats that might emerge from them?

The other subtitle is the question of 'nation-building' and here we are asked to consider the 'failure' of American arms, diplomacy and money. In Pakistan it is not a question so much of failure but rather of the inability of the U.S to invade the parts of that country which have been taken over by Al Quaida. In fact Pakistan is failing not only in the NWFP tribal areas but also in Baluchistan. Afghanistan, once a success, is being overun and the opium crop is funding the thugs turned drug barons turned Islamists. A short chapter on the nuclear issue also details some of the threats from increased instability or the fall of Pakistan.

An important and well written work.

Seth J. Frantzman