This case study of the comparatively popular 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War examined the domestic pressures which then-President George H.W. Bush had on his foreign policy choices. Interviews conducted during 1996-1999 with former administration officials provide important insights how that Iraq war was fought--and why it was won with relatively little causalities.



Needing to deflect citizen attention and scrutiny from his less-than stellar domestic policies, Bush shamelessly and openly promoted Saddam Hussein as a Arabic Adolph Hitler.



Because the now dead German dictator remains one of the most loathed figures in world history, the president's label provided an instant rallying point for a majority of Americans and world leaders to act. Since appeasement had failed so miserably the first time, very few people were eager to attempt a reenactment, proactively stopping another Hitler was its own tangible evidence and justification rolled into one.



Bush was able to position himself as the commander because he had ample congressional support (from then-Democratic majorities), funding, international coalition allies, and a challenge which itself was not difficult to manage. Critically differing from Hitler, Saddam did not have a coalition of Middle East states openly supporting him and the countries nearest to Iraq ultimately donated space for the allies to stage their own forces.



With America currently in a much different Iraq war with another Bush, this book is an essential read. It is important remembering however those international successes could not negate the American people from examining the domestic economy performance.

This case study of the comparatively popular 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War examined the domestic pressures which then-President George H.W. Bush had on his foreign policy choices. Interviews conducted during 1996-1999 with former administration officials provide important insights how that Iraq war was fought--and why it was won with relatively little causalities.

Needing to deflect citizen attention and scrutiny from his less-than stellar domestic policies, Bush shamelessly and openly promoted Saddam Hussein as a Arabic Adolph Hitler.

Because the now dead German dictator remains one of the most loathed figures in world history, the president's label provided an instant rallying point for a majority of Americans and world leaders to act. Since appeasement had failed so miserably the first time, very few people were eager to attempt a reenactment, proactively stopping another Hitler was its own tangible evidence and justification rolled into one.

Bush was able to position himself as the commander because he had ample congressional support (from then-Democratic majorities), funding, international coalition allies, and a challenge which itself was not difficult to manage. Critically differing from Hitler, Saddam did not have a coalition of Middle East states openly supporting him and the countries nearest to Iraq ultimately donated space for the allies to stage their own forces.

With America currently in a much different Iraq war with another Bush, this book is an essential read. It is important remembering however those international successes could not negate the American people from examining the domestic economy performance.