The author review military doctrine in dealing with local insurgencies. He compares the British experience in Malaysia and the American experience in Viet Nam. The focus on the book is in describing a "learning organization." This is one that adapts and learns; that evolves to meet new challenges. While this applies in combat, it also has value in all organizations that deal with challenges.

This is an excellent companion book to the new U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual

Colonel Nagl has written one of the best books on recent military history I have yet to read. He examines the past experiences in Vietnam and Malaya, pointing out what the failures and success of those experiences and translates them into an astounding piece of history for the present and the future. It is a blueprint for what to do and what not to do, given the current and quite likely future of warfare. It is a telling book by a combat leader. He writes with exceptional clarity and he work is replete with references and the bibliography is extraordinary. Everyone should read this book. In addition he is also the author of the Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgeny Field Manual, another excellent and detailed book on COIN operations.

As a military history buff I feel like I have a good understanding of the dynamics of the Vietnam War and the reasons for the outcome from the perspective of the United States. However, Colonel Nagl puts the whole issue in a much more focused perspective than anything else I have ever read. (A quick note: Although the book addresses the British experience in Malaya and the US experience in Vietnam, the clear objective is to better understand Vietnam by comparing and contrasting it to Malaya. Hence, my focus here on Vietnam). By taking a methodical, academic approach, this book sets forth very specific criteria by which to measure the performance of the British and US militaries, delivering a well thought out and rational discussion of what must be done to counter an insurgency and how Britain and the US fared in their respective conflicts. More than that, it explains why the outcomes of Malaya and Vietnam were so different, not just from a tactical or strategic perspective, but also in terms of the overall structure and philosophy of the British and US armies. Much has been written about why the US failed to achieve its objectives in Vietnam, but I found this book to be far more thorough and insightful - and therefore more credible - than anything else out there.

On another note, it is extremely refreshing and encouraging to see this level of introspection and intellectual rigor from an Army officer, something I have noticed more and more in today's Army. To lead the US military into the future and prepare its personnel for the conflicts of today and tomorrow, this is precisely the kind of thoughtful self-examination and open inquisitiveness that officers will need to demonstrate.

This was required reading for a graduate course in the history of American military affairs. The purpose of John A. Nagl's book was to explore the reasons why the British army was able to change its strategy and tactics of war fighting in order to successfully conduct a counterinsurgency operation in Malaya from 1948 through 1960, and why the U. S. army failed in its counterinsurgency challenge in Vietnam from 1950 through 1973, because its leaders clung to their strategy and tactics of annihilation. Nagl's thesis, for which he cogently argued in his book, was that the answer lied in the "organizational culture" differences between the British and U. S. armies. "The organizational culture of the British army allowed it to learn how to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign during the Malayan Emergency, whereas the organizational culture of the U.S. Army prevented a similar organizational learning process during and after the Vietnam War" (213).

As Nagl so aptly pointed out, the British army was structured on a regimental system whereby soldiers and officers served together for their whole careers, which gave them several advantages to learn and improve their war fighting skills. Units could quickly change their tactics and training methods as they found the counterinsurgency techniques that brought them mission success in the field. The British also learned from over one hundred years of colonial rule around the globe, that it was prudent to cultivate the trust and listen to the local populace. Since the British army was small, its senior leadership was in closer contact with the military operations in Malaya and more readily willing to listen to their junior officers' advice. In sharp contrast, Nagl argued that the institutional culture of the U.S. Army was too intransigent to change its learning cycle. "An army that saw its raison d'etre as winning wars through the application of firepower and maneuver to annihilate enemy forces simply could not conceive of another kind of war in which its weapons, technology, and organization not only could not destroy the enemy, but usually could not even find or identify him" (198).

No doubt, Nagl was correct in implying that had the U.S. commanders listened to the advice of those who called for using counterinsurgency tactics in Vietnam, they may have faired better. However, it is important to note that the British failed in conducting a successful counterinsurgency in Palestine, mainly because they could not win the trust of the Jews to help them since virtually the entire Jewish population were united in their quest for independence. Similarly, the North Vietnamese Communists under the inspired leadership of Ho Chi Minh, commanded the respect and support of probably more of the Vietnamese populace than the U.S. or the intolerably corrupt government of the South Vietnamese could ever hope to win over. Thus, another lesson for governments to learn is to carefully pick and choose when and where to militarily intervene.

Recommended reading for anyone interested in American history and military history.

Read this book when I was still on active duty. It got a lot of hype when OIF turned into the "long, hard, slog" and military professionals from the brass on down had to get smart on counterinsurgency real quick. I didn't feel his thesis was well supported, so in that regard this effort falls short. On the other hand, I found it a great guide to further reading on counterinsurgency - great value for the professional. For the nonprofessional, this is a decent introduction.

Very cool book for operators (armed forces and civilian) and regular people. It shows us what we should be trying to do in the whole world. Make people safer, and they'll help you find the really bad guys (not the everyday ones). Really worth reading.

Good read. Great knowledge. I wish the authore had stayed in the army becasue he knows what he is talking about.

As the war in Iraq slides into it's fifth year I am sure most Americans are perplexed on why things remain so screwed up over there. Why can't American's just handle it and come home. This book sort of explains the why. This book is excellent. It really defines what an insurgency is. It isn't like the traditional war like WWII which we see on the history channel. Anyone who wants to get perspective on events needs to read this book.

The book has a second point too which anyone can apply. This book shows how the organizational culture can effect the ability to solve problems. The author does that in studying the British experience in Malay vs. the American experience in Vietnam. He shows how the British were adapt and could learn then apply as they go along. The LTC then shows how the American's were not flexible and paid the consequences. LTC Nagel shows how the American's were so preprogrammed in fighting a WWII type battle they couldn't grasp any other solution. The Generals were preprogrammed in Vietnam to such a degree they threw out any fact that upset the model in their mind. They may have changed the buzz words but the core way of doing business was the same throughout Vietnam for the Americans, search and destroy. While the British had a way to listen and apply the lessons learned from the bottom up. The result of such innovation was that they won their war and we didn't. Insurgencies tend to be as much of a political fight as anything else. LTC Nagel shows that in the book.

Any manager of any large organization needs to read this book because it shows how organizational culture can choke a team to death.

LTC Nagel does identify what an insurgency is but doesn't offer much remedy to fighting that war directly. He does talk about how the British did it and how some American's had theories in handling that type of war. It would be interesting to hear of his insight in the context of Iraq. However I feel that the planners in this surge probably read this book. It has a lot of similarities with the British Malay model.

Overall it is an easy read. He does get lost in the military terms a little. The material he talks about is the same concepts you read about in the newspapers. It will help the reader understand what is going on.