Stephen Ashley Hart does well in this study to shed light on some of the constraints that governed Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's handling of British and Canadian forces in 1944 and 1945. He is most convincing in the course of arguing that Montgomery's emphasis on "grip" and caution stemmed from a sense that in general, the campaign would be won by steady progress rather than dramatic strokes. Hart does less well in reconciling Monty's demand for concentration with the flaws of his operational methods, particularly a fondness for one-corps attacks that negated manpower advantages and the 21st Army Group's fondness for repeatedly passing units through the lines to continue the attack. He is also not convincing on the question of the British Army's manpower situation; it is well-known that the American army also struggled to fill its ranks as the campaign dragged on. There are two major flaws to the work. One is that there is almost no comparative analysis of the effectiveness of the Anglo-Canadian army's methods vis-a-vis the American army's. It's all well and good to contend that those methods saved casualties, but Hart advances the claim in a vacuum. Second, Hart largely ignores Montgomery's effort to secure Eisenhower's backing for a single thrust into the Ruhr on the northern end of the front. To the extent he touches on the matter at all, it's to say that Montgomery was acting mainly in the service of long-term British interests, in particular his country's need to end the war in 1944. But the logistical risks involved in the single thrust (as highlighted by Weigley and many other commentators) would seem to fly in the face of Montgomery's customary preference for caution. All in all, however, this is a valuable work.

Stephen Ashley Hart does well in this study to shed light on some of the constraints that governed Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's handling of British and Canadian forces in 1944 and 1945. He is most convincing in the course of arguing that Montgomery's emphasis on "grip" and caution stemmed from a sense that in general, the campaign would be won by steady progress rather than dramatic strokes. Hart does less well in reconciling Monty's demand for concentration with the flaws of his operational methods, particularly a fondness for one-corps attacks that negated manpower advantages and the 21st Army Group's fondness for repeatedly passing units through the lines to continue the attack. He is also not convincing on the question of the British Army's manpower situation; it is well-known that the American army also struggled to fill its ranks as the campaign dragged on. There are two major flaws to the work. One is that there is almost no comparative analysis of the effectiveness of the Anglo-Canadian army's methods vis-a-vis the American army's. It's all well and good to contend that those methods saved casualties, but Hart advances the claim in a vacuum. Second, Hart largely ignores Montgomery's effort to secure Eisenhower's backing for a single thrust into the Ruhr on the northern end of the front. To the extent he touches on the matter at all, it's to say that Montgomery was acting mainly in the service of long-term British interests, in particular his country's need to end the war in 1944. But the logistical risks involved in the single thrust (as highlighted by Weigley and many other commentators) would seem to fly in the face of Montgomery's customary preference for caution. All in all, however, this is a valuable work.