An easier, more entertaining read than it could have been considering the complexity of Col. Boyd himself. Well documented with a few important photos. In addition to fairly in-depth description of the OODA theory and development, I would have liked more info on the actual implementation of the parts of the loop.

This book is amazing. I have no military background - I have no relationship with the government (other then being a taxpayer). I simply read this book because of my exposure to Boyd's OODA Loop and how it relates to business decisions. Amazing parallels between the mentality of government and big business. Absolutely encourage you to read this book.

PS - Thanks Colonel Boyd - your insight and persistance left an indeible mark on the history of the United States of America....I wish I had known you.

This book gave me an enlightening view of the evolution and procurement of American jet fighter aircraft. John Boyd thought of himself as the best fighter pilot ever; and Robert Coram's book about him makes me believe that Boyd might have been correct. He was not only highly skilled but he also created a model of the physical characteristics of jet combat. Coram shows how Boyd's Energy-Maneuverability Theory explained many puzzles in jet warfare since the first battles in Korea. Questions such as why was the F-86 successful against the Migs in Korea but the F-100 suffered against the Soviet aircraft in Viet Nam and why the F-15 was seriously inferior to the F-16.

Coram also gives us insight into Boyd's difficult and uninhibited personality. After a general had heard Boyd's analysis of the F-111 he asked for recommendations regarding the aircraft. Boyd answered: "General, I'd pull the wings off, install benches in the bomb bay, paint the g------ thing yellow, and turn it into a high-speed line taxi."

Biographies of military figures are a tricky business. The core audience for the books is so passionate that they are willing to forgive lousy books in their thirst for more information. For that reason there are a lot of mediocre war books. Because of the title and the subject, it's easy to glance at this book and think of it has a Costco war biography or a decent Christmas present for a military buff. Don't.

It is instead of a truly peerless book on military strategy. Coram's chronicle is artful, so well-researched and so informative that it brought John Boyd to the forefront of military strategy well after his death and many years of neglect. Compared to his fellow writers in this field, Coram is a god among men.

This book's strength is its ability to make complex, strategic theories that fundamentally shifted the art of war understandable to the average reader. Believe me, that is not an easy task. If the book inspires you to read some of Boyd's academic papers you will quickly discover how artful Coram has translated them. In journal form, Boyd's Creative Destruction is obtuse and confusing. Coram's book is the primer to its understanding for those of us who don't have ranking military professors to explain it.

Lastly, Coram doesn't shy away from the negative sides of Boyd's genius bubble. We see how it torn at his family life and how he bore little of the consequences. If it wasn't for the endless patience of his wife who subsidized and tolerated his lifestyle with her support, the world would have been deprived of his insights.

This is a superior book, in every respect, and I cannot recommend it strongly enough to readers interested in post World War Two military aviation. As a former B-52 navigator-bombardier (Vietnam War era) and USAF officer, I was particularly interested in the relationships and conflicts within the fighter community and even more interestingly how that group dealt with the often greater "threat" consistently coming from Curtis LeMay's Strategic Air Command. While the fighter community was fighting among itself, TAC as a whole was being constantly gnawed away by SAC, which consistently received so much of the nation's national defense dollars during the 1950s and 60s, much of it at the fighter's expense. The analysis of the shortcomings of that era's fighter tactics and armament is peerless. Many Vietnam USAF pilots came to believe that their relatively poor showing against the NVA (and compared to Naval Aviation) would not have happened if Boyd and men like him had been listened to. Coram handles all this material extremely well--not only does he give all the needed facts and figures, his prose stays extremely readable throughout--indeed I would call "Boyd" a real page-turner. This book has a special place in my aviation library--there are lessons included that need to be continually referenced even today, and beyond.

Excellent book! Great insight into the military-industrial complex and the hard time innovators have in the military bureaucracy.

Robert Coram's biography about the life and the legacy of John Boyd is a gripping, page-turning read.

Boyd's life and teachings over and over showcase his basic tenets of warfare: how frontal attacks and war-by-attrition are a loser's game. The smart strategist causes confusion in the opponent, gets into his mind, anticipates his moves and sidesteps strongholds of resistance. Its applications range far and wide to any level of human relationships. He always preaches that people come first, ideas second and hardware last. His message is as applicable as ever in today's society that looks to technological wizardry as the cure of all ills.

There is ample overlap and application to business, sadly Boyd died before he could expand upon his ideas outside of the military arena. The last chapter quotes Taiichi Ohno, the mastermind behind the fabled Toyota Production System that instilled fear into the US Auto industry and gave rise to lean manufacturing. For Boyd is was protecting his own and defeating overwhelming opponents, be it an army or Pentagon bureaucracy.

Boyd is shown to be of a rare breed of great warriors who were also intellectuals, or intellectuals who were also warriors and follows in a line that reaches far back to great historic figures such as Sun Tsu, Napoleon, and WWII generals of both sides.

Having been in the Air Force during the Vietnam era, and having served at the command level, I found this book to be rather insulting. I served with many fine staff officers, and flag officers, who were trying their very best to do what was right for this country and the Air Force. To try to lump these fine individuals into Robert Coram's classification of "Blue Suiters" is repugnant to me at the best.

The book is long, boring, repetitive and somewhat poorly written. As an Air Force veteran I have great difficulty finding John Boyd the savior of the Air Force and the country. Hero worship should be left to comic books.

I am still awaiting delivery of this book. The vendor assures me that he mailed it, but it has NOT arrived.

This book should be read by anyone who is concerned about the military-industrial complex. It is a sympathetic biography of a reformer who tries to change the Air Force against all odds, and while not succeeding directly on most issues, ends up establishing a legacy of critical strateguc thought that is very important. It magnifies the "warrior" vs "careerist" dichotomy within the Air Force and raisses many questions about the motivations of senior military leaders when it comes to making aircraft procurement decisions.

Boyd is a fascinating book because the man himself was truly remarkable. A combination of many contradictory personality traits, Boyd nevertheless attracted superior talent in support of his ideas. His unbounded determination guaranteed that his activities would have broad impact in the national defense area.

I am sure as you read you will appreciate the unfolding of his amazing career.

Great book - Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War
if you like history!!! I was a member of the Officers Club that Boyd and his team met at. I never got to meet this genius - wish I had. The book is great and I have bought other books about Boyd's theories.

I had never heard of John Boyd, but I had read Coram's other excellent work about George "Bud" Day, so I decided to give this one a try as well. After reading both of these books, I would have to say that Coram ranks among the very top of military historians I have read. His books are well researched with hundreds of hours of personal interviews that clearly show through in the stories he presents.

The idea that a USAF fighter pilot ("excuse me, but I'm just a dumb fighter pilot") can change the way our military wages war is pretty far fetched indeed. But it happened. Boyd was brilliant- loud, brash, opinionated, extremely well read, but brilliant.

From his childhood in Erie Pennsylvania to his service in World War II, Korea, USAF Weapons School, Southeast Asia and finally in the Pentagon, Boyd knew how to make enemies. Coram paints a very balanced, thoughtful and insightful picture of John Boyd, his life and the times. And in the process, he brings real insights to the Pentagon, the top brass in each of the US Armed Forces. Nothing and no one is spared.

It's often said that "At the Pentagon, Colonels are emptying the trash cans." That would be over-simplifying things a bit, but the idea that someone of his lowly stature would have the ear of two Secretaries of Defense (SecDefs), Chiefs of Staff and other top brass speaks volumes to his influence. But that the Commandant of the Marine Corps was a huge fan of a former USAF fighter pilot is nothing short of amazing.

Ever wondered who came up with the famous "feint" and left hook attributed to "Stormin' Norman" Schwartzkopff? John Boyd, that's who, a lowly retired USAF Colonel who had the ear of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheyney.

If you find the works of Von Clausawitz and Sun Tsu of interest, get this book. Exhaustingly researched and very well written.

Boyd, a rough-cut diamond developed fighter jet theories and stuck to his guns with the hide-bound Pentagon brass. We would all be richer if more military officers quit saying "yes sir" and used their minds to act like Boyd did.Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War

If you want to change the world for the better or just keep your little corner of it from getting worse, then you'll want to read this book. It's not just about "the art of war," as the subtitle claims. It's what Boyd discovered about how conflicts are fought and won. Sadly, although he flew in two wars, most of Boyd's clashes were fought within our own military rather than with some foreign foe. As a result, one of the best USAF fighter pilots who ever lived is better remembered by the Marine Corps, where he is a hero, than by his own branch.

I'm not going spend time praising Boyd. The fact that I finished this book with a list of books and articles to read is praise enough. Instead, I'm going to offer a useful corrective to Boyd the man, by introducing someone else you should read.

That someone is G. K. Chesterton, an Englishman with a maverick, warrior personality every bit as fierce and unyielding as Boyd's. On June 1, 1941, on one of the darkest days in World War II, when the island of Crete had fallen to the Germans, leaving 17,000 British soldiers as prisoners of war, the Times of London, defiantly put these lines from Chesterton's "The Ballad of the White Horse" on its front page:

I tell you naught for your comfort,
Yea naught for your desire,
Save that the sky grows darker yet
And the sea rises higher.

Like Boyd, Chesterton understood that how we fight determines if we win or lose. He shared Boyd's contempt for those who believe that bigger is better. In a 1909 at the height of England's fears about new German battleships, Chesterton wrote precisely what Boyd would later say about fighter aircraft.

"Common-sense tells a man that indefinite development in one direction must in practice over-reach itself... If you perceive your enemy plunging on blindly in a particular direction, the real thing to do, if you have any spirit and invention, is to calculate the weakness in his course and advance yourself in some other direction. You ought to take advantage of his infatuation, not to imitate it; you ought to surprise his plan of campaign, not copy it laboriously. If he is building very big ships, the best thing you could do would probably be to build small ones; ships lighter, quicker, and more capable of navigating rivers."

But Chesterton understood something that Boyd never learned, an aspect of warfare that's so often forgotten today that the very word for it seems quaint--chivalry. Perhaps his best explanation of chivalry came in a 1906 article explaining why the Europe of his day dominated the world. Again Chesterton described a concept dear to Boyd, the power that comes from an ability to think new thoughts and imagine new ways of acting.

"The elements that make Europe upon the whole the most humanitarian civilisation are precisely the elements that make it upon the whole the strongest. For the power which makes a man able to entertain a good impulse is the same as that which enables him to make a good gun; it is imagination."

Boyd thought like a fighter pilot. He would have us understand a man in order to destroy him, knowing that a foe who's blown out of the air will never trouble you again. As a writer, Chesterton had a different perspective. He believed that understanding leads to restraint, writing in that same article: "For if you do not understand a man you cannot crush him. And if you do understand him, very probably you will not."

Chesterton saw conflict in broad terms. When he clashed with H. G. Wells over the latter's infatuation with a World State or with Bernard Shaw over pacifism, he took the time to understand what each was saying. His criticisms of the dangers and weakness of international institutions are among the best ever written. His description of the pacifist personality is so accurate that it applies with near perfection to today's pacifists. But having gotten into the mind of his opponent, he recognized in him a fellow human being. With few exceptions, he retained the respect and even friendship of his foes. Only when one crossed a critical line, demonstrating that without great pain he was beyond redemption, would Chesterton seek to crush him to prevent the evil he intended. What was for Boyd the rule, destroying anyone who disagree with him, was for Chesterton the rare exception. Boyd needs to be tempered with Chesterton

In short, I'd suggest that, as you read what Boyd said about war and conflict, you also read what Chesterton wrote. You'll accomplish a lot more and suffer far less grief if you do. And as you might suspect, I wrote a book on that topic, a collection of Chesterton's best articles on war and peace paying particular attention to his warnings about Germany. And when the necessity arose, Chesterton could be as tough-minded as Boyd. Chesterton used all his powers as a writer to crush those ideas in the German mind that Nazism would later exploit.

--Michael W. Perry, editor of Chesterton on War and Peace: Battling the Ideas and Movements that Led to Nazism and World War II

Fascinating insight into the mind of a genius. I read it in one day and did not want it to end.

In 2008, John Arquill (Netwars) will publish a book on American military reform. In it he makes three recommendations, the elimination of the Pentagon, the end of strategic bombing strategy, and force reductions to 100,000 in each of the main services.

This book, published in 2002, tells the story of a man who fought to realize these same notions in the 70s, 80s and 90s.

The book reads like a novel. As told, John Boyd is a flawed genius on a lonely mission, assisted by a few friends. There isn't much work done to place Boyd in context. Instead, Boyd is the context. He is Newton, Sun Tzu and George Washington blended into one great, tragic master. I think the story would stand on its own merits without the hype.

Within the excited rhetoric, one can get a sense of the dark bureaucratic games played in Washington. This alone is worth the time spend reading.

One of the most interesting themes involves bureaucratic wars between Army, Navy, Air Force and any politician in power. As told here, true Air Force vitriol was not expended on foreign enemies, it was saved for the Navy, Marines and Army. After all, there is always a much higher chance that your career will be cripled by a competing service, than by a foreign power. As Orwell wrote in "1984", "The Party seeks power entirely for its own sake. We are not interested in the good of others; we are interested solely in power. Not wealth or luxury or long life or happiness: only power; pure power."

These tales occupy half the book and are told almost exclusively from the recollections of Boyd's friends. In fact, the second half of the book is really about the activities of Boyd's friends, not Boyd. Frankly, I don't know what to make of this. You can read it with blind faith in Boyd, or take any one of many over-generalizations and dismiss the whole thing. There are plenty of gratuitous insults against anyone not a fighter pilot to turn off any but the most friendly reader. Perhaps, it is best to see it as an attempt to see it like Boyd saw the Pentagon bureaucracy battles. As such, you get to ride copilot and enjoy the ride. At a minimum, it will make your next reading of Sun-Tzu more interesting.

In 2008, John Arquill (Netwars) will publish a book on American military reform. In it he makes three recommendations, the elimination of the Pentagon, the end of strategic bombing strategy, and force reductions to 100,000 in each of the main services.

This book, published in 2002, tells the story of a man who fought to realize these same notions in the 70s, 80s and 90s.

The book reads like a novel. As told, John Boyd is a flawed genius on a lonely mission, assisted by a few friends. There isn't much work done to place Boyd in context. Instead, Boyd is the context. He is Newton, Sun Tzu and George Washington blended into one great, tragic master. I think the story would stand on its own merits without the hype.

Within the excited rhetoric, one can get a sense of the dark bureaucratic games played in Washington. This alone is worth the time spend reading.

I'm not sure how Robert Coram's book justified all the gushing praise printed on its cover and front matter. It's a serviceable biography if one wants to learn about John Boyd's relationship with his mother but don't expect to learn a lot about his theories: potentially Boyd's "real" impact on the US military.



The reader will learn that Boyd was a rebel, a potty mouth, he flipped the bird to superior officers, evidently enjoyed prodigious Schadenfreude when a competitor failed, etc. Anecdotes demonstrating these character flaws of Boyd's come at the reader ad nauseam. If I had a dime for every time Coram writes words to the effect that "Boyd's behavior would have ended the career of a lesser officer" I'd be a wealthy man. Boyd basically banged his head against a concrete wall most of his career. However, I wonder how much, if at all, Boyd's legacy survived the ten years since his death (he died in March, 1997, I'm writing this in March, 2007).



Boyd demonstrated that as an old colonel once told me "Those who think also serve." His first theories concerned air-to-air combat as the world's air forces transitioned to jet planes and evidently were successfully implemented by the USAF late in the Vietnam War. Due largely to Boyd's self-destructive tendencies he was not allowed to fly fighters during that conflict. In the 1970s-80s he kept thinking while serving, among other places, at the Pentagon. Here his main mission in life seemed to be the vain attempt to keep the F-15s and F-16s "pure fighters" against the efforts of USAF generals to load them down with avionics and ordnance.



I first became aware of Boyd in the early `80s when a friend turned me on to the Boyd- or OODA Loop. Clearly this concept had universal applicability to just about any military situation plus those in the political, commercial, diplomatic, etc. realms as well. From then on I kept my eyes open for anything about Boyd (hence my initial high-hopes for Coram's book when I saw it reviewed in "Air & Space" magazine) but in the pre-internet age that was difficult. Ten years later I stumbled across "A Discourse on Winning and Losing" at the Ft. Leavenworth library. Its simplicity and elegance were obvious. Unfortunately, the other 99% of the US military was as tradition-bound (and I don't mean that in a good way) and entrenched as those USAF fighter generals, Boyd's thinking didn't fit into American doctrine so found few adherents.



Regrettably, the reader of Coram's book will learn little about these theories. As a journalist he's competent to discuss Boyd the teen-age life guard or USAF workaholic but only knows the very basics about the military (a couple of airplane rides notwithstanding) so Coram has to rely on others to tell him about Boyd's philosophy and here he falls way short. Therefore, after a few paragraphs or a couple of pages superficially describing the OODA Loop, etc. it's back to anecdotes concerning Boyd the curmudgeon telling yet another general to pound sand.



Coram's book is a bibliography only in the most limited sense. I'd wager 99% of his readership are left wondering "OK, so this guy Boyd made full colonel and was a great thinker but his personality and modus operandi were so strident and off-putting that his potentially great message was squandered due to his personal baggage. Therefore where's his greatness in this?"



Then there's the remaining 1% of us who are still waiting for a serious treatment of Boyd's thinking that would fulfill the implied promise of Coram's subtitle and explain how Boyd "changed the art of war." I have little doubt Boyd contributed to the military arts and sciences in exactly this manner but one's not going to learn that from the admiring Coram.

I'm not sure how Robert Coram's book justified all the gushing praise printed on its cover and front matter. It's a serviceable biography if one wants to learn about John Boyd's relationship with his mother but don't expect to learn a lot about his theories: potentially Boyd's "real" impact on the US military.

The reader will learn that Boyd was a rebel, a potty mouth, he flipped the bird to superior officers, evidently enjoyed prodigious Schadenfreude when a competitor failed, etc. Anecdotes demonstrating these character flaws of Boyd's come at the reader ad nauseam. If I had a dime for every time Coram writes words to the effect that "Boyd's behavior would have ended the career of a lesser officer" I'd be a wealthy man. Boyd basically banged his head against a concrete wall most of his career. However, I wonder how much, if at all, Boyd's legacy survived the ten years since his death (he died in March, 1997, I'm writing this in March, 2007).

Boyd demonstrated that as an old colonel once told me "Those who think also serve." His first theories concerned air-to-air combat as the world's air forces transitioned to jet planes and evidently were successfully implemented by the USAF late in the Vietnam War. Due largely to Boyd's self-destructive tendencies he was not allowed to fly fighters during that conflict. In the 1970s-80s he kept thinking while serving, among other places, at the Pentagon. Here his main mission in life seemed to be the vain attempt to keep the F-15s and F-16s "pure fighters" against the efforts of USAF generals to load them down with avionics and ordnance.

I first became aware of Boyd in the early `80s when a friend turned me on to the Boyd- or OODA Loop. Clearly this concept had universal applicability to just about any military situation plus those in the political, commercial, diplomatic, etc. realms as well. From then on I kept my eyes open for anything about Boyd (hence my initial high-hopes for Coram's book when I saw it reviewed in "Air & Space" magazine) but in the pre-internet age that was difficult. Ten years later I stumbled across "A Discourse on Winning and Losing" at the Ft. Leavenworth library. Its simplicity and elegance were obvious. Unfortunately, the other 99% of the US military was as tradition-bound (and I don't mean that in a good way) and entrenched as those USAF fighter generals, Boyd's thinking didn't fit into American doctrine so found few adherents.

Regrettably, the reader of Coram's book will learn little about these theories. As a journalist he's competent to discuss Boyd the teen-age life guard or USAF workaholic but only knows the very basics about the military (a couple of airplane rides notwithstanding) so Coram has to rely on others to tell him about Boyd's philosophy and here he falls way short. Therefore, after a few paragraphs or a couple of pages superficially describing the OODA Loop, etc. it's back to anecdotes concerning Boyd the curmudgeon telling yet another general to pound sand.

Coram's book is a bibliography only in the most limited sense. I'd wager 99% of his readership are left wondering "OK, so this guy Boyd made full colonel and was a great thinker but his personality and modus operandi were so strident and off-putting that his potentially great message was squandered due to his personal baggage. Therefore where's his greatness in this?"

Then there's the remaining 1% of us who are still waiting for a serious treatment of Boyd's thinking that would fulfill the implied promise of Coram's subtitle and explain how Boyd "changed the art of war." I have little doubt Boyd contributed to the military arts and sciences in exactly this manner but one's not going to learn that from the admiring Coram.

I'm not sure how Robert Coram's book justified all the gushing praise printed on its cover and front matter. It's a serviceable biography if one wants to learn about John Boyd's relationship with his mother but don't expect to learn a lot about his theories: potentially Boyd's "real" impact on the US military.

The reader will learn that Boyd was a rebel, a potty mouth, he flipped the bird to superior officers, evidently enjoyed prodigious Schadenfreude when a competitor failed, etc. Anecdotes demonstrating these character flaws of Boyd's come at the reader ad nauseam. If I had a dime for every time Coram writes words to the effect that "Boyd's behavior would have ended the career of a lesser officer" I'd be a wealthy man. Boyd basically banged his head against a concrete wall most of his career. However, I wonder how much, if at all, Boyd's legacy survived the ten years since his death (he died in March, 1997, I'm writing this in March, 2007).

Boyd demonstrated that as an old colonel once told me "Those who think also serve." His first theories concerned air-to-air combat as the world's air forces transitioned to jet planes and evidently were successfully implemented by the USAF late in the Vietnam War. Due largely to Boyd's self-destructive tendencies he was not allowed to fly fighters during that conflict. In the 1970s-80s he kept thinking while serving, among other places, at the Pentagon. Here his main mission in life seemed to be the vain attempt to keep the F-15s and F-16s "pure fighters" against the efforts of USAF generals to load them down with avionics and ordnance.

I first became aware of Boyd in the early `80s when a friend turned me on to the Boyd- or OODA Loop. Clearly this concept had universal applicability to just about any military situation plus those in the political, commercial, diplomatic, etc. realms as well. From then on I kept my eyes open for anything about Boyd (hence my initial high-hopes for Coram's book when I saw it reviewed in "Air & Space" magazine) but in the pre-internet age that was difficult. Ten years later I stumbled across "A Discourse on Winning and Losing" at the Ft. Leavenworth library. Its simplicity and elegance were obvious. Unfortunately, the other 99% of the US military was as tradition-bound (and I don't mean that in a good way) and entrenched as those USAF fighter generals, Boyd's thinking didn't fit into American doctrine so found few adherents.

Regrettably, the reader of Coram's book will learn little about these theories. As a journalist he's competent to discuss Boyd the teen-age life guard or USAF workaholic but only knows the very basics about the military (a couple of airplane rides notwithstanding) so Coram has to rely on others to tell him about Boyd's philosophy and here he falls way short. Therefore, after a few paragraphs or a couple of pages superficially describing the OODA Loop, etc. it's back to anecdotes concerning Boyd the curmudgeon telling yet another general to pound sand.

Coram's book is a bibliography only in the most limited sense. I'd wager 99% of his readership are left wondering "OK, so this guy Boyd made full colonel and was a great thinker but his personality and modus operandi were so strident and off-putting that his potentially great message was squandered due to his personal baggage. Therefore where's his greatness in this?"

Then there's the remaining 1% of us who are still waiting for a serious treatment of Boyd's thinking that would fulfill the implied promise of Coram's subtitle and explain how Boyd "changed the art of war." I have little doubt Boyd contributed to the military arts and sciences in exactly this manner but one's not going to learn that from the admiring Coram.

An excellent read. As a former Naval aviator and now an employe for Lockheed Martin Aeronautics where the F-16 is built, I can attest to Boyd's drive to build the best lightwight fighter in the world. He was certainly correct in his methodolgy to build somethng that the rest of the world did not have. Sales prove that. But the information in the behind the scenes tactics that Boyd employed are exceptional reading. Highly recommended - everyone that I have suggested that they read this book has agreed

An excellent read. As a former Naval aviator and now an employe for Lockheed Martin Aeronautics where the F-16 is built, I can attest to Boyd's drive to build the best lightwight fighter in the world. He was certainly correct in his methodolgy to build somethng that the rest of the world did not have. Sales prove that. But the information in the behind the scenes tactics that Boyd employed are exceptional reading. Highly recommended - everyone that I have suggested that they read this book has agreed

Overall, this book has more merit as the basis for someone interested in producing a 'Made for T.V. movie', then it does for anyone seriously interested in COL Boyd's career and his contribution to the art or war.

In 'BOYD', Coram attempts to portray COL Boyd's career (1952-1975) as a single faceted, 'fighter pilot's crusade' against the inept and corupt Defense bureaucracy.

This portrayal ignores the significant influence that 'Nuclear Brinkmanship' had on defense policy and military thinking at the time of the Cold War (1947-1991) and results in a substantially biased and diminished work that all too often relies upon innuendo, conjecture and exagerations in order to preserve the author's story line over any form of historical objectivity.

During the Cold War, the major threat and focus of the senior military and civilian leadership of this country was on the 'nuclear triad' (i.e. Strategic Bombers, ICBMs & Nuke Subs), not on tactical fighter combat. Against this backdrop, Coram's antithesis, "Bigger-Higher-Faster-Farther" while making for a very poor fighter, does describe the performance parameters that could lead to an exceptional 'bomber interceptor', that would address one of these three threats to our national security. A part of the story that Coram gives no attention too and a fine example of the lack of objectivity that permeates this book.

Finally, two of COL Boyd's most important contributions to the art of war, 'The OODA Loop' and 'Destruction and Creation' (the former of which had a significant influence on the development of the Land Warfare Doctrine that defeated Iraq twice in the last two decades), only get cursory coverage in this book at best.

As important as Coram makes Boyd's E-M theory (i.e. a technical measurement of aircraft performance) out to be , its influence and impact on aerial warfare and the art of war is mostly technical, of which the benefits it will provide, can only be temporary at best.

Even now, technical improvements in 'air to air' and 'missile engagement' technology (i.e. Radar, AIM-7s, AIM-9s and even pilotless aircraft,...etc.) are such that it is possible to forsee the day when these advances will succeed in eliminating most, if not all of the area of the fighter engagement envelope that E-M was created to address.

When that happens, Robert Coram's book which is mainly aimed at the controversial aspect of COL Boyd's E-M contribution, will have missed the mark of how it could have told the story about "The 'Man' That Did Change the Art of War".

This is easily one of the most impactful books I have ever read on military theory. Boyd and the work of his acolytes should be on the Chief of Staff's reading list. I am also embarrassed at the behavior of senior officers during Boyd's time. It's revolting. There are still clearly military politicians and military warriors.

This book and the work of others who have followed Boyd will be required reading for all of my officers.

I have just, a few minutes ago, finished a book called "BOYD: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War", by Robert Coram.

It is truly one of the most amazing books I've ever read. And it applies to everything I am working on in my business now. It is about fighting a war by thinking way, way outside the dots. Though I related to this book because I, like Col. Boyd, am an Air Force guy, it was the Marines who best adapted his philosophy of war. It was because Marines are by their nature purely tactical, yet highly disciplined and adaptive.

Having worked in the Pentagon, having seen the way the military worked (or didn't), having been at the top of big business and seen the very beginnings of fantastic small business success - this book is amazing and applies to them all. You feel from reading it that you're now in on some secret.

He was truly a hero, one who made so any generals mad that he and virtually everyone who ever believed in him were punished severely, their careers ruined, their lives changed for the worse, their beliefs labeled heretical. And yet in the end, they turned out to be right not, in the Pentagon or most of big business, that matters. When the soldiers die because of useless equipment it is never the fault of those in power at the time, but of those years before.

Anyway, if Lean Manufacturing is compared to his theories and Tom Peters gives him credit for his original "Thriving on Chaos" radical management theory book, there's something to this guy, something we all could apply right now, this day, this minute to flanking the enemy and to thinking, once and for all, about absolutely nothing else day and night.

This was one of those books where, when I turned the page and realized the end was coming, I simply could not breath.

im only 14, dont get straight a's, and I dont no much about aviation. this book was amazing. no other word. i understood 95% of the math. if u have any interesest in aviation you should read this book. i promise you it will be one of your favorite books.

im only 14, dont get straight a's, and I dont no much about aviation. this book was amazing. no other word. i understood 95% of the math. if u have any interesest in aviation you should read this book. i promise you it will be one of your favorite books.

I first heard of Boyd the fighter pilot when I operated out of Boyd Hall at Nellis AFB and saw the blurb about him in the entryway. When the book came out, I was eager to find out more, especially since I have flown F-16s for many years, and was interested in more of its background, since the book promised revealing Boyd's influence in the development of the modern fighter.

I did find the book interesting, but I think not in the way the author intended. As a fighter pilot, Boyd seems to have been exceptional, but that aspect was only worth a few chapters (which is about how much it took). I thought the author spent entirely too much time on Boyd's childhood, trying to lay the groundwork for explaining his eccentric behavior. As a person, I found Boyd anything but admirable. He was a lousy officer, a lousy husband, and a lousy father (based on the facts laid out in the book). And by the author's own accounts, Boyd was somewhat less than fully truthful in some of his recounts of past exploits. One thing I got from the book was that if Boyd had been able to improve his interpersonal relationship skills even a little, he could have had a much greater, positive affect on all the things he is known to have influenced and probably many he is not known for. But I strongly agree with what Boyd said about "doing something" or "being someone" (careerists) in the Air Force (trust me, after 18 years I understand - I chose to do and consequently got burned).

This brings me to the three things I thought made the book a worthwhile read. I loved the nitty gritty that surrounded Boyd as the fighter pilot. I thought it interesting to compare the then and now, to read about some of the first jet fighters from a fighter pilot's perspective. But what I found even more interesting was the story surrounding Boyd's lengthy time at the pentagon and the influences and swirling controversy Boyd affected on the developments of the fighters of my era, the F-111, F15, A-10 and F-16. The third was Boyd's direct influence on the change in much of the doctrinal thinking across the services in his later years.

So, as a vehicle to bring the reader through these interesting eras, Boyd was worthy of a book. I only wish the author hadn't spent so much effort trying to make Boyd out as a super-human who just wasn't understood, instead of what he was, an eccentric fighter pilot with some great ideas and the convictions to see them through.

Well Done--Coram!

America is desperately seeking patriots in all fields of endeavor; education, social services, military, industry and especially government.

You revealed a group of patriots who knowingly put thier country before their own self-interests--and you also clearly showed what happens to a patriot!

Again! WELL DONE!

I both enjoyed and learned a lot from this book. It is right for you if your interests fit one or more of the following:
1. It is a fast moving description of a most unusual man. He was not entirely admirable by any means but he had a genius and an integrity that you have to admire.
2. In my younger years I did a lot of flying and had a part in designing aircraft. I found boyd's ideas on aircraft of great interest.
3. I believe that like it or not we must all share in decisions about, not if, but what kind of military forces we must have. This book is only a start but if you are interested there are a number of good follow up books cited about Boyd and his sources of information and ideas on military strategy.
4. It is a useful study of the great difficulty in managing a huge Federal establishment and particularly something as specialized and far reaching as the military.
5. If you like a good story and one or several of these topics interest you buy this book. You will get your money's worth.

This book works on two levels. First, it is a biography of a very interesting man; it also provides a "slice of life" (a la Chuck Yeager's autobiography) for those interested in military careers.

On a deeper level, it introduces a revolutionary way of thinking. The OODA loop, put simply, is to do the least-expected thing to get your opponent off balance, and to follow that with more "least-expected" actions until you achieve your goal. The trick is to understand the situation before the opponent does.

Since reading this book, I've started seeing "OODA Loops" everywhere there has been success in competition--basketball games, boxing matches, contract negotiations, advertising campaigns, chess, office politics, the invasion of Iraq...

The book provides a good (if basic) intro to Boyd's ideas, but it does give you the tools to understand his (very chewy)concepts. It also includes an extensive list of books Boyd found interesting, which I have been using to guide my own reading.

Overall I highly recommend the book but with the caveat that further reading is needed to gain a more balanced understanding of Boyd's immense contribution to our nation.