Fascinating insight into the mind of a genius. I read it in one day and did not want it to end.

In 2008, John Arquill (Netwars) will publish a book on American military reform. In it he makes three recommendations, the elimination of the Pentagon, the end of strategic bombing strategy, and force reductions to 100,000 in each of the main services.

This book, published in 2002, tells the story of a man who fought to realize these same notions in the 70s, 80s and 90s.

The book reads like a novel. As told, John Boyd is a flawed genius on a lonely mission, assisted by a few friends. There isn't much work done to place Boyd in context. Instead, Boyd is the context. He is Newton, Sun Tzu and George Washington blended into one great, tragic master. I think the story would stand on its own merits without the hype.

Within the excited rhetoric, one can get a sense of the dark bureaucratic games played in Washington. This alone is worth the time spend reading.

One of the most interesting themes involves bureaucratic wars between Army, Navy, Air Force and any politician in power. As told here, true Air Force vitriol was not expended on foreign enemies, it was saved for the Navy, Marines and Army. After all, there is always a much higher chance that your career will be cripled by a competing service, than by a foreign power. As Orwell wrote in "1984", "The Party seeks power entirely for its own sake. We are not interested in the good of others; we are interested solely in power. Not wealth or luxury or long life or happiness: only power; pure power."

These tales occupy half the book and are told almost exclusively from the recollections of Boyd's friends. In fact, the second half of the book is really about the activities of Boyd's friends, not Boyd. Frankly, I don't know what to make of this. You can read it with blind faith in Boyd, or take any one of many over-generalizations and dismiss the whole thing. There are plenty of gratuitous insults against anyone not a fighter pilot to turn off any but the most friendly reader. Perhaps, it is best to see it as an attempt to see it like Boyd saw the Pentagon bureaucracy battles. As such, you get to ride copilot and enjoy the ride. At a minimum, it will make your next reading of Sun-Tzu more interesting.

In 2008, John Arquill (Netwars) will publish a book on American military reform. In it he makes three recommendations, the elimination of the Pentagon, the end of strategic bombing strategy, and force reductions to 100,000 in each of the main services.

This book, published in 2002, tells the story of a man who fought to realize these same notions in the 70s, 80s and 90s.

The book reads like a novel. As told, John Boyd is a flawed genius on a lonely mission, assisted by a few friends. There isn't much work done to place Boyd in context. Instead, Boyd is the context. He is Newton, Sun Tzu and George Washington blended into one great, tragic master. I think the story would stand on its own merits without the hype.

Within the excited rhetoric, one can get a sense of the dark bureaucratic games played in Washington. This alone is worth the time spend reading.

I'm not sure how Robert Coram's book justified all the gushing praise printed on its cover and front matter. It's a serviceable biography if one wants to learn about John Boyd's relationship with his mother but don't expect to learn a lot about his theories: potentially Boyd's "real" impact on the US military.



The reader will learn that Boyd was a rebel, a potty mouth, he flipped the bird to superior officers, evidently enjoyed prodigious Schadenfreude when a competitor failed, etc. Anecdotes demonstrating these character flaws of Boyd's come at the reader ad nauseam. If I had a dime for every time Coram writes words to the effect that "Boyd's behavior would have ended the career of a lesser officer" I'd be a wealthy man. Boyd basically banged his head against a concrete wall most of his career. However, I wonder how much, if at all, Boyd's legacy survived the ten years since his death (he died in March, 1997, I'm writing this in March, 2007).



Boyd demonstrated that as an old colonel once told me "Those who think also serve." His first theories concerned air-to-air combat as the world's air forces transitioned to jet planes and evidently were successfully implemented by the USAF late in the Vietnam War. Due largely to Boyd's self-destructive tendencies he was not allowed to fly fighters during that conflict. In the 1970s-80s he kept thinking while serving, among other places, at the Pentagon. Here his main mission in life seemed to be the vain attempt to keep the F-15s and F-16s "pure fighters" against the efforts of USAF generals to load them down with avionics and ordnance.



I first became aware of Boyd in the early `80s when a friend turned me on to the Boyd- or OODA Loop. Clearly this concept had universal applicability to just about any military situation plus those in the political, commercial, diplomatic, etc. realms as well. From then on I kept my eyes open for anything about Boyd (hence my initial high-hopes for Coram's book when I saw it reviewed in "Air & Space" magazine) but in the pre-internet age that was difficult. Ten years later I stumbled across "A Discourse on Winning and Losing" at the Ft. Leavenworth library. Its simplicity and elegance were obvious. Unfortunately, the other 99% of the US military was as tradition-bound (and I don't mean that in a good way) and entrenched as those USAF fighter generals, Boyd's thinking didn't fit into American doctrine so found few adherents.



Regrettably, the reader of Coram's book will learn little about these theories. As a journalist he's competent to discuss Boyd the teen-age life guard or USAF workaholic but only knows the very basics about the military (a couple of airplane rides notwithstanding) so Coram has to rely on others to tell him about Boyd's philosophy and here he falls way short. Therefore, after a few paragraphs or a couple of pages superficially describing the OODA Loop, etc. it's back to anecdotes concerning Boyd the curmudgeon telling yet another general to pound sand.



Coram's book is a bibliography only in the most limited sense. I'd wager 99% of his readership are left wondering "OK, so this guy Boyd made full colonel and was a great thinker but his personality and modus operandi were so strident and off-putting that his potentially great message was squandered due to his personal baggage. Therefore where's his greatness in this?"



Then there's the remaining 1% of us who are still waiting for a serious treatment of Boyd's thinking that would fulfill the implied promise of Coram's subtitle and explain how Boyd "changed the art of war." I have little doubt Boyd contributed to the military arts and sciences in exactly this manner but one's not going to learn that from the admiring Coram.

I'm not sure how Robert Coram's book justified all the gushing praise printed on its cover and front matter. It's a serviceable biography if one wants to learn about John Boyd's relationship with his mother but don't expect to learn a lot about his theories: potentially Boyd's "real" impact on the US military.

The reader will learn that Boyd was a rebel, a potty mouth, he flipped the bird to superior officers, evidently enjoyed prodigious Schadenfreude when a competitor failed, etc. Anecdotes demonstrating these character flaws of Boyd's come at the reader ad nauseam. If I had a dime for every time Coram writes words to the effect that "Boyd's behavior would have ended the career of a lesser officer" I'd be a wealthy man. Boyd basically banged his head against a concrete wall most of his career. However, I wonder how much, if at all, Boyd's legacy survived the ten years since his death (he died in March, 1997, I'm writing this in March, 2007).

Boyd demonstrated that as an old colonel once told me "Those who think also serve." His first theories concerned air-to-air combat as the world's air forces transitioned to jet planes and evidently were successfully implemented by the USAF late in the Vietnam War. Due largely to Boyd's self-destructive tendencies he was not allowed to fly fighters during that conflict. In the 1970s-80s he kept thinking while serving, among other places, at the Pentagon. Here his main mission in life seemed to be the vain attempt to keep the F-15s and F-16s "pure fighters" against the efforts of USAF generals to load them down with avionics and ordnance.

I first became aware of Boyd in the early `80s when a friend turned me on to the Boyd- or OODA Loop. Clearly this concept had universal applicability to just about any military situation plus those in the political, commercial, diplomatic, etc. realms as well. From then on I kept my eyes open for anything about Boyd (hence my initial high-hopes for Coram's book when I saw it reviewed in "Air & Space" magazine) but in the pre-internet age that was difficult. Ten years later I stumbled across "A Discourse on Winning and Losing" at the Ft. Leavenworth library. Its simplicity and elegance were obvious. Unfortunately, the other 99% of the US military was as tradition-bound (and I don't mean that in a good way) and entrenched as those USAF fighter generals, Boyd's thinking didn't fit into American doctrine so found few adherents.

Regrettably, the reader of Coram's book will learn little about these theories. As a journalist he's competent to discuss Boyd the teen-age life guard or USAF workaholic but only knows the very basics about the military (a couple of airplane rides notwithstanding) so Coram has to rely on others to tell him about Boyd's philosophy and here he falls way short. Therefore, after a few paragraphs or a couple of pages superficially describing the OODA Loop, etc. it's back to anecdotes concerning Boyd the curmudgeon telling yet another general to pound sand.

Coram's book is a bibliography only in the most limited sense. I'd wager 99% of his readership are left wondering "OK, so this guy Boyd made full colonel and was a great thinker but his personality and modus operandi were so strident and off-putting that his potentially great message was squandered due to his personal baggage. Therefore where's his greatness in this?"

Then there's the remaining 1% of us who are still waiting for a serious treatment of Boyd's thinking that would fulfill the implied promise of Coram's subtitle and explain how Boyd "changed the art of war." I have little doubt Boyd contributed to the military arts and sciences in exactly this manner but one's not going to learn that from the admiring Coram.

I'm not sure how Robert Coram's book justified all the gushing praise printed on its cover and front matter. It's a serviceable biography if one wants to learn about John Boyd's relationship with his mother but don't expect to learn a lot about his theories: potentially Boyd's "real" impact on the US military.

The reader will learn that Boyd was a rebel, a potty mouth, he flipped the bird to superior officers, evidently enjoyed prodigious Schadenfreude when a competitor failed, etc. Anecdotes demonstrating these character flaws of Boyd's come at the reader ad nauseam. If I had a dime for every time Coram writes words to the effect that "Boyd's behavior would have ended the career of a lesser officer" I'd be a wealthy man. Boyd basically banged his head against a concrete wall most of his career. However, I wonder how much, if at all, Boyd's legacy survived the ten years since his death (he died in March, 1997, I'm writing this in March, 2007).

Boyd demonstrated that as an old colonel once told me "Those who think also serve." His first theories concerned air-to-air combat as the world's air forces transitioned to jet planes and evidently were successfully implemented by the USAF late in the Vietnam War. Due largely to Boyd's self-destructive tendencies he was not allowed to fly fighters during that conflict. In the 1970s-80s he kept thinking while serving, among other places, at the Pentagon. Here his main mission in life seemed to be the vain attempt to keep the F-15s and F-16s "pure fighters" against the efforts of USAF generals to load them down with avionics and ordnance.

I first became aware of Boyd in the early `80s when a friend turned me on to the Boyd- or OODA Loop. Clearly this concept had universal applicability to just about any military situation plus those in the political, commercial, diplomatic, etc. realms as well. From then on I kept my eyes open for anything about Boyd (hence my initial high-hopes for Coram's book when I saw it reviewed in "Air & Space" magazine) but in the pre-internet age that was difficult. Ten years later I stumbled across "A Discourse on Winning and Losing" at the Ft. Leavenworth library. Its simplicity and elegance were obvious. Unfortunately, the other 99% of the US military was as tradition-bound (and I don't mean that in a good way) and entrenched as those USAF fighter generals, Boyd's thinking didn't fit into American doctrine so found few adherents.

Regrettably, the reader of Coram's book will learn little about these theories. As a journalist he's competent to discuss Boyd the teen-age life guard or USAF workaholic but only knows the very basics about the military (a couple of airplane rides notwithstanding) so Coram has to rely on others to tell him about Boyd's philosophy and here he falls way short. Therefore, after a few paragraphs or a couple of pages superficially describing the OODA Loop, etc. it's back to anecdotes concerning Boyd the curmudgeon telling yet another general to pound sand.

Coram's book is a bibliography only in the most limited sense. I'd wager 99% of his readership are left wondering "OK, so this guy Boyd made full colonel and was a great thinker but his personality and modus operandi were so strident and off-putting that his potentially great message was squandered due to his personal baggage. Therefore where's his greatness in this?"

Then there's the remaining 1% of us who are still waiting for a serious treatment of Boyd's thinking that would fulfill the implied promise of Coram's subtitle and explain how Boyd "changed the art of war." I have little doubt Boyd contributed to the military arts and sciences in exactly this manner but one's not going to learn that from the admiring Coram.

An excellent read. As a former Naval aviator and now an employe for Lockheed Martin Aeronautics where the F-16 is built, I can attest to Boyd's drive to build the best lightwight fighter in the world. He was certainly correct in his methodolgy to build somethng that the rest of the world did not have. Sales prove that. But the information in the behind the scenes tactics that Boyd employed are exceptional reading. Highly recommended - everyone that I have suggested that they read this book has agreed

An excellent read. As a former Naval aviator and now an employe for Lockheed Martin Aeronautics where the F-16 is built, I can attest to Boyd's drive to build the best lightwight fighter in the world. He was certainly correct in his methodolgy to build somethng that the rest of the world did not have. Sales prove that. But the information in the behind the scenes tactics that Boyd employed are exceptional reading. Highly recommended - everyone that I have suggested that they read this book has agreed

Overall, this book has more merit as the basis for someone interested in producing a 'Made for T.V. movie', then it does for anyone seriously interested in COL Boyd's career and his contribution to the art or war.

In 'BOYD', Coram attempts to portray COL Boyd's career (1952-1975) as a single faceted, 'fighter pilot's crusade' against the inept and corupt Defense bureaucracy.

This portrayal ignores the significant influence that 'Nuclear Brinkmanship' had on defense policy and military thinking at the time of the Cold War (1947-1991) and results in a substantially biased and diminished work that all too often relies upon innuendo, conjecture and exagerations in order to preserve the author's story line over any form of historical objectivity.

During the Cold War, the major threat and focus of the senior military and civilian leadership of this country was on the 'nuclear triad' (i.e. Strategic Bombers, ICBMs & Nuke Subs), not on tactical fighter combat. Against this backdrop, Coram's antithesis, "Bigger-Higher-Faster-Farther" while making for a very poor fighter, does describe the performance parameters that could lead to an exceptional 'bomber interceptor', that would address one of these three threats to our national security. A part of the story that Coram gives no attention too and a fine example of the lack of objectivity that permeates this book.

Finally, two of COL Boyd's most important contributions to the art of war, 'The OODA Loop' and 'Destruction and Creation' (the former of which had a significant influence on the development of the Land Warfare Doctrine that defeated Iraq twice in the last two decades), only get cursory coverage in this book at best.

As important as Coram makes Boyd's E-M theory (i.e. a technical measurement of aircraft performance) out to be , its influence and impact on aerial warfare and the art of war is mostly technical, of which the benefits it will provide, can only be temporary at best.

Even now, technical improvements in 'air to air' and 'missile engagement' technology (i.e. Radar, AIM-7s, AIM-9s and even pilotless aircraft,...etc.) are such that it is possible to forsee the day when these advances will succeed in eliminating most, if not all of the area of the fighter engagement envelope that E-M was created to address.

When that happens, Robert Coram's book which is mainly aimed at the controversial aspect of COL Boyd's E-M contribution, will have missed the mark of how it could have told the story about "The 'Man' That Did Change the Art of War".

This is easily one of the most impactful books I have ever read on military theory. Boyd and the work of his acolytes should be on the Chief of Staff's reading list. I am also embarrassed at the behavior of senior officers during Boyd's time. It's revolting. There are still clearly military politicians and military warriors.

This book and the work of others who have followed Boyd will be required reading for all of my officers.

I have just, a few minutes ago, finished a book called "BOYD: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War", by Robert Coram.

It is truly one of the most amazing books I've ever read. And it applies to everything I am working on in my business now. It is about fighting a war by thinking way, way outside the dots. Though I related to this book because I, like Col. Boyd, am an Air Force guy, it was the Marines who best adapted his philosophy of war. It was because Marines are by their nature purely tactical, yet highly disciplined and adaptive.

Having worked in the Pentagon, having seen the way the military worked (or didn't), having been at the top of big business and seen the very beginnings of fantastic small business success - this book is amazing and applies to them all. You feel from reading it that you're now in on some secret.

He was truly a hero, one who made so any generals mad that he and virtually everyone who ever believed in him were punished severely, their careers ruined, their lives changed for the worse, their beliefs labeled heretical. And yet in the end, they turned out to be right not, in the Pentagon or most of big business, that matters. When the soldiers die because of useless equipment it is never the fault of those in power at the time, but of those years before.

Anyway, if Lean Manufacturing is compared to his theories and Tom Peters gives him credit for his original "Thriving on Chaos" radical management theory book, there's something to this guy, something we all could apply right now, this day, this minute to flanking the enemy and to thinking, once and for all, about absolutely nothing else day and night.

This was one of those books where, when I turned the page and realized the end was coming, I simply could not breath.

im only 14, dont get straight a's, and I dont no much about aviation. this book was amazing. no other word. i understood 95% of the math. if u have any interesest in aviation you should read this book. i promise you it will be one of your favorite books.

im only 14, dont get straight a's, and I dont no much about aviation. this book was amazing. no other word. i understood 95% of the math. if u have any interesest in aviation you should read this book. i promise you it will be one of your favorite books.

I first heard of Boyd the fighter pilot when I operated out of Boyd Hall at Nellis AFB and saw the blurb about him in the entryway. When the book came out, I was eager to find out more, especially since I have flown F-16s for many years, and was interested in more of its background, since the book promised revealing Boyd's influence in the development of the modern fighter.

I did find the book interesting, but I think not in the way the author intended. As a fighter pilot, Boyd seems to have been exceptional, but that aspect was only worth a few chapters (which is about how much it took). I thought the author spent entirely too much time on Boyd's childhood, trying to lay the groundwork for explaining his eccentric behavior. As a person, I found Boyd anything but admirable. He was a lousy officer, a lousy husband, and a lousy father (based on the facts laid out in the book). And by the author's own accounts, Boyd was somewhat less than fully truthful in some of his recounts of past exploits. One thing I got from the book was that if Boyd had been able to improve his interpersonal relationship skills even a little, he could have had a much greater, positive affect on all the things he is known to have influenced and probably many he is not known for. But I strongly agree with what Boyd said about "doing something" or "being someone" (careerists) in the Air Force (trust me, after 18 years I understand - I chose to do and consequently got burned).

This brings me to the three things I thought made the book a worthwhile read. I loved the nitty gritty that surrounded Boyd as the fighter pilot. I thought it interesting to compare the then and now, to read about some of the first jet fighters from a fighter pilot's perspective. But what I found even more interesting was the story surrounding Boyd's lengthy time at the pentagon and the influences and swirling controversy Boyd affected on the developments of the fighters of my era, the F-111, F15, A-10 and F-16. The third was Boyd's direct influence on the change in much of the doctrinal thinking across the services in his later years.

So, as a vehicle to bring the reader through these interesting eras, Boyd was worthy of a book. I only wish the author hadn't spent so much effort trying to make Boyd out as a super-human who just wasn't understood, instead of what he was, an eccentric fighter pilot with some great ideas and the convictions to see them through.

Well Done--Coram!

America is desperately seeking patriots in all fields of endeavor; education, social services, military, industry and especially government.

You revealed a group of patriots who knowingly put thier country before their own self-interests--and you also clearly showed what happens to a patriot!

Again! WELL DONE!

I both enjoyed and learned a lot from this book. It is right for you if your interests fit one or more of the following:
1. It is a fast moving description of a most unusual man. He was not entirely admirable by any means but he had a genius and an integrity that you have to admire.
2. In my younger years I did a lot of flying and had a part in designing aircraft. I found boyd's ideas on aircraft of great interest.
3. I believe that like it or not we must all share in decisions about, not if, but what kind of military forces we must have. This book is only a start but if you are interested there are a number of good follow up books cited about Boyd and his sources of information and ideas on military strategy.
4. It is a useful study of the great difficulty in managing a huge Federal establishment and particularly something as specialized and far reaching as the military.
5. If you like a good story and one or several of these topics interest you buy this book. You will get your money's worth.

This book works on two levels. First, it is a biography of a very interesting man; it also provides a "slice of life" (a la Chuck Yeager's autobiography) for those interested in military careers.

On a deeper level, it introduces a revolutionary way of thinking. The OODA loop, put simply, is to do the least-expected thing to get your opponent off balance, and to follow that with more "least-expected" actions until you achieve your goal. The trick is to understand the situation before the opponent does.

Since reading this book, I've started seeing "OODA Loops" everywhere there has been success in competition--basketball games, boxing matches, contract negotiations, advertising campaigns, chess, office politics, the invasion of Iraq...

The book provides a good (if basic) intro to Boyd's ideas, but it does give you the tools to understand his (very chewy)concepts. It also includes an extensive list of books Boyd found interesting, which I have been using to guide my own reading.

Overall I highly recommend the book but with the caveat that further reading is needed to gain a more balanced understanding of Boyd's immense contribution to our nation.