I read this book, here in Brazil.This book is full of correct things, and I must tell you, that this book isn't very biased or ridiculous.This book even has some appendixes about bombers, losts e even one appendix with a letter.
Failures of this book are small.The biggest of them is the fact, that this book has almost nothing, about american bombers and its results.
Even so, this book is good.To example, on page 350 , the author writes:"The two great archivements of the allied strategic air offensive must be conceded to the Americans:the defeat of the Luftwaffe by the Mustang escort-fighter, and the inception of the deadly oil offensive."The British inflicted grevious injurious upon us,'said Milch after the war, 'but the Americans stabbed us to the heart.'

Bomber Command is a great book if you want to know about how bad war can be, and should be read by anyone that thinks there is some glory in war. However, the conclusion drawn by Jerry Saperstein, "as Hastings notes, there was no such thing as an innocent German civilian" is not supported by the text, and is full of hate, and is obnoxious. The statement apparently relates to the rationalization of "strategic" bombing that England the USA chose as being less expensive in US/UK lives, even if more expensive in civilian lives. In fact, at the start of WWII, bombers only got 10% of all loads withing fifty miles of the target, so setting cities on fire and then bombing them made targets that the bombers could find. The rational was that people who live in cities go to work in factories that either produce weapons or produce food, or electricity; something that supports the war effort. If this means that every German was guilty of war crimes, consider these two parallels: (1) Recently Hizboallah was accused by Amnesty International of war crime for firing rockets and aiming some of them cities (Hizbollah did kill more Israeli soldiers than civilians, so they were MUCH better than the British and US in WWII), (2) in August and September (2006) Israeli troops killed 37 children under 18 in Palestinian territory (Gaza, mostly), supported my weapons made in the USA, and by a huge amount of foreign aid from the USA. If Saperstein is correct, every Israeli, every Jew, and every American is guilty of killing each of those children (one was a young boy, killed while playing his own yard. The killing was followed by a call to his parents from Israel telling them to get out of their home). If we are all guilty of shooting children, I want out. Had any number like that of Israeli children been killed, certainly Mr. Saperstein would have found all Palestinians guilty, and it would justify taking more land from them. The facts are, you are responsible only for those things that you can change, millions of Jews/Israelis want Israel to implement UN Security Council Resolution 242, and every German knew that those who stood up the Hitler were soon killed. "Bomber Command" shows, as the war in Iraq has, that a few politicians can make huge decisions without the public even being told the facts, but the public will pay the price, even when they have no control over the actions. Guilt is not something that one person (even a writer) determines, and we have rightly condemned the German army for collective punishment for shooting civilians when they could not find partisans, a lesson we all need to appreciate.

Bomber Command is a great read, full of facts that will amaze you by their brutality, but any theory of common guilt was a rationalization to support collective punishment, just as Israel has recently done to Lebanon. Just as the bombing did not work in Lebanon, it did not work in Germany. Destroying people's homes does not make them stop supporting war, it leaves them with no alternative but fighting. If you are a war buff, or just want to know why Churchill put off invading Europe for so long, this is a must buy.

In this era of political correctness and "sensitivity," it may strike many as repulsive that hundreds of thousands of German civilians were the target of tons of bombs night after night from British aircraft. But the reality is that the campaign was intended to terrorize the German populaion into demanding that their leadership end the barbarous war they started. Ultimately, as Hastings notes, there was no such thing as an innocent German civilian. Each in their own way contributed or supported the slaughter and enslavement of millions by German soldiers and bureaucrats.

Hasting's contribution is to strip the British effort down to its barest essentials: its beginnings as the only effort the otherwise defeated and defenseless British could muster to the excesses of the bombing in the last few months of the war when almost everythng that could be destroyed had been destroyed.

Hasting has a wonderful approach, weaving general history into individual stories of the bombers, the planners, the civilians and soldiers.

For everyone with an interest in accurate history, "Bomber Command" is essential reading.

Jerry

It is simple really to understand. The Germans started the war, enslaved milllions, killed multi-millions, displaced millions, experimented on thousands and euthanized thousands. Why are the apoligists 60 years later saying that we should not have bombed German cities back to the stone age? In the context of that era what other resolution could there have been? Innocents on both sides were slaughtered.

First of all, it is easy to see how this work won the 1980 Somerset Maugham Award for Non-Fiction. I was totally riveted throughout. After reading the book in nearly one sitting, I felt exhausted and numb. The book is an indictment against the entire theory of strategic bombing in WWII and the wholesale slaughter of civilians specifically. While Max Hastings devotes much time to "Bomber" Harris who conducted the night-air campaign without reflection or apologies, his sharpest barbs are for those politicians (Churchill included) and senior military planners that made policy. These hid behind an unspoken but widely understood policy that wide-area terror bombing was the only avenue available to Bomber Command for most of the war but refused to discuss the subject honestly in the public arena in the hopes that they could maintain some sense of moral superiority over their enemy. Hastings also correlates Bomber Command's policy and operations with that of the USAAF, who he writes also hid behind a pretense that collateral casualties were a regrettable but unavoidable tragedy of war. Of course the hypocrisy of this position was laid bare following the continued slaughter of unprotected German cities in 1945 long after everyone knew that the bombing would make no difference to the outcome or even pace of the war, it became bombing just for bombing's sake, or in the case of Dresden, showing the Soviets what Anglo-American air power could do; slaughtering refugees fleeing from the advancing Soviet horde. In fact, the Associated Press reported in February 1945 that the Allied Air Chiefs had embarked on a terror campaign against the German civilian population, but Hastings points out that this news scoop was 3 years late (it had of course been policy soon after the British realized they could not hit specific targets at night). The most mind numbing account is late in the book in which Hastings describes in detail the bombing of Darmstadt. The Allied armies were within 100 miles of Darmstadt and the civilians were under the mistaken impression that they would be spared. In September 1944 Bomber Command made Darmstadt its next target for destruction. As Hastings makes the point, the horror is not that the attack was particularly special or difficult, it was the routine of it all that made it so terrible. The entire process reminds me of the banal evil more often associated with the murder of the Jews; being led into the concentration camps were "the system" would process and prepare them for organized and efficient death. Such was the case of German cities by late 1944. The Luftwaffe had nearly run out of aviation fuel and could only put up a meaningful defense on occasion. The Anglo-American armies had overrun the Luftwaffe's radar belts, so even when fuel was available, the Luftwaffe night-fighters could receive no warnings or directions. The "system" identified a German city for destruction, the bombers went up, everyone did their job and went home. Numbers were difficult to come by, but perhaps 10,000 died in that raid. 1 out of every 5 was a child under 16. 1.81 women for every man (at this stage of the war most men away from the war fronts were elderly). The casualties inflicted upon the citizens of Darmstadt were less than that of many larger German cities, but demonstrates that no German city regardless of size or importance was immune to terror bombing. In fact, Hastings describes how several German cities were identified for destruction not because they contributed to the German war effort, but because they could be easily destroyed, as in the case of medieval cities with a preponderance of wooden housing. Hastings describes the eventual unspoken shame that the wholesale slaughter of the German civilian population left in the minds of the British royalty and government. After the war, Churchill tried his best to distance himself from it and declined to secure a peerage for "Bomber" Harris (a reward given to many with lesser responsibilities). The Bomber Command aircrew were not awarded a Campaign Medal, though the Luftwaffe night-fighters and flak crews inflicted between 72,000-73,000 casualties on British Bomber Command alone. "Bomber" Harris himself emigrated with his family to South Africa soon after the war, shunned by those that used him to conduct their own policies. Hastings makes clear that nobody wanted to take credit for the terror bombing policies of Bomber Command after the smoke of WWII cleared. Hastings does not fault the young aircrew themselves and has nothing but admiration for them. Even so, during his research for the book, he interviews a surviving pilot who became a teacher after the war. The former Bomber Command pilot asks Hastings if others he interviewed complained of nightmares. Perhaps something for the young to think about the next time their government orders then to bomb civilians. Does a state of war really justify the killing of defenseless civilians? Does it really matter that the other side did it first (though in fact many give credit to Churchill for having a German city bombed first in the hopes of redirecting Luftwaffe focus from the RAF airfields to British cities, giving the RAF a new lease on life at the height of the Battle of Britain. This strategy proved successful). Regardless who bombed who first, can killing nearly a million German (and thousands of French) civilians be morally justified? There seems no doubt that the western Allies gave up much of the moral superiority they seem so fond of taking for granted. The biggest irony of all is a point Hastings makes again and again, would not the war have been conducted more efficiently had the resources lavishly spent on Bomber Command been used to assist the British armies and Royal Navy instead? The morale of the German civilian population and their industrial production levels never faltered throughout the day (USAAF) and night (Bomber Command) bombings, only when the German war machine ran out of manpower and fuel did Hitler's armies finally fall back and eventually become overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers. It seems quite probable that the horrors unleashed on the civilian populations did little to actually win the war.

This was a fascinating, and at times, disturbing read. How people in command at the highest levels stubbornly adhere to theories of warfare in the face of mounting evidence disproving those theories, and despite having no clear criteria for success. Hastings offers a balanced examination of a difficult subject, and a critique which is careful to judge the decisions made and actions taken within the context of the times, rather than undertaking a ex post facto guilt trip. The use of the airmen's personal stories, and the harrowing description of the raid on Darmstadt help illuminate the history.

This book is a history of the British Bomber Command. The horror of world war one led the British to build a strategic air force as a means of avoiding the sorts of casualties faced in that war. It was hoped that by using air craft Germany could be made to surrender.

This book is an examination of the failure of that strategic concept. In the first days of the war the British tried a daylight raid on Bremen naval yards. It was generally thought that bombers could get through in daylight due to their speed and defensive armament. This turned out to be a false assumption and a large number of the British Bombers were shot down. Further raids confirmed the vulnerability of unescorted bombers and from that time on it was decided that British Bombers would fly only at night.

For some months bombers flew out at night and tried to bomb various military and industrial targets. The bombing was so inaccurate generally hitting farmland and forests that the Germans were not able to even work out what the intended targets were. The British carried out evaluations and found that only a small percentage of bombs were falling within miles of the targets.

As a result a change in strategy was adopted and that was to bomb the German civilian population. The reason for that was that cities by comparison were easy to find and the use of incendiaries could lead to destructive fires which could destroy housing stock.

The only problem with the strategy was that it resulted in the deaths mainly of the elderly women and children. The structure of German cities was such that the burning and bombing of cities only had a marginal effect on industrial production. (The situation was different in Japan where industry was dotted throughout cities and the fire bombing led to the collapse of industrial production in that country)

The German night fighter effort was reasonably successful against the British Bombers so that the casualty rates of British air crews was very high. The book argues that in general terms the campaign was a poor use of resources and had limited effects until near the end of the war. By late 1944 the German air force was practically destroyed and allied bombers by that time had such a preponderance that they were able to destroy the transport network and to destroy production.

The book is well written easy to read and a fascinating look at a topic that has been dominated by myth makers not truth seekers.

This is an excellent book that objectively traces the history and rationale for the area Bombing campaign against Germany that would lead to the deaths of 52000 aircrew and more than half a million civilians.

The book also relates the revulsion and guilt felt by many aircrew when confronted, after the war, with the results of their bombing missions.

Ironically these same aircrew still idolise their Operational commander - Bomber Harris, who never set foot on an operational squadron during the War.

Arguments are also related about the disagreements that Bomber Harris had with his American colleagues who wanted the Area Bombing campaign transferred to destroying synthetic oil plants and ball bearing factories. Harris wanted to continue bombing cities even when there was not much left to bomb.

When first published this book was severely criticised in England, for daring to suggest that the effort put into Area Bombing could have been better spent elswhere.

This is a thoroughly readable and thought provoking book.

This is unquestionably the best general history in English. All bases are covered fairly. Of course it is written in the English historical tradition.

I read this on the advice of a friend after a tour of northern Germany during which I wondered why so many of the beautiful churches had been levelled in WWII. This book gives a detailed narrative of the strategy and tactics, as well as the horror on the ground and in the air of this controversial air campaign. Interesting and thought-provoking to read. Written by an Englishman.