This book did what it was intended to do. It made me understand that CIA took the blame for "intelligence failure" as part of the political process in Washington. Tenet did his job pretty well it seems. He worked hard and used all his personal and professional resources to win allies to the U.S. cause. Actually, I think Tenet did remarkably well. Also, right from the beginning I liked him, especially when hearing of his Greek and Albanian roots and the way his parents brought up their sons.

The problem with the CIA, and maybe a very good thing, is they don't set policy and they don't have a seat among the cabinet officials. They're out of the inner power loop, and Tenet was of the Clinton administration and not one of Bush's inner circle. As a result, the longer he stayed on at CIA under the Bush administration, the more his job became to have the agency and himself absorb the blame for strategic policy failures of the administration.

This is really a long and detailed book. The early part was on the fight against terror and it showed that when there is less partisan bickering in Washington, the CIA can be extraordinarily effective and deliver very good returns on the public investment. As the concerns about terror subsided, except in the media off course, and the overriding concern became the Iraq War, everything changed. Nothing Tenet said was appreciated by the administration during this time and he was simply fighting a losing battle. His views, based on information, differed from the start with Cheney and the neocon group, and they made it clear that the information must be changed to suit the policy. By staying on, Tenet was accommodating them unwittingly. His book sets the record clear for scholars, but will probably never be understood by 99% of the American people.

Unfortunately, the monotonous drone of controlled media sound bites will endure as truth during our lives and crowd out thoughtful books such as this one by George Tenet. People will always think the U.S. went to war in Iraq due to intelligence failures, and many will always blame Sadam for 9/11. Tenet's audience, therefore, is incredibly small.

Because Tenet is not old, one would hope he returns somehow to the national stage at some point to continue his work against terror and to try to get the politicians to properly use intelligence analysis. In the meantime, we can rest assured that the first Greek-Albanian to hold such an office did a damned good job.

Mr. Tenet is a great storyteller. The melodrama is rampant here. Where does the story end and the truth begin? There is only an index at the back of this book. No footnotes whatsoever. Other books that I have read from former gov't officials have copies of un- or de-classified memos and documents to back up their arguements. Arbitrary discretion does not inspire confidence in the story. It will always be a mystery to me as to the reasoning behind President Bush keeping this holdover from the Clinton administration on as CIA director. Mr. "slam-dunk" fails again.

Fortunately, I waited to buy this from the "bargain books" list. Read the book, just take what he says with a grain of salt.

It is an interesting point of view but there are some serious omissions and denials that make the story incredulous. Although the CIA had a complete failure on the WMD's in Iraq, Mr. Tenant fails to understand why his intelligence agency was not fully listened to in Iraq. Secondly, he fails and or doesn't bother to explain why they had absolutely no inside people or intel in Iraq or for how many years this was the case.

Mr. Tenant also claims that many of the leaks of the NSE papers were done because either people felt that they needed the information known to improve the situation in Iraq or because the people felt they were being ignored and the purpose was not political. He further states it was not the people from his office leaking the reports. He does not say there are people who wish to damage the administration and leaked the reports to do so. Either he is a liar or he was to stupid to lead the CIA. He appears to be a very bright man.

Mr. Tenant fails to even address the press reporting and the senators and congressman who continue to call for us to withdrawl and the effects that this has on the war. Mr. Tenant talks about the funding in Iraq but fails again to address the fact that when 2100 professionals were requested to train Iraqi police, the congress and the senate funded 800. All of these things were by his account, policy failures of the current administration and he never mentions those in our government actively working against our country in Iraq such as Dennis Kucinich.

Mr. Tenant makes no attempt at all in addressing the people in our own country that are working against us. Leaking our banking pursuits against terrorists or other programs. What he really fails to do is explain how programs, only known by his people got leaked to the press. Then makes the statement that leaks were not coming from his office. However, he and his people know they can leak a program to a senator and a congressman. That senator or congressman can then go on national news and leak the program and then Tenant can claim "his" people didn't leak it.

He talks about the Joe Wilson case but fails to explain why someone so unqualified for the job was sent in the first place. Secondly, why did this person not sign or agree to nondisclosure as normally would be done? Why did this scenario come to pass and how many more like it are there? Who okayed the moron to go and who paid any price for sending him? This is a minor gaff or bad trade craft. It was stupid and bad business. He omitted any kind of explanation on how something like this happened and he didn't have the curiosity to find out how many more things like this have happened. The purely political after math of this was his agencies fault. Why did he not come out and talk publicly about Joe Wilson's failure to follow CIA practices? After all he was working for them.


In the Afterward he talks about the need to form policies to fight against terrorism, yet doesn't talk about how politics have damaged our war effort. He talks about the old canard about western democracy versus middle eastern democracy. He sites our lack of engagement with the Palestinians. The problem is the middle east will point anywhere else but at themselves as a cause of the problem. They will use Palestine, the condition in a country they are not part of to justify leaving negotiations when they don't feel like talking. Saying that not settling a problem that hasn't been settled in close to 60 years is a center piece will always lead to failure. If he doesn't recognize it, that is what the rest of the middle east wants. What does the Palestinian problem have to do with Thailand or the Phillipines? There is muslim terrorism there as well. As far as domestic spying goes, we have people actively fighting it. They find people to leak the programs that were in his building. Politics do effect spying. He seems to dance around the obvious.

He had many conspicuous omissions from his analysis.

It is an interesting point of view but there are some serious omissions and denials that make the story incredulous. Although the CIA had a complete failure on the WMD's in Iraq, Mr. Tenant fails to understand why his intelligence agency was not fully listened to in Iraq. Secondly, he fails and or doesn't bother to explain why they had absolutely no inside people or intel in Iraq or for how many years this was the case.

Mr. Tenant also claims that many of the leaks of the NSE papers were done because either people felt that they needed the information known to improve the situation in Iraq or because the people felt they were being ignored and the purpose was not political. He further states it was not the people from his office leaking the reports. He does not say there are people who wish to damage the administration and leaked the reports to do so. Either he is a liar or he was to stupid to lead the CIA. He appears to be a very bright man.

Mr. Tenant fails to even address the press reporting and the senators and congressman who continue to call for us to withdrawl and the effects that this has on the war. Mr. Tenant talks about the funding in Iraq but fails again to address the fact that when 2100 professionals were requested to train Iraqi police, the congress and the senate funded 800. All of these things were by his account, policy failures of the current administration and he never mentions those in our government actively working against our country in Iraq such as Dennis Kucinich.

Mr. Tenant makes no attempt at all in addressing the people in our own country that are working against us. Leaking our banking pursuits against terrorists or other programs. What he really fails to do is explain how programs, only known by his people got leaked to the press. Then makes the statement that leaks were not coming from his office. However, he and his people know they can leak a program to a senator and a congressman. That senator or congressman can then go on national news and leak the program and then Tenant can claim "his" people didn't leak it.

He had many conspicuous omissions from his analysis.

This is a valuable book and an unprecedented account by a Director of the CIA. Tenet's tenure, with its overriding focus on the threat of terrorism, bridged both the Clinton and George W. Bush presidencies. Tenet is not kind to many in the Bush administration, particularly Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld, Feith, Cheney, and Libbey, whom he accuses of cherry picking intelligence and asserting as fact statements that could not be backed up in their determination to justify a war with Iraq, but does not criticize the President. In the face of so many controversies and White House efforts to put the blame on intelligence for the Administration's policy errors, the book is at times inevitably defensive in tone, but this does not detract from a remarkable account full of considerable detail on matters not usually revealed in public. The "afterword" at the end makes it clear that, in Tenet's view, the war on Iraq was launched with total failure to heed warnings about the problems of winning the peace or making any real preparation therefor. For the future this account is an important reminder of both the importance and limitations of intelligence and the necessity always to "speak truth to power."

Tenet comes across remarkably unaware of the world around him, while simultaneously revealing intriguing conversations within the halls of our government. The fatal flaw of the book is the utter failure to recognize his own shortcomings or failures under his watch. He does so artfully though, simultaneously projecting an air of humility while really being quite blind to any failings. In the end, it projects a tone of "aw, shucks, I guess I really was pretty smart" which just doesn't jibe with the reality of the recently disclosed 2005 report from the CIA inspector general that outlines many of the CIA's failings under Tenet's leadership. This is a painful read (to see a guy so clueless and without any sense of self-awareness), but compelling enough to finish (to understand some of the mechanics of how we got ourselves into this mess).

"Poor George", but this George wasn't born with a silver spoon in his mouth. After reading what he had to say, I acquired a bit more respect for him than I had gotten from the media. George Tenet was in a tough job, made no easier by the White House and its coterie of yes-men around the other George. If the president wanted this man to be Director of Central Intelligence, he should have let him do his job, which was to oversee the collection and analysis of intelligence, not babysit the Israelis and Palestinians during interminable peace talks that eventually went nowhere. The Israelis and Palestinians are hell-bent on killing each other over their scrap of land---that's what Tenet needed to tell the president, not sit in while they pretended to negotiate. Tenet made too many trips to various places, particularly the Middle East; he should have been at Langley working. Even so, one has to give the guy credit for stamina. Tenet is very careful in this book to not directly criticize George Bush. Towards the end, particularly in the Afterword, criticism of Bush's policies, but not Bush himself, becomes more noticeable. After all, Bush invited Tenet's son to the White House for a private talk to assure the boy that he wasn't "mad" at him for being the purported reason his father resigned his job. Criticism of Vice President Dick Cheney, and several others such as Scooter Libby, is obvious. Tenet obviously thinks less of some of Cheney's doings that those of his boss. On the whole, this is a well-written and well-balanced book, and much better than expected.

I found this very interesting and provided a background knowledge of events that were transpiring right under our nose. Although I believe a lot of fact, there was too much justifying, but that may have been necessary to cope with a very difficult time and responsibility.

It is known that the US has one of the worst funded intelligence gathering agencies among modern nations. We pale in comparison to those enjoyed by our greatest enemies and our best friends of the past 20 years. George Tenet comes across as a normal, average product of our spy system. He does not compare well with Wild Bill Thompson, Allen Dulles and others who in earlier years headed the important task of gathering the information on which we make our decisions. To have the CIA Director removed from Cabinet Status by the president pretty much says it all.

The opening of the book, the clandestine walk along the canal, is right out of our every day expectations for CIA activity.

This 520 page book reads like a comprehensive account
of recent history by an insider -- but as to how
accurate and complete (how many important facts are
still classified?) it is? That will take time and
sifting by historians. On the first page of the book
the former DCI writes that on September 12, 2001 in
front of the White House, Richard Perle said to him:
"Iraq has to pay a price for what happened yesterday.
They bear responsibility." And that "odd encounter" is
gain mentioned on page 306. It has since been
reported that Richard Perle was out of the country on
that day. Is this just an accidental fictional hook in
a non-fiction book or is there more to it?
But even if this book may not be entirely factual it
is an informative insight into the risky jobs many
brave and talented people perform for us everyday
without getting the credit and public recognition they
deserve, because of secrecy requirements. And, of
course, as this book makes crystal clear they will
continue to get pummeled, because warnings without
actionable intelligence will never be acceptable in
this WMD world.
I subtract one star for Richard Perle's absence from
the right place on September 12, 2001.

1. The difficulty of reaching an agreement with Middle East Folk and how quickly an agreement is "Broken."
2. We are at WAR, and I do not believe a vast majority of the American people comprehend this fact.
3. Intelligence gathering is difficult and not perfect but neither is the USCongress and those who are always hanging the CIA "out to dry"
4.One mistakes buries a hundred successes.
5.When it "hits" the press, it's too late to "duck!"
6. George Tenet did his job, or he would not have run the CIA for seven years

Contrary to what the book's back cover might have you believe, George Tenet does not use this book as a means to deflect criticism. Instead, he recaps his experience as DCI (1997-2004) in the most honest way that he can.

Tenet never criticizes President Bush (43) explicitly. At times, he paints him as a man with good intentions. However, through much of Part III, Tenet implies that the President delegated (and abdicated) too much authority to his staff. Tenet vilifies Douglas Feith (undersecretary of defense for policy (2001-2005)) for promoting war with Iraq in advance of adequate supporting intelligence. He places Feith as a man who wielded a disproportionate amount of influence in the White House. It is left as an exercise for the reader to consider why President Bush was so willing to accept Feith's ideas in lieu of other credible viewpoints.

As articulated in the `Afterword' [p. 490-491, 499], Tenet constantly reminds the reader of the CIA's role in government:

"Often, at best, only 60 percent of the facts regarding any national security issue are knowable... Intelligence alone should never drive the formulation of policy. Good intelligence is no substitute for common sense or curiosity on the part of policy makers in thinking through the consequences of their actions... Intelligence does not operate in a vacuum, but within a broader mandate of policies and governance."

Here are some other highlights of the book:

- The CIA told the White House that Iraq likely possessed WMD (Chapter 17), but it never established a link between Iraq and al-Qa'ida (p.307).

- "In Afghanistan, we had started from the ground up, allowing the various political groups to legitimize themselves, then building to a central, representational government. In Iraq, the process couldn't have been more different... We were in charge, and by God, we knew what was best." (p.439)

- "Although CIA came to take everything we heard from [Ahmed] Chalabi with a healthy dose of skepticism, others, such as the vice president, Paul Wolfowitz, and Doug Feith, welcomed his views." (p. 397)

- "On one of his trips to Iraq, Wolfowitz told our senior [CIA] man there, 'You don't understand the policy of the U.S. government, and if you don't understand the policy, you are hardly in a position to collect the intelligence to help that policy succeed.'" (p. 430)

- The CIA suggested ways that the United States could establish peace in Iraq, but these suggestions were ignored (Chapter 23 and p. 441, 446).

- Brent Scowcroft was the only administration official who expressed public disapproval of the White House's plan to go to war with Iraq (p. 315).

- After the attack on the USS Cole, the U.S. "...Didn't need any additional excuses to go after UBL or his organization. But simply firing more cruise missiles into the desert wasn't going to accomplish anything. [The U.S.] needed to get into the Afghan sanctuary." (p. 128-131)

- "For years, it had been obvious that without the cooperation of the Pakistanis, it would be almost impossible to root out al-Qa'ida... The Pakistanis always knew more than they were telling us, and they had been singularly uncooperative in helping us run these guys down." (p. 139)

- Al-Qa'ida planned to attack the New York City subway in the fall of 2003. The attack was cancelled during the last stages of preparation "for something better". (p.260-261)

- "When I was with King Hussein, I always felt that I was in the presence of wisdom and history... I've often wondered what impact his wisdom would have had in helping all of us avert the mess we find ourselves in today." (p.71-72)

Contrary to what the book's back cover might have you believe, George Tenet does not use this book as a means to deflect criticism. Instead, he recaps his experience as DCI (1997-2004) in the most honest way that he can.

Tenet never criticizes President Bush (43) explicitly. At times, he paints him as a man with good intentions. However, through much of Part III, Tenet implies that the President delegated (and abdicated) too much authority to his staff. Tenet vilifies Douglas Feith (undersecretary of defense for policy (2001-2005)) for promoting war with Iraq in advance of adequate supporting intelligence. He places Feith as a man who wielded a disproportionate amount of influence in the White House. It is left as an exercise for the reader to consider why President Bush was so willing to accept Feith's ideas in lieu of other credible viewpoints.

As articulated in the `Afterword' [p. 490-491, 499], Tenet constantly reminds the reader of the CIA's role in government:

"Often, at best, only 60 percent of the facts regarding any national security issue are knowable... Intelligence alone should never drive the formulation of policy. Good intelligence is no substitute for common sense or curiosity on the part of policy makers in thinking through the consequences of their actions... Intelligence does not operate in a vacuum, but within a broader mandate of policies and governance."

Here are some other highlights of the book:

- The CIA told the White House that Iraq likely possessed WMD (Chapter 17), but it never established a link between Iraq and al-Qa'ida (p.307).

- "In Afghanistan, we had started from the ground up, allowing the various political groups to legitimize themselves, then building to a central, representational government. In Iraq, the process couldn't have been more different... We were in charge, and by God, we knew what was best." (p.439)

- "Although CIA came to take everything we heard from [Ahmed] Chalabi with a healthy dose of skepticism, others, such as the vice president, Paul Wolfowitz, and Doug Feith, welcomed his views." (p. 397)

- "On one of his trips to Iraq, Wolfowitz told our senior [CIA] man there, 'You don't understand the policy of the U.S. government, and if you don't understand the policy, you are hardly in a position to collect the intelligence to help that policy succeed.'" (p. 430)

- The CIA suggested ways that the United States could establish peace in Iraq, but these suggestions were ignored (Chapter 23 and p. 441, 446).

- Brent Scowcroft was the only administration official who expressed public disapproval of the White House's plan to go to war with Iraq (p. 315).

- After the attack on the USS Cole, the U.S. "...Didn't need any additional excuses to go after UBL or his organization. But simply firing more cruise missiles into the desert wasn't going to accomplish anything. [The U.S.] needed to get into the Afghan sanctuary." (p. 128-131)

- "For years, it had been obvious that without the cooperation of the Pakistanis, it would be almost impossible to root out al-Qa'ida... The Pakistanis always knew more than they were telling us, and they had been singularly uncooperative in helping us run these guys down." (p. 139)

- "When I was with King Hussein, I always felt that I was in the presence of wisdom and history... I've often wondered what impact his wisdom would have had in helping all of us avert the mess we find ourselves in today." (p.71-72)

Contrary to what the book's back cover might have you believe, George Tenet does not use this book as a means to deflect criticism. Instead, he recaps his experience as DCI (1997-2004) in the most honest way that he can.

Tenet never criticizes President Bush (43) explicitly. He paints him as a man with good intentions. However, through much of Part III, Tenet implies that the President delegated too much authority to his staff. In fact, it is fair to say that Tenet vilified Douglas Feith (undersecretary of defense for policy (2001-2005)) for promoting war with Iraq in advance of adequate supporting intelligence. In doing so, Tenet places Feith as a man who wielded a disproportionate amount of influence in the White House.

As articulated in the `Afterword' [p. 490-491, 499], Tenet constantly reminds the reader of the CIA's role in government:

"Often, at best, only 60 percent of the facts regarding any national security issue are knowable... Intelligence alone should never drive the formulation of policy. Good intelligence is no substitute for common sense or curiosity on the part of policy makers in thinking through the consequences of their actions... Intelligence does not operate in a vacuum, but within a broader mandate of policies and governance."

Here are some other highlights of the book:

- The CIA told the White House that Iraq likely possessed WMD (Chapter 17), but it never established a link between Iraq and al-Qa'ida (p.307).

- "In Afghanistan, we had started from the ground up, allowing the various political groups to legitimize themselves, then building to a central, representational government. In Iraq, the process couldn't have been more different... We were in charge, and by God, we knew what was best." (p.439)

- "Although CIA came to take everything we heard from [Ahmed] Chalabi with a healthy dose of skepticism, others, such as the vice president, Paul Wolfowitz, and Doug Feith, welcomed his views." (p. 397)

- "On one of his trips to Iraq, Wolfowitz told our senior man there, 'You don't understand the policy of the U.S. government, and if you don't understand the policy, you are hardly in a position to collect the intelligence to help that policy succeed.'" (p. 430)

- The CIA suggested ways that the United States could establish peace in Iraq, but these suggestions were ignored (Chapter 23 and p. 441, 446).

- Brent Scowcroft was the only administration official who expressed public disapproval of the White House's plan to go to war with Iraq (p. 315).

- After the attack on the USS Cole, the U.S. "...Didn't need any additional excuses to go after UBL or his organization. But simply firing more cruise missiles into the desert wasn't going to accomplish anything. [The U.S.] needed to get into the Afghan sanctuary." (p. 128-131)

- "For years, it had been obvious that without the cooperation of the Pakistanis, it would be almost impossible to root out al-Qa'ida... The Pakistanis always knew more than they were telling us, and they had been singularly uncooperative in helping us run these guys down." (p. 139)

- "When I was with King Hussein, I always felt that I was in the presence of wisdom and history... I've often wondered what impact his wisdom would have had in helping all of us avert the mess we find ourselves in today." (p.71-72)

It has most important issues talked about; There are best man and womam
serving our nation; The role model is for everybody of first american generation.
He is representing my most respected group of people. Yes, they made mistakes.
Who else did not ! We need all to realize that people are doing their
best, and that are all they can do. He and his group earned my best
admiration. As I said, this is my first book in more than 20 years.

Bush bashers will love the book even though this guy was not effective at all when Clinton appointed him. You will read reviews of people who could review The Wizard of Oz and tie all bad things to Bush. Just watching the delusional author on 60 Minutes was enough to tell one that the thesis of the book is blame all others, I did a great job. Tenet, who was a Capitol Hill hack, never was a professional intelligence officer. In fact, it is hard to find a job in his past for which he was not a political appointee. He dodges bullets about the first World Trade Center Bombing, Embassy bombings in Africa, USS Cole, Chinese Embassy bombing by U.S. Forces in Kosovo, India Nuclear Weapons Test, Iraq WMD, etc...Tenet failed time after time and still stayed on the job. In the book he claims the "system was blinking red" before 9/11, but never mentions this to the President in his daily meetings with him? He says, "Things don't work like that in D.C." If American lives being lost due to a terrorist attack on the homeland do not justify an "excuse me, Mr. President, but you must listen to this", what does. From the read, it seems he is more interested in self back patting, casting blame, and riding off into the sunset, gloriously of course. Tenet also fails to mention how he rolled his tenure as DCI into a million dollar pay-off working with contracting companies that provide services to CIA and the Intelligence Community.

The fact that this book has already vanished from public attention says it all. In my opinion, it is an attempt to varnish over his years at the CIA when the performance of that organization was an abomination security wise. The book just not justify CIA failures pre 9/11 nor vis-a-vis the WMD's alleged to be in Iraq. Nor does it explain where the weapons that Hussein once had and did use go to. A wasted effrort at self vindication for which there is none.

This is a pretty good recapitulation of events, personages, etc., during the time George Tenet was Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The text flows smoothly as Mr. Tenet recounts his experiences during difficult years leading up to and following the 9/11 terror attacks on U.S. soil. Tenet portrays himself early on as a man of the highest moral integrity and probity.





If however the reader is looking to find mea culpa(s) for Tenet's mistakes as DCI which helped lead to the September 11, 2001 atrocities, this is not the book to read. Instead this is a book filled with personal absolution and exculpation.





Case in point: Tenet's involvement at the Wye River negotiations which were completed in October 1998. Tenet wrote: "We don't make policy; we implement it." Tenet was responsible for security arrangements. His intimate dealings are with mass-murderer / arch-terrorist mastermind, Yasir Arafat. Mr. Tenet liked this killer on a personal level. Tenet got along well with Arafat's terrorist entourage, Muhammad Dahlan, Jabril Rajoub and Amin Al-Hindi. For an hour and a half George Tenet played a game of "Israeli jail-house pool" with Mohammed Dahlan.








Dahlan was chief of the Palestinian Security Forces in Gaza. According to reports, he spent four years in Israeli prison for terrorist activities, and was a commander of operations for Arafat's Fatah terror group during the mass "intifada" violence that began in 1987. Israeli government claims Dahlan was one of the primary directors of terrorist violence against Israelis in the Gaza region.





Israel Radio reported on October 20, 2000, that "Dahlan was behind the October 18 bombing of an Israeli bus in Gush Katif." The Israeli daily Ha'aretz reported on November 16, 2000, that "members of the Preventive Security Force in Gaza, headed by Mohammed Dahlan, were involved in a series of attacks on Israelis in Gush Katif and Netzarim." Ha'aretz reported on April 17, 2001, that Yasir Arafat "takes an active part in decisions regarding the firing of mortars. The general directives in this regard are passed to Mohammed Dahlan, and from Dahlan to his deputy, Rashid Abu Shabak."








Dahlan was defendant in a lawsuit filed by victims Arab terrorism, including an American citizen as well as three children whose legs were blown off in a Dahlan-directed rocket attack on a bus on November 20, 2000. The Israeli daily Hatzofeh has reported (April 13, 2001) that the Central Intelligence Agency has tape recordings of telephone conversations in which Dahlan can be heard ordering the November 20 rocket attack and other terrorist attacks against Israelis.





Dahlan told the PA-sponsored newspaper Al Ayam on Oct.26, 1998 that terrorist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad "will not be outlawed."





In an interview with the Hamas newspaper Al-Risallah (cited in Ha'aretz, June 15, 1997), Dahlan said: "The presence of Hamas on Palestinian territory is very important for building the Palestinian homeland."





The CIA chief, George Tenet, could not morally differentiate between the the one side --- the Israelis --- and the other side --- the Palestinian Arab terrorists. Tenet helped train Palestinian terrorists. If Tenet were a man of integrity, why didn't he protest to Clinton and later, to Bush administration officials? There was no personal protest with Clinton officials on the part of Tenet in the sordid affair at Wye --- other than against the release of convicted Israeli spy and a former United States Naval civilian intelligence analyst, Jonathan Pollard. No protest to the arming and training of Arafat's Palestinian Muslim terrorists.





This cognitive dissonance continues with the the current DCI, Michael Hayden. Bush's appointed Director of Central Intelligence, Hayden has been and continues arming and training Fatah terrorists; the successors to arch-terrorist Yasir Arafat --- godfather of modern terrorism and airline hijacking. Hamas terrorists recently routed Fatah terrorists in Gaza, acquiring millions of dollars in advanced U.S. weaponry.





As Tenet himself said, he was an "honest broker" between the terrorists and the Israelis.

This is a pretty good recapitulation of events, personages, etc., during the time George Tenet was Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The text flows smoothly as Mr. Tenet recounts his experiences during difficult years leading up to and following the 9/11 terror attacks on U.S. soil. Tenet portrays himself early on as a man of the highest moral integrity and probity.



If however the reader is looking to find mea culpa(s) for Tenet's mistakes as DCI which helped lead to the September 11, 2001 atrocities, this is not the book to read. Instead this is a book filled with personal absolution and exculpation.



Case in point: Tenet's involvement at the Wye River negotiations which were completed in October 1998. Tenet wrote: "We don't make policy; we implement it." Tenet was responsible for security arrangements. His intimate dealings are with mass-murderer / arch-terrorist mastermind, Yasir Arafat. Mr. Tenet liked this killer on a personal level. Tenet got along well with Arafat's terrorist entourage, Muhammad Dahlan, Jabril Rajoub and Amin Al-Hindi. For an hour and a half George Tenet played a game of "Israeli jail-house pool" with Mohammed Dahlan.





Dahlan was chief of the Palestinian Security Forces in Gaza. According to reports, he spent four years in Israeli prison for terrorist activities, and was a commander of operations for Arafat's Fatah terror group during the mass "intifada" violence that began in 1987. Israeli government claims Dahlan was one of the primary directors of terrorist violence against Israelis in the Gaza region.



Israel Radio reported on October 20, 2000, that "Dahlan was behind the October 18 bombing of an Israeli bus in Gush Katif." The Israeli daily Ha'aretz reported on November 16, 2000, that "members of the Preventive Security Force in Gaza, headed by Mohammed Dahlan, were involved in a series of attacks on Israelis in Gush Katif and Netzarim." Ha'aretz reported on April 17, 2001, that Yasir Arafat "takes an active part in decisions regarding the firing of mortars. The general directives in this regard are passed to Mohammed Dahlan, and from Dahlan to his deputy, Rashid Abu Shabak."





Dahlan was defendant in a lawsuit filed by victims Arab terrorism, including an American citizen as well as three children whose legs were blown off in a Dahlan-directed rocket attack on a bus on November 20, 2000. The Israeli daily Hatzofeh has reported (April 13, 2001) that the Central Intelligence Agency has tape recordings of telephone conversations in which Dahlan can be heard ordering the November 20 rocket attack and other terrorist attacks against Israelis.



Dahlan told the PA-sponsored newspaper Al Ayam on Oct.26, 1998 that terrorist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad "will not be outlawed."



In an interview with the Hamas newspaper Al-Risallah (cited in Ha'aretz, June 15, 1997), Dahlan said: "The presence of Hamas on Palestinian territory is very important for building the Palestinian homeland."



The CIA chief, George Tenet, could not morally differentiate between the the one side --- the Israelis --- and the other side --- the Palestinian Arab terrorists. Tenet helped train Palestinian terrorists. If Tenet were a man of integrity, why didn't he protest to Clinton and later, to Bush administration officials? There was no personal protest with Clinton officials on the part of Tenet in the sordid affair at Wye --- other than against the release of convicted Israeli spy and a former United States Naval civilian intelligence analyst, Jonathan Pollard. No protest to the arming and training of Arafat's Palestinian Muslim terrorists.



This cognitive dissonance continues with the the current DCI, Michael Hayden. Bush's appointed Director of Central Intelligence, Hayden has been and continues arming and training Fatah terrorists; the successors to arch-terrorist Yasir Arafat --- godfather of modern terrorism and airline hijacking. Hamas terrorists recently routed Fatah terrorists in Gaza, acquiring millions of dollars in advanced U.S. weaponry.



As Tenet himself said, he was an "honest broker" between the terrorists and the Israelis.

George Tenet rips into the Bush administration, the one he serves, but one wonders how much of this book was cobbled together tto sell while people still rememmbered the author. There is nothing 'secret' in this book and few insights that will enlighten someone who has read the newspapers for the last seven years. Tenet was a central figure in the administration and yet he comes away blaming others for many of the failings that took place on hsi watch. Additionally there are massive oversights in this book that leave one wodnering what was taking place at the CIA. At one point Tenet notes that he had no idea why Yasser Arafat hated the Kuwaitis. But wan'st Tenet briefed on the fact that Kuwait threw out 300,000 Palestinians in 1992 following the Gulf War and that Arafat himself had resided in Kuwait? Tenet was either ignorant, the CIA was blind or the book is just a rammbling account of nonsense.

Either way its not a book that bring many new things to light, although it gives the reader yet one more point of view on the Bush adminsitration from an 'insider'.





Seth J. Frantzman

George Tenet occupies a special place in history: he was in charge of the CIA for several of that agency's greatest failures. The failure to detect the 9/11 plot; the failure to accurately ascertain the extent and nature of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program. Perhaps above all, Tenet is the man who assured President Bush that the CIA's assessment of Iraq's WMD program was a "slam-dunk".



Why Bush kept Tenet on after 9/11 when a decent man might have resigned is unknoan. Tenet was eventually awarded the Medal of Freedom leaving many to wonder why.



It is increasingly clear that the effort in Iraq is a failure. True to form, where success has a thousand fathers and failure none, George Tenet has taken time from busy schedule to inform the world that the other guy - not George Tenet - is responsible for the multitudinous failures of the CIA, while Tenet ran it.



Tenet is a genius in his own mind. Why, he got the media to run a photo of Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the captured terrorist, looking disheveled. Quite an accomplishment for the man responsible for spending billions of taxpayer dollars to gather intelligence. And we all know how well the Tenet led CIA did at that. Of course, according to Tenet retrospectively, the failures aren't his fault.



Sour grapes is the stock in trade of many a failed politician and bureaucrat. George Tenet is no different than others who failed before him. A reasonable person, upon reading this book, might reflect on why the CIA which consumes billions of dollars has been so remarkably inept for so long with so little oversighrt. The counter-argument, of course, is that the CIA can't crow about its successes. Perhaps there is a degree of truth in that. But the record of failures we know about is enough to give pause.



George Tenet could have performed a true public service by writing the truth, without trying to evade responsibiltiy. It is a pity that he did not.



Jerry

According to this book, George Tenet never did anything wrong.





Two months before September 11, 2001 George Tenet met with Condi Rice and many others on the National Security Council. His thesis: Osama bin Laden is looking to attack the United States. What did the White House do about it? Nothing. George Tenet and the Intelligence community were sounding the alarm bells and nobody was listening. After all there was far more important things to do: attack NOW for boycotting companies that were anti-women, faith-based initiatives, mortgaging the country's future so that everybody could get $300 back from their taxes and making secret deals with oil companies behind closed doors. So, George Bush's White House did nothing and let bin Laden attack the Twin Towers and the Pentagon.





Well, thanks Mr. Tenet we already knew that. What we really wanted to know was answers to certain questions. Did you say the intelligence to attack Iraq was a "slam dunk"? What have you done about rendition and water-boarding? Were you complicit in such acts? How did you think there were 100 to 500 tons of chemical and biological agents in Iraq, when in reality there was none? How did the 16 words get into the State of the Union?





To the first question apparently he said that. He also feels that it had no bearing on whether we went to war. While I do accept that, you were obviously wrong. From Bob Woodward's book we see that the problem was that even the President of the United States thought the evidence was thin. So, instead of perhaps trying to verify the intelligence estimate, Mr. Tenet said: "It's a slam dunk!"





The second and third question, he completely ignores. No talk of secret camp or sending people to get tortured by other governments. There is no discussion of the CIA's stand on torture! Not one word. While I may be able to accept that the CIA's censorship department nixed anything about it when reviewing the book, such a complete omission is unforgivable. Such actions relate to how the CIA and George Tenet have helped the White House erode the Soft Power of the United States that George Bush (43) and Bill Clinton helped to build since the fall of the Berlin Wall.





The fourth question: apparently its only an estimate based on the available data and everybody knew it was not enough to hold up in say a court of law. What? George Tenet let the Secretary of State go to the United Nations (an organization the Bush administration was trying to bully into action), and say that the best guesses of analysts who had never been to Iraq were facts! They were not facts!





The fifth question has an easy answer. George Tenet didn't do his job and let subordinates do it. It's that simple, the Director of Central Intelligence did not read the speech.





Then we get into two other things that I did not have questions about until Mr. Tenet wrote this book. How did he meet with Richard Perle and discuss Iraq on September 12 when Mr. Perle was stuck in France until the 15th (remember planes couldn't fly)? It seems inconceivable that anybody would confuse the 12th of September with any other date. I good and well remember what I said to people on the 12th. I admit I may get the 13th and the 15th confuse. It just seems like he his deflecting what blame is his by trying to show that the neocons wanted to attack Iraq from the beginning. Well, if you didn't know that, you don't pay enough attention anyways.





And, did Mr. Tenet ever really do his job? It seems every time there was something really important for the CIA to do, George Tenet put John McLaughlin in charge. At the principals meetings (SecDef, Secretary of State, etc.), the deputy director, John McLaughlin, represented the CIA. At the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing to discuss the National Intelligence Estimate (the slam dunk) George Tenet didn't even go! Who went? That's right, John McLaughlin.





Basically the gist of the book is that George Tenet never did anything really wrong! (He admits that he did not do some things, but, has what he actually thinks are reasonable excuses). And when the stuff goes down - John McLaughlin was in charge. Therefore one is begged to ask the question. If you were so bad at this job, Mr. Tenet, why wasn't John McLaughlin just made Director of Central Intelligence.





The fact is, it seems that Mr. Tenet is a well qualified bureaucrat and diplomat that has no business being the man who must tell truth to power. From September 11th on he is a member of the circle as opposed to the fact-based critic of the circle that the CIA is supposed to be. Again and again he says its policy makers jobs to take the intelligence and make policy. But, it was your job to tell them when they were wrong. Mr. Tenet: you failed miserably. You failed to read the State of the Union address which made the President lie to the world, got a CIA agent outed and Scooter Libby sent to jail. None of this would have happened had you read the damn speech.





As far as the quality of the book is? It reads like a journalist's book. Captain Harlow must be an excellent writer and I would like to read his novel "Circle William." The pages flow well and the pre-9/11 life of Mr. Tenet is both informative and interesting, however, after reading the remainder - it might all be lies or excuses too.

According to this book, George Tenet never did anything wrong.



Two months before September 11, 2001 George Tenet met with Condi Rice and many others on the National Security Council. His thesis: Osama bin Laden is looking to attack the United States. What did the White House do about it? Nothing. George Tenet and the Intelligence community were sounding the alarm bells and nobody was listening. After all there was far more important things to do: attack NOW for boycotting companies that were anti-women, faith-based initiatives, mortgaging the country's future so that everybody could get $300 back from their taxes and making secret deals with oil companies behind closed doors. So, George Bush's White House did nothing and let bin Laden attack the Twin Towers and the Pentagon.



Well, thanks Mr. Tenet we already knew that. What we really wanted to know was answers to certain questions. Did you say the intelligence to attack Iraq was a "slam dunk"? What have you done about rendition and water-boarding? Were you complicit in such acts? How did you think there were 100 to 500 tons of chemical and biological agents in Iraq, when in reality there was none? How did the 16 words get into the State of the Union?



To the first question apparently he said that. He also feels that it had no bearing on whether we went to war. While I do accept that, you were obviously wrong. From Bob Woodward's book we see that the problem was that even the President of the United States thought the evidence was thin. So, instead of perhaps trying to verify the intelligence estimate, Mr. Tenet said: "It's a slam dunk!"



The second and third question, he completely ignores. No talk of secret camp or sending people to get tortured by other governments. There is no discussion of the CIA's stand on torture! Not one word. While I may be able to accept that the CIA's censorship department nixed anything about it when reviewing the book, such a complete omission is unforgivable. Such actions relate to how the CIA and George Tenet have helped the White House erode the Soft Power of the United States that George Bush (43) and Bill Clinton helped to build since the fall of the Berlin Wall.



The fourth question: apparently its only an estimate based on the available data and everybody knew it was not enough to hold up in say a court of law. What? George Tenet let the Secretary of State go to the United Nations (an organization the Bush administration was trying to bully into action), and say that the best guesses of analysts who had never been to Iraq were facts! They were not facts!



The fifth question has an easy answer. George Tenet didn't do his job and let subordinates do it. It's that simple, the Director of Central Intelligence did not read the speech.



Then we get into two other things that I did not have questions about until Mr. Tenet wrote this book. How did he meet with Richard Perle and discuss Iraq on September 12 when Mr. Perle was stuck in France until the 15th (remember planes couldn't fly)? It seems inconceivable that anybody would confuse the 12th of September with any other date. I good and well remember what I said to people on the 12th. I admit I may get the 13th and the 15th confuse. It just seems like he his deflecting what blame is his by trying to show that the neocons wanted to attack Iraq from the beginning. Well, if you didn't know that, you don't pay enough attention anyways.



And, did Mr. Tenet ever really do his job? It seems every time there was something really important for the CIA to do, George Tenet put John McLaughlin in charge. At the principals meetings (SecDef, Secretary of State, etc.), the deputy director, John McLaughlin, represented the CIA. At the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing to discuss the National Intelligence Estimate (the slam dunk) George Tenet didn't even go! Who went? That's right, John McLaughlin.



Basically the gist of the book is that George Tenet never did anything really wrong! (He admits that he did not do some things, but, has what he actually thinks are reasonable excuses). And when the stuff goes down - John McLaughlin was in charge. Therefore one is begged to ask the question. If you were so bad at this job, Mr. Tenet, why wasn't John McLaughlin just made Director of Central Intelligence.



The fact is, it seems that Mr. Tenet is a well qualified bureaucrat and diplomat that has no business being the man who must tell truth to power. From September 11th on he is a member of the circle as opposed to the fact-based critic of the circle that the CIA is supposed to be. Again and again he says its policy makers jobs to take the intelligence and make policy. But, it was your job to tell them when they were wrong. Mr. Tenet: you failed miserably. You failed to read the State of the Union address which made the President lie to the world, got a CIA agent outed and Scooter Libby sent to jail. None of this would have happened had you read the damn speech.



As far as the quality of the book is? It reads like a journalist's book. Captain Harlow must be an excellent writer and I would like to read his novel "Circle William." The pages flow well and the pre-9/11 life of Mr. Tenet is both informative and interesting, however, after reading the remainder - it might all be lies or excuses too.

I did not consider Mr. Tenet to be one of the more outstanding DCI's. His story about the Agency and its MO was extremely interesting. He does have the tendency to go into boring (to outsiders) details. Frankly, it held my attention although the read was, at times, rather heavy.

Let me start off by admitting this is an incomplete review because I only read the first 200 pages of the book- after that I just gave up. I recognize no autobiography is going to be unbiased, but Tenet fills the pages with nothing but facts to cover his back against the criticism he has been receiving lately. Reminding us that prior to 9/11 he predicted Al-Qaida will attack the US doesnt mean much when I assume these one liners were single sentences in a briefing that was several inches thick. Anyone in the army will know what Im talking about when I say this book reads like an OER, filled with sentences like, "I innovatively developed new processes to analyze intelligence in 97 countries world-wide." If it were occasionally thrown in I could stomach it, but when it is 90% of the content, it gets pretty old. When someone spends that much time defending their actions and promoting their agenda, I become hesitant to accept his version of the story. I dont have anything against Tenet, but I'll spend my time reading something a little less biased.

This is not the whole story. However, given his position it is inevitable that he is able to tell stories that no one else can. For that reason, it is a valuable read.

I did enjoy learning about his early life and roots his father etc.
Then my interest level started to "wane".
He has many details which were not available to the general public up to this point.
However, other than two or three details I learned, the book did not keep me deeply interested.

As with most books of this type, George Tenant has a tendency toward self aggrandtizement and patting himself on the back a little too often. That being said, I thought the book offered many tidbits of insider information not found in the deluge of information already available on many of the topics he covered.

Tenant's explanation of his involvement with the 2003 State of the Union "sixteen words" debacle, the administration's handling of pre-war CIA intelligence reports regarding the ties between Saddam and Osama bin Laden (especially Dick Cheney's choice to blatantly ignore the CIA's findings), and their cloudy information regarding WMD were all points of view I appreciated hearing. Although the author never comes right out and calls anyone a liar, he makes it clear much of the information this administration chose to use did not have the support of the intelligence agencies.

The book's narrative is entertaining and well-written and I felt as though Mr. Tenant was attempting to give a fair anyalysis of events and the people who shaped them.

There is much political discussion on what really was said and done by George Tenet. Whatever the truth is vis-a-vis Tenet, this book is insightful on the operations of the CIA and the bickering between countries and their leaders. For example, The Palestinians and Israelis shake hands and agree. Then one leader or the other pulls a Columbo..."Oh, one more thing..." There will never be peace between these two countries.

I enjoyed this book.

George Tenet's book "At the Center of the Storm" is not a belated effort to offer excuses for the failure of the CIA to prevent the 9/11 tragedies or to provide the Bush administration with correct intelligencee before the
decision to invade Iraq, as some critics have said. In fact, the opposite is true. Tenet, with remarkable candor,
identifies not only the shortcomings of the intelligence commuity but his own mistakes.
The book, however, is much more than a litany of errors. To a degree seldom if ever seen in other books that have covered critically or otherwise the inside operations of the American government at the highest levels, Tenet gives astonishing details about the real way major decisions are made, how interlligence is gathered and evaluated, how the various agencies cooperate or feud over turf, how human beings having tremendous power may not be as wise, impartial, competent or honest as the ordinary citizen wants to believe that they are. He does that by naming names, describing in detail specific meetings, revealing what happened behind the scenes at critical moments in the years Tenet was Director of the CIA. This is not hearsay, or second-tier stuff.
I found especially refreshing his admission that, in retrospect, it appears that Saddam Hussein deliberately fed the intelligence community with false information to create the impression that he possessed biological and chemical weapons with the expectation that this would deter the United States from invading Iraq (pp.316-333). "Before the war," Tenet writes on p. 333, "we didn't understand that he was bruffing, and he didn't understand that [in threatening to invade] we were not." Interestingly, in my bi-weekly column in "The National Herald," I had presented on July 24, 2004 (p.7) under the title "A Saddam Hoax?" evidence that Saddam had indeed used disinformation deliberately as a deterrent.
Georger Tenet's book is an eye-opener and a must-read for every citizen who wants to know with specifics how our leaders get by, their own choice, into situations leading to disastrous consequences, and how uncommon is common sense in high places.
Professor Dimitrioss G. Kousoulas

I've seen Genrge Tenent making the rounds of the talk shows and found his take on the actions of the CIA to be credible sounding enough though I know the attack dogs are out to discredit him. Reading his new book gives a great deal of context to the actions of ther CIA and I found the first half on the structural issues concerning his tenure at CIA and his prosecution of the war on terror in Afghanistan to be completely credible and full of candor. I only hope the second half in Iraq sheds more light on the murky dealings that led to this war.

Very engrossing and scary. But you feel the obligations George Tenet has
to keep the secrets as just when it gets exciting he has to hold back
the juicy details. Also one wonders how this guy ever made it to be DCI -he doesn't come across as having the intellect and depth one assumes would be a requirement. But a good read.

I found the book very interesting. It definately workth to read it.

In what is probably the best Washington insider book of recent years, George Tenet documents the intelligence and policy screw-ups leading up to 9/11 and the invasion of iraq. The story has been told by others, but Tenet tells it especially well, spreading the blame widely for these awful fiascos, but accepting some himself.

The book is inadvertently revealing about the Tenet CIA's priorities and shortcomings. For instance, little mention is made of Russia and China and of the multiple challenges that these countries' emergent economic and military strength poses to U, S global leadership. Tenet stresses that CIA recruitment was expanded and democratized during his tenure, but intelligncee is not a numbers game--CIA doesn't need more analysts and spies as much as it needs smarter ones. The CIA and the intelligence community generally are consumed with short- range problems and success targets, while sometimes missing the bigger picture. On this latter point, Tenet portrays Afghanistan as a CIA success story, but modern-day Afghanisttan is a catastrophe in the making--comprising a patchwork of narco-principalities, a resurgent narco-funded Taliban and a government that can't exercise its writ much beyond Kabul. Of course, Tenet's CIA was a product of the times--an obsessive national focus on terrorism---but the Agency needs now to recalibrate its priorities and move on.

You have to wonder after reading the book if Bush is the President or is it Chaney? Why Bush has not been impeached is a mystery. I guess that sex in the White House is a greater Offense than having innocent people die and bankrupting the country.

While some of Tenet's observations should be read through a political filter, his discussion of how we were successfully tracking bin Laden's activities prior to 9/11 are exceptionally fascinating and captivating. Overall, he describes a contentious political environment in Washington that hasn't changed all that much. I think we'd been better off if Tenet had Gates to work with, rather than Rumsfeld.

Very enlightening, especially the insight into post Irag war rehabilitation. Whether or not you were appalled that the US would even think of going to war with Iraq, knowing what we knew at the time, it could have come out reasonably ok if wiser minds had prevailed and the VP's close-minded neoconservative friends had been kept out of it. We owe a debt of gratitude to George Tenet and others of his ilk, for sharing his thoughts and sacrificing much of his professional and family life.

Although some my say that Mr Tennet uses the book to make excuses for CIA short comings leading to the 9/11 catastrophe and the Irag war, the book is an interesting read. It cannot, however be read in a vaccum. Readers should compare it to works in a similar vein and to news stories and articles prevalent during the time period covered in the book.

At the Center of the Storm is clearly written, filled with enough detail, and is suffieniently insightful to hold one's interest from cover to cover. Tenet does not whine, and, in my opinion, offers a successful defense of his tenure at CIA. If the reader expects a diatribe against the president and the neocons, she will be disappointed.

Detailed story of how the CIA operated during his leadership.
I think he got a bad deal from the administration and in general from the congress. Such is politics and nothing to do with one's achivement.

A true behind the scenes look of our nations failed intelligence efforts leading up to and during the war in Iraq. He places blame in both the Clinton administration in ignoring warnings and decreasing the resources for our intelligence efforts, and in the current Bush admin's failure to plan an exit strategy. Fascinating reading and a MUST read if you are serious about understanding the problems in the Middle East.

I had anticipated a more direct, clearly expressed and no nonsense book. I did not received what I anticipated. Tenet plays games with his readers ever as he appears to do on his TV interviews.I hear excuses, but I do not hear valid reasons for his failure to pull the plug on the president's insane drive to invade Iraq with only unverified intelligence at his disposal.

I was quite excited when I received a copy of Tenet's book as a gift. U.S. relations with the Middle East have long been a topic of interest for me, and I hoped that At the Center of the Storm would provide a new perspective on some of the issues facing our country today. I was certainly not disappointed.

The book is not simply a defense against accusations made about Tenet. He fully admits that he erred on a great many occasions and takes responsibility for his actions.

Tenet does support many of his decisions and clarifies some issues, such as his now-infamous "slam dunk" comment, but this makes the book even more interesting. Indeed, one of my favorite parts of the book was hearing a new perspective on issues that have been rehashed again and again in the media.

My only criticism is that, in defending himself, Tenet frequently references warnings given to the President. While this is important to discuss, he fails to adequately explain that this material might not be all that useful in practice, given its vague nature and the great deal of threat information that policy-makers receive on a daily basis.

It's also worth noting that Tenet discusses much more than 9/11 and the war in Iraq:

First, the book begins with an excellent discussion of Tenet's role in peacemaking in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict under the Clinton administration. At the time, Tenet's proposals received a great deal of support from both sides in the conflict. It is unfortunate that they have been almost completely forgotten today.

Second, Tenet tells the fascinating and often forgotten story of CIA's secret war in Afghanistan, which many would argue did more to overthrow the Taliban than any conventional American military force.

Third, for those interested in the shady world of intelligence, At the Center of the Storm provides some interesting material about how intelligence agencies actually function in practice and some of the problems they face. This real-world material certainly gives the book some flavor.

Tenet's book is very readable, and it only took me a few hours to finish the 500-page volume. Make sure to leave yourself some time because you will not be able to put this book down once you start reading. Overall, this book is an excellent choice.

I was eager to hear Tenet's side of the story. To my surprise, my perception is, as Bob Woodward describes so well, that Tenet condemns himself in the book. Overall the book is poorly written and edited. Nothing really new is exposed. I'm sure many people in the CIA and FBI were pleading for action while the so-called leaders were playing "yes" men. Somehow we have to solve the problem of limp leadership.

This book in itself is at the center of the storm. I have followed the reviews on this board and most of the initial reviews (which have been removed because they did not review the book) evoked a political response. The real controversy around this book - more so Tenet himself - is the timing of the book. We find ourselves in a colossal blunder in foreign policy with no end in sight. And we find a public outraged and looking to point fingers. To those that are pointing fingers, bear in mind that we reelected Mr. Bush and in 2004 there were brimming signs of pure incompetence (including many in his administration). I for one did not vote for him for numerous reasons, more importantly, where we find ourselves today is no surprise to me. Tenet repeatedly states in his book that the CIA and his directorship were not policy setters rather implementers of policy. And I do support this role as in all the history I have been alive for, I don't recall many CIA directors playing in politics. I have watched Tenet defend himself in many TV interviews regarding this book and I always get the feeling he is "mostly" truthful yet is holding back. Quite possibly he can only divulge so much since much information I assume is classified.

The first part of the book shows Tenet's rise in his career to the position of Director (which mostly happened by chance). He describes inheriting a mostly defunct CIA and his great efforts to bring the agency back up to par and restore its valuable position in government and service to our country. His love of his job is conveyed by Tenet. This section of the book describes his role in Clinton's push for Israeli and Palestinian peace of which Tenet played a very big role. His role was very political and he details how it was an odd position since the CIA traditionally has not been a political office. I believe Tenet utilized his relationships with his contacts in other countries to usher the peace process. I did not know the depth of his involvement until I read this book. He also goes into the CIA's role in some of the political issues of the late 90's such as India and Pakistan going nuclear and Clinton's response to the evolving problem with Al-Qa'ida.

The second part of the book (which is well worth the read) is about the current state of terrorism and their effort to continue to reign war against Western civilizations. Its amazing the detail given by Tenet as one would assume much of the information would be classified. He elaborately discusses many of Al-Qa'ida's foiled plots and their aspiration that still exists to reign terror on the US and our allies. He details how the CIA has and still is chasing this terror network to prevent their ultimate goal - possession of a nuclear weapon. This section also provided a good appreciation for our now chief enemy and a good wake up call as to why we should not become complacent which I believe many in our country have. He also discusses the US response to the Afghanistan after 9/11 that surprisingly was a CIA lead operation. I for one got chills knowing the determination of our now chief enemy to continue pursuing us.

The last part of the book discusses the Iraq war - what lead up to it, what had occurred and the administration's handling of the war. One can not help that Tenet has truly kept civility and somewhat continues to be a team player (mush like Powell has). There is not a seething attack on the Bush administration but Tenet is not gentile on Cheney, Feith, Rumsfeld and Rice. He does a decent job at divulging the "slam dunk" comment so taken out of context. He details the role of the National Intelligence Estimate used to lead the country into war by Bush. He also explains his position that Iraq was a very big mistake and gives insight as to why the war has gone so bad. He also discusses his thoughts on the controversial awarding of the Medal of Freedom. My anger at this administration has only boiled over more so after reading this section. Tenet describes how the administration guided the intelligence rather then the intelligence guiding the policy. Other books I have read support this.

I think after reading this, Tenet has been largely a scapegoat for this administration's blunders. I have always kept blame to Bush as he appoints his staff and he make the ultimate decisions or at least is responsible for them. This book is written in plain spoken English which is how Tenet is. I personally believe him but keep in mind this is his version, his memoirs. Let the reader judge for himself/herself. Tenet's profound love for Bush does show through. I believe they relate to each other on many levels. I highly recommend this book, as it's a rare event for a CIA director to write their memoirs and especially in such revealing detail. I most definitely have much more respect for the CIA as unsung heroes. I truly believe Tenet did his best to protect the American people. I will hold this book as simply his memoirs not a face saving effort.

This is a well-written book and it contains a great deal of very interesting material, which has been discussed at length by other reviewers. Not much of the material is new, if you have read all the other recent "Iraq" books (Fiasco, Hubris, Imperial Life in the Emerald City, etc.), but it is worthwhile to read Tenet's book to get another perspective. That said, Tenet spends way too much time evading responsibility. He does say several times that he or the CIA made mistakes for which there can be no excuses. But then he spends the next 20 pages or so making excuses.

His handling of the issue of torture is particularly troubling. He tiptoes around the issue with so many euphemisms that, if you didn't already know that he must be talking about torture, you would you have no idea what he was trying to say. At one point he writes about a suspected terrorist in American custody whom the CIA sent to another, unnamed, country for "further questioning." Tenet insists that there is absolutely no truth to the claim that this person was sent to that country to be tortured. But what other reason could there be for the CIA to give up custody of a key terror suspect to another country? Of course the guy was tortured. And Tenent doesn't offer any other explanation for the transfer of custody. If Tenet really believes, as he implies, that torture is justified, then he ought to have the courage of his convictions and say so straight out, instead of playing word games. That pretty much sums up the book: while it contains a great deal of valuable information, it's completely lacking in moral courage.

Excellent CIA library addition, detailed with names, dates and chronologies, yet is easy to read. Another look inside the Bush Administration. Be prepared to read it all the way through once you start, it's hard to put down.

At the Center of the Storm is the story of George Tenet's seven year stint as head of the Central Intelligence Agency, which occured during a period when the top job was virtually undoable. Tenet, the son of a Greek immigrant, defends his reign and assails those around the president whom, he claims, misused the intelligence his Agency provided.

The book, a frank and fascinating account of the events leading up to 9/11 and the Iraq war, describes the unaccredited work done by the Agency to prevent 9/11 and bores in on the on the dark roles played by VP Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz in the run up to war.

The author goes to great lengths to explain how mistakes were made in assessing the truth behind obtaining Uranium from Africa, purchasing aluminum cylinders for centrifuging Uranium, and equipping trailers for manufacturing chemical weapons. With George Tenet sitting behind the Secretary of State at the UN, and not withstanding the extreme weakness of supporting intelligence he used, Colin Powell skillfully pitched the existence of a Uranium buy by Iraq, the acquisition of aluminum tubes and the unquestionable existence of chemical trailers - all this and more - as clear and certain evidence that compelled the United States to make a preemptive strike on Iraq.

At the Center of the Storm is the book to read regarding a large part of the story of why the United States went to war against Iraq.

I ordered this book on Amazon way before it came out. It was one of the books that I had most looked forward to reading in the past several years. Let me put it this way: FASCINATING. From detailed discussions of al Qaeda to fly-on-the-wall accounts of some of the most important conversations to ever take place in the Situation Room and Oval Office, the book really gives an insider's view the machinery of government and - more interestingly to me - the machinery of intelligence. Sometimes it was hard to believe that Tenet got all of this information cleared by the CIA!

I admit I thought it was a little strange that they let Bob Woodward do the editorial review for this book. He doesn't come off well in it. While his review was somewhat interesting, it doesn't do a good job of explaining how much of a page-turner At the Center of the Storm really is. Maybe we can chalk that up to a lack of objectivity, because compared to State of Denial - which I confess I really enjoyed - there's no competition. I guess that's the difference between reporting events and living them.

Long story short: this book has my highest recommendation. If you want to know what it's like to work for two very different presidents while controlling the world of American espionage, check it out.

Please don't listen to all the hype. And please don't listen to Bob Woodward, who seems more interested in proving his own cleverness than in honestly reviewing the book. This is a very good book, and well worth reading.

A lot of the media criticism misses one simple fact: it is very, very rare for former CIA directors to write about their careers. One, Dick Helms, wrote his memoirs 30 years later. So what this book provides is a fascinating and revealing glimpse into the secret world of intelligence, and the inner workings of the CIA.

There aren't too many 'spy stories' but there is a thoughtful treatment of some of the most pressing issues. The rise of Islamic terrorism. The Middle East peace process. Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, global nuclear proliferation networks; it's all here. Unlike many political books, this one is well researched and full of new information.

The most interesting chapters are those describing Al Qaeda's desire to build a nuclear weapon, the global response against Al Qaeda after 9/11 and the interlinking nuclear proliferation networks of Pakistan and Libya.

Separate from all the hype, there is a really interesting book here. I'd encourage you to read it for yourself.