This well written book introduces the reader to the strategy and tactics and indeed, the politics of the invasion of the North African littoral by the British and American forces.

The author gives portraits of many of the main and subsidiary actors and decriptions of battles.

This fills a space in popular/authoritative histories of WW2.

This is a truly great work of narrative history, combining thorough research, balanced analysis, and excellent writing. I was skeptical at first as to the need for a full length history on a minor theater of battle, particularly when one considers the hundreds of divisions and millions of casaulties occurring on the Eastern Front at this very time. But Atkinson is setting out to write the history of the development of a superior American military tradition that is critical for understanding world history in the second half of the twentieth century.

Atkinson in unsparing in his criticism of the initial deficiencies of the American fighting man and commander. These guys are truly not ready for prime time, but one does learn quickly in war. Much of the appeal of this book lies in how well Atkinson portrays the transformation from likable amateur to cold-blooded killer.

The description of the critical battle of Kasserine Pass, perhaps the worst defeat of American troops since 1812, is excellent. What was new for me was not the deficiences of the soldiers but the bone-headed strategic calls of the commanders, including Eisenhower. Eisenhower's deficiencies are laid out for all to see -- the stupidity of holding vulnerable ground for the sake of holding ground; the failure to coordinate air support; the bad choice of subordinate commanders; the weakness in the face of British condescension; and the focus on politics. But Eisenhower's ability to learn from his mistakes and his charm come through, and one does feel a patriotic glow at the sight of these wonderfully American characteristics.

The British formed their military tradition a long time ago, and their superiority in battle must be, and is, conceded by Atkinson. But of course, they lack the resources to win the war themselves, and the story that Atkinson begins to tell in this volume is the shift in the staffing and leadership of the war from the British to the Americans. Still, even today (particularly in Iraq), the British do tend to outperform the Americans, man-for-man, and the reasons for this are not entirely clear to me. The British criticism is that the Americans are always looking for the easy way out of overwhelming the enemy with superior resources, and perhaps in the process we have neglected getting the most out of each individual soldier. On the other hand, the insufferable Montgomery and the infuriating condescension of the British are justly criticized by Atkinson.

The description of Patton is priceless and, based on this book, George C. Scott's portrayal of him was not far off the mark. Patton's gift is, like Grant's, the ability to see that war is all about killing and to brutally and single-mindedly lead officers and men into taking the murderous offensive. But Atkinson does highlight Patton's neglect of logistics as well as his sometimes puzzling lack of strategic imagination.

This book deserved the Pulitzer Prize, and I look forward to reading to next volume.