This original book is focused on the role that the U.S. Navy General Board had in designing and, to the extent possible, building a U.S. Navy capable of meeting and defeating the Imperial Japanese Navy in WWII. The General Board was created in 1900 to advise the Secretary of the Navy on technical matters related to naval ship design, construction, and armament. In practice the Board functioned as a component of what was in all but name the Navy General Staff. The Board was dissolved in 1950 when changing command structures made it redundant.

By Kuehn's account the most important service of General Board came during that period of uneasy peace between the end of WWI and the start of WWII. His argument, which he supports quite well, is that in spite of imposed treaty limitations and chronic shortages of funds, the Board cooperated with the Naval War College, the Chief of Naval Operations(CNO), and the Navy Bureaus (e.g. Bureau of Aeronautics) to build a powerful modern navy entirely capable of meeting the challenges of WWII. Perhaps one of the most surprising points he makes is that the Board did not seek consensus, but cooperation and mutually developed solutions to problems involving a wide spectrum of naval issues.

During the inter-war period, the General Board was a powerful advocate for a strong navy and was composed at times of the CNO, the President of the Naval war College , the Chief of Naval Intelligence, and the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps. Remarkably although most senior U.S. Naval Officers at the time were 'battleship men', the Board consistently demonstrated a clear understanding of vital role that naval aviation would play in future fleet encounters. Probably the most difficult problem that these intelligent and prescient officers had to solve was how to provide the Pacific Fleet with adequate forward support bases in the Western Pacific. Under the Washington Naval Treaty the U.S. was forbidden to build effective, fortified full service naval bases in the Western Pacific or to improve the few existing bases already built there. This forced them to reconsider their strategic (Orange) plans for war with Japan and to develop various innovations to extend the range and effectiveness of the Pacific Fleet. The most far reaching and original of these innovations was the 'Mobile Base Project' (MBP) which incorporated floating dry docks and a carefully crafted logistic support system that proved itself in WWII. All in all not a bad record for the Board or the U.S. Navy.