Written by a neophyte with no military or counter-insurgency experience, this book takes an academic approach to "grading" the effectiveness of commanders undertaking counter-insurgency operations. Having served in two recent post-conflict, counter-insurgent operations, and having some experience with the difficulty in determning the best course of action in a confusing and ambiguous ground situation, I found this work dry, academic, and overly-critical of the command decisions made in various conflicts. It's a lot easier to take aim at the commander after the fact, than to be on the ground having to make the actual decision.

Mark Moyar has a reputation for going against the academic grain. One of his previous books, "Triumph Forsaken," is a full-throated, unapologetic defense of assassinated South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem and US involvement in Vietnam in general. His inability to land a tenure track position at any American university despite his glittering resume (summa cum laude from Harvard, D.Phil from Cambridge), presumably because of his conservative viewpoints, has been the subject of debate in the academy - and a civil lawsuit.

In this, his most recent piece, on the hot topic of counterinsurgency, Moyar takes aim, indirectly, at the celebrated US Army / Marine Corps COIN Manual published in 2006, which focuses on population centric doctrine as the touchstone for a successful COIN campaign. The author's main thesis is that good leadership - defined as a combination of charisma, creativity, sociability, flexibility, empathy and morality - is just about the only thing that really matters. To paraphrase Lance Armstrong, "It's not about the book" -- it's about the man. Moyar uses nine case studies, all of which but one (Malay Emergency) were US experiences, to demonstrate his point, both in the positive, examples where good leaders made all the difference, and the negative, where the lack of such leadership led to failure, often despite the use of population centric COIN best practices.

Moyar has dug up some great quotes from legends to support his case. One of my favorites comes from Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, who was asked by Winston Churchill to opine on the situation in Malaya at a time when things were particularly bleak for the British cause. Monty's plain spoken response is a gem and encapsulates Moyar's central argument: "To determine what must be done is only half the answer, and the easiest half; that of itself will not achieve success. In all this welter of trouble 'the man' is what counts. The second half of the answer is to produce good men, really good men, who have the courage to issue the necessary orders, the drive to insist that those orders are carried out, and the determination and will-power to see the thing through to the end." The end result was the selection of Sir Gerald Templer, the COIN leader par excellance, according to Moyar, a man who almost single-handedly turned around the entire campaign for the British.

Two other quotes of note come from Vietnam, Moyar's academic specialty. Robert Komer, the head of COORDS and a leader Moyar describes as effective but hampered by his abrasive style, once said, "I started out looking at Vietnam as a problem in resource allocation, and ended up looking at Vietnam more as a problem in getting the right Vietnamese in the right jobs." (For the record, this review is being submitted from Kandahar, Afghanistan, where I'm serving with the NATO forces in a counterinsurgency role, and based on my ground level experience here, I couldn't agree more.)

The next comes from General Creighton Abrams, a COIN leader of rare skill, according to the author, on par with Templer, even. "Leadership - where that's good, they're good. Where it's mediocre, they're mediocre. Where it's piss poor, they're piss poor. It's just that simple. We've had some very dramatic examples here of where one man has changed - one man, just the commander, and in a month and a half's time you've got an entirely new outfit. Used to be flat on its ass, wouldn't go anywhere, couldn't fight. Only changed one man - transformed the whole thing."

But for every Templer and Abrams - or Ramon Magsaysay (Philippines / Huk), General David Petreaus (Iraq), General Carlos Vides Casanova (El Salvador), Brigadier General Franklin Bell (Philippines Insurrection), or Major General Henry Halleck (US Civil War Missouri occupation) - there are numerous uninspiring or failed COIN leaders, many of whom proved their leadership abilities in other capacities, such as conventional warfare or political administration, such Philip Sheridan (Texas and Louisiana during Reconstruction), Sir Henry Gourney (Malaya), General Elwell Otis (Philippines Insurrection), Ambassadors Elbridge Dubrow and Henry Cabot Lodge (Vietnam), and Lt. General (ret.) Jay Garner and Ricardo Sanchez (Iraq).

There's no denying that good leadership is important, perhaps even critical, in COIN operations. But what highly competitive group endeavor doesn't require strong leadership as a sine qua non for success? Is there any Fortune 500 corporation or championship athletic team that gets by on "best practices" or individual talent alone? I don't think so. There were aspects of this book that reminded me of another highly acclaimed historical piece on counterinsurgency, John Nagl's "Eating Soup with a Knife." Nagl's central thesis is that armies that exhibit traits of a "learning organization" are more effective at counterinsurgency that those that don't. No surprise there. Likewise, is it really surprising that armies with strong, charismatic, empathetic and inspiring leaders perform better than those with out?

Moyar concludes with a number of recommendations based on the insights from his nine case studies. Paramount and most peculiar is a call for the focused military recruiting of certain personality types, specifically those with INTJ personalities on the Myers-Briggs scale. I certainly guffawed when reading this section, although my opinion was slightly muted by the fact that I'm an INTJ currently in a COIN role in southern Afghanistan, so it was a modest personal fillip. Moyar's core argument is that the military is a naturally sensing-judging organization and tends to attract and promote sensing-judging personalities, rather than the intuitive-thinking types most critical, in his opinion, to COIN leadership.

Moyar's other recommendations are more level-headed. He emphasizes the need in selecting credible leaders of quality for the military and civil leadership of the host nation security forces at the expense of quantity, even if that means welcoming back men from the old regime or with questionable backgrounds. Furthermore, the author notes that one of the primary jobs of the military commander is to constantly assess his leadership team, promoting and firing commanders frequently in accordance with their performance. He frequently highlights how effective COIN leaders like Templer, Magsaysay and Petreaus were always on the go and visiting the field, while the COIN failures like Otis, Gourney and Sanchez spent most of their time cooped up in an office behind a pile of paperwork. Finally, Moyar stresses the criticality of empowering traditional elites to the greatest extent possible. He frequently equates the US experience in Iraq to the federal government during Reconstruction (he says the preferred analogy to post-war Germany is flawed), where local elites were dismissed wholesale and replaced with largely incompetent outsiders with an innate hostility to the indigenous population and where significant social and economic programs, including elections, contribute little and have the potential to be extremely damaging. Indeed, Moyar has strong words for elections in COIN strategy. "Democracy in counterinsurgency is like dynamite in a coal mine, capable of reshaping the environment to the user's advantage or of destroying everything, the user included."

In closing, Moyar's clarion call for leaders of substance and dedication in undeniably valid. His case studies are mostly well done, although the one on Iraq is long and occasionally acerbic in tone, while the case study of Afghanistan is light and superficial. I must say that the urgency I know feel to identify Afghans, particularly local Pashtuns of ability and traditional leadership status, has been heightened after reading this book.

There is much to praise about Moyar's work here. He presents nine excellent case studies of counterinsurgencies, some of which succeeded and some of which failed. If the early cases - the Civil War and Reconstruction - leave you thirsting for more, that is because few writers have looked at these as "insurgencies" and Moyar's cases lay the groundwork for more detailed study.

Also, his chapter on Vietnam is spectacular. For those of us who have drunk the Kool-Aid of popular histories, his appreciation of Ngo Dinh Diem is an eye-opener. I would have liked more references to the source material in his footnotes, instead of his own book, but that well-regarded work is fully footnoted, so I will just have to go to it. Also, although I was somewhat skeptical of his theme of the centrality of leadership when I began the book, he soon convinced me of the correctness of this view.

However, I am not so keen on the only case study of which I have personal knowledge - the current Afghan conflict. Although his general analysis is solid, there are details and analyses which are unsatisfactory. First, and I may be reading too much into his text here, he seems to share the sentiment of Peter Galbraith and the Obama Administration that you can topple the local government with impunity. This is surprising for a writer so clear headed about the results of the US-promoted Diem coup. You either dance with the one that brung ya or you leave. You don't try to rearrange the government to suit the foreigners' needs. The successor will never get the street cred that he needs.

Second, like almost every Westerner I've read on the subject, he fails to realize the attraction of corruption in a country like Afghanistan. Corruption is a combination welfare system and intelligence network. If you are in a position of authority, you are expected to skim as much revenue as you can from your official duties. But you don't pocket it; you pass it down to employees, fellow tribe members, family and many others. No one makes a livable wage, so you use this to supplement their income. In return, the recipients owe you loyalty and information. I used to marvel how, if you told something to a janitor, by the end of the week a cabinet member would have been aware of what you said. This is a neat and efficient system which provides a valuable local function and while we may be able to channel it to useful ends, we will never be able to end it. Moyar's blanket condemnation of corruption is off the mark.

And so is his condemnation of warlords. Some of them are very good indeed. They need to go, but one has to be aware of the delicacy of the situation. They provided the bulk of the forces to topple both the Russians and the Taliban. To turn yesterday's heroes into today's goats is not an easy thing to do. Imagine the uproar if, after the American Revolution, the French who helped us gain independence suddenly decreed that Washington was a warlord who needed to be ousted and that, oh, say, Button Gwinnett had to be installed as President. We face the same situation there.

Finally, and most seriously, he doesn't even mention the role of Zalmay Khalilzad, the US Ambassador from late 2003 through 2005 in his text. I had the honor of serving under him in 2004 and 2005 and his leadership highlights Moyar's own theme. Moyar mentions that during that period, warlords were being brought under control, but he doesn't say why or how. The reason we had a moment of sunshine in the Afghan conflict was largely because of the character, courage and intelligence of Ambassador Khalilzad. I remember one time, when he ordered a flight of B-52s to fly over the capital city of a warlord who was being particularly obstreperous. The B-52s dropped no bombs, but they flew very low and very noisily. "I have to show him that I am a bigger warlord than he is," Zal told us. That is the stuff of leadership.

Despite my reservations, this is a solid contribution to the subject of counterintelligence and well worth the time invested by even the professionals.

EDIT of 21 Feb 2010: A colleague in COINSOC has pointed out that I missed one key aspect of this book and I hasten to add it: "Moyar's point that we are applying peacetime personnel policies by putting people in place based on factors other than their leadership ability and continuing to allow poor leaders even after their capabilities are apparent is a good one though. It's kind of like we are the Titanic and the inertia is too much." It is an important point. It takes two years to weed out the unfit leaders in a real war, but first you have to admit you are in a real war, and the USA has still not gotten to that point so we are damned on both sides: not taking the fight seriously, and leaving the home front wide open to attack (see my review of Charles Faddis's two books, one on CIA and one on DHS).

I first encountered the author when I read and reviewed Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965, but in ordering this book, took no notice of who the author was, I rarely do, and thus was surprised to discover this is the second work by the author, now at the Marine Corps University where I served as Adjunct Faculty once upon a time.

This book is brilliant and unique in its chosen focus, but I have to leave it at four stars because it simplifies in a manner that is almost neo-conservative in its sharpness.

The single most important insight is that the single most important intelligence quesiton as we get into any insurgency or counter-insurgency is this: who are the elites on either side of the confrontation, how good are they, do they have the special character (that this book helps define), and what does this mean to us?

The problem I have with this book is that it dismisses legitimacy and morality, does not recognize the futility of being on the wrong side of the conflict (as we were in Viet-Nam and have been on hundreds of occasions) or on having ideological traitors or blatantly corrupt self-serving partisan hacks in the White House making decisions that are grounds for impeachment if our flag officers had more character and could remember they swore an oath to uphold the Constitution against all enemies domestic and foreign, not an oath to be blindly loyal to the craven and the corrupt.

Here are some notes and links intended to complement this original work by the author. All of my reviews, virtually all non-fiction,are more easily examined at Phi Beta Iota the Public Intelligence Blog, where Insrugency, Leadership, and Stabilization & Reconstructions are among the 98 categories in which I read.

I read the notes and the index first, something I do for books I consider especially worthy. The index STINKS, being a name index with a few terms randomly added. Early on I am distressed to see that the author, in his focus on leadership traits, assumes that all else follows, e.g. intelligence. This may be true, but he does not carry the argument far enough--we lacked integrity at all levels of command in Viet-Nam and El Salvador, where I spent formative years (1963-1967 and 1979-1980 respectively), from the White House to the My Lai incident in Viet-Nam and the murder of the Archbishop in El Salvador.

The ten attributes of leadership:
01 Initiative
02 Flexibility
03 Creativity
04 Judgment
05 Empathy
06 Charisma
07 Sociability
08 Dedication
09 Integrity
10 Organization

Then the author adds Shared Identity and Experience

I have to observe that we beat the first three out of our children by the time they are in the fith grade, over-emphasize Charisma and Dedication, mock Empathy, and define Integrity as Loyalty rather than Righteousness. Just two links: Weapons of Mass Instruction: A Schoolteacher's Journey through the Dark World of Compulsory Schooling; and an oldier but still relevant goodie, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence.

The entire book is a plea for 21st Century adaptive officers who are well-read and multiculturally sensitive.

A quote on page 205 captures the very best of this book. Citing LtCol Ian Hope, commander of Canada's Task Force Orion in Kandahar:

"Under the baking Afghan sun we are rediscovering, by way of pain, that the first determinants in war are human. In combat, the power of personality, intellect and intuition, determination, and trust outweigh the power of technology, and everything else. This stark reminder comes after 30 years of the Canadian Army following obediently the lead of our allies [i.e. the bloody Americans] in combat development and falling victim to the seduction of the microchip."

Exactly right. Winston Churchill liked to say "The Americans always do the right thing--they just try everything else first."

NEWSFLASH: In Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen, and in the other 150 failed states around the world, the Americans are still a decade away from getting it right.

The author concludes the book with a chapter on How to Win that has the following nine sections:
01 Improving Leadership Attributes
02 Recruiting
03 Leadership Development
04 Foreign Influences on Leadership Development
05 Foreign Influences on Command Selection & Deselection
06 Lines of Authority
07 Delegation of Authority
08 Methods of Command
09 Co-Opting the Elites

As I read through the chapters, an enormous amount of naivete jumped out at me, especially with respect to Viet-Nam and El Salvador, and more recently, but remotely, Afghanistan and Iraq. I also lived in the Philippines and have read widely on counter-insurgency.

01 The author, despite being a revisionist historian ofthe first order (tendence neo-conservative), accepts too much of the conventional history and avoids coming to grips with the strategic realities that make leadership, however good, irrelevant in the absence of higher order integrity. A few books:
The Search for Security: A U.S. Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century
Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World's Last Dictators by 2025
Killing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A. Interventions Since World War II-Updated Through 2003

02 The author seems to assume "our government right or wrong," and this is of course a death wish in dealing with reality. While the author discusses the fact that the Huks were independent fighters against the Japanese and those Filipinos that went vichy, he segues straight into their being "the enemy" when we decide the government is ours, and he is unwitting of the literature on Lansdale's creating mock Huk units to terrorize rural areas so that our chosen front guy could ride the white horse into elected leadership.

03 In Iraq, which is a direct result of the treason of Dick Cheney and his small band of neo-conservative betrayers of the public trust, the author either avoids the vast literature on the mis-steps before the war and the mis-steps after the quick victory, or chooses to downplay it. I accept all that the author offers in the way of leadership prescriptions, but he goes several bridges too far in failing to address both the lack of integrity among our flag officers in not putting Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Feith before the Congress for impeachment, and in willfully accepting the "lite" force into Iraq that was known to be deficient in terms of keeping the peace. The author appears to be unaware of all the word the Department of State did to plan the Golden Hour peace transition, and makes no reference at all to the varied impeachable offenses of the Rumsfeld tema in shutting the Department of State completely out. Nor does the author seem to recgnize that General Garner was on the verge of extracating us when Dick Cheney send Paul Bremer in to muck it all up so we could occupy the country for the long term. One of these days the taxpayer is going to see the cost tally for all the permanent installation we have been building in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that may be the straw that breaks the Pentagon's back. We have lacked integrity at every level.

04 Finally, and really a blend of all of the above, the author seeks to isolate leadership traits in our officers without due regard for the righteousness of revolutionaries. something I know a little bit about, not least from writing the still best examination of the preconditions and precipitants of revolutiuon in 1976, distinguishing among political-legal, socio-economic, ideo-cultural, techno-demographic, and natural-geographic. The US Government has been too often on the WRONG SIDE, and it has been on the wrong side for a variety of reasons including the failure of our system of checks and balances, and the failure of our flag officers to demand legal, ethical political leadership as a condition for sending our faithful forces into harm's way.

America lost its exceptionalism when it gave up being a Republic Of, By, and For We the People, and instead became a two-party tyranny fronting for banks and phantom wealth fabricated by the Federal Reserve (which is neither Federal nor a Reserve) and Wall Street. We are now spending close to 1.3 trillion a year on war, when we could--for just $230 billion a year--eradicate all ten of the high-level threats to humanity identified by LtGen Dr. Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret) and other members of the United Nations panel, and as reported out in A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility--Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.

We all keep coming back to Sun Tzu, who is quoted but never embraced--the acme of skill is to win without fighting, and the surest path to victory is to know yourself as well as you know your enemy. We have no clue about either because we have allowed a $75 billion a year monstrocity to claim without reason to be our "national intelligence," while allowing a $750 billion monstrosity, four honey pots called by their Service names, to lust for bells and whistles in the technical arena without being held accountable for strategic, operational,tactical, OR technical integrity.

There is a great deal more at Phi Beta Iota, the Public Intelligence Blog, where virtually 98 of the reading categories and grouped reviews bear on this book. Bottom line: this book is a great checklist. Checklists don't win wars, leaders do. We don't have any to speak of, despite the author's florid praise for General Petraus. Gray, Zinni, Stackpole, Clapper (before he became USD(I), O'Lear--those guys are GONE. We have a handful of Colonels that "get it" but most of them are either not making flag or choosing to go work for the US Institute of Peace (Mike Dziedzic, co-author of Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security or going to work for contractors.

My last two "authorized" links:
Deliver Us from Evil: The Slavery Question in the Old South
Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda

I am *not* a happy camper. I have not given up on the Republic (see the literatures on Collective Intelligence, Non-Zero Panarchy, and Biomimicry), but I am acutely aware that we are in a fight to death, and the fight is in-house, not with some legitimate foreign enemy. Pogo nailed it: we have seen the enemy and he is us. Now let's get our act together and become righteous--America the Beautiful again. All it takes is unwavering INTEGRITY, one person at a time.

I welcome any invitation to discuss this. Phi Beta Iota the Public Intelligence Blog is where I have placed over 30,000 pages of reference material as well as all of my Amazon reviews clustered into 98 categories.

Moyar's book is a "must-read" for any serious student of current events, counterinsurgency, or operational art. As a military professional who has read most recent works that have been heralded as "must-reads" or as works providing unusual or original insights into counterinsurgency, I have been disappointed the vast-majority of the time. Rarely have I read anything on counterinsurgency that provided true "food-for-thought" other than that which was produced by Galula, Kitson, or Thompson; however, Moyar has produced a volume that may be as influential as those written by the Big 3 COIN savants. The book is very well organized; providing overwhelming evidence for the auhor's hypothesis in a manner that does not become repetitive and boring.

"A Question of Command" is head and shoulders above its contemporaries when it comes to objectively distilling counterinsurgency theory. The first thing you will notice is that Moyar's treatment of competing theories is comprehensive and the book is extremely well documented and footnoted. Very professional.

The central theme of Moyar's work is the theory that counterinsurgency is "leader-centric" warfare, a contest between elites in which the elites with the superior leadership attributes usually win.

I was pre-disposed to discard this theory, but thought, "it may be an interesting book anyway." Well you can teach an old dog new tricks. His articulate and well documented arguments caused me to reconsider my biases and pre-conceived notions about the role of leadership in counter-insurgency warfare. You see, anybody can say "leadership is the key." But not everybody can get down in the weeds and spell out the specifics where both good and bad leadership made a substantive difference. This man does excellent, in-depth research is a good writer too.

Mr. Moyar's uses case studies, some of which are a bit remote from mainstream counterinsurgency literature, e.g. the Civil War, Reconstruction in the South (a major eye-opener for me), The Philippine Insurrection, The Huk Rebellion, Malaya, Vietnam, the Salvadoran Insurgency, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Vietnam was especially interesting. There is a prevailing logic as to how and why we "lost in Vietnam." I am not going to be a spoiler. I am a Vietnam "Era" Vet, and I encourage other Vets to read the book, especially this Chapter. I think it sets the record straight about a lot of half-truths and politically correct journalist accounts that were flat incorrect.

While Moyar forcefully puts forth his hypotheses on leadership as the key factor, he simultaneously castigates "ethnocentric" American civilian and military leaders that had little or no appreciation for Vietnamese culture and values (this hubris is not restricted to Vietnam, but is endemic to all counter-insurgency wars) Assumptions about the universal appeal of American political and cultural norms coupled with a lack of appreciation for the host country's culture was a formula for failure. Moyar's assessment of the Diem régime is most telling in this regard. My only complaint is that I cannot share his esteem for the leadership abilities of Gen. Creighton Abrams. I remember all too well how General Abrams encouraged the court martial of Col. Bob Rheault, then commander of 7th Special Forces,over the "termination" of a double-agent. I never thought Abrams, a straight-leg tanker, was a friend to special operations.

His chapters on Iraq and Afghanistan are also enlightening and credible. He had excellent access to a variety of Army and Marine leaders and leaves no doubt about sources and attributions. He also went "to the field" and saw those wars first hand. Those are not my wars; but Moyar gives me a true narrative of war seen through the eyes of men doing the fighting.

Finally, I think he opens a very credible, and new research stream for those interested in counter-insurgency, i.e. COIN leadership and elites. He readily admits that counterinsurgency operations are complex and highly context dependent; but demonstrated there are leadership attributes, measurable and observable, that successful COIN operations have in common from the American Civil War to our current conflicts.

Good job! I highly recommend the book.