Samantha Power has produced a history of genocide through the 20th century. She presents an impressive accounts of genocide against Armenians in Turkey, Jews in Holocaust, Tutsi in Rwanda, Kurds in Iraq, and Bosnian Muslims in the Balkan war; the stories are extremely well-written, and the images are vivid. Apart from stories about the conflicts themselves, she gives credit to the individuals who contributed to political understanding of genocide and recognition of the term in international law. She puts heavy emphasis on the role of the United States in dealing with genocide, mostly taking the critical stance.

The book is remarkably unbiased, as a great piece of journalist prose. Samantha Power spent several years in Bosnia as a reporter for the Western magazines, and her writing style evolved to reflect vivid images while passing information and truth to her reader. She is not judging the culprits of genocide, including a chapter about the war tribunals instead. That leaves the reader with an option of making one's own choices in thinking about genocide.

The book is a great source of information on genocide, foreign policy of the United States, and the role of individuals in dealing with the "problems from hell." Simply brilliant reading and definitely worth your time!

While I have some issues with this work, it is, overall, a good piece of journalism and a major call to arms against the legacy of inertia when genocide is involved. Power delineates the history of the Genocide Convention and its applications. She also does great case studies of genocides in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Cambodia showing the failures of US policy at the times of genocides.

She is also unwilling to excuse inertia at the time of genocide for such excuses as national security and protection of American interest. The repulsion of protecting the Khmer Rouge for the sake of hurting Viet Nam is well acknowledged. The inaction in Rwanda because of the problems found in Somalia is equally well documented.

My issues with this book stem neither from the facts nor from the general sentiment. They really arise in her oversimplification over several international issues. She uses the phrase "Turkey" as if such a nation existed at the time of the Armenian Genocide. She is constantly changing the words for ethnic groups that people use. And, she oversimplifies the American response specifically to the Cambodian Genocide. While I understand that it is warranted to a degree to keep the reader on the issue of specific genocides, in reality it seems that she may be trying to hide something for those who know the international situations at the times.

All and all it is a good book. Her critique of the Clinton Administration, and its refusal to lead world opinion, is something that could be taken from the works of Zbigniew Brzezinski. Her call to arms against genocide is one that must be made so that we can say "Never again," again. Yet, her continuous over simplification of global situations seems to avoid the need for counterargument in the work. I would read it, but it is not a must read.

The phrase, "A Problem From Hell" is a gripping metaphor of our troubled times. And this is a meticulously research and well-written (although a bit dense for my taste) book adequately covering the tip of the iceberg of that subject.

However, and meaning no disrespect to this brilliant author, it must be said that we have seen these sensitivities and sensibilities come and go before in the form of eagle scout exuberance, and mostly liberal-leaning "do-gooder" NGOs, and neophyte overly excitable roving reporters. And while we could throw up a whole of wall of clichés that would better make my larger point, it must be said that "trading in" self-righteous indignation" very much after the fact is a "detail" but hardly a policy prescription, and certainly not a useful way to solve complex international problems.

Yes, it is true that rather than enter World War I, which would surely have been the result had the U.S. intervened on behalf of the Armenians against the Turks in 1915-1916 does leave a lasting bitter taste in the mouth. Or, the same can be said for the rationalizations against bombing the railroads leading to the Nazi concentration camps, or not allowing more Jews fleeing those horrors to enter the U.S., or moving too slowly and too late in Yugoslavia, or not at all to stop the genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda - and even today, of making sweet sounding noises but doing nothing in Darfur.

And although, as the last standing superpower we may have had (and may still have) a "special responsibility" to use our power to intervene in many of these instances, we are not the only members of the international community that must live with the moral guilt of our own international cowardliness and "chosen ability" not to act to save hundreds of thousands of innocent lives.

Despite this, since every U.S. President who has had to face an ongoing questions of genocide, has also found convenient ways to either ignore or rationalize them away, we must ask the question at the subtext of this research: Are these then all just matters of cold-blooded raw calculations of rational decision making? Or simply just cases of weighing national means and costs against rational ends and returns to the national interests? Rather than questions of pure morality? Or is there something deeper going on here?

Far be it for me to rain on the author's award winning parade.

However it must be said, if only in passing, that it is curious indeed how a book on genocide can take the U.S to task and at the same time simply leap frog right over the most sordid aspects of the U.S. own genocidal history and find a neat landing in an island clearing that is as morally pristine as it is naive:

Neither the genocide against Native Americans nor against African Americans during slavery merited even so much as a footnote in the book, apparently neither was relevant enough to be mentioned, even once. Like a cat, somehow the author manages to land on both feet in a clearing on the other side of this historical messiness with her humanity, morality, innocence and self-righteous indignation, all still unperturbed and perfectly intact. How can this be done?

If genocide at home has no more moral meaning or consequence than that, then maybe doing nothing is the prefect answer to all genocide, whether home or abroad, and whether in the past, present or the future. If we use past U.S. sensitivity to genocide as a guide, one would be led to ask: Where is the problem? Maybe the author is doing exactly what one raised in the U.S. should do: pretend that that there is no connection between the past and the future, and just keep leaping over to the next moral clearing. After all we did not fail to sign the International Treaty Against Genocide without a good reason?

This moral prestidigitation of course has its own precedents and raises its own separate questions: Can a nation that fails to confront honestly the genocide in its own closeted past really be expected to intervene when it occurs in the international arena? Yes, it is sad that in every instance that we had the chance to, except Yugoslavia, we failed to muster the moral strength and courage to intervene. But it is infinitely sadder not to realize that this cowardliness stems in part, directly from our own domestic home-grown genocidal experiences. As a final note, perhaps it is a little known fact that it was the U.S. Eugenics program that served as the model for Hitler's "Final Solution. What is the cliché about charity begins at home?

Four Stars

According to this author the 20th century was "the age of genocide". Incredibly, in this massive narrative of over 600 pages she feels no need to address the phrase from the title. Having announced that the purpose of her book, in part, is to survey "the major genocides of the twentieth century" (p. xv) she celebrates "those who have refused to remain silent in the age of genocide" (p. xviii). This may be the only time the phrase occurs in this voluminous book. Hence, the idea that the twentieth century was the age of genocide is simply taken for granted. Power is not alone in so characterizing the past century; it is quite a trendy claim, in fact. Thus, according to R.J. Rummel's calculations the genocides of the twentieth century have killed more than four times as many people as all the wars and revolutions of the same time period combined. This way of counting causes of death is more than likely dubious, it fits with the fashionable nonsense du jour that we live in an age of genocide.

This attitude of simply screaming "genocide" whenever one feels like it leads to the social phenomenon I call "genocidalism of commission" (see Aleksandar Jokic, "Genocidalism" The Journal of Ethics Vol. 8, No. 2, 2004, pp.251-250) defined thusly: the energetic attributions of "genocide" in less than clear cases without considering available and convincing opposing evidence and argumentation. Power's book is an example of genocidalist literature par excellence:

The main theoretical "contribution" of the book is deeply flawed. Power chastises the U.S. and its policymakers for failing to respond to specific genocides in the twentieth century. Implausibly, the U.S. is presented as an ideal observer (as if angelic intelligence from heaven) that has no possible (let alone real) contributory causal role in mass-killings around the globe. For her the only question is why the U.S. regularly does nothing or too little, despite its unquestioned might, to ensure that genocide does not repeatedly occur. Her puzzle is this: Why the U.S. does not eradicate genocide once and for all? Ignoring the fact of genocides completed against a series of Native American nations in the century that just preceded the alleged "age of genocide" Power unconvincingly simply pretends that the U.S. is not capable of deploying the favorite trick of all empires, divide et impera, and engage in mass killings (or have it done by a proxy).

Consequently, "genocidalism of commission," or genocidal use of "genocide," amounts to giving alleged "genocides" an inappropriate kind of attention: camouflaged as genuine concern for the evil contained in genocide the real interest is of another sort, e.g., the outcomes may have clear propagandistic connotation. This is morally inappropriate even when well grounded in the politically correct phraseology of the day, and applied to the geopolitically targeted groups selected for "treatment" by the super-power. It may be that the genocidalism of commission has as its ultimate aim or at least its consequences inevitably lead to the silence and cover up of real genocides. And the ultimate outcome of this practice is the trivialization of the Holocaust.

In brief, a thorough and indispensible guide to genocide, and the American response to genocide, in the 20th century. The book is long, and given the subject matter not always a pleasant read. Nevertheless the detail is necessary to give a complete understanding of the problem, an in particular how the American response to genocide has evolved in the past century.

While Power makes the obvious point that we should do more to stop genocide in the 21st century than we did in the 20th, she mostly sticks to the facts and doesn't overwhelm the reader with personal opinions. When she does reveal her opinions, they are well supported. This book should be viewed primarily as a work of journalism and to a much lesser extent as a recommendation of policy.

As such, I was not left with a clear idea of what exactly should be done. I am inclined to agree with Power that more should be done -- not simply as a matter of morality, but as a matter of American self-interest. However, what struck me most about America's historical policy was not its inaction, as Power has pointed out, but the fact that it has been so ad hoc. I wonder if our reluctance to commit in advance to a clear position on intervention -- in either direction -- has backfired by emboldening perpetrators and dragging us ultimately into more deadly and expensive conflicts than would have otherwise happened.

This book is a fascinating look at the unwillingness of the US to act in the face of genocide in other countries. It shares the horrors of Turkey, Germany, Iraq, Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and other such situations of "ethnic cleansing" and genocide, and the US's steadfast avoidance of acting when it easily could. It provides a very worthy background for thinking about the obligations (or not) of a so-called moral super power. It also provided an eye opening look at several administrations, casting none of them in a good light. I hope our next president will do a better job (and it seems to me only one of the 3 candidates really could break the mold and bring in a fresh approach)

I read this book for a world history class last semester. It was a really well researched book, but Samantha Power came off as overly idealistic. I realize the focus of the book was America's involvement in preventing genocide, but it really seemed to bash on the USA at times. Not that the US didn't deserve it, but the blame can not rest squarly on America's shoulders. There was nothing said about the UN's lack of leadership, corruption, and inept ability to make decisions to enforce it's own policy. Some of Powers's ideas just made my blood boil. She repeatedly states the need for the United States to take a leadership role in combating genocide, but implies that America should surrender its sovereignty in order to accomplish this goal. While I agree with Powers that the US should do more, just how much more we can do is debatable. The United States is not the world police. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven the world doesn't want us in it's back yard. Still, this is a good starting point for further research on the issue. The book is a good starting place to research genocide in the 20th century. However, if you want to know about genocide prior to the 20th century you're going to have to look somewhere else.

I read this book for a world history class last semester. It was a really well researched book, but Samantha Power came off as overly idealistic. I realize the focus of the book was America's involvement in preventing genocide, but it really seemed to bash on the USA at times. Not that the US didn't deserve it, but the blame can not rest squarly on America's shoulders. There was nothing said about the UN's lack of leadership, corruption, and inept ability to make decisions to enforce it's own policy. Some of Powers's ideas just made my blood boil. She repeatedly states the need for the United States to take a leadership role in combating genocide, but states that America should surrender it's sovereignty in order to accomplish this goal. While I agree with Power's that the US should do more, just how much more we can do is debatable. The United States is not the world police. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven the world doesn't want us in it's back yard. Still, this is a good starting point for further research on the issue. However, if you want to know about genocide prior to the 20th century you're going to have to look somewhere else.

This is a book that will boil the blood. The chapter on Rwanda, reprinted in The Atlantic Monthly, is famously what converted President Bush to nation building. "Not on my watch," he scrawled on his copy. I don't believe that you can have a conscience, read the book and not want to do something about genocide. It is not just the scenes of mass murder that Ms. Power captures so well, but the simultaneous inaction from the US Government, foreign aid agencies and international organizations which stood by and let it happen. President Clinton actually blocked the UN from taking action to stop the murder of a million Tutsis in Rwanda and he didn't lose a single supporter.

Including, perhaps, the author. The least that can be said about the war in Iraq is that it prevented Saddam Hussein from killing more Kurds (when I was in Afghanistan, we'd see horrible photographs of the killing fields in Iraq and it was certainly something you have nightmares over), but Ms. Power was against the war from the beginning. She has always actively opposed any intervention by the United States to prevent genocide and is currently as advisor to Senator Obama's campaign urging the candidate to adopt the policy of repudiating all unilateralism and working through the UN to prevent genocide. This is a spectacular triumph of hope over experience, since the UN has proven to be so ineffectual, even becoming part of the problem sometimes, as when the UN peacekeepers engaged in mass child rape a year or two back. The one time President Bush adopted the message of Ms. Power and not the message of her book was when he turned the Darfur genocide over to the UN six years ago. They have been debating it ever since.

Poor George Bush. You can lack the conscience and compassion to want to stop genocide like President Clinton and still be a hero in today's world. You can lack the common sense and practical wisdom to craft effective responses against it, like Ms. Power, and still be considered a prophet. But if you have both qualities, you are the goat of the world. And Ms. Power wonders why genocide is an effective tool for dictators throughout the world.

It is appropriate to rate even a great book negatively when its message goes so strongly against the author's intent, so averaging five stars for the book and one star for the author seems appropriate.

In "A Problem from Hell" Ms. Power documents the history of genocide as it is presently understood and argues for an end to non-intervention when dealing with this horrific act. The formation of the modern definition of genocide is chronicled in the first few chapters, she documents the extraordinary efforts of Raphael Lemkin, a lawyer and Jewish refugee from Nazi occupied Poland, to get genocide, a word he first coined to describe the Ottoman slaughter of Armenians, declared an international crime. Then Ms. Power moves on to gripping journalistic accounts of the many genocides (though many were never declared so) of the twentieth century; she argues that most if not all could have been either prevented or stopped quickly if western nations, specifically America, were more forceful and faster in their response. The policies that she lays out are Wilsonian in nature and, in my opinion to broadly applied, however, many would have undoubtedly worked (i.e. cutting off military aid to Saddam's Iraq in 1989).

In the end, Ms. Power's book is a must read that informs one of the true nature of genocide, moreover, it also outline possible solutions to future genocides. Still, these opinions are separate enough that, so long as one reads with awareness of them, its quite easy to ensure they stay suggestions and do not transmute into facts once in one's head. The main problem is the book's tremendous length and depth -- definitely not a book for those looking for a simple overview -- but if one desires a thorough as well as relatively concise history of genocide this is the book.

Because of its democratic principles and military might, the United States has been viewed by the world as a moral authority for most of the twentieth century. The United States has claimed the chief role in defeating communism and making the world safe for democracy. However a closer examination of the actions behind the speeches reveals a pattern of economic and geopolitical interests taking precedence over humanitarian concerns, even cases of genocide.

Samantha Power, a human rights professor from Harvard University, expressed her surprise and frustration over the history of non-response that the United States has accumulated regarding foreign cases of genocide. Power cited the slaughter left in the wake of the Turkish, the Nazis, Pol Pot, Saddam Hussein and the Hutus of Rwanda, and examined how the United States may have verbally condemned the occurrences, but failed to back up their words with meaningful force.

When Power tried to warn the Washington Post of an upcoming genocide in Bosnia, she was negated until something more newsworthy came along. Genocide followed. She found that her actions followed a similar pattern of voices of warning that cry in the wilderness which are subsequently ignored. Henry Morgenthau's warnings about Turkey, Raphael Lemkin's prescient comments about Nazi Germany, William Proxmire's determined efforts for passage of law, and Peter Galbraith's advocacy for Kurds provide insight into what could have been avoided if human life had a higher priority than diplomatic protocol or political timidity.
Power effectively put a face on the incomprehensible numbers involved with genocide.

For example, she opened her preface, as well as chapter one, with a gripping tale of a single murder. In the preface, a school aged girl was killed while jump roping; in chapter one, a man who had coordinated the killings of one million Armenians was shot as revenge for his actions. She often relayed the words of those who somehow managed to escape death and who thus were able to speak for the dead. She organized her analysis into several categories: "Warning," usually from a lone voice or two who are very familiar with the area; "Recognition," official documents testify of the knowledge deep within the State Department or presidential cabinet, but often not made public knowledge; "Response," or more often, lack thereof, due to feelings of futility, perversity, or jeopardy (acting won't matter or will make it worse); and then finally "Aftermath," an analysis of what has happened since the genocide.
Power detailed Henry Morgenthau's experience as U.S. ambassador to Turkey during the slaughter of Armenian Christians. Morgenthau's sensibilities occasionally took precedence over the diplomatic tradition of not interfering with the internal affairs of a nation. Talaat Pasha, the Turkish interior minister who headed up the force to rid Turkey of Armenians, was aghast that Morgenthau would actually care about these Christians when Morgenthau himself was a Jew. Talaat was clueless why Morgenthau would complain. Morgenthau found a similarly frustrating experience dealing with the neutrality policy of Woodrow Wilson. Eventually he resigned in frustration. His advice remained unheeded and events became calamitous.

As a child in Poland, Raphael Lemkin followed the events in Turkey. He developed an early interest in fighting genocide and vandalism, and devoured books upon the subject. Fifteen years later Lemkin found a similarly horrible series of events unfolding in Nazi Germany. Similar to Morgenthau's (and Power's) experience, Lemkin encountered a brick wall when he tried to warn the League of Nations. Power cited Lemkin's expressions of frustration, but they clearly reflected her own. "The crime of barbarity repeated itself with near `biological regularity.' But Lemkin clearly saw that people living in peacetime were clearly going to have difficulty hearing, never mind heeding, warning pleas for early action."

Lemkin understood that Nazi atrocities were simply beyond comprehension of a civilized people, and decided that the first step on this long journey was to coin a new term to encapsulate the incomprehensible. He came up with the word "genocide," which eventually did take hold as the term for such events. By sheer force of will and persistence, Lemkin convinced the members of the UN to listen to him and draft his proposals. However, Lemkin found the U.S. a harder sell than the U.N., as the U.S. was reluctant to give up elements of sovereignty and economic concerns. The futility of Lemkin's battle against the American legislative brick wall was underscored by Lemkin dying penniless and friendless, his life worn out by his mission. Only seven people attended his funeral.
Senator William Proxmire (D- Wisc) picked up the dropped baton in 1967 and told "a largely uninterested, deserted Senate chamber" of his intention not to let this issue die, despite the need to step on some political toes. Typical of the reaction to Senator Proxmire's exhortations was the response of one junior State Department official. "Do you know of any official whose career has been advanced because he spoke out for human rights?"

In stark contrast, the touching words of Prince Sirik Matak expressed the betrayed American Dream. As he was led to his Khmer Rouge executioners, Matak invoked the voice of so many desperate people before him. "As for you and in particular for your great country, I never believed for a moment that you would abandon a people which had chosen liberty. You have refused us your protection and we can do nothing about it.... If I die here on this spot in my country that I love.... I have only committed this mistake of believing in you, the Americans."

The rise of the Khmer Rouge occurred on the heels of American involvement in Vietnam. For once, an American leader, President Gerald Ford, foresaw some of the horrors that would accompany a KR/ Communist takeover of the government of Cambodia. Unfortunately, the American public and its representatives in Congress were tired and believed top officials were crying wolf once more, perhaps to gain more aid or to prevent one more domino from falling. Elizabeth Becker, a young reporter for the Washington Post whom Power described as looking like a teenager, attempted to tell the story, but yet again, institutional forces quieted her warnings. Yet neither she, nor other voices of warning such as George McGovern, fully comprehended what was beyond the deep shroud surrounding the Khmer Rouge.

By 1978, three years after the Khmer Rouge had overtaken Phnom Penh and two million Cambodians were killed, the citizens were ironically saved not by the Americans, but by the old enemy, the Vietnamese. Although the U.S. couldn't be blamed for not knowing the full extent of the atrocities, they chose to do nothing when they could have done something. "For neither the first, nor the last time, geopolitics trumped genocide. Interests trumped indignation." (Power, 142). The U.S. continued to support the Khmer Rouge over the Vietnamese occupation, in part because the U.S. wanted to continue fostering a relationship with China.

The U.S. Senate finally passed the genocide convention in 1986, the 97th nation to do so, only after the law had had its teeth removed (by removing U.S. subordination to an international court) and Strom Thurmond (R.-S.C.) was able to get a couple of Republican judges appointed in exchange for his vote. Ironically, the first chance to use the new law came within a year, as Saddam Hussein and his cousin Ali led a mass execution of Kurds in northern Iraq. The U.S. again put economic concerns above humanitarian ones, and continued to support Iraq's regime by supplying subsidies and wheat. With Iraq currently at war with Iran, the U.S. found itself in a similarly awkward situation as with Cambodia/ Vietnam. Which was the lesser evil? Memories of the 444 days trumped the humanitarian concerns regarding Saddam versus the Kurds, and the U.S. continued its support for Hussein, and did not choose to believe Iran's claims of Iraqi genocide. Finally, in 1991, Hussein stepped too far. While the Kurds did not represent a political interest of those in Congress, Kuwait did, and Congress finally passed a resolution to put a stop to Hussein's aggression. Power struck a hopeful note when she described the camps set up for Kurdish refuges along the Turkish border shortly after the 1991 Iraq War. For once, a small piece of hope emerged as America fulfilled a promise to the world.

Samantha Power's 'A Problem from Hell' is a broad attempt to document the major acts of genocide/human rights violations of the 20th century paired with the international community's subsequent negligence in each case. She reports on the Holocaust, the Armenian genocide, and especially her major areas of research- Rwanda and Serbia.

However, Powers is content to simply recount major instances of crimes against humanity that the U.S. and other major Western powers simply ignored (a worthy historical task), rather than to document the major atrocities the U.S. supported/participated in (the far more morally serious and honest task). While she is scrupulous in her documentation of the horrors of Rwanda and Iraq, her sections on Indo-China fail miserably. She provides a lengthy and conventional chapter on the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, without mentioning to inform us about the U.S.'s massive contribution to such atrocities (only side references are provided). Additionally, she mentions in a rather depraved manner, that "In 1975, when its ally, the oil-producing, anti-Communist Indonesia, invaded Timor, killing between 100,000 and 200,000 civilians, the United States looked away" (147). In actuality, the U.S. did not look away: it funded the genocide, and President Carter deliberately escalated the intensity of the atrocities. This is the essence of Power's political backwardness. Pointing to the atrocities of official enemies is easy, it is far more difficult and necessary to point to the atrocities of the U.S. and its allies. Nowhere does Powers discuss Israel and the Palestinians, nowhere does she discuss Pinochet, or the Contras, or Kissinger for that matter. So long as the the liberal intelligentsia refuses to stare in the mirror, the world will continue to be an arena of exploitation, injustice, and crimes against humanity.