In 1688, James II of England fled the country and the following year his daughter, Mary, and son-in-law William of Orange were named Queen and King. In recent times, this "Glorious Revolution" has been portrayed as either a typically English sensible conservative movement to protect the ancient constitution or as a reaction to the increasing encouragement of Roman Catholicism by James. In either case, this was not a true modern revolution unlike e.g.the French or Russian ones. Steve Pincus, professor of history at Yale University sets out, and I believe convincingly, to overthrow this view and establish 1688-9 as "The First Modern Revolution".

Pincus argues it is wrong to assume that revolution is due to a failure of the existing regime to react to changing circumstances. He argues that, in fact, revolutions only occur when the regime attempts to modernize and is faced with competing ideas as to how to do that. He traces the steps that changed the popular mood from enthusiastic support of James in 1685 to one that forced him to flee in 1688. James II wished to develop a modern, centralized, absolutist monarchy modeled on that of Louis XIV, the"Sun King" of France. During this process he alienates not only the reforming Whigs but also many of the Tories (who fear the expanding power of Louis) and Catholics (who do not agree with his approach to Catholicism). Pincus examines the events of the revolution itself and shows how it was much more popular, violent and divisive then is often portrayed, with a significant minority remaining Jacobins, culminating in a foiled assassination and invasion plan in 1696. After William becomes king, Pincus argues convincingly that in foreign policy, the economy and the Church of England radical changes were made.

This book is not a general history and requires some knowledge of the events of the period. Pincus has clearly done considerable research and draws very heavily on contemporary sources. Although it is interesting to hear the actual thoughts of people at the time, the sheer volume of quotes can overwhelm the point being made. He also has a tendency to be repetitive. These two characteristics can make the book much harder work than it need be. It's worth reading for the insights and sheer depth of research but I fear many will give up before the end.

This is not so much a book as an argument, and an academic one at that. It might make a fine dissertation - to be read and discussed in excruciating detail by a limited handful of the author's peers - but as a history of this period for modern readers, it just does not cut it.

If you are looking for a sense of the major actors in the drama - James II, William, Mary, and their cohorts - you will find none of that here. James, for all the space devoted to his policies, remains a cipher. William and Mary might as well have stayed at home in Holland for all the impact they have on events. Modern writers perhaps tend to over-emphasize the force of human nature in history, but this book ignores it altogether.

If you are looking for a narrative and explanation of specific events, this is not the place to find that either. Events are brought in at random and elucidated only insofar as they advance the author's argument. There is one especially good summary of the changing economics of the times, but for the rest, the author clearly assumes you already know as much as he does (if so, why buy the book?).

If you are looking for how these events fit into the history of the British peoples, you can forget that too. These events were bracketed in history by two of the most dynamic periods in British history - Cromwell's revolt and the Hanoverian monarchies. Yet references backward and forward in time are sparse and random and, again, only introduced to push along the author's argument.

As to the argument itself - that this revolution was every bit as cataclysmic in its time as the French and Russian Revolutions in theirs - I have my doubts.

For one thing, the author's argument is based entirely on observations of the protagonists themselves. Most historians would agree that events are better understood in retrospect. Here, the author stands that proposition on its head, by claiming that retrospective observation is invalidated by the opinions voiced at the time. Not sure about that.

For another, the author many times forgets to back up these opinions - and his entire argument - with objective facts. Perhaps they aren't available, history being the way it is, but it remains a weakness of the book that the mind-numbing repetition of an argument does not validate it. This is especially true with respect to the author's claims of great violence in the Glorious Revolution. Nowhere does he actually prove that the violence was on a scale that might have horrified the rest of the world (as did the conflicts in both France and Russia).

The endless and mind-numbing repetition in the book makes the pace glacial and turns the reading of it into somewhat of an endurance test. This is unfair both to the subject matter, which really is exciting and important, and to the reader, who buys the book based on the sales pitch and at least expects a good read.

I still give the book two stars, because after all, this is one of the more neglected periods of British history. Anyone who puts this much effort into bringing it out of the shadows deserves credit for the effort.

Pincus shows in "1688" what every CEO needs to know: which business model - think Apple and Dell - will succeed? Mine? Or the other guy's.

Looking back over three centuries we know which model, French conservative or English liberal, succeeded in 1688 and which failed. But it was not at all clear at the time. James II thought that Louis XIV, the power of Europe, had the true path to modernity. He had overcome the Fronde, dispatched the Parlements, eliminated his Protestant opposition, and established a thoroughly modern state as it was conceived at the time.

In the event, Louis' high conservative policy of centrism, statism, and religious orthodoxy ended up bankrupting France - so badly that not even Napoleon could bring it back. "1688" is about avoiding this fate. Steve Ballmer, Read this book!

Pincus is at pains to show that the early liberals, by contrast, were all over the map, did not know what they wanted -- woe to the CEO who doesn't get this -- and were unified in only one thing, their rejection of Louis' conservatism. Not a promising beginning. Yet, very much like many successful businesses: Apple muddled through for decades until Steve Jobs saw a clear path and, like the England of William and Mary, destroyed far more value for others than he created for Apple. Watch out Samsung!

Key liberal tools, like the Bank of England, were, as Braudel emphasized over and over, impossible to make work effectively in France's highly structured environment. We see the same thing today as iTunes eviscerates the music, movie, and soon publishing and other industries. None of this was obvious to CEOs in those markets ten years ago.

Pincus' great accomplishment is to show that, if we know what we are looking for, we can discern winners from losers earlier than we think. But for a little thought, AOL could have been Google.

The outcome of 1688 is that we all speak English rather than French. No small matter three centuries on, and something that Microsoft and Google need to think about. Hard.

Where Pincus falls down is in not having a full-blown theory of information. Information costs were clearly falling much faster in England than in France during this period. Indeed, Pincus describes a blog-like, viral spread of views through the cheap mails, in free flowing coffees houses and in rapidly disseminated pamphlets that no amount of high conservative statism could stop. Kind of like China today.

By contrast, Louis control of the presses, mails, and other tools of communication raised the cost of information to unsustainable levels, very much like the old Soviet Union. The lesson for CEOs: as always in history, whoever is ahead on the falling information cost curve gains competitive advantage and wins.

Sadly, the copyediting is simply dreadful for a book of this high caliber. The adjective "apologetic" is used repeatedly for the noun "apology." "Modern" is repeatedly endlessly on some pages when once is more than enough. The French Great Fear of 1789 is variously said to have happened in 1789, 1780, and 1689. People are "intruded" (p. 184) which is hard to imagine, and some things are "instantiated," which is correct but such an uncommon use the copy editor should have replaced it.

A superb history of one of the foundation events upon which the modern Western/liberal state was built.

Professor Pincus brings broad and deep scholarship to this book, which, in turn, provides impressive value to the serious reader.

If you want to learn more about why the English turned away from James II and his style of modernization (focused on the French model) and the effects of this revolution on foreign relations, military (blue water navy or a standing army?), economics (land vs. manufacturing as the source of a country's wealth), religion (tolerant?), read this book.

It is not focused on personalities: you will not learn much about William and Mary, for example. However, this book is a remarkable synthesis of various strands of historical thought on what many heretofore have viewed as almost a peaceful, conservative non-event.

Professor Pinucus hammers his firmly held opinions home repeatedly, backed up by multiple citations. His views on the Glorious Revolution seem to this common reader to be sound and quite useful toward explaining not only 1688 England, but also much of the political, economic, and religious world of today.