A very deep, well-researched and informed book. An important work which should be read by anyone for or against the Iraq war

I found this book to be an interesting inside view of what was going on. I first saw the book on the daily show with John Stewart, and thought i'd pick it up. Wether or not you agree with Douglas Feith on the issue of deception, this book is filled with information you should probably know.
Factual, mostly unbiased accounts of what was going on, and also what is in the official records too, is what this book is filled with. I personally liked that it has a map of that region of the world in the front, a good idea what with only 1 in 7 people in the U.S. able to find Iraq according to the latest statistics spread by news media. 4 stars.

I picked up this book after watching Jon Stewart do his best to bring the leftist attack to the author on his show. When checking the reviews on Amazon, I appeared that those who rated the book the lowest were drinking the code pink cool-aid while writing their review. After listening to the book, it is obvious that those who rated the book as one star never read the book. If you are on the right or the left and have an open and intelligent mind I recommend the book as an accurate recounting of history from the author's point of view. However, if you are not into politics, policy, or history you may find the book a little tedious.

This is a must-read for anyone who wants to get a firsthand view of the origins of the State/CIA war on Defense and eventually Bush 43. According to Feith, it began because Rumsfeld vehemently objected to Gen. Jay Garner hiring a staff composed nearly entirely of State Dept. officials.

If you've only gotten your accounts of the war behind the war from the major media, you need to read this book. If you've followed it via the alternative media, you're probably familiar with many of the anecdotes and facts related herein (such as State wanting a long-term American presence in and dominion over Iraq, while Defense wanted something like the eventual Iraqi temporary administration years before it finally happened; or State's willingness to sacrifice American lives just so long as they could have any possibility of Chalabi not gaining power). Even so, you'll find it a good read.

Perhaps the most interesting correction to the record (one that was new to me) is the idea that Garner was not fired, but was always intended to be a stop-gap, and that the disastrous reign of Paul Bremer was at Rumsfeld's recommendation. Only after his appointment did Bremer apparently forget he reported to the SecDef and became infatuated with pursuing State's policies rather than those of the administration. Bringing an end to Bremer's megalomania only happened after a self-aggrandizing editorial in the Washington Post, run without any apparent clearance from anyone in his chain of command.

Feith does a good job portraying most of those he was able to observe closely. Rumsfeld is brusque, brilliant, and difficult. Rice is always looking to trinagulate and please everyone. Powell consistently is reported as saying one thing in the media and then denying it to Feith and his colleagues. Armitage uses the media to wage a near-coup against the President. The lone cipher in all this is Wolfowitz; he's nearly a ghost in the book, and you'll learn nothing about the man from it.

All in all, a solid read, and highly recommended.

The sheer magnitude of misinformation concerning the run-up to and the current U.S. policy in Iraq is simply withering. FINALLY, an insider not only lays everything out for anyone seriously interested in looking and understanding (which doubtless will exclude much of the dominant, old-line media), but one who provides significant documentation for everything he says! That fact alone is worth the price. Barak Obama, et al, should take a break, and read this book!

Unlike the fact-free, free-standing assertions of many (most?) books (and, significantly, of politicians from both Parties) on this subject, Secretary Feith thoughtfully has provided a web site (www.waranddecision.com) containing easy (one-click) access to the unclassified versions of the documents upon which his tome relies.

One may disagree with Iraq policy, in comfortable reflection based on a degree of knowledge concerning past events, but this book sets forth in engaging, easy-to-read narrative, what was happening and when. It leaves no excuse for the sort of ignorance that is so pervasive in discussions of these issues. Yes, yes, sometimes the presentation can be tedious; but isn't that in the very nature of policy? Especially Middle East Policy?

Far from being an "Apologia-Pro-Vita-Sua" exercise, Secretary Feith frankly sets forth where and when he could have made better "calls." This, alone, is refreshing -- especially if one has slogged through, or is familiar with the vacuous, ego-driven volumes of Zinni and McClelland (Franks is another story).

All in all, this is The Essential Read on this subject. It should be on every serious history reader's shelf. It is an unparalleled single point of reference on the matter.

First, buy it. Don't necessarily read the whole thing, but own it and read from it. It's only $19, it will be a valuable reference, and Doug Feith is donating his procedes to veterans. The Lessons Learned are invaluable and applicable to leaders in many other realworld contexts.

The final chapter is a must read. Begin by reading the last two and a half chapters and then occasionally skim and read from other parts of the book (use the index to choose points of iterest to you).

He is overly critical of his collegues, and a bit whiney, tedious and longwinded. But his criticism is almost always justified.

His account of the run up to the Iraq war is by far the most accurate I've encountered since April 2003.

The New York Times and Washington Post have steadfastly refused to review this book, which is a strange form of flattery for Douglas J. Feith. Having printed numberless falsehoods and distortions about Feith, these guardians of the truth as they want it known, do not want the actual truth disseminated, the truth contained in "War & Decision".

It is indeed lamentable that so few will read this book. First, the subject is too serious for most people. They will continue to rely on newspapers, magazines, blogs and so on. Second, reading Feith's book requires dedication. While well written and eminently comprehensible by virtually any reader, it is packed with detail and detail to the uninterested becomes quickly tedious.

Fortunately, though the Times and Post have declined to review "War & Decision", many other honest people have - and the conclusion has been generally that Feith has written the first serious history of the Iraq war. It is comprehensive. It covers the planning, the execution, the aftermath. It is unsparing in praising the successes - and lamenting (as well as explaining) the failures.

Many myths and outright lies of the mainstream media and left-wing are exposed here and supported not only with profuse sourcing, but in some cases with copies of the actual documents as well. No anonymous sources as you would find in a Woodward book or a Times or Post article.

It will take dedication to work your way through the entire book and, frankly, I doubt that it is totally comprehensible with a single reading. This book invites scholarly researching and multiple readings. Considering the importance of the events to our era and the future, one can only hope that other similar histories - honest and detailed - will be forthcoming in the future from other participants in the events. But, in reality, I doubt that there will be many for few will be willing to hold as reflective a mirror to themselves as Feith does.

Feith tells us much. Colin Powell and the miserable Richard Armitage come badly here as they justifiably should. L. Paul Bremer is the object of much, far too polite, scorn. The generals, Rumsfeld, Bush himself, everyone is responsible in one way or another for the failures. More importantly, perhaps, Feith also identifies who should receive credit for the successes - and there were many with quite possibly more to come.

The student of history will note the differing environments in which policy was decided upon during WWII, Korea, Vietnam and now Iraq. Feith doesn't say so, but it is clear that the Congress of the United States over the years has intruded where it doesn't belong and has tied the hands of the current and future Presidents in terms of defending the nation. The mainstream media, firmly held in the hands of the left-wing, seems to hate the United States more than the nation's enemies.

The State Department, CIA and Department of Defense have become unelected branches of government, with entrenched anonymous bureaucrats who are unaccountable and unknown to the public, but who play a large and dangerous role in deciding or shaping policy. One need only look at the war that Feith describes between State, CIA and Defense.

I wish Feith had produced a second companion volume "Iraq For Dummies" or something along those lines so more people might be drawn into reading what he has to say. It is an adventure in truth.

Feith explodes the myths that there were no reasons to be concerned with Iraqi WMD efforts, that the war was about oil or George W. Bush's ego, that there was no post-occupation plan and so on. All of these points are explained and documented.

It is difficult, frankly, to write a concise review of this book. There is much information in its 600-plus pages (including notes) and since so few people will actually read it, there is a desire to spread as much of its content as possible.

The reality is that if you are concerned with the United States and its future and want to understand why invading Iraq was a brave and proper decision, read this book. It tells the whole story, warts and all.

Jerry

Ext.Lens Crafters
Day.
Feith:(High pitched nasal voice) --and then we shut down the rape rooms, thanks in no small part to a rather trenchant memo I floated over to the CPA stating just how morally objectionable I found them.

Urkle:(High pitched nasal voice)Gee D.F. you really layed down the law over there. Maybe someday I'll have an opportunity to wield such strength.
(clumsily knocks over display of sunglasses)

Feith:(high pitched nasal voice) Give it time Urk-man , give it time.
(clumsily knocks over display of sunglasses)

Like many of my neighbors, I scraped the faded American flag decal off my back window in ,oh, about 2005 when I became disgusted with the war in Iraq. Two questions kept popping up in my mind: "Why are we still in this?" and "Why didn't the planners see this mess coming?"

Like many, I had forgotten the original purpose of our national effort which I think Feith summarizes best in one of his chapter titles: "Change the Way We Live, Or Change the Way They Live". His explanation took care of my first question.

Feith's book takes long strides to answer my second question, and it was well worth my time. Without a doubt this book is from Feith's viewpoint, as it should be. As he recounts, others disagreed with his views. But even if you disagree with Feith's viewpoint, you should read this book. After reading it, I am grateful to Doug Feith for this book, not to mention his service to the nation.

This is the Ultimate account of the strategy and planning behind the Liberation of Iraq. The "Dark Winter" theoretical Exercise that took part a few months before 9/11 was a Eye opener ! once you read that, then it was the "Only Option" to take out Saddam Hussein . The Country just could not afford to take the chance that biological weapons could get into the hands of ANY Terrorist organization ...Look at the Bad guys who had residence in IRAQ ..Abu Nidal ...George Habash etc just to name a few !!!..all the liberal rhetoric about looking for Nuclear ICBM'S the so called WMD'S ???...Colin Powell did not go to the U.N and say anything about them he spoke mostly about Saddams "Biological "capabilty !! and now we find out that how serious it was ...The Nuclear capability was only in it's Infancy (Thanks to the Israeli's)..what was to stop him Giving AL QAEDA SMALLPOX!! THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY IS MY FRIEND...THEY WERE BOTH SUNNI.....ITS A NO BRAINER..
WE HAVE STILL NOT DISCOVERED WHO PLANTED "ANTHRAX" AROUND NEW YORK AND D.C ...SMALLPOX WOULD BE MUCH MORE DEVASTATING...

Finally, an honest, cogent telling of the thinking within the Bush Administration in the days following 9/11. Not everyone agreed on the proper response but a workable strategy was developed based on the information at hand. The logic seems inescapable - a major injury to the American people had been sustained and it was clear that the threat of further attacks was growing, not diminishing. The government of the US has a core responsibility to meet and prevent further attacks and that's what they did.

The tests of a report, whether in a book like this or in the day-to-day media coverage, are how well the story appears rational and in agreement with other knowledge of how the world works and, in the long run, how well can predictions based on those reports hold up to events. The media's version of events in real time never hung together and seemed to conflict with other understandings. The political opposition to the Bush Administration was clearly contra-factual in most respects. This book however makes its cases clearly and with logic and precision. It just makes sense, especially in light of current conditions.

Where I would take a differing position from Feith and Rumsfeld is in the matter of how important it was that Iraq's government would be democratic. Feith seems to have advocated, and still advocates, that something less than democracy in Iraq would serve the US well enough. The State Department did take a longer view although they over-romantized it in their arguments. I think Bush made the right decision to think the long game and push for a sound basis for democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The book also highlights the importance of the next president's choice of Secretary of State. The prime task will be bending the bureaucracy to the will of the elected leadership and making it a team player. I read where Obama is floating Joe Biden for the job!

I won't gush over Mr. Feith's writing skills. I found it easy enough to read but he has a style honed in the writing of interoffice memos and PowerPoint presentations. Certainly good enough but his background shows.

If one reads only one book on post-9/11 decision-making, read this one. My respects (and thanks) to Mr. Feith!

From http://www.slate.com/id/2192696/

A Tale of Two Tell-Alls

IF YOU WANT TO READ A SERIOUS BOOK ABOUT THE INTERVENTION IN IRAQ, LOOK TO DOUGLAS FEITH.
By Christopher Hitchens
Posted Monday, June 2, 2008, at 11:40 AM ET

When Bush's Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill defected from the Cabinet in 2002 and Ron Suskind told O'Neill's story of being surrounded by fools, Michael Kinsley observed that the president deserved all he got from the book. Anyone dumb enough to hire a fool like O'Neill in the first place ought to have known what to expect. So it goes with the ludicrous figure of Scott McClellan. I used to watch this mooncalf blunder his way through press conferences and think, Exactly where do we find such men? For the job of swabbing out the White House stables, yes. But for any task involving the weighing of words? Hah! Now it seems that he realizes, and with a shock at that, that there was a certain amount of "spin" or propaganda involved in his job description. Well, give the man a cigar. Beyond that, the book is effectively valueless to the anti-war camp since, as McClellan says of the president, "I consider him a fundamentally decent person, and I do not believe he or his White House deliberately or consciously sought to deceive the American people."
Bertrand Russell's principle of evidence against interest--if the pope has doubts about Jesus, his doubts are by definition more newsworthy than the next person's--doesn't really justify the ocean of coverage in which the talentless McClellan is currently so far out of his depth. For one thing, he doesn't supply anything that can really be called evidence. For another, having not noticed any "propaganda machine" at the time he was perspiring his way through his simple job, he has a clear mercenary interest in discovering one in retrospect.
If you want to read a serious book about the origins and consequences of the intervention in Iraq in 2003, you owe it to yourself to get hold of a copy of Douglas Feith's War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism. As undersecretary of defense for policy, Feith was one of those most intimately involved in the argument about whether to and, if so, how to put an end to the regime of Saddam Hussein. His book contains notes made in real time at the National Security Council, a trove of declassified documentation, and a thoroughly well-organized catalog of sources and papers and memos. Feith has also done us the service of establishing a Web site where you can go and follow up all his sources and check them for yourself against his analysis and explanation. There is more of value in any chapter of this archive than in any of the ramblings of McClellan. As I write this on the first day of June, about a book that was published in the first week of April, the books pages of the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, and the Boston Globe have not seen fit to give Feith a review. An article on his book, written by the excellent James Risen for the news pages of the New York Times, has not run. This all might seem less questionable if it were not for the still-ballooning acreage awarded to Scott McClellan.

Feith was and is very much identified with the neoconservative wing of the Republican Party, and he certainly did not believe that Saddam Hussein was ever containable in a sanctions "box." But he is capable of separating his views from his narrative, and this absorbing account of the interdepartmental and ideological quarrels within the Bush administration, on the Afghanistan and Guantanamo fronts as well as about Iraq, will make it difficult if not impossible for people to go on claiming that, for instance:
1. There was no rational reason to suspect a continuing Iraqi WMD threat. Feith's citations from the Duelfer Report alone are stunning in their implications.
2. That alternatives to war were never discussed and that the administration was out to "get" Saddam Hussein from the start.
3. That the advocates of regime change hoped and indeed planned to anoint Ahmad Chalabi as a figurehead leader in Baghdad.
4. That there was no consideration given to postwar planning.
It's also of considerable interest to learn that the main argument for adhering to the Geneva Conventions was made within the Pentagon and that the man who expressed the most prewar misgivings concerning Iraq was none other than Donald Rumsfeld. Feith doesn't deny that he has biases of his own. One of these concerns the widely circulated charge that his own Office of Special Plans was engaged in cherry-picking and stovepiping intelligence. Another is the criticism, made by most of the neocon faction, of Paul Bremer and the occupation regime that he ran in Baghdad. In all instances, however, Feith writes in an unrancorous manner and is careful to supply the evidence and the testimony and, where possible, the actual documentation, from all sides.
Without explicitly saying so, Feith makes a huge contribution to the growing case for considering the Central Intelligence Agency to be well beyond salvage. Its role as a highly politicized and bewilderingly incompetent body, disastrous enough in having left us under open skies before Sept. 11, 2001, became something more like catastrophic with the gross mishandling of Iraq. For these revelations alone, this book is well worth the acquisition. (I might add that, unlike McClellan, Feith is contributing all his earnings and royalties to charities that care for our men and women in uniform.)
I don't know Feith, but I can pay him two further compliments: When you read him on a detail with which you yourself are familiar, he is factually reliable (and it's not often that one can say that, believe me). And his prose style is easy, nonbureaucratic, dry, and sometimes amusing. If a book that was truly informative was called a "tell-all" by our media, then War and Decision would qualify. As it is, we seem to reserve that term for the work of bigmouths who have little, if anything, to impart.

Douglas Feith is as responsible as anyone for the disastrous decision to go to war in Iraq. He is also one of the people most responsible for the bungling of the occupation of Iraq by the USA.

Here's what his colleagues at Georgetown had to say about him: "Mr. Feith has been accused of ethical conflicts during his term in charge of Iraq reconstruction. More seriously, he has sought to diminish the importance of the Geneva Conventions and has defended the use of torture in a number of public writings and talks. He speaks regularly against the relevance of international law to conflicts in the Middle East and opposes diplomatic solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Perhaps most seriously, he was a central figure in the dissemination of false justifications for the illegal invasion of Iraq, behavior that many experts consider to constitute war crimes, and which the most sympathetic would have to think a highly dubious grounds for further employment."

I read the book and think it presents a persuasive and illuminating case for what went on during this period. It is heavily documented and corrects many errors in the popular media.

It is far more important than the "make some money" books based on emotion and a dearth of facts--like most of the negative reviews. One wonders whether those "reviewers" really read the book--few of them offer substantiated criticisms of what Feith reports.

This book contains a serious error that undermines its credibility.

On page 187, Feith writes that the "CIA's assessment of Iraq's support for terrorism was reinforced by postwars discoveries", and then goes on to claim that "among the terrorists whom Saddam harbored in Iraq were .. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi".

This is categorically false. The 2006 Senate Intelligence report, produced while Republicans controlled the intelligence committee, concluded that "postwar information indicates that Saddam Hussein attempted, unsuccessfully, to locate and capture al-Zarqawi and that the regime did not have a relationship, harbor, or turn a blind eye towards Zarqawi."

Here is the report. Perhaps Feith should make more of an effort to familiarize himself with its contents. Page 109 contains the excerpt I quoted:

[...]

It is true that *pre-war* assessments suggested that Saddam's regime may have tolerated Zarqawi's presence, but the postwar findings refuted this assessment. The language in his book clearly suggests that we still have good reason today to believe that Saddam harbored Zarqawi. This is completely false.

Even if he has some rationale for not accepting the Senate committee's conclusions, it is quite improper to flatly assert the contrary without even mentioning their findings.

I don't blame Feith for all the distortions and finger-pointing in this book. If I had hurt the country that badly, I don't know if I would have had the courage to come clean about it, either.

At my first duty station I helped take care of wounded service members who had bled in large part due to the incompetence of Feith and his cronies. Most of these guys looked too young to shave regularly, but they were brave enough to walk into the face of death if they thought it helped the country.

One of the few things they expected in return for their service was a moderate amount of competence. They also expected honesty. This book shows the author to have neither.

Logic and facts did not stop the Bush administration from looking for connections. Vice President Cheney promoted a theory that Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, was really an Iraqi doppelganger who had assumed Yousef's identity. The administration circulated as authentic a raw intelligence report, apparently from an alcoholic and discredited agent, that had the September 11 mastermind, Mohamed Atta, meeting with an Iraqi embassy official in Prague in 2000. (There is no evidence that Atta went to Prague.) Not satisfied with the conclusions of the intelligence professionals at the CIA and his own Defense Intelligence Agency, Secretary Rumsfeld set up the Office of Special Plans, staffed by ideologically vetted political appointees and reporting to Under Secretary for Policy Douglas Feith, with the mission of finding the link between Saddam and Al Qaeda that the intelligence professionals had supposedly missed.

President Bush simply asserted that Iraq was integral to the war on terror. He had no basis for his claim before the war, but he turned out to be prematurely correct. As a result of the American invasion, Sunni fundamentalist terrorists have flooded into Iraq. The Sunni Arab center of Iraq has become what Afghanistan was during the Taliban--an inaccessible region dominated by shadowy figures that now host foreign terrorists linked to Al Qaeda. By staging spectacular attacks, the terrorists have given Al Qaeda new strength and have helped generate thousands of new recruits. The foreign terrorists have done real damage to the prospect for a successful outcome in Iraq.

SOURCE: Peter Galbraith, The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), page 80.

This volume is an attempt to cover the tracks of a gang of immoral, devious, vicious, neocons who fabricated the evidence and devised the strategy of propaganda used to propel the US into an illegal war. Feith was one of many back-room boys who fed a dim president the words that were used to sell the Iraq fiasco.
Watch him squirm and whine when interviewed by Jon Stewart.
In a proper and just World Feith would be made to stand before a Court and defend a charge of War Criminal.
Don't buy this book. He should not benefit from evil.

Just because I disagree with something (as I do with most of this fairytale), I'm not one to give it a bad rating. However, this was simply the most poorly written book I've read in ages. There are too many footnotes to distract, and it's hard to ignore the common liars techniques - An example would be repeating a story 4 times with extra details added each time.

If this book sells many copies, it'll be due to the "Nancy Grace effect" - wherein people want to see why something is so bad and will buy it to find out - Not unlike the movie "Plan 9 from Outer Space."

Wow this is an important definiton of managed major media news -- as well ad the agenda driven, risk adverse CIA and Department of State -- "Let's go along and get along, we will pay the consequences some other time" and "My mind is made up, don't confuse me with the facts.

I marvel at the detail of notes and memory of the author -- some times a bit more than needed to make the point. So, we are required to do a bit of digging through the meetings and conversations to get to the meat. But so be it.

The author also defines that one of the unfortunate points in the Iraq war coverage is the administration's lack of P.R. capabilities, leaving the public to the twisted interpretation of the initiation and conduct of the war to the major news media.

Fact #1: State Dept is competent & trustworthy (anonymous sources say so)
Fact #2: CIA is competent & trustworthy (anonymous sources say so)
Fact #3: DoD is secretive and incompetent (anonymous sources say so)
So how can anyone write a book that disproves those facts?
Well, actually, it turns out it's really really easy to disprove those facts.

The inside story of a defining moment of American character. Want to know what Colin Powel is really like? Want to know how much control the President really has over foreign policy? Read it.

At last, a sensible, informed history from one of the responsible participants in these events.

I think it is skilfully written and I found it a joy to read, not just for the language mastery and informed history, but for the careful clarity, perspective, humility and sensitive care in purpose. I think it is a valuable insight into some truly capable people in action; standing up, discerning and doing the right thing, and doing their best, even when its really challenging, even when there is voluminous opposition, and when the stakes are very, very high. People who will find a way to rise and meet a challenge no matter how high, and some who don't. I found it exciting and inspiring to read, and a wonderful example of how to behave well that I will treasure.

Clearly, the integrity of the free world was in some fine hands here.

I loved it. Thanks.

I have now finished the book but the number of negative reviews posted here still suggests that half a review by someone who has read the book carefully was better than what else is on offer so far. I have not altered my comments since reading the rest but have a few additional observations. This is a personal story of Feith's career in the DoD, before and during the Iraq War. He comments on contacts with others but he does not offer general statements or philosophy about matters that he is not personally familiar with. He does, however, offer some conclusions at the end about what was done well and what the mistakes were. He is honest about identifying his opinions and what he believes to be facts. This is a source document for the history that will be eventually written, hopefully fairly, about this period. I marked a number of sections because they impact the mythology of the war as illustrated in the other reviews and comments.

He is critical of Colin Powell, and especially, Richard Armitage, who seemed not to be as concerned with the post-Saddam situation yet who resisted anyone else treading on their turf. His first skirmish was in 2002 (page 173) when he attempted to set up an office, called Office of Strategic Influence, to counteract the Islamist propaganda about why violent jihad was becoming a threat. Some went back to the old "root causes" excuse yet the Saudi hijackers of 9/11 were upper middle class educated men. His effort came to naught when the office was attacked in a strategic leak from within the administration, followed by a sensational NY Times article that accused them of planning to spread false information. Another similar article was printed recently about another DoD effort to reach Muslims with honest information. In his conclusions, he points out that we still do not have any serious effort to counter jihadist rhetoric.

He refutes (page 197) another charge, prominent in another review here, that Chalabi was a "creature" of DoD and Feith was his "sponsor." One would think that the fact the Chalabi has been a major official in the Iraq government would put to rest that old CIA smear but it lives on on Amazon pages. He tells the story of CIA incompetence and the firestorm created when a 20-year DIA expert on his staff wrote a critical briefing (page 265) pointing out how CIA had ignored links between Saddam and al Qeada before the war. On page 278, he recounts another example of State's conflicted thinking where they advise against an "occupation" but their antipathy toward the "externals" (exiles like Chalabi) leads them to plan for a "many year" occupation and rule before an Iraqi government can be set up. The insurgency gained force from resentment at that policy. He points out with some understandable satisfaction that the "externals," including the Kurds who CIA predicted would not be accepted by other Iraqis, constituted almost the entire interim government that took over from Bremer and the CPA in 2004.

He has some mixed opinions about Paul Bremer, pointing out how Bremer took too much authority, resisting any consultation with Rumsfeld, his superior in the chain-of-command, and made a number of serious mistakes. The most serious one was excluding the Iraqis from governing their own country for as long as he did. The insurgency might never have gained the support of so much of the Sunni population had the "Occupation" not been so obvious.

I don't say this is the last word and Feith seems to resist many generalizations. This is an objective account and very valuable. He has his deficiencies. The most serious is the fact the he never mentions the tribal nature of the Iraqi society. This was a major mistake in the early history of our post-Saddam attempts to govern the country and fight the insurgency.

I have read many books on this subject and the ones I respect, beginning with The Threatening Storm by Kenneth Pollack, all mostly agree. For example, another review here mentions Bob Baer and his book about Aghanistan and Gary Berntsen and "Jawbreaker" also about Afghanistan. I have read both books and Baer, in particular, dismisses his CIA bosses pointing out the lack of language skills in CIA. This lack, and the ignorance of the culture, was a major factor in the CIAs poor performance in Iraq and is discussed by Feith. He is chiefly critical of CIA implying that their information was better sourced than it was. They concealed how few assets they had in Iraq (none) and led others astray who placed more faith in their reports than was warranted. Better to confess ignorance than mislead.

The dissent, like some of the other reviews here, comes with plenty of invective and obscenity but few facts. I still think this is an important book that anyone trying to understand our policy on fighting militant Islam should read. I'm sure Feith is evening a few scores here but he marshals lots of facts and refers to other documents to support his conclusions. This is an essential book, not least because he is such a controversial figure. The abuse he has taken from partisans is outrageous. At one point (page 388) he mentions a particularly odious slur attributed to Colin Powell by Bob Woodward in which Feith's office in the DoD is described as "a Gestapo office" ignoring the fact that Feith's father was a Holocaust survivor. Powell denied making the remark and apologized to Feith, whom he had known for 20 years, but the tone was set.

I am only half way through the book but the number of negative reviews posted here suggests that half a review by someone who has read the book carefully is better than what is on offer so far. This is a personal story of Feith's career in the DoD, before and during the Iraq War. He comments on contacts with others but he does not offer general statements or philosophy about matters that he is not personally familiar with. This is a source document for the history that will be eventually written, hopefully fairly, about this period. I marked a number of sections because they impact the mythology of the war as illustrated in the other reviews and comments.

He is critical of Colin Powell, and especially, Richard Armitage, who seemed not to be as concerned with the post-Saddam situation yet who resisted anyone else treading on their turf. His first skirmish was in 2002 (page 173) when he attempted to set up an office, called Office of Strategic Influence, to counteract the Islamist propaganda about why violent jihad was becoming a threat. Some went back to the old "root causes" excuse yet the Saudi hijackers of 9/11 were upper middle class educated men. His effort came to naught when the office was attacked in a strategic leak from within the administration, followed by a sensational NY Times article that accused them of planning to spread false information. Another similar article was printed recently about another DoD effort to reach Muslims with honest information.

He refutes (page 197) another charge, prominent in another review here, that Chalabi was a "creature" of DoD and Feith was his "sponsor." One would think that the fact the Chalabi is a major official in the Iraq government would put to rest that old CIA smear but it lives on on Amazon pages. He tells the story of CIA incompetence and the firestorm created when a 20-year DIA expert on his staff wrote a critical briefing (page 265) pointing out how CIA had ignored links between Saddam and al Qeada before the war. On page 278, he recounts another example of State's conflicted thinking where they advise against an "occupation" but their antipathy toward the "externals" (exiles like Chalabi) leads them to plan for a "many year" occupation and rule before an Iraqi government can be set up. The insurgency gained force from resentment at that policy.

I don't say this is the last word and Feith seems to resist (at least so far) many generalizations. This is an objective account and very valuable. I have read many books on this subject and the ones I respect, beginning with The Threatening Storm by Kenneth Pollack, the all mostly agree. The dissent, like some of the reviews here, comes with plenty of invective and obscenity but few facts. I will update this review when I finish the book but could not leave potential readers with the impression given by several reviews here.

Fascinating view of the first years of our War on Terrorism. Only Bush seems to make decisions based on the fact that our enemies had discovered how to fight their enemy (the USA) by bypassing our military and attacking citizens directly. Why the MSM doesn't understand that protecting us from such attacks has to be the main function of our Presidency is beyond me.
. . only their hatred for our country and hope for its downfall can explain the anti-war behavior. Noone wants war but to pretend it's not necessary is foolhardy. Bush's main goal (according to Feith) is that we not suffer another attack and in that he's been successful. I for one am grateful to President Bush for that. Feith finds errors on all sides (state dept, Defense Dept. but he's gives a full narrative not just the soundbitten biased report we now expect from the mainstream media. Anyone interested in the real story must read this book!

I rarely write reviews, and especially when I have not even read the book, my bookshelves are full of almost all of the politcal books written between 2000 and 2008 (Amazon can testify for me!). As reported by John Byrne - at the booksigning party and I quote:
"On Thursday, Feith pointed his finger at everyone but himself regarding the war in Iraq. According to the Washington Post's Dana Milbank, at a book-launch party for his new book, "War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism," Feith blamed a laundry list of officials for failing "to challenge the logic of going to war."
(here: http://rawstory.com/news/2008/Feith_says_Iraq_war_not_my_0425.html)

Mr. Feith blames everyone else except himself. With all of his bumbles and misplaced loyalties I would rather sit in silence for 8 hours than read his phony book.

I would suggest for anyone who is bothered and mad about the Bush 43 Presidency, I would suggest do not buy this book to deprive this maniac of any royalties.

For those of you who disagree, you are entitled.

This book is Feith's attempt to recover his reputation in the aftermath of the Iraq war by throwing almost everyone else under the bus. The pattern of the book follows the usual neocon line. Feith was the faithful underling carring out the wishes of the president and therefore anything that was wrong with the war is Bush's fault. There is also the usual pattern of blaming the CIA (i.e. Clinton holdover George Tenant).

An example of Feith's reasoning. Feith says he personally had nothing to do with claiming that Iraq had something to do with 9/11. His claim of blamelessness starts with with Wolfowitz who decided for Feith that Iraq had to investigated because the CIA was run by the incompetent democrat George Tenant. Then he blames their own investigators for being incomptent. In the end, he manages to blame and hold responsible everyone around him except himself.

So what according to the author went wrong in Iraq? Feith is still a fanatical believer in his London Iraqis. If the US had simply handed over all power to Chalabi, Iraq would have become a pro-western model democracy with no conflict at all. Feith of course stays with the traditional story. Every policy of his is really the President's policy and when Feith's policies don't end up being implemented, its the fault of sinister forces who have somehow defeated the will of the president.

In page after page, the thing that comes across is an idealism that deals in absolutes and doesn't concern itself with the hard work of turning policy into results. Feith seems to be better suited to writing papers and speaking at conferences than making things happen.

At the end if the book, what you have is an account of Feith's arrogance. Iraq isn't his fault, its the CIA, the uniformed army, the state department, his boss, the people who worked for him, the DIA, Paul Bremer, Colin Powell and the list goes on. It was as if it was him, Rumsfeld, Ahmed Chalabi and G.W. Bush with their "plan" against everyone else.

The book isn't enlightening about how policy for Iraq was made. But it is very enlightening as to the bad personality of Feith and why he was a bad choice for a critical role at the defense department. Taking a country to war requires having a team in government who can work with each other. Feith quite obviously was the wrong person for the job.

This attempt of his showed he was still internationally dangerous years after Desert Storm. It is also mentioned in the 2008 New York Times Almanac (in the Kuwait section).

On other points, there is a mention of how the US seized a ship in 2003 (a ship which was carrying centrifuge parts) to Gadhafi's Libya! This book explains how the ship's seizure lead Libay to disarm wmd-wise! True and so did the very occupation of Iraq by the US and allies (see books like Shopping for Bombs, Surrender is not an Option and former CIA-head Tenet's own memoir book 'At the Center of the Storm' plus a webpage called "How Gadhafi lost his groove" for more on this).

PS The ship's name, not given on the page the seizure was mentioned on, is the BBC China!

This book is essential reading for historians and those concerned with national security reform. It is not recommended for normal people, including those that have strong political views one way or the other. You will get much better value simply by reading reviews of a 100 related books starting with the ten below, and buying the book Fixing Failed States and checking out the reviews of the books I recommend there.

I read the Index after the Table of Contents and before I actually read the book. It became immediately evident to me that:

1) The index stinks in not including place names like Jalabad, Tora Bora, Kandahar, etcetera.

2) The author has written a personal account that opens with a concise (even impressive) summary of the high points of "alleged" criticisms and conspiracy claims, but with the exception of Bob Woodward, I could not find a single other reputable author in the index (see my list of ten books below, a token of the 100+ books that generally refute most of what this author has to say at the external level). I have no doubt this author is honest and credible on the details he knows, but as with the Viet-Nam rejoinder, "so what", I really question whether the author--good man that he is--is at all in touch with reality. Baer, Bamford, Clarke, Ritter, etc. do NOT appear in this book's index or footnotes that I could find.

Getting into the book, I am immediately impressed by the existence of a supporting website (waranddecision.com just add the www) and I am generally very impressed with the level of detail, the sequencing of information, the able reference to those he talked with by name. There is no question in my mind about the authenticity of this book. The author speaks from his mind and his heart, he is not dumb, just self-centered.

As the book progresses, I am astonished by several factors:

1) Dick Cheney appears only 28 times in this book, and not before page 53. The Cheney-Rumsfeld relationship is one that was evidently not shared by the author. He consequently is oblivious to the reality that Dick Cheney orchestrated 935 distinct documented lies in the rush to war; and committed 25 distinct impeachable offenses, not least of which was leveraging the nine advance warnings of the plans to attack the World Trade Center to allow a Pearl Harbor.

2) I had to go forward to read Chapter 6 ("Why Iraq") because of the prominence of the author's claim of the many "proven" instances in which Iraq trained, supported, or financed terrorism, but I quickly note that the author makes no reference at all the many proven open sources, including the former President of Czechoslovakia, who totally trashed this assertion.

3) The author is actively deceptive on more than one occasion. He cites the New York Times as "evidence" while casually neglecting to mention that he is citing the notorious Judith Miller, a fellow traveler at least, if not an active agent of influence for Israel.

4) The author is critical of the CIA throughout the book, including Milt Bearden whom I happen to respect greatly, and while I myself think CIA needs to be burned to the ground, I do not respect the manner in which the author manages to completely disrespect by omission of three major facts:

+ CIA got it right on WMD. Between the son in law that defected and the 30+ legal travelers that Charlie Allen orchestrated, CIA established without a shadow of a doubt that they kept the cookbooks, poured the stocks into the river (something that will have downstream impacts for decades), and were bluffing for regional sake. Since Rumsfeld and Cheney delivered the original WMD supplies and the joke is they kept the receipts, what I see here is an elegant concealment of the reality that the Pentagon was not about to listen to the CIA no matter what. The fact is that the professional CIA got it right, George Tenet sacrificed his integrity, and the White House was able to ignore secret intelligence because both the CIA professionals and the Pentagon's flag officers drank the koolaid and confused loyalty with integrity to their Constitutional oaths of office. ALL of our checks and balances failed us.

+ The author infuriates me with the manner in which he blatantly misleads the reader about how he and Rumsfeld triumphed in pushing for both early precision targetting inside Afghanistan, and the push to Kabul prior to the winter. He is maliciously evil in failing to credit the CIA teams that are described in "First In" and "Jawbreaker" and he can be excused for not being told that Putin told Bush he could take Kabul before the winter. Obviously the author does not read widely, and one can understand how immersed he might be in the reality of his own creation.

+ He misleads the reader in parroting Ahmed Chalabi's accusations against the CIA, while failing to point out that CIA fired Chalabi for stealing and lying; that Chalabi was convicted in Jordan for embezzlement; and that Chalabi is almost certainly a very well paid agent of influence for Iran, one reason most in Iraq's leadership circles want nothing to do with him.

In passing, there is no mention in this book of our love fest with 42 of 44 dictators; there is active (virulent) hatred for Colin Powell and Rich Armitage (I would follow either over any hill), nor is there any mention, as the book draws to a close, that ignorant treasonous rendition and torture aside, the score for nailing terrorists right now is CIA 40+, DoD zero (I may not know of one or two).

I bought and labored through this book because James Schlesinger recommended it and because it may be the only book among the 100 or so I have read circling the sordid regime from 2000-2008, that comes from one of the avowed "insiders." I give the author high marks for his homework, his documentation, and his writing.

Doug Feith is what you get when you agree to elect one man who picks a few cronies that pick other cronies who in turn orchestrate their kind of crony in Afghanistan and Iraq and elsewhere. In Singapore, I am told, one must have a Master of Business Administration before being qualified to run for Parliament. We don't need to go that far. I believe that in the General Election, we must demand that Presidential candidates appoint a Cabinet in advance of election, at least three of whom must participate in the debate process (State, Defense, Attorney General), *and* they must produce a balanced budget proposal for public scrutiny at least 90 days before Election Day. It's time to put Citizen Wisdom back into the Republic.

See also, apart from my lists on Dick Cheney, impeachment, strategy, emerging threats and so on, the following ten books:
DVD Why We Fight
Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World's Last Dictators by 2025
9/11 Synthetic Terror: Made in USA, Fourth Edition
A Pretext for War : 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies
State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III
Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander
First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan
Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq
Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq
Vice: Dick Cheney and the Hijacking of the American Presidency

I read the Index after the Table of Contents and before I actually read the book. It became immediately evident to me that:

1) The index stinks in not including place names like Jalabad, Tora Bora, Kandahar, etcetera.

2) The author has written a personal account that opens with a concise (even impressive) summary of the high points of "alleged" criticisms and conspiracy claims, but with the exception of Bob Woodward, I could not find a single other reputable author in the index (see my list of ten books below, a token of the 100+ books that generally refute most of what this author has to say at the external level (I have no doubt this author is honest and credible on the details he knows, but as with the Viet-Nam rejoinder, "so what" I really question whether the author--good man that he is--is at all in touch with reality.) Baer, Bamford, Clarke, Ritter, etc. do NOT appear in this book's index or footnotes that I could find.

Getting into the book, I am immediately impressed by the existence of a supporting website (waranddecision.com just add the www) and I am generally very impressed with the level of detail, the sequencing of information, the able reference to those he talked with by name. There is no question in my mind about the authenticity of this book. The author speaks from his mind and his heart, he is not dumb, just self-centered.

As the book progresses, I am astonished by several factors:

1) Dick Cheney appears only 28 times in this book, and not before page 53. The Cheney-Rumsfeld relationship is one that was evidently not shared by the author. He consequently is oblivious to the reality that Dick Cheney orchestrated 935 distinct documented lies in the rush to war; and committed 25 distinct impeachable offenses, not least of which was leveraging the nine advance warnings of the plans to attack the World Trade Center to allow a Pearl Harbor.

2) I had to go forward to read Chapter 6 ("Why Iraq") because of the prominence of the author's claim of the many "proven" instances in which Iraq trained, supported, or financed terrorism, but I quickly note that the author makes no reference at all the many proven open sources, including the former President of Czechoslovakia, who totally trashed this assertion.

3) The author is actively deceptive on more than one occasion. He cites the New York Times as "evidence" while casually neglecting to mention that he is citing the notorious Judith Miller, a fellow traveler at least, if not an active agent of influence for Israel.

4) The author is critical of the CIA throughout the book, including Milt Bearden whom I happen to respect greatly, and while I myself think CIA needs to be burned to the ground, I do not respect the manner in which the author manages to completely disrespect by omission of three major facts:

+ CIA got it right on WMD. Between the son in law that defected and the 30+ legal travelers that Charlie Allen orchestrated, CIA established without a shadow of a doubt that they kept the cookbooks, poured the stocks into the river (something that will have downstream impacts for decades), and were bluffing for regional sake. Since Rumsfeld and Cheney delivered the original WMD supplies and the joke is they kept the receipts, what I see here is an elegant concealment of the reality that the Pentagon was not about to listen to the CIA no matter what. The fact is that the professional CIA got it right, George Tenet sacrificed his integrity, and the White House was able to ignore secret intelligence because both the CIA professionals and the Pentagon's flag officers drank the koolaid and confused loyalty with integrity to their Constitutional oaths of office. ALL of our checks and balances failed us.

+ The author infuriates me with the manner in which he blatantly misleads the reader about how he and Rumsfeld triumphed in pushing for both early precision targetting inside Afghanistan, and the push to Kabul prior to the winter. He is maliciously evil in failing to credit the CIA teams that are described in "First In" and "Jawbreaker" and he can be excused for not being told that Putin told Bush he could take Kabul before the winter. Obviously the author does not read widely, and one can understand how immersed he might be in the reality of his own creation.

+ He misleads the reader in parroting Ahmed Chalabi's accusations against the CIA, while failing to point out that CIA fired Chalabi for stealing and lying; that Chalabi was convicted in Jordan for embezzlement; and that Chalabi is almost certainly a very well paid agent of influence for Iran, one reason most in Iraq's leadership circles want nothing to do with him.

In passing, there is no mention in this book of our love fest with 42 of 44 dictators; there is active (virulent) hatred for Colin Powell and Rich Armitage (I would follow either over any hill), nor is there any mention, as the book draws to a close, that ignorant treasonous rendition and torture aside, the score for nailing terrorists right now is CIA 40+, DoD zero (I may not know of one or two).

I bought and labored through this book because James Schlesinger recommended it and because it may be the only book among the 100 or so I have read circling the sordid regime from 2000-2008, that comes from one of the avowed "insiders." I give the author high marks for his homework, his documentation, and his writing.

Doug Feith is what you get when you agree to elect one man who picks a few cronies that pick other cronies who in turn orchestrate their kind of crony in Afghanistan and Iraq and elsewhere. In Singapore, I am told, one must have a Master of Business Administration before being qualified to run for Parliament. We don't need to go that far. I believe that in the General Election, we must demand that Presidential candidates appoint a Cabinet in advance of election, at least three of whom must participate in the debate process (State, Defense, Attorney General), *and* they must produce a balanced budget proposal for public scrutiny at least 90 days before Election Day. It's time to put Citizen Wisdom back into the Republic.

See also, apart from my lists on Dick Cheney, impeachment, strategy, emerging threats and so on, the following ten books:
DVD Why We Fight
Breaking the Real Axis of Evil: How to Oust the World's Last Dictators by 2025
9/11 Synthetic Terror: Made in USA, Fourth Edition
A Pretext for War : 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies
State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III
Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander
First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan
Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq
Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq
Vice: Dick Cheney and the Hijacking of the American Presidency

This book is an absolutely fascinating look into the chain of reasoning following 9/11 that led to the declaration of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the most tangible manifestation of which has been Operation Iraqi Freedom. Up front Feith presents his (and apparently Rumsfled's) theory that, "All organizations involved in international terrorism could be considered in partnership with others in that business (i.e. terrorism)" apparently regardless of religion, motivations or targets. Feith later (page 229) explains this network as incorporating al Qaeda, other Islamic `Jihadists' and non-Islamic Groups. The GWOT then is literally that, a U.S. world war against all groups using terrorism as their principal tactic as well as any state that sponsors them. Feith then identifies the principal strategic goal of the GWOT as to prevent another catastrophic attack against the U.S. or its interests. This apparently is the source of the administration doctrine of preemptive war or "anticipatory self-defense" as Feith calls it. Following this logic, Saddam Hussein's Iraq was identified as a state sponsor of terror and also a threat to U.S National Security in its own right. If Feith is accurate, this was the driving force behind Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Now Feith also provides the reader with some really intriguing though not necessarily accurate accounts of the deliberations that went on in the build up to Operation Iraqi Freedom and its immediate aftermath. By his own account, Feith was a strong backer of Ahmad Chalabi and his Iraqi National Congress as the government in exile best suited to take over after the fall Saddam Hussein. His faith in what he calls "Iraqi Externals" was apparently boundless.

Feith also expresses his extreme dissatisfaction with the intelligence provided by CIA prior to the war. He denies that he ever claimed that Saddam Hussein was behind the 9/11 attack, but he did claim that Iraqi was a state sponsor of terrorists. For this reason he agreed with his superior, Paul Wolfowitz that an Iraq-al Qaeda connection ought to be looked into as their feeling was that CIA was not willing to do so. To this end he directed a loan-in analyst from DIA to conduct a review of all the intelligence on this connection. The analyst literally did this by compiling a list of all the reporting that indicated an Iraqi-al Qaeda connection. But in what could called an incredible omission, the analyst failed to compile a similar list of the reporting that contradicted those reports or indeed to subject the reports that had been compiled to any sort of critical analysis. This is pretty well how Feith conducted all of his official business.

Feith is a reasonably good writer, but he appears utterly unreflective and arrogant. Yet his book does provide unique insights on why Iraq was considered so important to the GWOT.

Douglas Feith was one of the key architects of the war. His Office of Special Projects was responsible for manipulating the intelligence in such a way that he could defeat skeptics like Powell, Tenet and the American people.
In this endless snoozer, he apologizes for nothing and argues that if the war he had planned had actually been implemented, all would be well.
His disrespect for the military is glaring. At every step of the way the brass had serious problems and reservations but Feith, Harvard educated, knew he was smarter and ignored the brass.
But this is a book so it rises or falls on its readability. This is the most boring book ever. I only read it because I had to (job reasons). If you don't have to, read Tenet's or one of the other memoirs of the Iraq debacle. You'll never get through this one.

One great feature of the Kindle is easy access to "first chapters" of books. I'm using that feature to provide a Kindle-Sample review as a preview of the entire book. Obviously this approach assumes that the remainder of the book is similar in style and substance to the sample which is a safe assumption I think in most cases. When I read the entire book, I'll post of a review of that. Thus, please read this review for your own potential interest in the sample.

I was a health and safety administrator in the Federal government on 9/11 and had a variety of small duties, responsibilities, and relationships with some of the people who were killed that day. I have taken America's response to that event seriously and have tried to understand the meaning of the attacks and how to respond to it ever since. This sample promises a compelling, balanced, and detailed insider account of the event and the Administration's response to it.

In the three sections provided in the sample (preface and the first two chapters), Douglas Feith gives a clear, well-written overview of his position in the government, his work before and after 9/11, and his approach to writing the book. He writes from detailed contemporaneous materials rather than simple recollection after the fact, provides references to publicly available evidence, and seeks to describe what happened as well as any human can do in such a position. (Just think about trying to write about your own professional work experience over the course of the past five years and what that would look like. Would anyone think you had written an "objective" account?)

I find Mr. Feith's writing to be extremely strong. He is organized, structured, and coherent even though he's describing complex, fluid, and interdependent events. Further, in the sample provided, his tone and content strike me as measured, descriptive, and balanced. He is more like a witness and not a like an advocate.

I doubt that anyone can read anything from a person in the Bush Administration, especially about the 9/11 attacks, and not perceive bias, cant, or error, but in the sample materials (preface and first two chapters) Feith does as good as job at being "objective" as anyone could. Perhaps the book will turn into a hit job in later chapters, but then that would directly contradict the clearly stated aims Mr. Feith lays out in these chapters. Thus, if the book turns into an advocate's apology, then Mr. Feith is a barefaced fool for being so dumb as to claim a desire for neutrality and then deliberately contradict it.

I would encourage any Kindle owner to download this sample and read it for yourself. People are killing and dying over this issue. How can you not at least read a free sample of this?

Douglas Feith was a major participant in the planning of the invasion of Iraq. His book, "War and Decision" gives some insight into how that unwise war was planned and implemented. The policy of forcing democracy onto a foreign nation was flawed from the beginning.

In a 1994 interview with the American Enterprise Institute, Vice President Cheney said that if then President H. W. Bush had invaded Baghdad in 1991, it would have resulted in a "quagmire."

It seems that Feith and the other neoconservatives should have watched that interview sometime in early 2002.

Feith is now a professor at the school of Foreign Service at the Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. Let us hope he stays there and stick to writing books.


Author of: Mr. NewHeart (New Heart): Heart Attack to Transplant and Beyond