I thank Mr. Goldsmith for sharing his experience in the Bush Presidency. The account was informative on the workings of government and the men involved. Well done!

In the book "The Terror Presidency" by Jack Goldsmith, the author gives the best reasoning for allowing torture that I have ever seen. He has also written opinions that give the widest latitude to the government to suspend habeas corpus and trial by jury. Mr. Goldsmith is a conservative lawyer and a college professor, according the book's jacket. (Obviously not of the "originalist" school of thought since it is clear the makers would be appalled by these opinions which are exactly the opposite of their intentions.) Mr Goldsmith's idea is to stretch the Constitution as far as possible in order to deal with the danger of terrorism.

There are other opinions that, according to Mr. Goldsmith, are necessary for the United States. For instance, he states that the US should never recognize the International Criminal Court and uses Rumsfeld's explanation that weak nations could use it to protect themselves against powerful nations. The current administration calls the use of laws as a substitute for "traditional military action," "Lawfare."

One hardly knows what to say to these logical arguments. They certainly do not agree with the notions about this country that I learned at my father's knee. He taught me that we were a nation of laws. The poor and the weak were as important as the rich and the strong. I can't imagine that the founding fathers would say use of military action is preferable to using the courts.

There has been a lot of conversation about using torture "in an emergency." The only rule a civilized nation should have is that torture is illegal period. If one of our agents gets hold of someone who is planning a terrorist attack and knows in his heart that torture would uncover the plot, that agent should be willing to go to jail for ignoring the law. His sentence would likely be short if this torture saved a lot of lives. Civil disobedience to save the nation should also mean taking the penalty for that disobedience. Think how many people have sacrificed their very lives for this country. Secret agents presumably are willing to put their lives on the line for their country.

The depressing thing is that we used to be the "good guys." In the past, if our government was doing something shameful, it tried to keep it a secret. These days we don't even try to hide it.

Everyone should read this book even if it is depressing. Mr. Goldsmith seems to have no clue that he has written a treatise on how many angels can dance on the head of a pin and completely ignored morality, principle, law, and the Founding Fathers.

Jack Goldsmith's book about his eight months at the Department of Justice is gracefully written, historically informed, and filled with great Washington vignettes. (For example, his job interview at the White House began with hostile questions about why he once gave money to a Democratic candidate for Congress.) Goldsmith has an entertaining knack for sticking a knife in people in understated prose. Alberto Gonzales comes off as out of his depth. John Yoo is gently chided for writing laughably sloppy (but convenient) legal memos. David Addington seems like Darth Vader, intent on expanding Presidential power while crushing his bureacratic foes. (Of all the book's characters, Addington is the only one whom Goldsmith really seems to dislike. He calls Addington's legal views "idiosyncratic" and "crazy".)

Helpfully for citizens, Goldsmith documents case after case where proposals to put the war on terror on a sounder legal and political footing were rejected because the White House didn't want to share power with Congress or be seen as heeding European concerns about human rights. It's clear that the goal of "never weakening the Presidency" was at least as important to Cheney et al as fighting al-Qaeda. Long-suffering State Department and military lawyers were vindicated (and the White House was horrified) when the Supreme Court finally ruled that core humanitarian requirements of the Geneva Conventions apply to the war on terror.

Goldsmith confirms that many Administration officials -- from cabinet secretaries to CIA agents -- were worried about being prosecuted once the emergency was over and calm was restored. Goldsmith does insist that no one knowingly broke the law -- but you get the feeling that no Administration since Nixon's has been so filled with litigation-dread. Goldsmith also confirms that everyone saw Yoo's memos as get-out-of-jail free cards for torturers. He keeps up the pretense that Yoo was an honorable official who buckled under the stress of wartime service in Washington -- but you don't have to be too cynical to see what was really going on. Goldsmith didn't think that the military ever authorized illegal acts on the strength of Yoo's warped memos. He wasn't so sure about the CIA.

Goldsmith himself is a bit of a mystery. It's hard to believe he wasn't some kind of operator. (Why is it a convention of Washington memoirs that top jobs always fall in the lap of the author?) That said, his writing is balanced and calm, and he comes across as an open-minded, rather philosophical conservative who was out of place in the screw-all-enemies atmosphere of the Bush/Cheney Administration. Maybe the picture is accurate. He did quit Justice after eight months to take a job at Harvard, which is hardly the behavior of a political animal.

Jack Goldsmith's book about his eight months at the Department of Justice is gracefully written, historically informed, and filled with great Washington vignettes. (For example, his job interview at the White House began with hostile questions about why he once gave money to a Democratic candidate for Congress.) Goldsmith has an entertaining knack for sticking a knife in people in understated prose. Alberto Gonzales comes off as out of his depth. John Yoo is gently chided for writing laughably sloppy (but convenient) legal memos. David Addington seems like Darth Vader, intent on expanding Presidential power while crushing his bureacratic foes. (Of all the book's characters, Addington is the only one whom Goldsmith really seems to dislike. He calls Addington's legal views "idiosyncratic" and "crazy".)

Helpfully for citizens, Goldsmith documents case after case where proposals to put the war on terror on a sounder legal and political footing were rejected because the White House didn't want to share power with Congress or be seen as heeding European human rights concerns. It's clear that the goal of "never weakening the Presidency" was at least as important to Cheney et al as fighting al-Qaeda. Long-suffering State Department and military lawyers were vindicated (and the White House was horrified) when the Supreme Court finally ruled that core humanitarian requirements of the Geneva Conventions applied to the war on terror.

Goldsmith confirms that many Administration officials -- from cabinet secretaries to CIA agents -- were worried about being prosecuted once the emergency was over and calm was restored. Goldsmith does insist that no one knowingly broke the law -- but you get the feeling that no Administration since Nixon's has been so filled with litigation-dread. Goldsmith also confirms that everyone saw Yoo's memos as get-out-of-jail free cards for torturers. He keeps up the pretense that Yoo was an honorable official who buckled under the stress of wartime service in Washington -- but you don't have to be too cynical to see what was really going on. Goldsmith didn't think that the military ever authorized illegal acts on the strength of Yoo's warped memos. He wasn't so sure about the CIA.

Goldsmith himself is a bit of a mystery. It's hard to believe he wasn't some kind of operator. (Why is it a convention of Washington memoirs that top jobs always fall in the lap of the author?) That said, his writing is balanced and calm, and he comes across as an open-minded, rather philosophical conservative who was out of place in the screw-all-enemies atmosphere of the Bush/Cheney Administration. Maybe the picture is accurate. He did quit Justice after eight months to take a job at Harvard, which is hardly the behavior of a political animal.

I found this to be an extremely valuable book on a radioactive topic--the purported legal justifications for the Bush Administration's "war on terror" and its treatment of detainees. The book takes an unique perspective--the author served for 9 months as the head of the Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") at the Department of Justice. Those of us who are "alums" of DOJ know how critical the work of OLC is, since it lays down the Department's "rulings" in its opinions as to what is legal and what is not legal. These opinions bind the entire government and so are of great significance.

It helps that this hot topic is addressed by someone who worked in the Bush administration and is of rather conservative temperment, rather than an outside critic. The book offers remarkable insight into the role of OLC in the Bush administration strategy, the interplay of law and military action, competing conceptions of presidential power, and the role of International Law (such as Geneva conventions) in placing limits on American freedom of action. We learn that administration officials were terrified of being pursued once out of office by Independent Counsel, Inspectors General, and foreign governments for their actions involving detainees. Such laws as the "War Crimes Act," the "War Powers Act," the Torture Statute, and so forth caused some officials to feel they were being "strangled by law."

The author discusses and critiques the key OLC opinions, many authored by John Yoo, which authorized the "treatment" accorded to detainees, at Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib and elsewhere. For those really interested in details, it is handy to have a copy of "The Torture Papers" edited by Greenberg and Dratel handy, since it contains almost all the key documents then available. The author could not discuss in detail the key March 14, 2003 memo which was then classified; recently, it has been released and is easily available on the internet. The author, who withdrew several of the OLC opinions by Yoo, presents the reader with several interesting questions: (a) are lawyers making terrorism policy and, if so, what are the consequences? (b) what is OLC, independent and court like, or a legal apologist?; and (c) most importantly, why did the Bush administration not seek to consult with Congress and secure authorizations rather than pursue its "go it alone" policy. After all, Congressional consultation and authorizations were good enough for Lincoln and FDR--why not this time around?

Expiation, confession, apologia, memoir, kiss and tell; each comes to mind in reading this book but one is not really sure because Goldsmith is both not sure himself and he is obviously muzzled by national security restrictions. A more informative book on the legal foundations for the various national security measures of the Bush Administration is John Yoo's "War By Other Means." Regardless of one's political viewpoint, the legal issues are more clearly addressed by Yoo for the interested reader to chew, digest, damn, admire or debate.

The media heralded this book as a blockbuster "kiss and tell" revelation of deep fissures emanating from the DOJ and the Office of Legal Counsel in the formation of the initial legal advice and policy post 9/11. Any lawyer sensitive to the legal and national security issues involved would hope that the debate would be active, heated and energetic as with most national security issues in our society. This should not be an earth shattering revelation but one may surmise based on this book's tilt that the author wanted this book to be publicized as just that type of blockbuster. He achieved his purpose in terms of publicity even though the sizzle does not merit the steak.

The necessary maxims are uttered about his fealty to his calling, his respect for the law, the importance of participating in the war on terror, his respect for the difficulty confronting complex legal issues of first impression. But the book bogs down in blurry timelines, preachiness and Goldsmith's self congratulatory sense of morality. An admitted academic rather than an advocate, Goldsmith resigned in June 2003, after being offered a Harvard professorship and when his fortitude and reliability were coming into question, after rescinding one of the torture memos, but not the still secret Yoo August 2002 memo. After his abrupt U turn, one might guess he is not getting many Christmas party invitations from the lawyers at the DOD or the CIA.

The book's confusing title is obscured until page 180 where he equates the title with Arthur Schlesinger's book on FDR reign "The Imperial Presidency." His elastic writing style is opaque, his word usage inventive ("manipulability"), his descriptions of his colleagues inexplicable, if not downright oxymoronic; David Addington, counsel to the Vice President, an advocate for strong presidential powers in time of war, is derisively characterized as possessing "perverse integrity," by steadfastly adhering to his beliefs in strong executive powers. Goldsmith speculates about other government lawyers "implicitly believing" that they might rely on the power of presidential pardons to absolve them given their advice on edgy interrogation techniques. His early compliments to Yoo ring hollow as he denigrates Yoo's initial memoranda for its "poor quality" decrying what was repeated by the press as the money quote, " the legal mess" caused by Alberto Gonzales, David Addington, and Yoo. He never details his specific objections preferring generalities.

The author turns angry when visited by the FBI and put before the grand jury on a separate leak investigation querying how could his DOJ colleagues ever target him. The reader might presume that he was one of many interviewed by the FBI, and if so, what is the big deal since he did not have to engage expensive counsel since in a footnote he admits to receiving pro bono representation. His interview with the agents borders on the incredible; he divines the agents' mindset as understanding "what I was talking about" and then describing the agents confiding in him - a possible target - about "the progress of the investigation."

After resignation at page 162, Goldsmith spends the rest of the book arguing that the Administration's "unusual conception of presidential power" influenced all that it did; that excessive fear led to unnecessary secrecy and drove its strategies and all could have been easier and more legitimate if it had consulted with Congress and if it just calmed down. He concludes that the judgment of Bush will be highly influenced his "strange unattractive views on presidential power." Hardly strange, arguably unattractive but most surely ignored by posterity.

Expiation, confession, apologia, memoir, kiss and tell; each comes to mind in reading this book but one is not really sure because Goldsmith is both not sure himself and he is obviously muzzled by national security restrictions, A more informative book on the legal foundations for the various national security measures of the Bush Administration is John Yoo's "War By Other Means." Regardless of one's political viewpoint, the legal issues are more clearly addressed by Yoo for the interested reader to chew, digest, damn, admire or debate.

The media heralded this book as a blockbuster "kiss and tell" revelation of deep fissures emanating from the DOJ and the Office of Legal Counsel in the formation of the initial legal advice and policy post 9/11. Any lawyer sensitive to the legal and national security issues involved would hope that the debate would be active, heated and energetic as with most national security issues in our society. This should be not be an earth shattering revelation but one may surmise based on this book's tilt that the author wanted this book to be publicized as just that type of blockbuster. He achieved his purpose in terms of publicity even though the sizzle does not merit the steak.

The necessary maxims are uttered about his fealty to his calling, his respect for the law, the importance of participating in the war on terror, his respect for the difficulty confronting complex legal issues of first impression. But the book bogs down in blurry timelines, preachiness and Goldsmith's self congratulatory sense of morality. An admitted academic rather than an advocate, Goldsmith resigned in June 2003, after being offered a Harvard professorship and when his fortitude and reliability were coming into question, after rescinding one of the torture memos, but not the still secret Yoo August 2002 memo. After his abrupt U turn, one might guess he is not getting many Christmas party invitations from the lawyers at the DOD or the CIA.

The book's confusing title is obscured until at page 180 where he equates the title with Arthur Schlesinger's book on FDR reign "The Imperial Presidency." His elastic writing style is opaque, his word usage inventive ("manipulability"), his descriptions of his colleagues inexplicable, if not downright oxymoronic; David Addington, counsel to the Vice President, an advocate for strong presidential powers in time of war, is derisively characterized as possessing "perverse integrity," by steadfastly adhering to his beliefs in strong executive powers. Goldsmith speculates about other government lawyers "implicitly believing" that they might rely on the power of presidential pardons to absolve them given their advice on edgy interrogation techniques. His early compliments to Yoo ring hollow as denigrates Yoo's initial memoranda for its "poor quality" decrying what was repeated by the press as the money quote, " the legal mess" caused by Alberto Gonzales, David Addington, and Yoo. He never details his specific objections preferring generalities.

The author turns angry when visited by the FBI and put before the grand jury on a separate leak investigation querying how could his DOJ colleagues ever target him. The reader might presume that he was one of many interviewed by the FBI, and if so, what is the big deal since he did not have to engage expensive counsel since in a footnote he admits to receiving pro bono representation. His interview with the agents borders on the incredible; he divines the agents' mindset as understanding "what I was talking about" and then describing the agents confiding in him - a possible target - about "the progress of the investigation."

After resignation at page 162, Goldsmith spends the rest of the book arguing that the Administration's "unusual conception of presidential power" influenced all that it did; that excessive fear led to unnecessary secrecy and drove its strategies and all could have been easier and more legitimate if it had consulted with Congress and if it just calmed down. He concludes that the judgment of Bush will be highly influenced his "strange unattractive views on presidential power."

This book is well worth reading. Jack Goldsmith provides an objective, straightforward analysis of the problems of over-lawyering of national security while at the same time providing a strong argument on why national security decisions must involve the citizenry and respect Constitutional principles.

The book has more questions and analysis of the problem than it does solutions, but that is why it is so helpful. Finally a non-political book giving an analysis of a problem that both conservatives and liberals believe we need to fix.

When I looked at the cover of this book I thought it would be a real critque of the Bush Presidency, especially in regard to his treatment of detainees. Instead the author seems to be ambivalent in his evaluation of the Bush Administration in which he played a key role. Bush intentions are seen as noble but his authoritarian style is what gets him in trouble. Bush may someday be seen as a Roosevelt or Lincoln who had to make difficult and unpopular decisions in a time of crisis, but would have had an easier time if he adopted a more consultative approach to decision making.

It is obvious that Professor Goldsmith is an intelligent lawyer but I question his moral judgment as a human being. This comes out clearly to me when he talks about the trip he took with a plane full of lawyers to GTMO, and to prisons where Padilla and Hamdi were held. He writes: "He thought the way the twenty-three year old Yaser Hamdi was kept in isolation was extreme.(p102) "It seemed unnecessarily extreme to hold a twenty-two-year-old foot soldier in a remote wing of a run down prison in a tiny cell isolated from almost all human contact and with no access to a lawyer. 'This is what habeas corpus is for,'I thought to myself. At this point one thinks Goldsmith is going to have a true sense of pity for this young man but that is not the way his mind turns. Instead he completes the sentence with the words,"I was somewhat embarrassed at the squishy sentiment." Then he writes, "I immediately thought my reaction was misplaced." He continues, "I had no doubt that(as the Supreme Court would affirm twenty months later) the administration had legal authority to detain Hamdi, without charge or trial, just as Roosevelt held 400,000 Italian and German prisoners in the United States during World War 11." (It is a well known fact that prisoners of World War II were treated so well in the United States that after the war some returned to become American citizens.) Goldsmith goes on to say, "my real thought was whether it was prudent to do so in this way, in these circumstance." Whether it was "prudent", not humane, the way said Bush said detainees were to be treated.

Again Goldsmith characterizes his reaction 'as a fleeting qualm on his fortieth birthday.'

The incident may explain why Professor Goldsmith reports earlier in the book, that Human Rights Watch, the Washington Post and the developed human rights law present unprecedented legal obstacles for President Bush to fight the war on terror. He does not see the good that has come from human rights advocates and what honest reporting does for society and individuals.

Maybe compassion for ones enemies in captivity, especially terrorists, is too much to ask, but at least Goldsmith could could have lingered in his initial reaction of sympathy for Hamdi, "on his birhtday as well, in the corner of his small cell in an unused wing of the brig, crouched in a fetal position, apparently asleep."

It is not only Bush's political tactics that are so abhorrent to people in the US and around the world, it is lack of humanity and empathy for the enormous suffering he and his policies have inflicted on so many human beings.

Mr. Goldsmith hardly mentions the war in Iraq and its awful consequences in his book. Are there no questions concerning the legality of the invasion of Iraq that would concern the top man in Office of Legal Counsel?

Goldsmith argues in another section of the book, the legal reasoning of previous interrogation memos by John Yoo and Alberto Gonzalz may have been faulty but the actual techniques approved for interrogation were justifiable and not affected by the legal theories supporting those techniques. Unfortunately one of the memos are still classified so we have to take Professor Goldsmith word. In this classified memo did the OLC give the green light to the CIA to waterboard detainees?

Fnally,is it fair to say after reading Mr. Goldsmith's book, as an American, I can sleep well knowing that Yaser Hamdi, a twenty-two year old alleged terrorist is being held in solitary confinement without benefit of habeas corpus, lawyers or due process.

This book is a schizophrenic concoction, hyped to sell to a hard left, Bush-hating crowd that will despise it, because Goldsmith's impressions all completely disprove the book's "Bush is Evil and Lawless" trade dress. Goldsmith wanted a job at Harvard and a nice book contract, and needed to cater to left wing sensibilities to get them. So, he went ahead and made his ex-colleagues into scapegoats for partisan sport in this book. Cold, eh? Still, if you're a law or politics junkie the book is a good read, and for historians it's an interesting document. Goldsmith's facts all show how hardworking, honorable, and totally in good faith the administration was, not only in its fight with Islamism, but in the dicey matter of compliance with "the law"--at least such as any sane, rational person might reasonably have understood it.

We are, after all, dealing here with a brand new situation, large, billowy legal uncertainties, cases of first impression, and "no controlling legal authority." Legal academicians may have their considered, or predetermined, opinions, of course. But who can ever pinpoint exactly what "the law" is, in all these blithering constitutional wrangles? Eventually we'll hear from the Supremes, I suppose. Yawn. Wake me up when it happens.

Goldsmith mercilessly stabs in the back his old friend John Yoo, who recommended him for the OLC top job in the first place--defaming him by implying, vaguely, that Yoo was a bad lawyer, who, in some unspecified way, made legal errors in his OLC memos. And what errors? Frustratingly, Goldsmith will not say. Something about overstating executive power and "tone." It is hard to see how all these "errors" could be classified. The OLC memos are all over the net. Legal discussions aren't secret, just boring. Goldsmith does say that the actual interrogation techniques and policies, and all that stuff, Yoo got exactly right--he just didn't like the executive power "tone" part so much.

The truth is that there were no "errors." Goldsmith just had qualms about the standard issue position all American Presidents, Republican or Democrat, have always taken, that the executive has the power to act in a war emergency, within the law as he reasonably sees it. There is nothing novel or new about this position. All Presidents have assumed it throughout American history. Of course some on the left wing of legal academia would like to change this, so as to make the executive a subordinate rather than an equal branch of government. But so far all they've done is intimidate those who require jobs or social acceptance in the legal academy. Like Jack.

Goldsmith also says that George Tenet and everyone else in government regarded Yoo's memos as absolutely crucial, if America was to protect its warriors, spies and interrogators in the war--rather than ditching them to the tender mercies of the left-wing litigation-bots out there. Who as we know, are scarier than driving through downtown Fallujah in an unarmored vehicle. Until 2004 and Abu Ghraib rolled around, none of the gazillions of lawyers in government who were relying on them seems to have had much of a problem. Though many must have had input along the way--dickering and grouching and cross-checking and playing devils advocate, as lawyers are wont.

Goldsmith's trope is that he is a scholar whose higher wisdom and morals forced him to correct all that sad, bad work of John Yoo. He conveniently fails to mention that these grave scholarly concerns were politically driven. That they were about Abu Ghraib is nevertheless a point that can be divined from the timing. Rasputinish henchperson David Addington (shudder!) is given a dramatic walk-on. It appears that he said something snarky, once, about FISA. Gosh, what a bad man. By the way, Goldsmith didn't actually correct any memo errors. Too much work. That was Dan Levin, who later said in a footnote that in fact no legal conclusions had changed, despite the new polish. Soon, after a mere 9 months at OLC, Goldsmith moved on to greener pastures at Harvard. Publish or perish!

Oh and also, it wasn't Goldsmith, but Philbin who first mentioned that, since it was now 2004, not 2002, and the immediate emergency was past, maybe they ought to review those old memos and make appropriate changes. Goldsmith heartily concurs. But he is too busy to do anything about it. Guess it's not really all that important after all. But as Abu Ghraib erupts, the lah dee dah mood breaks....let's see, broad presidential authorizations to fight terror--broadly....Yikes! All the wild new vicarious liability theories lefty academicians and ACLUers might be dreaming up suddenly flash before the bureaucrats' eyes. Intensive CYA, one of government's most critical tasks, ensues.

Keen observers of political farce, of which there may be about 200 scattered around the country, should enjoy this book. Anyone interested in the law will not. For there is no law in it to speak of. Just portentous adjectives, delivered in the classic tone of "more in sorrow, than in anger." But its facts are interesting, especially for how they belie all those adjectives.

This book is a schizophrenic concoction, hyped to sell to a hard left, Bush-hating crowd that will absolutely loathe it--because literally all of Goldsmith's impressions flatly disprove the book's "Bush is Evil and Lawless" trade dress. Goldsmith obviously just wanted a book contract, and a job at Harvard, and had to suck up to lefty sensibilities to get them. So, he went ahead and did that. Cold, eh? Actually, though, if you're a wonk, this book is a good read and ultimately a valuable one for history. Goldsmith's specific facts show how hardworking, honorable, and totally in good faith the administration was in the fight with Islamism, including in the matter of compliance with the law--such as any sane, rational person might reasonably have understood it.

After all, we're all dealing with a brand new situation, cases of first impression, large legal uncertainties, and "no controlling legal authority" here. Legal academicians may have their considered opinions, of course. But who in the end is to say what "the law" is in these blithering constitutional wrangles? Eventually we may hear from the Supremes. Yawn. Wake me when it happens.

Goldsmith mercilessly stabs in the back his old friend John Yoo, who had recommended him for the job in the first place, defaming him by implying here, vaguely, that he was a bad lawyer who, in some wholly unspecified way, made legal errors in his OLC memos. What were those errors? Frustratingly, Goldsmith won't say. Something about overstating executive power, and "tone." Its hard to see how all these errors could be classified though. The OLC memos are all over the net. And legal discussions aren't secret--just boring. Goldsmith does say however that Yoo got all his actual policies and techniques of interrogation, and all that stuff, completely right--he just didn't like the executive power "tone" part so much.

Yet Goldsmith also states that George Tenet regarded Yoo's memos as absolutely crucial if America was going to protect its warriors, spies and interrogators in the fight with Islamism--as opposed to ditch them to the tender mercies of the left wing lawyer litigation-bots out there. Definitely scarier than driving through downtown Fallujah in an unarmored vehicle. Until 2004 and Abu Ghraib rolled around, none of the gazillions of lawyers in government relying on them seemed to have too much of a problem, though plenty must have had input, and dickered and grouched and cross-checked and played devils advocate, as lawyers are wont.

Goldsmith's trope is that he is a wise legal scholar correcting all the sad, bad work of John Yoo. He conveniently fails to mention that his grave scholarly concerns were ALL ABOUT ABU GHRAIB--totally politically driven. Rasputinish henchman, David (Shudder) Addington has a dramatic a walk-on. Apparently he said something snarky, once, about FISA. Gosh, what a bad man. And, by the way, Goldsmith didn't actually correct any memos. Too much work. That was Dan Levin, who said in a footnote that no legal conclusions, actually, had changed, despite the new polish. Soon after, a mere 9 months at OLC, Goldsmith moves on, to greener pastures at Harvard. Publish or perish!

And it wasn't even Goldsmith, but Philbrick, who first said, well, it's 2004 now not 2002, so, now that the immediate emergency has passed, maybe we oughtta go over those memos and see if any policies need changing. Goldsmith says was too busy with other stuff to bother. Not that important, you see. As Abu Ghraib escalates, the lah dee dah mood shifts. Broad presidential authorizations to fight terror--broadly? Yikes!! Visions of wild new vicarious liability theories dreamed up by lefty academicians and ACLUers dance through the bureaucrats heads....

Jack Goldsmith tells a good story: this book is well written and moves quickly through the period of his brief tenure in the OLC, but the author strikes a most self-important tone and fails to ask the tough questions.

For example, on page 148 he writes, "The stakes in the interrogation program were unusually high. On the national security side of the balance potentially stood tens of thousands of lives, economic prosperity, and perhaps our way of life." Is there even a scintilla of evidence to suggest that this is true? Our way of life depends entirely upon the interrogation of terrorists? If he believes this to be true, he has a responsibility to explain the connections to his readers. It strikes me as pure hyperbole, what the Bush administration excels at when it comes to the "war on terror." Too bad they weren't more concerned prior to 9/11.

The author continues on page 192 with, "Franklin Roosevelt faced a similar set of challenges in the eighteen months prior to the Unites States' entry into World War II in December 1941." Similar set of challenges? I see no similarities whatsoever. Yet the author goes on for another 24 pages making the comparison between Roosevelt and Bush. We know that Roosevelt tried to keep us from entering WWII, despite the multiple anguished requests for help from the British, French, and others, and finally decided that we had to enter following Pearl Harbor, and it is also well documented that Bush lied to try to justify his CHOICE to invade Iraq (which presented and presents an infinitely smaller threat than Hitler and the Japanese), relying upon mea culpas of "failed intelligence" and a multitude of similar excuses. Diplomacy demonstrably worked in the case of Saddam; Bush invaded anyway. So, I ask Mr. Goldsmith, where is the comparison? Bush = Roosevelt? I don't think so.

If all you seek is some insight into the inner workings of a portion of the Justice Department under a portion of the Bush administration, you'll likely be satisfied with this book. If you want answers to tough questions, and want the big, tough questions to be asked, this book will leave you feeling disappointed and no better informed than you were before you read it.

I've read that it is publishers who title books, not the author. If this is so, the publisher deliberately misnamed this book "The Terror Presidency" to feed into the Bush Derangement Syndrome that afflicts so many left-wingers. But I feel the author may have had a more than a little to do with this grandstanding, for the author spent only a few months in the position he writes about and I think there is substantial reason to question his qualifications for the post. Not least among these reasons is his supposedly "tell-all" book.

I think it likely that Goldsmith would have found himself uncomfortable and unemployable in the administrations of Abraham Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower. (Parenthetically, Goldsmith's office was established by FDR in 1941. Prior to that Presidents felt no need for such counsellors. Anyone familiar with Roosevelt will understand why he did feel such a need.) He might, however, have been right at home with Jimmy Carter and Ramsey Clark.

Goldsmith himself sums it up nicely on page 79 where he opines on Dick Cheney and David Addington feeling the "same imperativers of responsibility that led [F.D.] Roosevelt and many other presidents to blow through "legalistic" restrictions on presidential authority during times of crisis". Dick Cheney has favored a strong executive during his more than 30 years in public office. Goldsmith prefers an executive swaddled - and choked - in lawyers and legalisms.

Goldsmith is obviously a principled man, but one who is apparently not a team player and is far more concerned with his own ego than the safety of the United States. (Left-wingers will claim that Goldsmith was "heroically" defending the Constitution: this is the same argument advanced by Bill Clinton when trying to avoid penalties for his prevarication under oath.)

Goldsmith reached his own conclusions about presidential power and defends them tenaciously in this book. He is clearly a competent advocate for his own opinions - but that doesn't mean his opinions are correct.

Goldsmith acknowledges that Presidents must be aggressive in times of crisis while at the same time shrinking before the task. Ironically he quotes Presidential scholar Clinton Rossiter who said that is a president is not "widely and persistently accused in his own time of 'subverting the Constitution.' he may as well forget about being judged a truly eminent man by future generations."

Goldsmith frequently contrasts the approach of the Bush presidency with that of Roosevelt. He reaches the conclusion that Roosevelt was somehow more respectful of the Constitution than Bush. An odd conclusion to anyone familiar with Roosevelt whose presidency was as contentious as the Bush years. I had to chuckle when Goldsmith writes "Roosevelt also understood the importance of establishing credibility and trust during times of war or crisis, especially by reaching across the aisle to the opposing political party."

This is far from true. Roosevelt had the political advantage of significant majorities in Congress for much of his 13 years in the White House. The Republicans and many Democrats had many very significant arguments with Roosevelt. Roosevelt was such a strict observer of the Constitution that several of his alphabet soup programs, often implemented on Executive Order, were killed by the Supreme Court. Roosevelt tried to pack the Supreme Court when it opposed him. Roosevelt interned several hundred thousand Japanese-Americans. In short, Roosevelt operated in a much different environment and the comparisons aren't entirely valid. (For an excellent portrait of Roosevelt, see The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression.

Ultimately Goldsmith has produced a book that will be helpful and interesting to those familiar with the contest of strong advocates, some knowledge of the law and a firm grasp of history. Goldsmith does not, to the disappointment of the Bush haters, explicitly condemn Bush. Rather Goldsmith ultimately argues for a weak executive branch, something that many people beyond Dick Cheney and David Addington oppose.

Goldsmith's book must be read within the context of the longstanding and quite possibly never ending argument over the limits of the executive branch. In many ways, Goldsmith's book sounds like sour grapes: like the yelping of a lawyer who is irritated that he wasn't listened to and unquestionably obeyed.

In short, Goldsmith lost an argument in the White House - and is more or less trying to get even. Makes for an interesting, thoughtful book, but not a convincing one.

Jerry

I found it impossible to read Jack Goldsmith's "The Terror Presidency" without having Hannah Arendt at my side every step of the way. Goldsmith is obviously a well-meaning person, an extremely intelligent person, a person who clearly had the guts to stand up to intense pressure within the administration before he finally resigned. When he is brought face to face with a human being caught up in the detention system, his reaction is intensely--human. He writes: "Witnessing the unmoving Hamdi on the fuzzy black-and-white screen, however, moved me. Something seemed wrong. It seemed unnecessarily extreme to hold a twenty-two-year-old foot soldier in a remote wing of a run-down prison in a tiny cell, isolated from almost all human contact and with no access to a lawyer." When he sees the Abu Ghraib photos he unhesitatingly labels what happened abuse. Even John Ashcroft comes across as somewhat sympathetic and principalled.

And yet . . . And yet . . .

I can understand the argument of self-defense, and I can see how the honorable men--they are all honorable men--reacted out of intense fear, that they would be responsible if another terrorist attack killed not thousands, but thousands of thousands.

And yet . . .And yet . . .

The book is fascinating because it evokes such contradictory emotions. One moment I'm grateful to Goldsmith, the hero, for saving us from even worse horrors. The next moment the horror of the bureaucracy of the whole thing, the very attempt to make it conform to the law, overwhelms.

This is a book to be buried in a time capsule, so that sixty years from now, when future generations want to know how we were able to do what we did, they willl have available the testimony not of a brute, but of an intelligent well-meaning person.

At first, I was skeptical about a book that was two hundred sixteen pages, and covered only seven months of the author's life, but the title of Chapter 1: The New Job, and the first couple of sentences had a sense of intrigue, and captured my interest. I had the distinct intuition that the author would be an engaging writer and I was not disappointed.

Jack Goldsmith, conservative lawyer and law professor tells us of his appointment as Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel to the Justice Department under John Ashcroft.

The Counsel is made up of lawyers who analyze the legal ramifications of a policy the president may want to consider or promulgate. They submit their opinions on the same, and its legality. In a post 9/11 atmosphere, Goldsmith describes a White House that is anxious to expand its powers so it may fight terrorism unimpeded. This is motivated by a constant stream of intelligence that provides a daily diet of threats and plots against the USA, and a vice president's belief that any threat, no matter how marginal, must be taken as an imminent threat.

With Goldstein's appointment in October of 2003, he began to offer his legal opinion on a number of issues. He defended these opinions at White House meetings that included the President's counsel, Alberto Gonzalez, the ever-present Vice President's Counsel, David Addington, and John Yoo who wrote several opinions giving the president carte blanche to implement virtually any policy he wanted. David Addington's long time conservatism and association with Dick Cheney gives him a great deal of power and influence. He is equally abrasive and uncompromising, insisting that presidential decisions should be without limits, and his actions not subject to the scrutiny or knowledge of the Congress or citizens of the US. He dismisses American allies saying, "They don't have a vote."

This is what eventually gets Goldstein in a squeeze, and enhances his perception by others that he is not a team player. He begins to review some earlier opinions made shortly after 9/11. These opinions are about enemy combatant status and the legal limits of torture. He advocates that these opinions should be reversed, which alienates him from C.I.A. who have been operating under guidelines that they believed would have left them immune from prosecution. With Goldstein's assertion that previous positions were legally untenable, this leaves several people at several levels open to legal action--retroactively. Hence, the hostility toward the author, who feels he has no option but to resign.

Then abu-Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay unfold after he suggests reversal of opinions regarding torture and treatment. He contends that secrecy, failure to inform, and keep Congress and the public in the loop makes it appear the government was not acting legally or morally, a perception he contends is false. He also makes a strong point that the more success the administration had in preventing a second attack that it "had an equally self-defeating effect of enhancing public skepticism about the reality of the threat."

The author closes by comparing the executive excesses and motives of Lincoln and FDR who were far more calculating and intuitive about public feeling and reaction. He illustrates several examples of their successful attempts through, guile, insight, and even deceit at expanding their power to preserve our freedom rather than a naked grab for power. He is very persuasive in showing the reader how President Bush's go-it-alone policies, operating in secrecy, lack of cooperation with Congress and other agencies, are ultimately self-defeating, less than pragmatic, and add to the public's mistrust of his office.

Goldsmith brought some excellent points to light. There is no doubt that he is a devout conservative and writes well and convincingly. I simply did not feel there was sufficient information to rate this book higher. This was only an appetizer, and I was looking for a feast.

This is a "one-day" book. I wish there had been more.



Other Books:

"The One Percent Solution"
"Oath Betrayed"
"The Genius of Impeachment"
"The Imperial Presidency"

This book is a profile in courage of a person placed in a high position in the Justice Department, who wanted to believe but who also sought to stick up for principles. It recounts the nine months, from October 2003 to June 2004, the author spent as the head of the Office of Legal Council (OLC). Although he says that there is much he cannot relate for security reasons, he does mention that he fought incessant legal battles during his time there.

We get a fascinating view into the roles of the major players. By that time the OLC had become a sort of arm of the White House, and was directed more by David Addington, Cheney's Counsel, and Alberto Gonzalez, Bush's Counsel, than by the Attorney General John Ashcroft. The OLC provides justification under the law, and anyone following its dictates is generally considered almost unprosecutable. When the author assumed the leadership role, it was assumed that he would play along; that he would continue with such precedents as the "torture memo", produced by Yoo and Bybee. But as he describes, he could not easily comply with the sloppy legal reasoning, which in his view needed to be at least cleaned up in order to make it comply better with the rule of law. He recounts that his biggest opponent in making changes was David Addington, an intimidating force who has shown himself determined to err on the side of national security, determined to push the power of the unitary Executive as far as possible. Gonzales deferred to Addington and shrunk to the sidelines in his presence.

In the face of being called a wimp by Addington, the author tries to adhere to good legal sense. Addington's statement - "If you rule that way, the blood of the hundred thousand people who die in the next attack will be on your hands." - coming as it did from the Executive, would make anyone pause. There is the "threat matrix" to consider. What will happen if chemical or biological or nuclear weapons fall into terrorist hands? The author emphasizes how much of an affect possible threats can have on those in positions of responsibility.

Apparently, his efforts along with Jim Comey and Patrick Philbin to put the Terrorist Surveillance Program on "proper footing" by going to what was then a sympathetic Congress came to naught. Addington said, "We're one bomb away from getting rid of that obnoxious [FISA] court."

In the last part of the book, the author contrasts the pains that Roosevelt went through to take action in support of Britain in its war against the Nazis, actions that would pull the U.S. out of its comfortable isolationalism. Roosevelt worked for change by persuasion, by using politics, by getting different parts of the government to agree, by respect for the separation of powers. That approach is world's away from the Bush Administration go-it-alone, secretive, and bullying approach.

Jack Goldsmith, conservative lawyer credentials notwithstanding, tried but failed to stand up for the Bush administration's "war on terror." He recounts his rocky eighteen month tenure as head of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Justice Department. He spends about half of his short book telling the reader how important many of the legal moves taken in the "war" are necessary to protect us from the bad guys, but finally he succumbs to the obvious conclusion that the various moves made by the administration hurt, rather than helped, efforts to keep us safe.

He focuses special disdain for the work of his erstwhile friend, John Yoo, who was the author of many of the rulings supporting questionable tactics used while in the Office of Legal Counsel, and on the person who was the driving force behind the moves, John Addington. Addington, then Vice President Dick Chaney's legal counsel and now his chief of staff, seemed to be in charge of the White House legal apparatus, even though Albert Gonzales was the White House legal counsel.

Goldsmith concludes that the White House's major error, beyond sloppy legal work, was in isolating itself from the other power centers in the government. He contends that many of the errors would never have been made had they used the built in checks and balances inherent in our government. As in Iraq, their errors have left the country in a mess.

This book helps "outsiders" get a glimpse into and an understanding of the nature of the policies being pursued by the current administration of the US. Goldsmith is objective and articulate; above all, he is persuasive.

Jack Goldsmith's book in nothing but an apology for horrible actions taken by the Bush government. He makes numerous excuses for the treatment of foreigners in the US and by the US. And he touts the flouting of international law because he says it is easily manipulated. He also claims the ICC lacks accountability. He also talks about lawfare which is really just an excuse to ignore judicial decisions against the US.

To me he touts his experience and high appointment in the government as if that would mean we would simply take his words for granted as truth. He speaks as if criticisms of the US are unfounded and lack any moral reasoning. He also calls people who want to make the US face up to its abuses of human rights as the weak and the US as militarily powerful.

It is funny also how a lawyer much less a lawyer for the department of justice would call "law" a threat to the president. He sort of reminds me of the Jack Nicholson character from a Few Good Men when he states that he does bad things so that we can have freedoms and that we can't handle that truth. Further he claims that the president and AG did what they did because they needed to fight an enemy that it couldn't see and didn't fully understand - but this is a lie because we can see al qaeda and we fully understand them (even before 9/11).

Further, he calls the laws written to govern war as vague and that somehow they are not any good any more because the were written before the advent of the internet, cell phones and miniaturized weapons of mass destruction. By that reasoning then all laws should be voided because they were written before the present also. Maybe we should just trash the constitution because it was written before the internet, cell phones and WMD's. Further, he claims that the laws are open to interpretation. But all laws are open to interpretation. That is the core function of the courts - to interpret laws. And in one line he writes that executive branch officials risk their lives to protect the nation. How? They are not out there in the field fighting. They are sitting at desks. Further, he proclaims how executive officials are scared and how litigation could ruin them financially and reputation wise. But many of the people from Iran-Contra are still in government and Scooter Libby was pardoned quickly after being found guilty and had his near $200,000 fine paid for him all at one time. And he promotes the notion that "things changed after 9/11" never explaining how they changed and why the should change.

The feeling I got before reading this book was that it was going to criticize Bush. But, to me it did nothing of the sort. All it did was attempt to reinforce what Bush is doing. The only person it seemed critical of was John Yoo.

Read the book if only to learn how Bush and his lawyers are trying to rationalize everything they do.

I have two minor criticisms of the book: 1) the book title is sensationalized and does not mirror the actual content of the book (although a more accurate title probably would not have sold as many copies); and 2) Jack Goldsmith uses the book as a platform to justify his actions and answer questions of his honor.

All-in-all, this book did answer my long standing question of, "what legal analysis or guidance is obtained prior to the executive office issuing a directive?" The book confirms that, in fact, U.S. legal analysis is a large part of the terror problem.

This book provides matter-of-fact insight into the executive branch and its tensions with the legislative and judicial branches as well as tensions with international organizations and laws.

Goldsmith was clearly placed in a no win situation, which he details cautiously. As noted above, Goldsmith uses the book as a platform to justify his actions and to universally defend his integrity. Although, to be fair, at certain points the two examinations are wholly entangled.

I would recommend this book to anyone who has questions regarding the authority of the executive branch and its legal boundaries.

After 9/11 the major concern of the Administration was that an incident like that must never happen again. A second act of destruction would surely bring down the government. The Terror Presidency is written by an acknowledged conservative, and I am in no way a conservative, yet I found the book to be quite interesting. First of all it is not the typical raving rant that constitutes many books written by conservatives and liberals alike.

Mr. Goldsmith was, for a short time, the head of the Office of Legal Counsel. He quickly found out that legal opinions were most valued when they did not in any way constrict the powers of the president. This attitude was again based on the compelling need to see that no further terrorist attacks occurred in the United States. David Addington, VP Cheney's chief lawyer, is the most adamant proponent of the idea that the powers of the presidency cannot be limited during this war against terror. When Mr. Goldsmith finally told the Administration that the anything goes opinion on torture written in 2002 by John Yoo was on shaky legal ground, the response was to kill the messenger. Mr. Goldsmith resigned.

But here is the fascinating part of the book. The author spends a lot of time comparing President Bush's wartime responses to those of Presidents Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt. FDR wanted to provide help to England at the beginning of WWII. The mood of congress and the nation, however, was soundly for isolationism. FDR got everything he wanted by a variety of actions. First he dismissed the Secretaries of War and the Navy, and installed two Republicans. His fireside chats to the nation forcefully presented his cause. He consulted with Congress, and even with his Republican opponent (Willkie) in the upcoming election campaign. He got what he wanted. Mr. Goldsmith feels that President Bush has gone too far along the route of secrecy, consulting with no one. His opinion is that Mr. Bush could learn from the approach of FDR.

While I do not always agree with everything Mr. Goldsmith says I did learn something from his reasoned interpretation of both current and historical events. On the other side of the coin I was somewhat frustrated with the author telling us from time to time that he engaged in various debates with White House lawyers, but due to security reasons he wasn't free to tell us what the substance of those debates were. Anyway, this is a book that should be interesting to all but those on the extremes of the right-left continuum

Goldsmith does a fine job presenting an objective view, from an insiders perspective, of the problems in the Bush administration's reponse to terrorism. Previous presidents have faced similar times of crisis but they handled them differently. An fascinating work comparing previous chief executives with our current one and the continuing shift of power away from Congress and the Judiciary to the Executive in response to crises.

Goldsmith's duty as head of the Office of Legal Counsel was to advise Bush II on the legality of various actions. Upon taking the position in October, 2003, he began reviewing his predecessors' work and found much regulating the treatment and interrogation of prisoners to be deeply flawed. This is quite surprising given that Goldsmith, a conservative, had been hand-picked for the job.

His first reaction was to resign - however, he decided to stay on and try to salvage policies with more reasoned support, intending to give the President the benefit of the doubt wherever possible. This only succeeded in delaying his resignation until July 2004.

Fear of not doing enough to stop the next terrorist attack, and an equal fear of doing too much and ending up in court or before a grand jury lie behind the controversial legal policy decisions about the Terrorist Surveillance Program, the Geneva Conventions, military commissions, interrogation techniques, Guantanamo Bay, etc.

Goldsmith's conclusions are based on comparing Bush II's actions during war with FDR's. Roosevelt understood the importance of establishing credibility and trust during times of war, especially by reaching across the aisle to the opposing political party. This helped dispel the suspicion that decisions rested on partisan motives and encourages broader delegations of power from Congress and the public. Bush II's go-it-alone approach relied on minimal deliberation, unilateral action, and legalistic defense that largely eschews the need to explain, to justify, to convince, to get people on board, and to compromise. As a result, the approach led to major legal and policy errors.

Why did the Bush administration so often assert presidential power in ways that seemed unnecessary and politically self-defeating? Goldsmith believes the answer lies in the administration's focus on increasing hard presidential power. Thus, the Bush team seems more interested in fighting limits on its power than fighting terrorism.

Meanwhile, I sit and try to understand why the Justice Department would first publicly declare torture "abhorrent" in a 12/4 opinion, then greatly expand acceptable (torture) techniques in a secret 2/05 memo, followed by Bush II's denial that we torture after the secret memo was revealed and he had quietly undermined much of Senator McCain's bill against torture through a signing statement. Conclusion - the man is not to be trusted, especially given the larger context of other actions and misleading statements.

This is a rare book in our polarized age: a book about the Bush Administration that doesn't paint the participants as either angels or demons. Jack Goldsmith is a former Bush Administration official who took over as the point man in the Administration's anti-terrorism legal strategy just as that house of cards, hastily erected in the aftermath of 9/11, began to collapse. He obviously had some "issues" with how that strategy was being handled, but might as well have been banging his head against a wall. His frustration is palpable as he loses one bureaucratic battle after another against other factions in the Administration, and he finally left his post after less than a year. What makes the book unusual is that Goldsmith doesn't demonize his antagonists; to the contrary, he portrays them as reasonable people doing what they thought was best to protect the country. His view is that, in their zeal to protect and enhance executive power, they wound up diminishing it, by pursuing a go-it-alone approach that ultimately backfired. But this is a dispute over means, not ends. Those who are looking for a broad-based indictment of the Bush Administration are looking in the wrong place. Instead, this book is about the messy intersection of policy, politics, and principle in the Age of Terror. It should be required reading for anyone interested in becoming a government lawyer. Particularly interesting is his thesis that "The Terror Presidency" is not limited to this Administration, but is a fact of life in our times, and will continue regardless of who wins the White House in 2008. Definitely an engaging and erudite read.

Countless people on the outside have accused the Bush administration of being isolated and immune from public perception. Jack Goldsmith's riveting new book, "The Terror Presidency" not only confirms these fears but adds a new level of questions about the Bush White House....the author was there for many months and his first hand account is invaluable. Make no mistake about it, Goldsmith is a conservative and in many ways applauds Bush's views of a strong presidency but his parting of the ways with the current administration is proof enough that things are not well in our nation's Executive branch.

Goldsmith, who was head of the Office of Legal Counsel from October, 2003 to July, 2004, paints a sobering picture of how policy is made and the contributing factors to it. He tells us that the administration is surrounded by lawyers who often suggest how policy should be made, even though many of them are simply out of their element of expertise and fail to take in other factors such as public opinion and relations with Congress. Indeed, the most damning comment Goldsmith makes is that the White House, rather than debating what is the right course of action, settles for, essentially, what they can get away with, legally. I suspect that when Bush leaves office in January, 2009, much more of Goldsmith's observations will see the light of day.

The author writes a dry, but serious book. The narrative is not colorful but his assessments more than pop off the page. A chapter on counter-terrorism is worth the whole book, but his chastisement of how lawyers have infiltrated the process of decision-making is nothing less than profound. Did we know this? No! Goldsmith, an academic at heart, parallels Bush with FDR...the comparisons couldn't be more stark with Goldsmith underscoring again and again in his book that failure to get the public on board with the war in Iraq and failure to get Congress to help legitimize the whole shebang has been the abject undoing of the last six and a half years. Summing it up, even before the book nears its conclusion, Goldsmith says, "it was said hundreds of times in the White House that the President and Vice President wanted to leave the presidency stronger than they found it. In fact they seemed to have achieved the opposite". Words for posterity, no matter how Bush wishes his legacy to be.

I highly recommend "The Terror Presidency". It's an insider's view of things that give this book a solid and firm ground on which to make the case of why the Bush administration overreaches and continues to do so. In the meantime, read this book....it's the best in peeling away the layers of Bush and how he got there along the way.

A fabulous insight into how our government operates under pressure, during war times--It is wonderful that Jack Goldmith has the principles and morals to stand up for what he believes in.

Perhaps the most shocking thing about the Bush Presidency has not been its seizure of unprecedented power to the detriment of the standing of the other branches of government, but how most members of his party gave him unqualified support in this authoritarian venture, accepting the administration's position that all those who oppose him are liberal, ignorant, defeatists. Of course, there have been a few exceptions, former Congressman Bob Barr for example who has called for the President's impeachment, but by and large the silence from Republicans has been nothing short of chilling.

Professor Goldsmith, a conservative lawyer with unassailable credentials who served in the Bush Justice Department as the Head of the Office of Legal Counsel, does not tell us anything we didn't know in terms of the policies of the administration, but gives a frightening first hand account of how the President skirted and even broke the law, even as Dick Cheney's hatchet men threatened and bullied those who were disturbed by these efforts. Goldsmith describes a White House inclined to twist the law like a mafia lawyer, often making arguments that fly in the face of 200 years of history, such as the strange idea that international treaties are not binding on the Executive Branch.

While often couched in "leagaleze," Goldsmith demolishes the comparisons often invoked by the administration's defenders with actions taken by Lincoln and FDR, explaining how both these presidents made every effort not to overly disturb the balance of power between the branches of government. Perhaps most frightening of all, Goldsmith explains how the use of 9/11 risks the evisceration of the institutions and principles on which America's democracy rests and how, without quick intervention, the imperial president might quickly become a permanent state of affairs.

A worthwhile read.

I give this book five stars despite the fact that I have several disagreements with the author. Why five stars? Because this book is basically fair and puts the Bush administration's actions into historical perspective, which is hard to find in a book about the Bush administration, pro or con.

Although highly critical of the Bush administration's view of presidential power, as well as Bush's shortcomings as a communicator and consensus builder, Goldsmith nonetheless portrays an administration bound by the rule of law and compliant with the legal opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel, where Goldsmith served for ten months as an Assistant Attorney General.

Goldsmith provides no evidence that the Bush administration ever acted contrary to counsel, and nearly always had a solid constitutional basis for its actions. Indeed, a couple of Supreme Court decisions which struck down elements of the war on terror were themselves departures from long-standing precedent. (In making this point, Goldsmith observes that the Supreme Court, not just Congress and the President, is influenced by public opinion, the press, the academy, the spirit of the times, and the passions of the moment. Here, too, he faults Bush for being tone-deaf to the nuances of leadership and the importance of getting everyone on board. He has a point: whenever a court bounced some thorny issue back to the president, he was nearly always able to get what he wanted from Congress, even the Democratic-controlled Congress. Had he been more prone to consultation, Bush arguably could have avoided some of these legal challenges.)

Goldsmith points out the extreme difficulty of discerning the exact limits of the law during times of crisis, and describes how these issues played out in the administrations of Lincoln and FDR. This leads to one of my main quibbles with the author - he is more critical of Bush for potential abuses of power, stemming from his imperial view of the presidency, than of the actual abuses of Lincoln and FDR, which far surpassed any of the excesses of Bush. (It will also come as a surprise to many readers that the controversial rendition program, considered by many as one of the black marks of the war on terror, was actually conceived during the Clinton administration.)

I also disagree with Goldsmith when he tries to contrast the views of Bush and FDR on the limits of presidential power. FDR, he says, made limited claims geared towards specific situations, whereas Bush made broad claims with no discernible limits. But Goldsmith himself admits that FDR was being cagey, a salesman, and relied upon tendentious opinions that were purpose-built by a compliant Attorney General. There is no doubt that FDR/Truman would have done - and did do - whatever it took to defeat the Germans and Japanese, Constitution or no Constitution. (Readers may recall that it was Truman, not Bush, who ordered the use of atomic bombs, and it was FDR, not Bush, who interred 90,000 Japanese Americans in relocation camps. Given these facts, Goldsmith is incredibly lenient towards FDR.) As for Bush, his claims to presidentail power are clearly focused on the same area as were FDR's - national security. In other areas, Bush has deferred to Congress and almost entirely eschewed his veto powers.

In those cases where Goldsmith personally found flaws in the legal opinions of his predecessors, the administration reluctantly changed course, but change course it did. Goldsmith makes the point - which should be obvious, but is generally ignored - that people of good will can have honest disagreements about what the Constitution requires and prohibits, about the limits of presidential power, about the handling of prisoners of war, and any of the other legal controversies surrounding national security. Nonetheless, it is clear from Goldsmith's account that when Bush says his policies were vetted and approved by lawyers versed in Constitutional, international, and national security law, he is telling the absolute truth.

Former Attorney General John Ashcroft comes across quite favorably; his successor, Alberto Gonzales, much less so. (The problem with Gonzales was not a tolerance for criminality, but rather a lack of experience in national security law, a deficiency which gave him a tendency to rubber-stamp flawed legal opinions from subordinates rather than ask the tough questions.)

Goldsmith attributes most of these flawed opinions to John Woo, the number two deputy at the OLC, who although an expert in the relevant law, cranked out several opinions that Goldsmith viewed as over-broad and imprecise. Goldsmith charitably attributes this to the crisis atmosphere that pervaded the White House in the months following 9/11, when fears of an imminent second major terrorist attack were running rampant.

This book may be like a Rorschach test, where what we see is determined by our own predispositions and tendencies. Be that as it may, I nonetheless recommend the book. For anyone with an open mind about Bush, if there are any such people left, the book describes a presidency that is deeply flawed, but hardly the criminal, rogue, Constitution-shredding despotism portrayed by its critics.

Indeed, as the author points out, never in our history has the conduct of war been so constrained by the influence of lawyers as the war on terror and the war in Iraq. Ironically, Goldsmith says that it was precisely the administration's preoccupation with following the letter of the law, and being justified by the law, that made it ignore the more subtle arts of persuasion and leadership.

Little new is discussed here, but to see it all together is scary. This presidency began as illegitimate as it could be, and probably the 2004 election was manipulated too. But none of it matters because those who could do something to take back the presidency and reestablish the power of the Constitution have been sitting on their hands. Impeachment should have been started as soon as the Supreme Court refused to let the Florida vote be completed because their decision was a forgone conclusion, right down party lines. 9/11 seved to emphasis just how criminal this president was willing to become, and how arrogant he could truly be. Too many books are available now with nothing being accomplished. Congress is hog tied and the Supreme Court are pathetic yes men.

Enumerating the awful truths in this book, which is so much like a dozen more, at this point serves no purpose. Bush and his henchmen have managed to wallow around and run out the clock. Now watch as the next president - especially a Democrat - will be vilified from day one and the unrelenting smear and fear that will eminate from the right. Lies that will be repeated so often that eventually they will be accepted as truth. It is the way of politics in the 21st century and if we don't get back on track soon we will lose our country and everything it has always stood for, and just because one administration was allowed to rip it asunder without sufficient protest.

After serving the Bush II administration for an entire ten months as head of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) from October 2003 to August 2004, Jack Goldsmith has offered up a recap and post-mortem on the major issues with which he was confronted during those 300-odd days. As it turns out, however, they were critical days, and the issues were equally critical: terrorist seizure, confinement, and methods of interrogation as well as the NSA's secret monitoring of communications.

Much of THE TERROR PRESIDENCY is devoted to the arcana of Geneva Conventions and Protocols concerning torture, Presidential/Executive branch wartime powers, and dissection of the weak legal structure upon which lawyer John Yoo authorized and approved earlier Bush II administration OLC opinions concerning those issues. With this subject matter comes, of course, the infinite (or is it infinitesimal?) parsing of words and phrases and nuances over which only a lawyer can get enthused. Readers looking for juicy insider stories about the Bush Presidency will find these discussions off-putting, to be charitable.

However, hidden among the legalistic treatises are some remarkable, if all too briefly discussed, gems as well as some truly troubling presumptions. On a somewhat academic level, Mr. Goldsmith provides a badly needed sense of historical perspective regarding the usurpation of additional Executive Branch powers during wartime. The author repeatedly compares and contrasts the post-9/11 actions of George W. Bush with those of Abraham Lincoln in the Civil War and FDR during World War II. On the one hand, the actions of those earlier Presidents provide a degree of historical cover for President Bush. At the same time, Mr. Goldsmith makes clear the enormous difference between Lincoln's and FDR's open, concisely defined, condition motivated, and carefully limited actions and the paranoically secretive, broadly defined, philosophically motivated, and ostensibly permanent actions of Bush II. "The power to manage the vast, whirring machinery of government derives from individual skills as persuader, bargainer, and leader," Goldsmith admirably quotes Arthur Schlesinger. Contrast this statement with "Bush the decider," the uncompromiser, the ignorer of allies, the partisan, and the gut reactor who speaks to and receives his guidance from "a higher authority."

Better still are the occasional first-hand accounts of events in the inner workings of the Bush Administration following the events of 9/11. Regretably, Mr. Goldsmith is a bit too much of a tease, opening the shutters ever-so-briefly before jamming them closed again with lawyerly circumspection. Nevertheless, John Yoo comes off as irresponsible, Alberto Gonzalez as a feckless featherweight, and John Ashcraft as more astute and statesmanlike than one would have thought. David Addington, Dick Cheney's chief assistant, becomes the true villain in this piece, an imperious blowhard and spiteful bully whose favorite argument regarding homeland security appears to center on threatening anyone who disagrees with him that they will be held responsible for 100,000 deaths in the next terror attack on U.S. soil. So much for the Constitution when fear rules.

And that is the true revelation in THE TERROR PRESIDENCY, as suggested by the book's very name. Goldsmith suggests convincingly that virtually every national security action of the Bush/Cheney administration since 9/11 has been motivated by fear of another attack. More specifically, fear of the political damage that would result from being blamed for not stopping the next attack. Goldsmith asserts clearly that fear of a second attack trumped every other consideration, legal or otherwise. In other words, by having three airplanes fly into three buildings on American soil, Osama bin-Laden changed the dynamic of American democracy and the manner in which the Constitution is applied to Presidential powers and American civil liberties.

Most horrifying of all, Goldsmith perceives this to be a near permanent state of affairs, and he conjures up the prospect of devastating attacks without ever mentioning mushroom clouds. "For generations the Terror Presidency will be characterized by unremitting fear of devastating attack, an obsession with preventing the attack, and a proclivity to act aggressively and preemptively to do so." A secretive Presidency is unilaterally and secretively making tradeoffs between perceived security and lost civil liberty without public discussion or Congressional consent. In essence, Bush/Cheney and the American government blinked, giving bin-Laden the ultimate terrorist victory of altering for the worse the governmental behavior and society of the target.

THE TERROR PRESIDENCY suffers from a surfeit of legalese and self-justification, and some readers will likely find either or both off-putting. Yet despite Mr. Goldsmith's overemphasis on legalisms and underreporting of the inner workings of the Bush Administration during the critical months following 9/11, this book sheds some disturbing new light on this Administration's motives and modus operandi.

Prof. Goldsmith - who resigned from the office of Legal Counsel in July 2004, only nine months after assuming duty - has revealed yet another astonishing account of the current administration's slipshod approach of handling the legal matters by avowing power and authority.

When Prof. Goldsmith wanted to adhere to the Fourth Geneva Convention that governs the duties of an occupying power and treatment of civilians (including those who are terrorists), he was told that "Terrorists do not receive Geneva Convention protection".

The question is: How do you determine someone is a terrorist before you investigate properly? And what happens if you find out someone is innocent (after nearly killing the person by torturing). That's what the Geneva Convention is for.

The saddest part of this whole saga is, Bush administration has set a very bad example to the whole world and has given a "carte blanche" to some failed states to torture anyone at will in the name of "War on terror".


Almost 4000 minorities (mostly civilians) have "disappeared" in Sri Lanka, a country which supports President Bush's "War on Terror". Everyday, civilians and journalists are abducted and tortured by democratically elected governments in Sri Lanka and many other countries that take cover under President Bush's "terror" policies. Go ask them why, they will point you to Guantanamo Bay.

Prof. Goldsmith concludes that President Bush has relied mostly on "the hard power of prerogative," unlike Lincoln and Roosevelt -- two other presidents who lead this nation at times of crisis.

Lincoln and Roosevelt are remembered by generations...! So will be President Bush, although for different reasons.

N.Sivakumar
Author: America Misunderstood: What a Second Bush Victory Meant to the Rest of the World