This book is a must read for every individual who has read the 9/11 Commission Report and still believes the report was independent and is the most reliable and accurate assessment of the 9/11 attacks. Philip Shenon clearly shows how the most important member of the Commission, Philip Zelikow, the Executive Director and the 9/11 Report's main author, did his best to manipulate and sway the investigation and final report in favor of his friends and like minded ideologues in the Bush Administration.

This book will undoubtedly infuriate most Americans who try to believe in our government and who expected honesty and credibility in the 9/11 investigation. Choosing the heavily conflicted Zelikow as the ED was the type of decision one would have expected from a third world country, it was the kind of decision that democracy suppressor Vladimir Putin of Russia would have been proud to have gotten away with. Shenon basically shows that when you start with rotten fish, you end up with rotten fish.

Overall, I would recommend this book, it provides some good additional insight into the 9/11 investigation and shows how politicized it really was. Following are some of the other positives and negatives of this book:

Positives:

1. It's an easy and entertaining read, similar to the 9/11 Commission Report, and also written for mass appeal and corporate media approval.

2. Has a good focus on Zelikow's many significant conflicts of interest and how the investigation and final report were heavily influenced by these conflicts.

3. Highlights the incompetence and credibility concerns of Condoleezza Rice and other top Administration officials (particularly Tenet and Ashcroft, and to a lesser extent, the infinitely incurious President Bush).

4. Provides some interesting insights into the commission's investigation and how important issues were addressed and resolved, including with the White House and the intelligence agencies.

5. Provides interesting color and background on most of the commissioners and a handful of the key staffers.

Negatives:

1. Somewhat light on new facts. A lot of Shenon's information can actually be found in the 9/11 Commission Report (although with much less attention and / or buried in the footnotes) and Kean & Hamilton's, "Without Precedent." It does have the benefit of some additional insight from interviews with approximately 40 commissioners and / or staff, as well as Andy Card.

2. It is almost comical that Shenon writes over 400 pages citing significant conflicts of interest by the commission's top member and author, a manipulated investigation and final report, significant and blatant intelligence failures, attempted "known" cover-ups, lying and unaccountable government and intelligence officials, etc, but then unquestionably assures us in about 1 page that only al-Qaeda was responsible??? It seems like a questionable conclusion on Shenon's part given some of the facts in his book appear to at least give rise to the "possibility" of complicity by others. David Ray Griffin's above review on March 19, 2008, actually addresses this issue in greater and more eloquent detail.

America failed the victims and families of 9/11 when we sat idly by and blindly accepted the white washed 9/11 Commission Report. Unfortunately, we will probably never have a reinvestigation of the 9/11 attacks, but Philip Shenon has at least done his part in showing a vastly different story to the account held in the 9/11 Commission Report. For his part, Shenon has corrected a small piece of history, I can only hope that some of the other commissioners or staffers follow in his footsteps in further setting the record straight.

I've read a number of books about September 11; the global politics and policies of the Clinton and Bush administrations, and I not only found this book engrossing and fascinating, but full of surprises.

Shenon has written an excellent account of the 9/11 Commission as well as a fascinating case-study of Beltway politics and spin. The book is much faster-paced and more engrossing than the rather dry title implies. He explores the combination of personal foibles (e.g., Lee Hamilton's aversion to confrontation), unforgivable oversights (e.g., the insufficent attention to staff director Zelikow's conflicts of interest given his ties to the Administration), and political manuevering that weakened the Commission's final product. While the Commission's report may have spared various Washington insiders the sort of accountability that was probably deserved, Shenon's book is more forthright in its judgements. The various missteps, ommisions, and misplaced priorities of Rice, Giuliani, Ashcroft, and others are laid bare.

Shenon has written an entertaining account without sacrificing journalistic standards. Is it the definitive account? Who knows. No book worth its salt about this subject and the actors involved will emerge unscathed given the legacies and political fortunes of those involved. This is an ambitious effort at achieving a balanced, accurate portrayal, however, that is well-worth the reader's time.

I breezed through this book as someone who had familiarity with the people and events described. I couldn't recognize them, except as fiction.

Mostly, the book contains very one sided presentations of very controversial , technical topics, e.g. Commissioner Gorelick's participation in building "the wall" that made it harder to connect the dots when she worked in Justice.

The book's portrayal of that serious disclosure as nothing more than a partisan, meritless attack was enough to make me walk away from it as being little more than the sort of useless, gossipy one sided account that sadly passes for journalism today.

The book also attacks other participants, such as the Commission's executive director, claiming that he someone hid his background from the Commissioners themselves - a truly ridiculous charge.

While some are hyping this book for telling them what they didn't know, all I can say is that you didn't know it most likely because it wasn't true.

In the 9/11 World Trade Center attack, 2,750 persons were murdered and, of these, only 292 whole bodies were found. A fierce inquiry into the cause of the horrific slaughter was expected, but the dead had died eight months into the presidency of George W. Bush. Where widows saw lost husbands, Karl Rove saw the loss of Bush's presidency. When the widows and others clamored for an inquiry, Bush, Vice-President Richard Cheney, and Speaker Dennis Hastert, strongly fought to block it, but their supporters in Congress, whose political necks were on the line, could not risk the opposition of the widows. In November, 2002, Public Law 107-306 established, and poorly funded, the 9/11 Commission, five Republicans and five Democrats, to inquire into the causes of the attacks. In July, 2004, the Commission released its report. Philip Shenon of The New York Times covered the Commission's work. His Pulitzer worthy book, The Commission, written in crisp, swift moving prose, is the result. It should be given to high school students in order that they may watch truth struggle with political hypocrisy even on the graves of the 9/11 dead. They might be surprised by what they see.
They will see a report that was based only on facts and opinions unanimously found and held, encouraging trades between Commissioners, which actually occurred, and effectively inhibiting dissents. They will see a report that holds no one personally accountable, in short, a lockstep report shaped by politicians and handed down during an intense presidential pre-election period.
They will see a Commission that compromised its duty to state the evidence that 9/11 was caused by America's identification with Israel. Too controversial, said the Commissioners off stage. (Ernst R. May [noted historian and Senior Adviser to the commission] When Government Writes History, A Memoir of the 9/11 Commission, May 23, 2005, The New Republic 33-34.). Surely, in the absence of a supervening cause, it is the duty of this nation to protect the lives of its people by refraining from its identification with any nation that will cause terrorist attacks on it. Such an issue was before the Commission. It hardly lay in anyone's mouth to claim that because it would generate controversy the issue should not be laid before the people.
An archery award should be given to Shenon for his descriptions, among others, of the mind-boggling failures of President Bush, the incompetent Condoleezza Rice, the CIA and FBI, to track and keep under surveillance the 9/11 hijackers, some of whom were seeking big craft flying lessons in the United States. With an equal eye for telling details, Shenon describes counter terrorism Richard Clarke's now historic memorandum of September 4, 2001 that virtually shouted to Rice that a 9/11 type attack was actually imminent. One reads with fixed attention the Department of Transportation's ignorance of terrorist warnings, the FAA's ignorance that the State Department had a watch list, the FAA's failure to alert our Aerospace Defense Command that a passenger plane had been commandeered, the outright lying of generals concerning military reaction to the hijacked planes, the CIA's 150-foot butcher sheet scroll listing minutely the CIA's antiterrorist efforts against Al-Qaeda prior to 9/11, the CIA's plans to kill Bin Laden in the 1990's, and the neanderthal computer equipment of the FBI, including its lack of an email system on 9/11. Shenon believes that FBI Director Louis Freeh's best gift to the FBI was his leaving it in June, 2001, else, writes Shenon, had Freeh been the Director on 9/11 the Commission might have dismantled it, treating Freeh responsible for the FBI's condition during his tenure in 1993-2001. However, Freeh had a full plate with President Clinton's numerous scandals, to say nothing of the moral revulsion had for Clinton by the intelligence services and the Pentagon.
For dramatic lying, an award to Cheney might be given for denying that on 9/11 he had unlawfully authorized the shooting down of passenger planes that were disobedient to military orders. Necessity, according to Shenon, tempers faulting Cheney. Therefore, for lying long and on a panoramic scale, the lying medal, with a cluster diamond heart pendent, should go to George Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, for his world class dysfunction to recall his conversations with Bush and facts such as a written directive to the CIA to kill Bin Laden.
For quick thinking by a patriot, the prize should be extended immediately to Henry Kissinger, first chairman of the commission. He met with the 9/11 widows who, he must have thought, had just come from a soccer game. Instead, they demanded that he make his client list public. When they asked whether he had Saudi clients, or clients named Bin Laden, the frightened Kissinger, Shenon reports, nearly fell to the floor from his couch. Kissinger resigned the next morning, sixteen days after his appointment.
Philip Zelikow, the Commission's executive director, dubbed by the staff the White House mole, was the iron handed ruler, and micro watcher of the work of the investigators who despised him. He had been part of Bush's transition team, author of Bush's paper supporting pre-emptive war, co-author of a book with Condoleezza Rice, and, from the Commission, secret communicator with Rice and Rove. He was a walking hotbed of conflicts of interest, a fact that did not stop the Commission's chair and vice-chair from stating publicly that they did not detect in Zelikow any conflict of interest, an opinion that arched the eyebrows of the Commission's staff. When appointed Secretary of State, Rice appointed the grateful Zelikow her counselor, a job that he had always wanted, presumably even as he sat in the Commission's office.
The granting of the Master Criminal award would unquestionably attract high school students to Sandy Berger as a recognizable class mate. He had been President Clinton's national security adviser and was Clinton's liaison with the Commission. In October, 2003, Berger, tasked by Clinton, went to the National Archives to examine classified national security papers of the Clinton administration copies or notes of which could not be made and taken from the archives. On a prior visit, he was seen walking to the men's room with papers rolled around and sticking out of his socks. On his October visit, however, the archivists, having set a trap, caught him. For his life of archival crime, Burger netted a misdemeanor conviction, a three-year loss of security clearance, and a $50,000 fine.
In November, 2004, Bush was re-elected with the help of the Commission's report, for it made the nation mindful of the threat of another 9/11 attack and, in connection with that attack, no fault was found by the Commission in Bush. And so Rove had his presidency, and the widows were left with no one held accountable.

A non-fiction page turner that every American should read as we enter into the last months of the most heinous regime in our history. This book should steel the masses to support the calls for impeachment that should start approximately January 10, 2009 (but, why wait?) Mr. Shenon is an excellent writer and researcher. I found myself hoping that somehow the ending would be different, but, alas, it's sadly all too true. Everything you ever suspected and then some.

Excellent book revealing the manipulation and control of the 9/11 commission by the Bush White House. So if the Report is a lie, does that mean the whole official explanation is false too?

Absolutely required reading. Removes any doubt as to the duplicity of the Bush Administration with regard to covering up the incompetence of Rice, Cheney and Bush leading up to 9/11 and the total mismanagement of foreign policy thereafter. Remarkably well written and shocking; even after all we already know.

In reading any book about a major historical event, you wonder about the motives of the author and his or her ability to competently address more than one perspective. A few chapters into reading this book I felt strongly that the author made an immense effort to be fair to the members and staff of the commission, without shirking his obligation to state the consequences of the decisions made about staffing, subpoenas, interviews and the goal itself.

I am deeply disappointed that the commission did not begin its work with issuing subpoenas to the White House, NSA, CIA, FBI and other relevant entities. In fact, one of the individuals considered for the position of counsel for the commission told the commission emphatically that the only way to get the information they needed was to subpoena it. This advice was disregarded and the commission ended up hiring an attorney who was much less aggressive in obtaining the needed information. This and the failure to assign a team to review all the information made available by the NSA appear to the be the biggest mistakes made by the commission's leadership and I think they will one day be judged harshly by historians as a result.

I am not a lawyer. I am a doctor. This was a very pleasant, informative read. I feel indebted to the author.

When we understand the size and clumsiness of our institutions, when we evaluate the inadequacies of our appointed and elected officials, when we understand the compromises of our political system and our desire to make everyone happy, blame no one, only then do we realize that we are doomed to failure.

God help us.

"The Commission" by Philip Shenon has performed a great public service, letting the world know that there are good reasons to be suspicious of "The 9/11 Commission Report." The main problem is the fact that the Commission was almost entirely under the control of Philip Zelikow, who was closely connected to the Bush White House. Although my book "Christian Faith and the Truth behind 9/11" revealed some of the facts about Zelikow that showed him to be one of the worst possible choices for the Commission's executive director, Shenon has revealed even more facts.

It was already known that Zelikow had been on the National Security Council (NSC) with Condoleezza Rice during the administration of the first President Bush; that he wrote a book with her while the Republicans were out of power; that he helped her make the transition from the Clinton to the Bush NSC; and that he wrote at her request the 2002 version of "National Security Strategy of the United States of America" (NSS 2002), which enunciated a new doctrine of preemptive war that was used, in Shenon's words, to "justify a preemptive strike on Iraq."

But now Shenon reveals more: that in applying to Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, the co-chairs of the 9/11 Commission, for the position of executive director, Zelikow failed to reveal some of his conflicts of interest, especially his authorship of NSS 2002 and his role on the transition team; that he continued, contrary to his promise, to be in touch with Karl Rove (who was very concerned about the Commission's work), as well as Rice; that Zelikow largely prevented direct contact between the staff and the Commissioners ("If information gathered by the staff was to be passed to the commissioners, it would have to go through Zelikow"); and that Zelikow largely "controlled what the final report would say."

Shenon also reveals that Zelikow, before the Commission's work had begun, had written a detailed outline for the Commission's report, complete with "chapter headings, subheadings, and sub-subheadings," and that he and the Commission's co-chairs agreed to keep this outline a secret from the Commission's investigative staff. When the staff learned about this outline a year later, some of them circulated a parody called "The Warren Commission Report---Preemptive Outline," one chapter of which was entitled "Single Bullet: We Haven't Seen the Evidence Yet. But Really. We're Sure."

However, although all of this should have made Shenon suspicious that Zelikow might have used his power to cover up the truth about 9/11, it did not. Shenon believes that the falsehoods in the Commission's report were limited to covering up White House incompetence (especially by Rice) and foreign funding of al-Qaeda (by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia).

Because Shenon simply presupposed the truth of the official story as fully as did the Commission, his book is terrible as well as great. It is terrible because Shenon, in mentioning the contention that 9/11 was an inside job, assures his readers that this contention has been debunked, while showing no sign of having studied any of the books that provide evidence for this contention. In his bibliography, for example, he mentions two defenses of the official account: "Debunking 9/11 Myths," put out by Popular Mechanics, and "Without Precedent," coauthored by Kean and Hamilton. But he does not mention my "Debunking 9/11 Debunking: An Answer to Popular Mechanics and Other Defenders of the Official Conspiracy Theory," in which I responded at length to both of these books. Also, although one would expect his bibliography to include all major critiques of the 9/11 Commission, it does not include my book, "The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions," which has generally been considered the major critique of the Commission's report.

Shenon's ignorance of facts contained in this alternative literature is apparent in his assurances that all is well with the official account. For example, claiming that the evidence that al-Qaeda was responsible for 9/11 is "incontrovertible," Shenon points to a videotape in which a bin Laden boasts about the attacks. Shenon is evidently unaware that bin Laden expert Bruce Lawrence called this videotape "bogus" and that FBI spokesman Rex Tomb admitted that "the FBI has no hard evidence connecting Bin Laden to 9/11." Also, claiming that there is clear evidence that "nineteen young Arab men . . . were aboard the four planes," Shenon is evidently unaware that, as I showed in "Debunking 9/11 Debunking" (updated edition), all this supposed evidence falls apart under scrutiny. For example, although we were told that the presence of hijackers on American Flight 77 was proved by Barbara Olson's phone calls to her husband, Ted Olson, the evidence given to the Moussaoui trial in 2006 by the FBI said that no such calls occurred. This same report contradicted the widely held belief that cell phone calls from passengers on United 93 had reported the existence of hijackers.

Shenon could have remained neutral on the question of the truth of the official story. But because he chose to enter the fray, it was incumbent upon him as a journalist to study, and report, the arguments on both sides of the issue. He did not.

Shenon's book is terrible not only because he endorses the official account without engaging any of the serious critiques of that account, but also because his complacent acceptance of that account leads him to ignore dozens of signs in the Commission's report that Zelikow used his position as executive director to cover up far more than incompetence. In "The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions," I showed that it contains over 100 omissions and distortions of the type that would be expected if Zelikow had indeed used his position to cover up official complicity. Here are a few examples that Shenon fails to mention.

Believing that the claim "that the Twin Towers were brought down by preplaced explosives" had been debunked before the Commission began its work, Shenon does not mention the Commission's silence about the fact that over a hundred members of the Fire Department of New York, in giving oral histories of that day---which were made publicly available by Shenon's own New York Times----spoke of apparent explosions in the towers. Shenon also fails to mention the Commission's silence about evidence that steel in the buildings had melted and even evaporated---evidence that a New York Times article called the "deepest mystery uncovered in the investigation," because the fires could not have come close to the temperature needed to produce such effects. Was Shenon unaware of these revelations provided by his own paper?

Shenon ignores the Commission's failure even to mention the fact that WTC 7, which was not hit by a plane and had fires on only a few floors, also collapsed. Shenon perhaps considers this omission unimportant because there was no mystery. "[I]t was determined," he says, "that a fire that . . . destroyed WTC 7 on September 11 was probably caused by the rupture of the building's special diesel fuel tanks." That is indeed the official theory. But the FEMA report---which is still the only official report on this building---suggested what it considered the most likely version of this theory but then admitted that it had "only a low probability of occurrence."

Although Shenon mentions that Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta testified before the Commission, he does not mention Mineta's report that Vice President Cheney was in the bunker under the White House by 9:20 AM, which contradicted the Zelikow-led Commission's later claim that Cheney did not arrive there until almost 10:00.

Although Shenon mentions Cheney's appearance on "Meet the Press" five days after 9/11, he does not mention Cheney's statement that he learned about the attack on the Pentagon after (not before) he entered the bunker---which the Zelikow-led Commission later contradicted.

Although Shenon points out that Zelikow and Clarke hated each other, he does not point out that Clarke's book, Against All Enemies, is not mentioned by the Zelikow-led Commission's report and that it contradicted that report on several points, saying that Cheney was down in the bunker before 9:15, that Clarke received shootdown authorization from Cheney before 9:55 (not at 10:25), and that General Richard Myers was in the Pentagon between 9:00 and 9:45 AM (not on Capitol Hill).

Although Shenon points out that the Commission failed to ask Rudy Giuliani any tough questions, he does not mention the Commission's failure to ask the toughest question that should have been asked: How did Giuliani know in advance that the Twin Towers were going to come down?

In sum: Whereas Shenon's book has performed a great service by revealing things about the Zelikow-led Commission that should lead people to suspect that its account of 9/11 covered up the truth, it is also a terrible failure: Because of Shenon's lack of journalistic skepticism with regard to the official account of 9/11, he failed to raise the most important question about the Commission's report: Did it cover up complicity by forces within our own government? Although the Commission's report contains dozens of signs that it did just this, Shenon's book mentions not a single one.

When 'The 9/11 Commission Report' was published, it received glowing accolades from the media, politicians, and a public desperate for reassurance.
The status of the Report as a document of historic importance was, however, severely damaged when its glaring deficiencies were exposed by David Griffin's devastating critique, 'The 9/11 Commission Report; Omissions and Distortions'. Indeed, Griffin's book added to growing suspicion that the attacks had been conceived, planned and carried out by elements within the United States.
I believe 'The Commission' is the latest attempt to arrest the spread of that awareness. It is far more subtle than some of its predecessors, such as 'Debunking 9/11 Myths', published by 'Popular Mechanics'. Its subtitle, 'The Uncensored History of the 9/11 Investigation', creates the impression of fearless investigative reporting by an author who is not afraid to cast doubts on the quality of 'The 9/11 Commission Report'. This impression is consolidated by the portrayal of Philip Zelikow, the anything-but-independent Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission.
The many vignettes illustrating Zelikow's role in directing the work of the commissioners are revealing and fascinating. However, the most important feature of the book is its sub-text: the implied -- and in some places stated -- assumption that the attacks on New York and Washington were perpetrated by a group of fanatical Arab Muslims.
The reader is thus re-directed to a modified but nevertheless orthodox view: although the attacks on September 11th were the work of fanatical Muslims, there were serious lapses in the work of a number of government organizations.
By focusing on the conflicts and tensions characterizing the work of the Commission rather than the details of the evidence presented to it, Shenon has been able to achieve something the 9/11 Commission could not: he could ignore the mountains of evidence against the official explanation without inviting the accusation of selective reporting.
By purporting to be an exercise in fearless, investigative writing, the book may have succeeded in reassuring some people. However, to those of us who know that, far from fulfilling their proper and traditional role as the Fourth Estate, the media are now actively complicit in the suppression of information essential to a healthy democracy, the book is masquerading under false colours. I have, for this reason, given the book one star.

In this book you will learn that 9/11 might have been prevented if the Bush gang had heeded the many many warnings they received about Al Queda's plans to attack in the US. You will discover the duplicity of Condelezza Rice, the extraordinary seizure of power by Dick Cheney on 9/11 itself, the conflict of interest that was embedded in the commission since the Executive Director was a close friend and co-author of a book with Condelezza Rice, the determination of George Bush to link Sadam to 9/11, the thick headedness of Attorney General Gonzales and also his predecessor Ashcroft, who apparently thought getting rid of mandatory waiting periods for guns was a more important issue than hunting terrorists. "I don't want to hear any more about Al Queda," he told his acting FBI director shortly before 9/ll. It's a mesmerizing book, not of the conspiracy theory sort, but of the incompentence and misplaced priorities of this administration. A must read.

I just read the review by Claire W. Solt who saw Philip Shenon on C-Span discussing his book, "The Commission". I can not tell from her review if she has actually read the book or is basing her opinion entirely upon the C-Span interview. Many books about politics are just a trifle boring. Philip Shenon's approach and style are wonderful and thoroughly readable. I couldn't put it down. I have already recommended it to my book club. It's fascinating and should engender a great discussion. We don't generally tackle politics because we want to stay friends, but "The Commission" is a real eye-opener. and should be read by anyone who votes, and even those who don't. Many authors prefer writing to talking about how good their books are, so I decided to counter the opinion of an apparent non-reader. Read the favorable quotes! They have said it better than I can.

I just watched this author on c-span, and I find his viewpoint appalling. He is content to analyze this as to who said what to whom in the White House. At this time, after watching all of the reform that has taken place, why doesn't he know that this was an institutional failure on national and internationmal scales? I don't think this author is even competent to discuss the subject. In an effort to defend Clinton he comes off qas an ignoramus.

This is a great read. It is an important companion book to the 9/11 Commission Report issued in 2004. It points out many weaknesses in the Commission's work and also the constraints that the Commission had to deal with. I believe it will be historically significant.

"The Commission" reviews the day-to-day activities of the 9/11 investigation, revealing both the flaws and strengths of those involved.

The commission's director (Philip Zelikow) was a major problem throughout the effort - brought important conflicts of interest (worked with Condoleeza Rice on the Bush transition and helped demote Richard Clarke, authored a paper that became a foundation for invading Iraq, communicated with Rove while on the commission), and further aggravated most of the staff with an abrasive personality and controlling management style. Nonetheless, given the abbreviated time frame Co-Chairmen Keane and Hamilton kept him on the job. After Bush II's re-election, Rice appointed Zelikow as a high-level advisor; he subsequently resigned after a minor furor from his pointing out the need for progress on Palestine-Israel talks.

Other material in "The Commission" included:

FAA rules at the time of 9/11 allowed 4" knives on board aircraft, and its "No Fly" list had less than 20 names - compared to 61,000+ on the State Dept's "watch list." (I'm still amazed that cockpit doors weren't even strengthened and locked - despite documentation of numerous threats from around the world.

Two of the hijackers lived in San Diego for almost a year - the CIA knew, but didn't inform the FBI. The CIA had considerable information on Al Qaeda, but failed to consolidate it into a more usable document.

Ashcroft's top ten priorities 5/01 for the Justice Dept.; did not include terrorism (he even instructed his FBI Director not to bring up the subject, and denied a request to increase anti-terrorism funding) - instead, he focused on speeding up gun background checks. As of 10/03, the FBI still had no internal e-mail system or an ability to electronically search most of its databases.

Mayor Bloomberg, despite being totally blameless for any 9/11 problems, inexplicably stonewalled the commission at first; NYC eventually provided limited cooperation and the commission failed to challenge Giuliani's image of great leadership. Mayor Giuliani's high-tech emergency management command center was located on the 23rd floor within the World Trade Center complex. The center was shut down on 9/11 out of fear it would be attacked, and caught fire when its emergency fuel ignited. The fire department's radios did not work well within the WTC.

The Bush administration was a continual thorn in the side of the commission. Besides opposing its creation, it created numerous battles over releasing documents and making officials available to testify. Rice's misstatements and Tenets faulty memory provided additional impediments.

One highlight of "The Commission" was learning that, while the Italian government stationed anti-aircraft missiles around an Italian site where President Bush was meeting (concerned about possible Al Qaeda hijacking an airplane and using it as a missile), and the 8/6/01 Presidential Daily Briefing warning of Al Qaeda hijacking planes within the U.S. - nothing was done. It was also particularly ironic that the two individuals most focused on Al Qaeda - Richard Clarke in the White House, and Michael Scheur at CIA, hated each other and were both demoted and ignored as a result of their zealousness; in addition, Scheur thought (incorrectly) Clarke was undermining his efforts.

Surely we could have done much better.

"The Commission" reviews the day-to-day activities of the 9/11 investigation, revealing both the flaws and strengths of those involved.

The commission's director (Philip Zelikow) was a major problem throughout the effort - brought important conflicts of interest (worked with Condoleeza Rice on the Bush transition and helped demote Richard Clarke, authored a paper that became a foundation for invading Iraq, communicated with Rove while on the commission), and further aggravated most of the staff with an abrasive personality and controlling management style. Nonetheless, given the abbreviated time frame Co-Chairmen Keane and Hamilton kept him on the job. After Bush II's re-election, Rice appointed Zelikow as a high-level advisor; he subsequently resigned after a minor furor from his pointing out the need for progress on Palestine-Israel talks.

Other material in "The Commission" included:

FAA rules at the time of 9/11 allowed 4" knives on board aircraft, and its "No Fly" list had less than 20 names - compared to 61,000+ on the State Dept's "watch list." (I'm still amazed that cockpit doors weren't even strengthened and locked - despite documentation of numerous threats from around the world.

Two of the hijackers lived in San Diego for almost a year - the CIA knew, but didn't inform the FBI. The CIA had considerable information on Al Qaeda, but failed to consolidate it into a more usable document.

Ashcroft's top ten priorities 5/01 for the Justice Dept.; did not include terrorism (he even instructed his FBI Director not to bring up the subject, and denied a request to increase anti-terrorism funding) - instead, he focused on speeding up gun background checks. As of 10/03, the FBI still had no internal e-mail system or an ability to electronically search most of its databases.

Mayor Bloomberg, despite being totally blameless for any 9/11 problems, inexplicably stonewalled the commission at first; NYC provided limited cooperation. Mayor Giuliani's high-tech emergency management command center was located on the 23rd floor within the World Trade Center complex. The center was shut down on 9/11 out of fear it would be attacked, and caught fire when its emergency fuel ignited. The fire department's radios did not work well within the WTC.

The Bush administration was a continual thorn in the side of the commission. Besides opposing its creation, it created numerous battles over releasing documents and making officials available to testify. Rice's misstatements and Tenets faulty memory provided additional impediments.

One highlight of "The Commission" was learning that, while the Italian government stationed anti-aircraft missiles around an Italian site where President Bush was meeting (concerned about possible Al Qaeda hijacking an airplane and using it as a missile), and the 8/6/01 Presidential Daily Briefing warning of Al Qaeda hijacking planes within the U.S. - nothing was done. It was also particularly ironic that the two individuals most focused on Al Qaeda - Richard Clarke in the White House, and Michael Scheur at CIA, hated each other, and Scheur thought (incorrectly) Clarke was undermining his efforts.

Surely we could have done much better.

Shenon is a member of the mainstream media, and as such he has a sixth sense about how far he can go. He stays well inside the lines delineating what is safe and what is heresy. That's why he's currently a media darling. Had he addressed any of the topics forbidden by the dominant media and he would have found his media tour cut short and his book remaindered.

Calling our Dear Leader incompetent is safe, as long as one pretends he is more than the drugged, terrified infant we saw sitting confused in that classroom as the tragedy unfolded. That qualifies as partisan bickering about who was incompetent and corrupt and no one has a problem with that.

Pointing out how the CIA lied, obfuscated and destroyed evidence is also permitted. This he does. Pointing out how the government and all its agencies, including both parties has done everything in its power to cover up, stonewall, distort, control and propagandize is beyond the pale. Were one to do that, one might be tempted to ask why? and that question is not permitted.

If you want to believe Democrats would have done things differently, or better or more honestly and were, in fact, not complicit in the tragedy and coverup, then by all means buy this book. If it's truth you're after, seek it elsewhere. It's all out there on the net for those with the curiosity to seek it out.

The event was tragic enough, but then "The Commission" reveals the depths of dishonor and the lack of integrity of our leaders. Not that this can be a real surprise to anyone but the most innocent, but I was looking to find more than a few shreds of honor and patriotism somewhere in our government. The best you end up with is that the staff tried hard but few felt that rocking the boat of their careers was worth the truth and that Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton were fools.

This book is an important one and I recommend it highly. The author was obviously disgusted at what he found but he spreads the blame equally and I felt honestly.

Certainly, the victims and families of 9/11 deserved better than what this commission put forth. I was also embarrassed to read about the conduct of Mayor Bloomberg, for whom up until now I held modicum of respect.

For the 9/11 student, there is little really new here but the details and actions described are almost as great a tragedy as the event itself.

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) was created to provide an objective, bipartisan accounting of the devastating terrorist attacks on September 11 2001. Its charter was to determine both why the U.S. National Security Establishment was surprised and how it reacted to mitigate the results of the attacks. This book provides a sketch of how the 9/11 Commission went about this important and difficult task.

As is usually the case, the prominent and respected commissioners selected for this job relied on a dedicated and select staff to do the heavy lifting of day-to-day research and analysis. According to Shenon the Commission made its first mistake by selecting Philip Zelikow as its staff director. He implies that Zelikow, a respected scholar, was far too close to the administration of President George W. Bush and especially his then national security advisor Condoleezza Rice to be objective and bi-partisan. This is a debatable contention, but from the book it does appear that Zelikow is a very unpleasant fellow who exercised very bad judgment on numerous occasions. Shenon then explains how the commission's staff was divided into subject area teams assigned to research issues such as warning intelligence, air defense, and emergency services as related to 9/11. His telling of the stories of these teams as they tried to pry information from what turned out to be very reticent bureaucracies is the most interesting part of this book. Shenon again implies, but does not explicitly state that Commission' final report was a whitewash of the Bush Administration and the principals involved in the 9/11 tragedy.

In point of fact, the 9/11 Report is a flawed document in many ways, but still offers the best summary of what happened before and during the first attack against the U.S. mainland since WWII. Yet like all products of a collective effort, the report is full of compromises and avoidance of contentious issues. The commission recommendations were especially ill-conceived. Its principal failing however is that its illustrious commissioners and support staff treated individuals and organizations involved in the 9/11 disaster as discreet and independent actors. In reality they were all interconnected members of a National Security System (Homeland Defense) that well before the events of 9/11 was identified as clearly inadequate for the defense of the U.S. Homeland.

Shenon has written an interesting book that sheds a good deal of light on how the 9/11 Commission actually went about its work. The reader should just be careful of his numerous inferences that he knows the motivations of the Commission actors.

I found it interesting that this book has no blurbs on the cover. No forward or prologue. It just gets right down to business. It's fascinating reading. The author creates a compelling narrative. There is alot that is very damaging to certain players, but the author does not turn them into cartoon cutouts. He makes an effort to show things as they may have seen them, but doesn't let himself become ensnared in their own self-serving narratives (I'm looking at you Bob Woodward). I think the book ends up providing a great deal of insight into how Washington really works. This is how investigative political reporting should be done.

This book is about the 9/11 commission, a dog and pony show. If you buy this book, you will get the details of - a dog and pony show, 457 pages of it.

The focus of the book is not the 9/11 eyewitnesses, not the 9/11 responders, not the 9/11 firefighters, nor the 9/11 victims' families.

The focus is the actors' acts in the dog and pony show, with the leading actor being Philip D. Zelikow*.

The truth of 9/11 is out there for you to acquire, but you are not likely to find the truth in a dog and pony show. The term "controlled demolition" is not even in the index.

*Reference from outside of the book indicates Zelikow assisted with Bush Sr.'s "New World Order" vision in the National Security Council circa 1989. Furthermore, Zelikow learned how 'public myth' could be formed to change the course of history at Harvard.

The book is well-written and seems to convey the process of the Commission's work, along with some of the constraints on the work. In this brief review, I want to highlight omissions in Shenon's book.

Shenon suggests in several places that Bush's conspiracy theory regarding who were the terrorists is not subject to question, e.g., p. 118. That is, he has no mention of many press reports of different alleged hijackers showing up alive after 9-11, nor mention of K.S. Mohammed being tortured for evidence when discussing, on pp. 182-83, his not being available to the Commission. Thus, Shenon does not call the Commission to task for an obvious requirement for a serious investigation.

On p. 200, Shenon ignores the fact that numerous video tapes of the Pentagon attack are in existence but have never been released, instead claiming easy access to information on that attack. On p. 347, he ignores the free-fall nature of the collapse of WTC 7 (which still has no analytical report from the NIST). The WTC collapses easily suggest a controlled demolition even for TV reporters witnessing them that day.

Insider trading in put options for American and United Airlines warrants no discussion at all (this has been a special interest of my own research in Hidden History of 9-11). And, in spite of a promise to report what was left out of the Commission's report, Shenon even fails to mention that the transcript of the testimony of Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta to the Commission is excluded from the Commission's report. While other testimonies were included, this one by Mineta contained description of Vice-President Cheney's orders around 9:30 a.m. regarding a plane coming in and is most important.

In other words, the hidden history of 9-11 remains quite unexplored.

The book is well-written and seems to convey the reality of the Commission's work, along with some of the constraints on the work.

However, Shenon suggests in several places that Bush's conspiracy theory regarding who were the terrorists is not subject to question, e.g., p. 118. That is, he has no mention of many press reports of different alleged hijackers showing up alive after 9-11, nor mention of K.S. Mohammed being tortured for evidence when discussing, on pp. 182-83, his not being available to the Commission. On p. 200, Shenon ignores the fact that numerous video tapes of the Pentagon attack are in existence but have never been released, instead claiming easy access to information on that attack. On p. 347, he ignores the free-fall nature of the collapse of WTC 7 (which still has no analytical report from the NIST). WTC collapses on 9-11 easily suggest a controlled demolition even for TV reporters witnessing them that day. Insider trading in put options for American and United Airlines warrants no discussion at all (this has been a special interest of my own research in Hidden History of 9-11).

In other words, the hidden history of 9-11 remains unexplored.

This book should have received five stars, but I give it only three. To learn why, read on.

Today in America we are witness to a great unraveling, the likes of which we have never seen before. There are no historical precedents. For many months now the official narrative about the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on America has been disintegrating. Philip Shenon's fine book is certain to fuel this process. Before I discuss the book, however, let us review the unraveling.

It began within weeks of the release of the 9/11 Commission Report (in July 2004) with the shocking revelation that members of the 9/11 commission were convinced that government officials, including NORAD generals, had deceived them during the investigation---in essence, had lied to their faces during the hearings. According to the Washington Post (August 2, 2006), the members of the commission vented their frustrations at a special meeting in the summer of 2004. The panel even considered referring the matter to the Justice Department for a criminal investigation.

The unraveling continued in 2006 with the release of a follow-up volume, Without Precedent, authored by the two men who had co-chaired the commission, Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton. The men had come under increasing fire ever since the release of their final report for presiding over what many now believe was a failed investigation. Stung by so much criticism, Kean and Hamilton felt the need to explain (and defend) themselves. The gist of their 2006 book is easily summarized. They write: "We were set up to fail."

The bleeding continued in May 2007 with the stunning announcement that former BYU physicist Steven Jones had found residues of thermate, a high temperature explosive, in the dust of the collapsed World Trade Center. The discovery has the gravest implications for our nation, and probably for this reason the announcement went reported in the US media.

Yet another startling revelation occurred in December 2007 when we learned that the CIA destroyed evidence, in the form of audio-tapes, deemed vital to the investigation. (New York Times, December 7, 2007) The news prompted 9/11 Commission co-chairs Kean and Hamilton to fire off an angry salvo in the New York Times (January 2, 2008) in which they charged that the CIA had obstructed their investigation. Their blunt accusation was explosive and should have caused every American to sit up and take notice. Unfortunately, the average American probably failed to connect the dots because, as usual, the US media offered nothing in the way of helpful context or analysis. We were fed the standard diet of tidbits and sound bytes: a wealth of minutiae. The big picture remained elusive.

Here is a synopsis of the story: Starting in 2002, the CIA conducted interrogations of captured Al Qaeda operatives, including Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi Binalshibh, at undisclosed CIA prisons outside the US. During these interrogations the CIA resorted to "enhanced interrogation techniques" (the CIA's euphemism for torture) to extract information. The methods included "waterboarding," which induces a sensation of drowning in the unlucky individual. Evidently, the CIA decided for its own internal reasons to video-tape these early interrogation sessions. However, years later (in 2005), Jose A, Rodriquez, the CIA's Director of Operations, ordered the tapes destroyed. For what reason? Well, according to current CIA chief Michael V. Hayden, because the tapes posed "a serious security risk." (New York Times, December 7, 2007)

Hayden went on to clarify his rather cryptic remark, and explained to the press that if the tapes had become public they would have exposed CIA officials "and their families to retaliation from Al Qaeda and its sympathizers." The excuse was flimflam, but the US media hung on Hayden's every word as if he were speaking gospel.

Hayden also claimed that the CIA had notified the appropriate committee heads in Congress in 2005 before destroying the evidence. But according to the Times this was immediately denied by the top two members of the House Intelligence Committee. A spokesman for Representative Peter Hoekstra (R-MI), who at the time chaired the oversight committee, said that he was "never briefed or advised" that the tapes even existed, let alone "that they were going to be destroyed."(New York Times, December 7, 2007)

Kean and Hamilton had a similar reaction---outrage. In their January article they state categorically that the CIA never informed them about any taped interrogations, despite their repeated requests for all pertinent information about the captured Al Qaeda operatives, who were then in CIA custody. In fact, as damaging as the news about the CIA's destruction of evidence surely was, the story exposed an even more serious problem. One might naturally assume that the official commission charged to investigate the events of 9/11 would have had unfettered access to all of the evidence pertinent to the case, including government documents and key witnesses. This goes without saying. Yet, it never happened.

In their article Kean and Hamilton summarize their dealings with the CIA.They describe their private meeting with CIA Director George Tenet and how he denied them access to the captured members of Al Qaeda. Which means, of course, that the panel never had a chance to conduct its own interviews. Tenet even denied them permission to conduct second-hand interviews with the CIA interrogators, which Kean and Hamilton felt were needed to "to better judge the credibility of the witnesses and clarify ambiguities in the reporting."Ultimately, the commission was forced to rely on third-hand intelligence reports prepared by the CIA itself. Many of these reports were poorly written and incomplete summaries, which, according to the co-chairs "raised almost as many questions as they answered."

The 9/11 Commission's lack of direct access to the captured members of al Qaeda can only mean that the official 9/11 investigation was fundamentally compromised from the outset. No other conclusion is possible, given the latest disclosures. In their January piece, Kean and Hamilton do not repudiate their own report, but they come close. They insinuate that the CIA's stonewalling now calls into question the veracity of key parts of the official story, especially the plot against America supposedly masterminded by Khalid Shiekh Mohammed and approved by Osama bin Laden. Until now, the nation has assumed that all of this was soundly based on the testimony of the captured al Qaeda operatives, several of whom supposedly confessed. However, when you probe more deeply you discover the devil lurking in the details. Since there has never been any independent confirmation about what the captives actually confessed to, or, indeed, whether they confessed at all, there is absolutely no way for us to know how much of the official story is true and how much was fabricated by the CIA for reasons we can only guess.

If the confessions were extracted under torture, just how reliable are they? For all we know, the entire story is a pack of lies. It comes down to whether the CIA is telling the truth.

Now, in February 2008, along comes a new "tell-all" book by Philip Shenon with much to say about these issues. Shenon covered the 9/11 Commission for the New York Times and over the course of the investigation he personally interviewed many of the commissioners and staff. His book is a well-written expose and affords our best look yet at what went on behind-the-scenes. Instead of burdening us with his personal opinions, Shenon plays the role of reporter and describes what happened through the eyes of the commissioners and staff. The book provides valuable insights into why the investigation failed. Of course, we already knew parts of the story. We knew about National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice's incompetence, for example, and about the serious conflicts of interest on the commission.

Shenon's most important contribution is naming CIA Director George Tenet as one of the government officials who lied during the hearings. Tenet gave testimony on three occasions (in addition to the private meetings with Kean and Hamilton) and in each of these hearings the CIA Director suffered from a faulty memory, frequently responding with "I can't remember." Initially, the commissioners were inclined to be sympathetic and gave the director the benefit of the doubt. But by Tenet's third appearance it was obvious to everyone he was perjuring himself.

Curiously, there no mention of this spectacle in the 9/11 Commission Report. Why not? Kean gave the reason at the panel's first public hearing in New York City, when he said: "Our...purpose will not be to point fingers." The comment was not well received. According to Shenon, it prompted a rumble in the audience, including sneers from the families of the victims who wanted those officials responsible to be held accountable.

Lying, of course, is a time-honored CIA tradition. For the first 25 years of its existence the CIA functioned entirely outside our constitutional framework of government. The state of affairs prevailed until the Watergate era when the Church hearings exposed a laundry list of criminal activities by the CIA, such as domestic spying, the assassination of foreign leaders, the overthrow of governments, plus the nasty habit of deceiving Congress. The Church hearings shocked the nation and led to the creation of House and Senate intelligence committees to provide the democratic oversight that was sorely lacking. Unfortunately, the CIA soon found ways around the oversight process. This is not surprising when you consider that the agency's expertise is clandestine operations. Today, the Intelligence Committees in both houses are widely viewed as a joke, and despite a chorus of denials from the agency and its admirers the perception is undoubtedly correct. To his credit, Shenon touches on the problem. The author mentions that one of the commissioners, former Senator Slade Gorton (R-WA), once served on the Senate Intelligence Committee but quit in frustration because of the lack of any serious business. Said Gorton: "I felt it was a useless exercise---I never felt I was being told anything that I hadn't learned in the Washington Post." Does such an agency deserve our trust and respect?

I give Shenon's book only three stars because the author supports the official 9/11 narrative. He seems unaware that in 2007 the evidence shifted decisively in favor of the "conspiracy theorists." Ignorance is no excvuse, however. Ironically, whatever Shenon's personal views, his book is sure to speed the unraveling process.

How? By focusing attention on the BIG issue -- the CIA's role. Though long delayed, a showdown now appears to be developing and portends a coming shift in the terms of the debate, away from the previous discussion about the incompetence of officials and "security failures" to more grave issues. But how this important drama will be played out remains unclear. Obviously, a new legally empowered 9/11 investigative body is urgently needed, since the 9/11 Commission no longer exists. While we have entered the most dangerous time in US history, the good news is that, once begun, the unraveling process is irreversible. As in the famous nursery rhyme, Humpty-Dumpty, the official reality is falling apart and the pieces will never be put back together again.

If only this wasn't yet another matter of preaching to the choir. Unfortunately, I'm sure that the only ones interested in even picking up this book after seeing its title will be those who're already at the very least dissatisfied with our government over the past 7-8 years.

Read this. Tell your friends about it. Tell your coworkers about it. Talk about it.
Then read it again. 'Nuff said.

In short, THE COMMISSION is to history as a filing cabinet is to an office. It's a centralized location for files, facts and dates all put into order and easily opened, read and then closed again... but unlike a filing cabinet, it fits neatly on your shelf. And like all the rest of these "filing cabinet" history books on 9/11, Bush and the war in Iraq, they will simply gather dust as they are quickly replaced with more up to date books and deeper studies.

Shenon promises us on the cover an UNCENSORED look behind the curtain of the 9/11 COMMISSION, but like the PDB's the president receives there's little here that you can't find elsewhere. Yes, there is some new material from the principal players on the commission (and yet no pictures in the book, which seems like an omission - while most of the players I already know by heart, Bush, Clinton, Rice, others I wouldn't know if they passed me on the street. As badly as Philip Zelikow comes off here, I was really curious as to what he looked like), and Shenon tries his best to get behind the suits and ties and smart business dresses to see more of the personalities and motivations of those seated on the commission as well as those seated before it... but, it's pop culture psych. As much as Shenon tries he never really breaks the surface of any one person here so at times the book has a soap opera quality about it... which, given then events before and after 9/11 is closer to the truth than I like to imagine.

THE COMMISSION does not pack any "wow" moments that will leave you floored or change much of your mind about 9/11 or the report on it, but again, like a filing cabinet, it does line up all the ducks and show us clearly that when it comes to 9/11 the FBI, the CIA, the White House, the NSC, the Pentagon, the State Department and any other government agency you can name did not fail America... it's the people who failed. Too busy to take the time, too busy setting themselves up for the next promotion, too busy paying off favors, too busy looking out for the next enemy who might be out for their job, not out to attack the country.

Everyone was simply too busy looking out for number one and that's the real "moment" in THE COMMISSION. The rest is just the facts and they read dry.

In the end, THE COMMISSION is both a source and a reference for those who are looking to study the history surrounding 9/11, and for those researchers it will act best as a day and date book on where people were and what they were doing. But as a read, as a book, as entertainment or even a matter of curiosity, it simply glides across the surface and is quickly forgotten.

Discussions of 9/11 often have an unfortunate tendency to generate more heat than light. On one side are those who condemn any challenge to the Bush administration's "excellence" as traitorous and the other those who imagine that the events of that awful day resulted from some fantastic, Byzantine, and wholly unbelievable conspiracy. As with many such polarizing debates, the vast majority is left in the ignoble middle, unable to gain insight above the din, often looking to the 9/11 Commission report. Yet, that report has taken on a status of near holy writ among near-everyone not on either of the two vocal extremes, leaving most people without perspective on its contents. That vast middle owes reporter Philip Shenon a great debt for providing a great deal much needed light.

With thoroughness and precision, Shenon tracks down source after source, revealing the Commission's inner workings and structure. Even more important, Shenon knows how to tell a good story. Particularly amusing is his anecdote of 9/11 widows meeting with the Bush administration's choice to chair the commission, Henry Kissinger. These women, demonstrating a skill sorely lacking in the media after 9/11, ask Kissinger if he has any clients named "Bin Laden." First Kissinger spills his coffee, than he calls the White House and resigns.

If there is a flaw in this important book, it is Shenon's use of Philip Zelikow as the story's villain. While Mr. Zelikow gives plenty to work with to fit the bill - indeed everything but a black hat and twisted mustache - ranging from his continued contacts with the White House to asking his Secretary to stop logging his calls after he'd spoken regularly with Karl Rove, this focus overshadows many other important elements of the book. Of particular interest is the Bush administration's crass, craven efforts to disrupt the Commission's work, deny them access to important people and documents, and demonize those who told truths which they found politically dangerous.

Where Shenon shines is his consideration of Commission chair's Kean and Hamilton's early decision not to "point fingers." This troubling choice to lay blame on systemic factors rather than holding individuals to account for their often shocking negligence created an environment of non-responsibility which persists to this day. After Pearl Harbor, FDR showed the courage to hold the admirals responsible, creating a culture of accountability which aided the Allies through the war. Perhaps Iraq and Afganistan might have proceeded better had the 9/11 Commission taken a similar tack.

Of one thing I am certain, members of all future "blue ribbon commissions" will begin their efforts with a copy of the 9/11 Report in one hand and Shenon's book in the other, and the country will better of for the insights they thus gain.

Others will give their opinions on this book based on their political leanings or previously held opinions about 9/11. I would urge you to buy and read this book with an open mind. And I would tell you that it is absolutely impossible to put down. This is not a dry recitation of facts and dates, this is a well told, engrossing story that will raise your eyebrows and yes, anger you at points. It may also bring you close to tears as you read about what was known and not acted on up through and even after 9-11. Highly recommended.

Mr. Shenon of the New York Times has written a reinterpretation of the work of the 9-11 Commission. Spell-binding to read, the narrative traces the public and private resistance of the Bush White House to the 9-11 Commission. He documents the private compromises that the Comission made itself to the White House, and then to the other Commission members to have a unified Commission. Instead of naming embarrassing names, the final report points fingers at various beaucracies. This is a book that the reader will not put down.

With this important new book, the growing 9/11 Truth Movement will finally be going mainstream. After the elections, we can start getting at the truth of 9/11 and the "war on terror" and set our sights on the true terrorists.

I bought this book with hopes that it would be an even-handed treatment of the story of the 9-11 Commission. But it really doesn't come across that way.

Here are a couple of examples:

1. A lot is made out of the Bush Administration trying to "destroy" Richard Clarke. I have no doubt that this was the case...the only thing is, that Richard Clarke wasn't exactly blowing kisses to the Bush Administration. Somehow, the author seems to forget that fact. I for one have never understood the attitude that some people seem to have, "How dare he try to defend himself when I'm trying to rip his throat out."

2. The author makes light of what Sandy Berger did, steal several copies of a highly classified NSC document about the 1999-2000 Millenium Plot. Not only did Berger steal these documents he did in a way that if he had been a working stiff in the Intelligence Community like me, he would have been the subject of a major counterespionage investigation.

Another good indicator of this book's biases is that the far left Pacifica Radio Democracy Now! program is offering the book for pledges of 125.00. So I'd avoid this book and stick with the 9-11 Commission Report itself.

In this well-crafted, important new study, the perfect companion to Griffin's magisterial The 9/11 Commission Report: Omissions and Distortions, we get to see from a very human perspective why the 9/11 Commission did not finally produce the truth. Most fascinating to me (and the book is tough to put down), the 9/11 Commission stands as a paradigm case for analysis of the inherent problem plaguing our democracy - that the critical decisions are made by extremely small groups of decision-makers, selected with specific implications of partisan conflict, more than the more generalized public good, in mind. These groups are thus necessarily politicized, representing the interests - not of the whole of society - but of only the most powerful oligarchs. Such a group made the decision the drop the bomb on Hiroshima, and again such a group essentially closed the door to further publicly sanctioned investigation of the signal event of our young century.

The prospective reader must note that, evidently due to his extensive investigation, Shenon writes from a definite standpoint on the events 9/11. He believes that the Bush Administration is guilty of criminal negligence (not conspiracy) - allowing, either by incompetence or some other motive, a security breakdown - and that its representatives, when they found they could no longer avert a public investigation (they managed to delay it for over 400 days - it took only 4 to start investigating Pearl Harbor), made every move possible to promote and maintain damage control, from the selection of key members of the Commission and its staff (he draws out a fantastic array of bit players, a number of whom I was wholly unfamiliar with, who distinctly influenced the course of the investigation), to what was discussed in the actual hearings, to what lines of questioning were pursued, and what paths of inquiry were not. "Rove began rewriting the strategy for Bush's 2004 reelection campaign literally the day after 9/11. He knew that Bush's reelection effort centered on his performance on terrorism; almost nothing else would matter to the voters. If the commission did anything to undermine Bush's anti-terrorism credentials - worst of all, if it is claimed that Bush had somehow bungled intelligence in 2001 that might of prevented the attacks - his reelection might well be sunk."

Shenon deftly traces the political lineages as the intertwine with the crucial testimony given and not given. By discussing the character, motives, and felt obligations of the main figures involved, we get a much deeper perspective on where the Commission went astray and why. Much of the discussion centers of the role of Phillip Zelikow, whose extensive ties to central members of the Bush Administration, might give rise to a further investigative Commission.

All in all, a notably balanced rendering of a topic that will surely be discussed for decades to come. For those with an interest in the future of democracy, without question, the read of the season.