My biggest challenge in reviewing Poole's books is trying to find new ways to say essentially the same things: they are a refreshing, authoritative source of well-documented research and in-depth analysis of modern tactical warfare that are unequivocally the troops' best reference tools and the status quo's greatest threats. This book certainly continues that tradition.

The book was organized into three inter-related parts. In the first part, Poole provided a great, detailed history of the terrorist relationships between Africa and the Middle East, and the increasing influence of Eastern (Chinese) methods and presence in the Middle East. Chapter 4, "Euphrates Pipeline," which read like a detailed intelligence summary of suspected infiltration routes in the Iraq-Syria border area, was the first of three `must-read' chapters for individuals and small units deploying to Iraq.

The second part was an analysis of small unit actions and lessons from many years of African insurgency-counterinsurgency conflicts. I was especially impressed with Chapter 10, the second `must-read' chapter, which highlighted the Rhodesian Selous Scouts. In the final part, Poole shared his experienced perspectives on how to train for and win against the terrorist threats we are likely to be facing for the foreseeable future. This final part includes the final `must-read' chapter, "To Truly Win in a Place Like Iraq," from which the following quote is taken that pre-dated and predicted the kinds of successes that we are starting to see from the surge efforts in Iraq:

"...America's leaders must override their cultural impulse to "think big" and start "thinking small." It will all come down to the basics - basic 4GW [4th Generation Warfare] skills for U.S. troops and basic services for oppressed populations. That means humanitarian light infantrymen instead of infrastructure destroying and jihadist-generating smart bombs. Some squads would anchor neighborhood security through CAP [Combined Action Platoon] platoons, while others mantracked and arrested perpetrators. Only then will the cycle of violence be broken."

I look forward to the challenge of reviewing my next Poole book, but not as much as I look forward to the day when our troops and small-units get the kind of training and leadership that they deserve. Read this book to see what they are facing and how they can be victorious against our terrorist foes.

Examines the roots of an aspect of what is currently being faced in other climes and places. The author is uniquely qualified to write on the subject.

Future historians will identify John Poole as one of those clairvoyant savants of military art who told us of the threat long before it happened, exactly what we should expect, and how to train to fight it. He will also be remembered as a perceptive author whose books were read and studied by the Soldiers and Marines who fought the wars of the 21st Century but, unfortunately, not read and studied by the generals who led them. In Terrorist Trail, he has again identified the threat, their modus operandi, and where to find them. He has identified why we haven't done very well at finding and eliminating the insurgents because of the lack understanding the threat, the absence of true soldier skills, and the burden of a very heavily laden attrition mind set on the part of most of the senior officer set.

Terrorist Trail is a well researched volume based on keen insights into the Arab mind and culture. Moreover, the Trail follows the flow of foreign fighters right through the valley of the Euphrates and across the borders of Iran. This is more than just insight, it is information - nay, intelligence - from what is happening on the ground based on first hand accounts and observations. It is a detailed account which could be used as a continuity document for units in Iraq to read and understand as they rotate into these areas.

Poole takes us on a tour d' force through successful counterinsurgency (COIN) operations throughout history and in the third world - pointing out lessons that should be learned if we are to ever master COIN ops. It doesn't take a mental giant to understand that this is a primer on "how to", but if unread, the lessons have no chance of being learned. If read, the lessons have to be implemented at a level to be effectively applied. Some of Poole's recommendations might be discerned in the new Army/Marine COIN Manual, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, December 2006, but these similarities exist in too few areas to think they are more than serendipitous. It would take an entirely different leadership, cultural mind-set, force organization, and training to implement Poole's recommendations, and there is no significant evidence of that in the conventional U.S. Army or Marine Corps.

There is some flavor of Poole's prescriptions in Special Forces, but they too suffer from conventional generals with 2d generation thinking. Poole makes the case for decentralization of training in order to be able to create the type of army that can successfully combat the terrorists. He goes so far as to suggest: "If America's brigade commanders can't figure out how to fight more effectively at short range, they should defer to the collective wisdom of those who do it for a living - their rifle squad leaders." Such an outrageous statement, no matter how true, will provoke more of a defensive reaction by the hierarchy than the more appropriate determination to improve. One suspects that just such a thing is happening as there is now a shortage of his books in the Post and Base Exchanges. As the world situation continues to deteriorate, being good has become far more important than looking good. Poole has developed and tested a new "bottom-up" squad training method. Until more U.S. infantry units adopt it, they will continue to have problems at short range in either conventional or unconventional warfare.

Thank you, John Poole, for doing some serious research and thinking on tactics, operations, and strategy and translating that into this newest great book, Terrorist Trail.

Terrorist Trail by LTC John Poole (USMC-Ret) is one of the great books explaining how operations should be run in Iraq (and Afghanistan) to minimize damage to the local civilian population, while downgrading the ability of the insurgents to re-supply & operate. The book explains irregular warfare at it's best. How to assist the local population without having to destroy it! Unfortunately the GameBoy Generals of the Pentagon do not understand that all that glitzy billion dollar weaponry they love so much causes more damage in the long run to the war effort than it helps. They like to use a sledge-hammer to pick-off a flea.

Instead of relying on massive firepower from the air or artillery, the US military needs to go back to training troops how to become excellent at small unit infantry skills. Let the Platoon & Squad leaders with eyes on the target, knowing his unit's capability, make the decision on how to attack a positon or control a target location. Instead of investing more billions in "real time" micro-managed command & control from CentCom, invest millions in highly effective light infantry training (*See the other works by John Poole regarding infantry training) on how to ID & target insurgent controlled areas while enlisting the help of the local population.
Tracking is one of man's oldest survival skills. Early man tracked to find food & when he "evolved" tracked other men to kill them. This skill is as old as it gets for survival - except for running. The fastest man survived, the slowest was dinner. If the US military wants to survive & even thrive in an asymmetric 4th GW environment it has to evolve & change it's methodology of warfare in the coming years. Terrorist Trail explains beautifully the "how to" methodology of fighting the insurgents and winning in Iraq & in other back waters of the world. Will our current military leadership look at this work as sage advice? Highly un-likely. Most senior military leadership is looking to retire & move on to high paying jobs in the military-industrial complex (better know as Beltway Bandits)& down & dirty combat tactics just won't get them a hi-tech job!

John Poole explains very clearly in Terrorist Trail who the insurgents are & where they come from, who & how are they supplied. The US military can acquire the intelligence to effectively fight & defeat the Jihadists. If you can ID the insurgent, know his mentality & fighting methodology, you can defeat him using the tactics & techniques recommended by LTC Poole in this book.
I highly recommend this book to anyone going in harm's way overseas & to anyone who wants to understand the dynamics of defeating the insurgents at their own game.

Mr Poole does it again. Another lifesaver for the troops.

Will use it in our training. If you are into tracking; check out the chapter on urban tracking, it's old techniques put in a new environment, might just save your life.

Terrorist Trail by John Poole is a superb book that is a must read for all warriors--military and law enforcement--and all those they protect if the U.S. is to win 4th Generation Wars. In other words everyone. Thoroughly researched and written by a warrior himself, who has lived what he writes about, it has the same passionate and inspirational style that characterizes the dynamic tactics instruction John Pooles gives to operational units. You will learn the reality of combat and feel empowered by the understanding and skills you'll acquire to perform, cope and even thrive in any extreme stress situation in the 4th Generation War environments. Do yourself a favor: read this book now.

In this volume H. John Poole attempts, once again, to explain how the Middle Eastern-inspired terror movements are attempting to work their will on the collective West. This book is divided into three parts.

Under the first part, Poole explains the terrorists' concern with Africa: a large, under-developed continent with myriad socio-economic problems and fertile recruiting among an extensive Muslim population. He outlines infiltration routes from Africa to Iraq and the Middle East. The author also notes the involvement of this pipeline from Africa with Iran.

The next section is an examination of African tactical adaptations to European armies' methods and technologies. Particularly noted are the Boers and Zulus of southern Africa. He introduces modern-day tricks and techniques such as those of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts, a special 1970s era unit whose mission wasa to serve as a pseudo-terrorist element in the hunt for enemy guerillas.

Poole brings together the history and the examples, in the last section, to indicate the way to defeat the current Middle Eastern version of terrorism.

He notes these following:

-the need for Western development aid to deal with Africa's problems, which, in turn could avert problems for the West;

-urban tracking - tracing the terrorist adversary through urban streets - as a means of coming to grips with the individual terrorist in his preferred sanctuary;

-U.S. forces learning to replace massive firepopwer with technique at the small unit level, focussing on the short-range fire fight and de-centralize tactical control;

-enhancing local security by preparing local troops with first-class light infantry skills;

-understanding Hezbollah destabilization; and

- how U.S. forces must learn to evolve tactically.

Poole makes some interesting proposals in this work, most of which he has discussed in his other books, among these being:

* the over-reliance by U.S. forces on technology;

* the need for more extensive training to build a tactically-refined light infantry;

* the need for more tactical finesse - and less force - in 4th Generation warfare;

* disparities of an over-armored, over-regulated and over-centralized U.S. force opposing a quick-moving, decentralized, initiative-wielding adversary;

* how Western tactical development has been equipment-driven; and

* that U.S. small unit techniques are 90 years behind state-of-the-art developments.

One would hoope that Poole's works would spark controversy as a precedent for tactical change. Such change is vital if the West expects to come out on top in the "War Against Terror".

In this volume H. John Poole attempts, once again, to explain how the Middle Eastern-inspired terror movements are attempting to work their will on the collective West. This book is divided into three parts.
Under the first part, Poole explains the terrorists' concern with Africa: a large, under-developed continent with myriad socio-economic problems and fertile recruiting among an extensive Muslim population. He outlines infiltration routes from Africa to Iraq and the Middle East. The author also notes the involvement of this pipeline from Africa with Iran.
The next section is an examination of African tactical adaptations to European armies' methods and technologies. Particularly noted are the Boers and Zulus of southern Africa. He introduces modern-day tricks and techniques such as those of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts, a special 1970s era unit whose mission wasa to serve as a pseudo-terrorist element in the hunt for enemy guerillas.
Poole brings together the history and the examples, in the last section, to indicate the way to defeat the current Middle Eastern version of terrorism.
He notes these following:
-the need for Western development aid to deal with Africa's problems, which, in turn could avert problems for the West;
-urban tracking - tracing the terrorist adversary through urban streets - as a means of coming to grips with the individual terrorist in his preferred sanctuary;
-U.S. forces learning to replace massive firepopwer with technique at the small unit level, focussing on the short-range fire fight and de-centralize tactical control;
-enhancing local security by preparing local troops with first-class light infantry skills;
-understanding Hezbollah destabilization; and
- how U.S. forces must learn to evolve tactically.
Poole makes some interesting proposals in this work, most of which he has discussed in his other books, among these being:
* the over-reliance by U.S. forces on technology;
* the need for more extensive training to build a tactically-refined light infantry;
* the need for more tactical finesse - and less force - in 4th Generation warfare;
* disparities of an over-armored, over-regulated and over-centralized U.S. force opposing a quick-moving, decentralized, initiative-wielding adversary;
* how Western tactical development has been equipment-driven; and
* that U.S. small unit techniques are 90 years behind state-of-the-art developments.
One would hoope that Poole's works would spark controversy as a precedent for tactical change. Such change is vital if the West expects to come out on top in the "War Against Terror".

Terrorist Trail, Backtracking the Foreign Fighter

Without realizing it, J.Poole is a Cultural anthropologist of warfare. He provides the reader with the historical cultural perspective of war, and how it applies to today's battlefields. Few can really do this, but J.Poole does.

This is historical -culture- warfare product of an individual, group or society of human beings. It includes their religion, technology, science, as well as their moral systems and the characteristic behaviors and warfare habits. In particular, the specific more detailed warcraft, meanings, and tactics in different domains of human activities, through out the world. J.Poole portrays this evolution of warcraft; he then contrasts this with the war with terrorism and their state sponsors. Or simply put, know your enemy, his ground, his tactics, and capabilities on all levels.

In addition what J.Poole is trying to build a flexible -fluid and dynamic approach on today's battlefield, no matter where that maybe. Today's soldiers need to be more thoroughly schooled in small unit tactics. Training conducted is not just going up to a static firing line and shooting at targets, but learning how to fight - shoot in a 3 dimensional sphere, 360 degrees, and more. J.Poole is for warfare at the Spartan level, each soldier a carefully crafted-educated weapon.

Clearly his book, "Terrorist Trail" belongs in every Soldier- Statesman library.

By Stephen E Hughes