If you are a traditionalist and are expecting the usual treatise to counterinsurgency then you will be disappointed. This is an out of the box approach to war in the 21st century. This book is not modern updates to Galula, Kitson, Mao or Trinquier. Examples of some of the topics covered include; "Superempowered Competition", "Open Source Warfare", and Guerrilla Entrepreneurs". This book is not for the faint of heart, it will destroy your conventional notions about counterinsurgency and will require you to completely rethink the "Graduate" level art of war.

Terry Tucker, PhD
Mobile Training Team Battle Staff Trainer
Afghanistan

It sure requires a lot of effort to regard life as a pleasant experience when you have to wonder every day if you're going to get blown up in a bus on your way to work, or if there's going to be a sudden blackout, shortage of water or gas. This may seem like a distant scenario, something happening to some poor "unliberated" underdeveloped state - but according to John Robb, disruptions of this kind can take place anytime, anywhere. In fact, they're being prepared as we speak. New York, Madrid and London were merely a sneak preview - and of course, places like Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Thailand and Chechnya have become classic sites for such disorder. What we are looking at, Robb argues, is a new type of globalized warfare involving small and largely independent "terrorist" cells with lots of cheap and accessible technology (from the internet to explosives). Robb aptly calls them the Global Guerrillas.

Never mind WHY such "nasty people" would want to disrupt your neat way of living: wars have always been fought for myriads of reasons and every murderer can be called a hero, every freedom fighter a terrorist, if you're so inclined. There is nothing particularly extraordinary about people plotting to disrupt other people's way of living (in fact, directly or indirectly, that's what we're all doing, all the time). One of the most refreshing aspects about Robb's book is that he doesn't waste many lines vilifying the global guerrillas, but rather coolly observes and describes their tactics, methods, even finances - and potential to emerge victorious. The one common aspect in all these groups (Al-Qaeda being the most famous) is that they are opposing a state, i.e., a huge organization with the (supposed) monopoly over violence (or security), taxation and all kinds of essential services such as the supply of energy, food, water and health care. And the interesting thing is that the global guerrillas have developed a cunning little trick to actually endanger the legitimacy and power of states: instead of going about waging massive wars with millions of soldiers and billions of explosions (which is really quite expensive), they engage in "systems disruption", damaging or destroying the very infrastructure on which states (and above all the population under their jurisdiction) rely. By blowing up pipelines, electricity grids, bridges, railroads, airplanes and buildings, the guerrillas cause massive damage and financial losses - not to speak of panic and insecurity - all of which end up weighing heavily on the state. For the perpetrators of such attacks, on the other hand, the costs can be minimal, as it is relatively cheap nowadays to organize and execute major disruptive actions. Plus they can be endlessly innovative, learning from each other's mistakes and successes, even though they are not connected or even cooperating with each other. Robb calls this "open-source warfare", analogous to Wikipedia, where millions of people can participate and improve, without need of a "central command". Which, of course, makes it all the more difficult for global guerrillas to be eliminated: you destroy one group here, and in the meantime ten others have sprouted up somewhere else.

Much of the book concentrates on Iraq, not only because it is such an obvious conundrum for America and its allies, but also for its variety of "terrorist" groups wreaking havoc on a daily basis and undermining the West's attempts to "conquer the hearts and minds" of the invaded territory's population. This provides a good basis to observe a (supposedly) powerful state's inability to actually detect, much less control all the insurgency against it. The end-result, Robb predicts, will be the failure of the American intervention. Surprising as that may sound.
With this in mind, Robb provides also countless examples of successful (and quite ingenious) recent operations in other countries, to finally conclude that we have entered a whole new stage in world events: the end of globalization and the beginning of global chaos. As he put it: "Now with the new forms of warfare any small group can wage war... and they will." A chilling prospect, perhaps, but Robb's arguments certainly sound convincing. Especially because he teaches us not to regard warfare as something stable, but rather as en ever evolving human talent, full of surprising twists and turns. The future will be one hell of an adventure. It's just a shame we will (most likely) have to participate in it.

This book isn't of course as timeless as Lao Tsu's or von Clausewitz's, but it shares space on my desk with these and a few others, simply because it is the only concise fifth-generation warfare (and fourth) reference I've found. John Robb produced a minor watershed which I've tabbed with over a score of Post-It tabs. Nicely written and functionally useful. (Still, by the author's own admission, tentative in the face of our ignorance about the future's potential for yet-unrecognized means of conflict.)

This is an interesting little book. I think that it may promise more than it delivers, but its lesson is right on. The Foreword relates a key part of the book's thesis (page ix): "[Examples] involve the idea of turning the complexity and power of a developed modern economy from strengths to vulnerabilities."

For one thing, terrorists can use relatively inexpensive techniques to create huge problems. For instance, it cost al-Qaeda about $500,000 for the 9/11 attacks and cost the American economy about $500 billion worth of damage--in the author's words (page x) "a million-to-one payoff ratio."

Other examples: cheap techniques (explosives) have cost Iraq millions upon millions of dollars in lost oil revenue, as pipelines are destroyed and income lost. The book itself is about (page xiv) "rapid chaotic and unexpected events. . . . 'black swans--events so different from what we know, so unpredictable and hidden by uncertainty, that they are impossible to predict with accuracy."

The book talks about the ability of terrorists to learn and use this learning to advantage against state actors. They tend to be more nimble and this provides an advantage. So, complex globalization presents an attractive target for simple responses by terrorist organizations.

An interesting argument. However, there are some questions that arise because of recent developments in Iraq. Robb believes that the antipathy of a variety of actors to the United States is doom. Whether or not the "surge" ends up working, though, it is clear that in the short run many Iraqis who formerly fought against Americans are now working with them against, for example, al-Qaeda. Will this last? or will the formerly antagonistic and currently cooperative groups just outwait Americans? Who knows? But the current situation (November, 2007) suggests a more fluid situation than the author depicts.

Only time will tell the outcomes in Iraq and against terrorists worldwide. The book has an interesting and even powerful logic. But we must wait to see what the evidence tells us in the future.

This is an interesting little book. I think that it may promise more than it delivers, but its lesson is right on. The Foreword relates a key part of the book's thesis (page ix): "[Examples] involve the idea of turning the complexity and power of a developed modern economy from strengths to vulnerabilities."

For one thing, terrorists can use relatively inexpensive techniques to create huge problems. For instance, it cost al-Qaeda about $500,000 for the 9/11 attacks and cost the American economy about $500 billion worth of damage--in the author's words (page x) "a million-to-one payoff ratio."

Other examples: cheap techniques (explosives) have cost Iraq millions upon millions of dollars in lost oil revenue, as pipelines are destroyed and income lost. The book itself is about (page xiv) "rapid chaotic and unexpected events. . . . 'black swans--events so different from what we know, so unpredictable and hidden by uncertainty, that they are impossible to predict with accuracy."

The book talks about the ability of terrorists to learn and use this learning to advantage against state actors. They tend to be more nimble and this provides an advantage. So, complex globalization presents an attractive target for simple responses by terrorist organizations.

An interesting argument. However, there are some questions that arise because of recent developments in Iraq. Robb believes that the antipathy of a variety of actors to the United States is doom. Whether or not the "surge" ends up working, though, it is clear that in the short run many Iraqis who formerly fought against Americans are now working with them against, for example, al-Qaeda. Will this last? or will the formerly antagonistic and currently cooperative groups just outwait Americans? Who knows? But the current situation (November, 2007) suggests a more fluid situation than the author depicts.

Only time will tell the outcomes in Iraq and against terrorists worldwide. The book has an interesting and even powerful logic. But we must wait to see what the evidence tells us in the future.

I purchased Brave New War expecting a fresh view, or at least an adequate review, of the contemporary security issues challenging states within the world. Unfortunately, Robb's book adds nothing that cannot be gleaming from current events and occasional sessions reading the newspaper. His argument is outlined within the preface, that globalisation has empower non-state actors by allowing them to gain technological symmetry with modern states and that their attacks require minimal financial resources for spectacular financial impacts upon national and global economies. Unfortunately, this argument is repeated verbatim on nearly every page. The book also makes sweeping generalisations and claims, which include the assertion that traditional interstate warfare is over. There are better sources of information available for both the seasoned and occasional reader elsewhere.

Futurist John Robb sees us going through a period in which increasingly things will get very local with people and organizations hiring private security companies to protect them. He sees a breakdown in global trade because of terrorist activities (both oil and security will become so expensive that a lot of trade will lose its value). Nation states will lose much of their power and legitimacy because of defective centralized command organizations (much the way communist economic systems failed) and because their great armies will be ineffective, even irrelevant, in combating the decentralized "swarm intelligence" of the Internet-like terrorist structures.

We can see in the fiascos of the Bush administration with the great George W. as "I'm the Decider" and Dick Cheney and his neocon cronies as Designers, that the view from the top, when it becomes superimposed upon the real world, can lead to disaster. Quite simply the "intelligence" at the top is no match for the independent intelligence spread out among the populace. There is more wisdom in the Internet than in the all the heads in Washington.

However I have departures from Robb's text that I would like to present. First of all he keeps talking about how the terrorists are winning. What are they winning? They kill people and destroy wealth, but what do they gain? Bin Laden may be a hero in the many parts of the Muslim world, but he has gained nothing but that celebrity. The terrorists are creating no wealth. They get their finances through donations, illegal activities, such as dope smuggling, and kidnappings for ransom and the like. Legalize street drugs and stop paying ransoms and where will the bulk of their financing come from? Counterfeiting designer jeans? Stipends from Saudi princes? Currently they are enjoying international notoriety and support partly because of the overreaction of the US. A lot of money goes into homeland security. Little if any of it goes to Al Qaeda. Bush has poured hundreds of billions of dollars into the Iraqi sand, and some of that no doubt is benefitting Al Qaeda, but wiser leaders will come to power in the Western democracies in the future and will not aid the growth of Al Qaeda as Bush and Tony Blair have done.

Robb sees the nation state as at a disadvantage vis-a-vis guerilla organizations. He relies on ideas from Israeli military strategist Martin van Creveld to come to this conclusion (see especially page 28). But guerilla organizations only have an advantage in their homeland against outsiders. Imagine the Vietcong or Al Qaeda conducting a guerilla war while hiding out in the United States. They would not have the support of the populace and without that support a guerilla army is lost.

Robb states that the Bush administration invaded Iraq "to transform the political landscape of the Middle East." (p. 34) This is an after-the-fact justification since the stated reason (WMDs and Al Qaeda connections) was revealed as a lie, and the underlying reason (control of oil--remember Iraqi oil was going to pay for all this) was found not to work. Bush actually invaded Iraq in order to run for a second term as an "at war" president. Being at war also allowed him to greatly increase the power of the executive branch of government. As Commander-in-Chief he pretty much had his way with Congress and the American press, which is the reason he is still strutting around like a peacock.

Robb sees Baloch tribesmen as gaining "returns on investment (ROIs) of at least 1,000 to 1" in their "systems sabotage" attacks in Pakistan. (p. 84) But to use such terminology is a bit silly and is part of where I think Robb goes wrong in his overall analysis. The "return on investment" that the Baloch terrorists or any terrorist organization gets from blowing things up is little or nothing. However, by showing that they can and will sabotage structures and kill people, they may get financial support from those who want the Pakistani government overthrown. That's the way the economics of terrorism work. You don't--to repeat myself--create wealth by destroying wealth, unless you get the contract for rebuilding! Take away the financial support that terrorists are getting and squelch their criminal enterprises and they are out of business.

On page 100 Robb makes a similar point using the term "rates of return" instead of ROI. He's talking about Nigerian guerillas blowing up Shell Oil facilities and finds that "the rates of return on these attacks are phenomenal." The only return they are going to get is if somebody pays them to stop or they are able to take over the government or the facilities. The (inadvertent, I presume) glorification of terrorists by the Bush administration and the press no doubt gains them some support from somewhere (Iran and Saudi Arabia?).

Despite what I see as errors in Robb's conception and conclusions, I still think this is a very good book that makes some important points. For example Robb predicts that "the knee-jerk solution [to terrorist attacks] will be to centralize security in the hands of the nation-state." But he sees this as "a wrong-headed approach. It will bring us to the brink of a police state for very little benefit." (p. 156) Another good point is from page 158 where Robb states that "preemptive war followed by aggressive nation-building" as a reaction to terrorism and extremism is "wrong." He calls this "the Bush doctrine" which has obviously failed, as he points out on page 160. He notes that Iraq and Afghanistan since the invasions by the United States have "become havens and sources of even more instability than they were before we invaded."

For those interested in where the world will most likely be heading in the next twenty years, this book is a must read. Robb paints a compelling portrait of what he terms "global guerrillas," those motivated, for whatever reason, to wear down the state by targeting its critical infrastructure. Learning how these groups operate and how globalization is empowering them is enough to make this book well worth your time. Robb puts forward a solid study of these non-state actors, which, for me at least, elucidated a large portion of the current chaos in Iraq.

Where this book stumbles is in the latter portions, when Robb is iterating what must be done to effectively counter global guerrilla groups. His ideas are indeed challenging, and ultimately my critique is more with his articulation of these ideas. However, while it does not seem that he specifically set out to draw up a blueprint, I still think more examples and stronger analogies would have helped his case.

In summation, I enjoyed this book immensely. It brought new ideas forward that got me thinking about recent world events in a new light. It challenges the reader to rethink current strategy and how the world can best counter the threats being posed to it from increasingly powerful non-state actors.

Robb's done some excellent analysis on his blog, which I am a frequent visitor. I looked forward to this book in which expands on many of the points previous hit upon in the blog.

He did a good job of describing some of the tactical changes in warfare and how small loosely linked groups are all working towards a common outcome; that of creating an on-going state of chaos which eventually weakens and undermines the state. While his prose is good in this regard, he did not make the case that this is some type of 'Brave New War'. Rather it smells like typical guerrilla warfare with better tools (telecommunications).

Ultimately, it is on this point that the book loses its energy. After putting forth a framework for open source insurgency, Robb takes scenario after scenario and forces his explanation into this narrow framework. In several cases it is apparent he is fitting square pegs into round holes. The book loses some credibility in these cases.

I liked it though, and found it well worth the money. However, Brave New War does not go into the category of grand strategic thinking. Rather, it is a solid look at some of the emerging tactics of what others have called World War IV.



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Robb's done some excellent analysis on his blog, which I am a frequent visitor. I looked forward to this book in which expands on many of the points previous hit upon in the blog.

He did a good job of describing some of the tactical changes in warfare and how small loosely linked groups are all working towards a common outcome; that of creating an on-going state of chaos which eventually weakens and undermines the state. While his prose is good in this regard, he did not make the case that this is some type of 'Brave New War'. Rather it smells like typical guerrilla warfare with better tools (telecommunications).

Ultimately, it is on this point that the book loses its energy. After putting forth a framework for open source insurgency, Robb takes scenario after scenario and forces his explanation into this narrow framework. In several cases it is apparent he is fitting square pegs into round holes. The book loses some credibility in these cases.

I liked it though, and found it well worth the money. However, Brave New War does not go into the category of grand strategic thinking. Rather, it is a solid look at some of the emerging tactics of what others have called World War IV.



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John Robb presents us with an excellent synthesis of future security trends in a highly readable book. When I finished I felt compelled to wrestle with the ideas myself. I wanted to read more, jot down ideas and engage in the conversation. To me, that is what a great book can do.

Readers of John Robb's Global Guerrillas blog will recognize many of the themes that here he weaves into a more thoughtful and polished presentation. I would have liked to have seen more of his thinking on what structures will emerge on the 'blue force' side in reaction to the rise of the global guerrilla. However, the picture of the trends he presents is an excellent start.

Some claim Robb's vision is dark. His ideas are absolutely unflinching and in an era where change is accelerating an unflinching look is what we need. If you follow current security trends Robb's work is invaluable to gaining perspective on where things are headed. I recommend the book.

Mr. John Robb provides a sweeping overview of the rising threat from what he calls, global guerrillas. He begins, in Part I, with the empowerment of guerrilla bands through advances in technology. He further draws attention to the time from the Peace of Westphalia to now as the rise of nation-states to the point where the nation-state is being challenged by new alliances centered on religion, crime, tribal links, and so on. In the past guerrilla challenges were localized and centered on nationalistic aims but the new guerrilla has found ways to use technology to either create or exploit a crisis in the nation state. The guerrilla of today focuses on challenging the legitimacy of national governments as the center of gravity they undermine. They seek not to replace the state but simply to hollow it and make it irrelevant. And their reach goes beyond geographic boundaries to include even the suppliers of the state legitimacy.

In Part II, Mr. Robb draws further attention to the organization of cell groups of guerrilla bands that are decentralized to challenge the highly centralized armies of the nation-state. It is a challenge to the presuppositions of nation-states that continue to use old counter-insurgency tactics against this new and highly evolved global threat. Mr. Robb demonstrates through examples from business and technology how this networked approach has matured to the point that it cannot be defeated by old counter-insurgency tactics. A new approach is required.

In Part III, Mr. Robb further argues that the better approach to a network threat is with a network counter-threat. Too often, Robb points out, nation-states respond with further centralization of control either creating knee-jerk police states or attempting pre-emptive nation-building strategies. Both approaches play into the strengths of the networked threat and make our security more brittle. Brittle security results in a hard break with greater affect than the more resilient networked approach. Robb does speak of how we might organize infrastructure and security in a networked manner that is market and environmentally friendly at the same time as it creates a more resilient, innovative, and effective response to this new threat. Unfortunately, while arguing the merits of free-forming locally-controlled networks, Robb responds to the old challenges of network weakness by suggesting a central-incentive program to discourage network abuse. It is the old fallacy of attempting to a little central control while attempting to gain the benefits of a full network. It is a supposed method of hedging our bets that I fear only weakens his argument for networked solutions. A centrally-influenced network is really no network at all. Robb goes on to argue that the networked approach will evolve naturally with time and that development in time will defeat the threat. Whether he is being overly optimistic as this reviewer believes or not can only be tested with time.

Despite the weakened argument by accepting central influence over networked approaches to security, Mr. Robb's analysis is flawless and difficult to challenge. It is a solid work that leadership in business and government should take for the future. Share it with your representatives and senators in particular. Robb's clear and convincing message should be heard and applied quickly to avoid the knee-jerk reactionaries to the next attack.

John Robb's perspectives on the status quo of warfare are only one small part of the much larger story to which he introduces us. He demonstrates an understanding of the implications of globalization, he touches on the growing impact of technology and he shows us what has been happening in Iraq from another vantage point.

His simple review of classic warfare provides us the basic historical understanding, which is needed by the non-military mind to fully appreciate his perspectives and concerns. His discussions are punctuated with a broad mix of references [Barabasi, Liddell Hart, Rashid] and several examples of how effective simple acts of warfare have been and can be.

Robb hits his stride when he `rethinks security' and couples natural and manmade disasters, which are fraught with the same uncertainties, to show us all how vulnerable we actually are. His frank analysis of the inability of the nation-states and the bureaucracies to cope with terrorism in an interconnected world and his ten-year projections are unnerving. Let's hope that he has held the attention of more than enough people to take the reality of modern terror head on, to dislodge the vested interests, to restructure our ideas of personal security collectively and to reshape our global futures.

Bob Magnant is the author of The Last Transition...- a fact-based novel about Iran, the Middle East, war and terrorism.

This book is very interesting for a variety of reasons. For one thing it is an excellent example of a new genre of literature; turning a blog or series of blogs into a printed, if short (196 pages) book. For another, it actually contains some very good insights and observations about the phenomenon called `Fourth Generation Warfare' (FGW) and the accumulation of systems that enable globalization.

Although Robb is at pains to explain that this is not a book about counter-terrorism or terrorists, it actually provides a very good description of the al Qaeda movement based on his judicious reading of Rand Corporation study of networked type of organizations, "Networks and Netwars" (2001 Amazon.com). He also provides a real service by coining the term `Global Guerillas' to describe the practitioners of the asymmetrical warfare that is critical to FGW. And terrorism is an important tactic in Global Guerrilla operations. His principal thesis for this book is that FGW is really a global scale war between non-state actors and nation states where in the goal of the non-state actors is not political conquest, but the destruction of nation states as entities. For this reason, Robb predicts that it is the systems that are critical to globalization that will be the targets of these global guerrillas. He also hypothesizes that conventional state on state warfare has become obsolete because of the immense destructive power nuclear weapons and the increasingly inter-connected, trans-national economic systems. In keeping with the blog style very little of this is supported by detailed analysis or evidence, saving for sparse end-notes and a short reading list. But interested readers can find a preponderance of evidence that actually supports most of his arguments.

Of course keeping in the blog style of the book, it also contains serious omissions and errors. No where in the book does Robb, in any detail, discuss the other side of the concept of "Networks and Netwars", the doctrine of Network Centric Warfare. Nor does he mention a key enabler of Globalization, the Global Telecommunications Network, which is not a physical entity, but is a convenient way to refer to the phenomenon of worldwide inter-connectivity that has been created between independently, owned and operated telecommunication networks. It is this interconnectivity that makes the Internet possible, but the Internet is only one sub-system within a much larger structure. Rather annoyingly, Robb never actually provides the reader with definitions of such key elements of his discussion as `system' and `rule set' (from Barnett, "The Pentagon's New Map), although he assumes everyone knows what he means. However, in the end "Brave New War" is a worthwhile read whose many shortcomings are more than compensated for by its presentation of some first rate ideas.

This is one of the best books that I have read on how wars will be different in the future and how terrorist groups have evolved and will continue to evolve. His blog is, Global Guerillas, which is his basic term for terrorist networks. Warning: you will learn a lot.

True, he does make a lot of predictions and who knows if they will hold up over time? But it is pretty different from what else is being written out there and should provide you with interesting talking points. And if it makes you act, and get others on board, all the better in Robb's view.

His conclusions are pretty bleak: This era of Globalization where tons of open ended software (e.g. Linux, Wikipedia) have improved the quality of items and access to information also applies to terrorist groups too. They don't need to be big, in fact they are most effective in smaller groups (7-8 guys) or medium sized ones. If they get over 150 people, they usually suffer from internal fighting and split off anyway though, these loosely coordinated networks can pull off more on a geographic scale. We see this in Iraq, where there is not one big monolithic group fighting us, they are a patchwork of different groups with different motivations but with one important goal: make the state chaotic. He emphasizes the term of their fighting-style, called, Fourth Generation War. They have been using open-ended technology against our troops and Iraqi allies with deadly results. Just look at the evolution of the IED.

For Robb the sovereign state isn't going the way of the dinosaurs, but we will see most of the countries of the world become very decentralized in the future. For Robb in the USA, the Dept. of Homeland Security will be the first casualty. They cannot spend money to protect all areas as a city can or a group of concerned citizens can (look at the Minute men). Also Robb thinks the border fence with Mexico will be as effective as the Maginot Line was in WWII, but I would like to point out that the West Bank Barrier has been regarded as a success in Israel strategically . . . . but I guess not politically.

He uses history as his guide and talks about how Lawrence of Arabia's goal in WWI was not to destroy all of the Ottoman Turkish rail lines. If they did that, the Turks would have used other shipping routes and the troops who guarded the rails would be deployed somewhere closer to Lawrence's bases of support. In this Arab Revolt, they merely sought system disruption, delay things, cost the Turks money, but don't destroy it. Make them unable to wage war on a full-scale level. The same is happening in Iraq with attacks on oil pipelines and electricity grids. Interrupt; cost the new Iraqi gov't billions in lost oil revenue on a certain day or two, but don't stop it. Because that would result in total war, not to terrorists' advantage.

He believes the next attack in the US or Europe, etc. will be aimed at the power grid: electricity, oil, shipping ports, etc. to disrupt the supply. America already having a trade and federal budget deficit, how much longer could we cope with another disruption?

What solutions does Robb give? Security will be more decentralized with cities possibly relying on privatized security forces and more energy independent initiatives, like your neighbors being able to produce (and sell) their electricity. So, if my friends and I in Hoboken wanted to buy a condo, we could throw solar panels on a building. If it got big enough, we could create a generating station for the whole block and make some money. The block would have people volunteer to guard the station from vandals. That way our block would be immune from a systems disruption on a main target. He uses the example of the blackout in the Northeast in 2003, to emphasize that our energy can no longer be centralized. A terrorist could spend a mere thousand dollars and get back a payoff of a billion dollars (the estimated cost of that one day blackout to the economic life of the area).

A final interesting prediction Robb has is that by 2016, China will have big problems, not be the superpower that everybody expects. This is in his final section: "Globalization will end Globalization." He predicts that because pirates, drug cartels, mob groups are so profitable now and (in this free trade era) will only get more powerful, that eventually barriers (in forms of more regulated trade) will be erected by many governments and the Chinese with their growing economy and thirst for very expensive oil and trade will begin to crack. They will defragment as the provinces will begin to assert more control and China will "finally revert to its historical norm: fragmentation." (Could be good news for Tibet). . . .

Worthy reading and his bold predictions are worth it enough. However, he is not an optimist. He believes the way we are fighting this new war is wrong and unless we get up to the terrorists' intelligence levels, we will see systems disruption on a massive scale that can seriously threaten our economy more than what happened on 9/11.

If Robb is wrong, then this book will eventually fall out of print in the next ten years. If he is right, it will be out in many new editions and could become a manifesto on how to adapt to this changing world.

This sometimes engaging, often thought-provoking analysis of the post-9/11 era explains why the superpowers will never defeat Islamist terrorists through costly military campaigns. Not well constructed but well researched.

Brave New War is ultimately about tactics, not strategy. It is a book about what is and suggestions on trajectories without getting into the messy business of "Why" or anything resembling an analysis of cause and effect that might support, or the more likely, reject his trajectories. From his perspective, they just are, accept it.

If Brave New War was about strategy, then we would have read more about why bad things are happening and who supports the bad guys. But that's messy, would have made the book bigger, ultimately making for a more complex narrative. Brave New War is about how attacks happen with the "why" mostly only applied to target selection. Much of his recommendations and comments on defenses and vulnerabilities belie this point. To his defense, this tactical view conforms with his profession and training as a counter-terrorist. Counter-terrorism is largely reactive, and rarely proactive, addressing the roots of threats. Counter-terrorism in this sense, as Brave New War tells us, focuses on preventing the attack, not getting at the foundation of motive and support. It does not consider how networks behind the threats build thrive, they just exist and use technology to get better and reach out to one another. There is a difference.

When Robb does go into the Why, he, like William Lind and Martin van Creveld who he cites and builds upon, oversimplifies motivations and goals to the extent of ignoring fundamental realities. Not all groups he builds his case on seek to "hollow out" the state. These little details tell us how threats grow and expand and how to shut them down. The details show that in many, if not most, of Robb's cases it isn't an attempt to bring down the state or hollow it out, but by a variety of reasons that built up over time. The Why is messy business and he chooses to ignore the causes behind the guerrilla movement, leading to his own catastrophic superempowerment of groups in his examples.

Consider this: how effective is a counter-terrorism strategy that only attempts to match actions and not address root causes? BNW is strong is making the reader consider tactical responses but not strategic threats or effective countermeasures.

While the book is worth reading -- which is why I still give if four stars and not three -- it fails not only to see the forest from the trees, but it fails to look at what is happening at ground level, around the roots and in the soil. If we understand, or at least acknowledge, these details, victory may smile upon us as we start to understand the future of conflict and the impact of globalization. For the counterterrorist, this is a useful book. For a holistic view, it is at best interesting.

I've read the reviews and now read this book. Bottom line is a recommendation, especially for planners, policy makers, and those who don't understand how today's wars can not show success by capturing a hill, nor can security be assured through fences and borders.

I'd also recommend it to those that are quick to make comments about intelligence failures on adversarial attacks when tragedy strikes the U.S. or takes the lives of our soldiers or representatives overseas.

John Robb does a very effective job highlighting the challenges associated with today's conflicts and the complexities of adversarial social networks that require a shift of thinking to combat their disruptive attacks.

This is the perfect size book and writing style that can be a quick read for an update on our current threats, and the book is a great starting point to springboard new ideas to address human factor threats. For others it will be a good awakening to what can happen and likely ways that global structures can be attacked or disturbed. It will also illuminate how people raised in clan or tribe structures with different social / religious views must be regarded with a lens of understanding unique to each actor.

Words like terrorist, insurgent, etc. are nice buckets that we have made to categorize the acts of those lashing out (against whom or what is not so easy to always tell). Robb understands the very complex fabrics from which hostile actions can cause devastating effects from even the smallest acts of aggression precisely executed to those that shake our very core.

Well done!

When Robb writes on page 7 that interstate war is behind us and is 'obsolete', I put this book back on the shelf. Read a real strategic thinker like Colin Gray, who would say that Robb is guilty of "presentism", i.e., the way things are right now is the way things shall now be. Robb's ahistorical thinking is exactly how we shall get and have gotten ourselves in real trouble. Given that state actors are not exactly graduates of Harvard seminars, why does Robb think that nuclear weapons have ended the threat of war? He should have been wiser to predict that there shall be a nuclear war somewhere. Read Thucydides, John.
Better yet, log on to PARAMETERS magazine of the US Army War College. Glad I discovered it myself.

In am always surprised at some of the reviews people write. The one that points out "1. Guerrilla warfare is nothing new. The American colonies gained their independence thanks to guerrilla warfare tactics 225 years ago." This person must not have read the book I read. Robb understands this and he even refers to it but that is not his point. It has to do with how the strategy of guerrilla warfare has evolved and why it is so much more powerful today. If you want to understand the dangers we are facing you must read this book. Robb describe how the same developments that are transforming the business world are also transforming warfare. In the age of the interconnected systems, the Internet, and cell phones "small" is potent. And small is very hard to stop. After you read this book you will be even more disappointed with our main stream media. They do not understand our new enemies -- at all. But our enemies understand us and right now they are winning. This book is a step toward understanding this new world of warefare and how we must evolve to win. Read it and share it with your friends.

I'd read some glowing words for this book on one of my favorite blogs and was a bit disappointed when I finally sat down to read it. For one, it's very short. Worse still, the contents are repetitive. You need only read the first chapter (free online) to get at the heart of the thesis. The fundamental insights are useful and eye-opening but it reads more like an in-depth feature for the Atlantic or the Economist than a proper book.

John Robb's book is the most articulate and readable of a new generation of counter-terrorism thinkers. This group, the "systems-thinkers" have finally been able to claw their way past the cold-warriors, conventional warriors, and industrial-era thinkers to offer a cogent definition of the terrorism problem: Modern terrorists have transcended the organizational laws of the past several centuries and have chosen a strategy of "systems disruption" to leach vitality out of the nation states who stand in the way of their vision. The factors that have ushered in globalization have also ushered in global guerillas. This is not a new concept, but Robb has done an excellent job of articulating the tools and enablers that allow global guerrillas to be so effective. His copious use of examples and clear writing style make this book a quick read with a surprising amount of substance.

I give the book only 4 stars because his attempt at showing the way forward in the last 20-30 pages of the book are very promising but a bit thin. I hope to see more of his writing in the future and much more emphasis on his ideas for helping to manage (if it can be managed) the global terrorism problem. Still, this is the best attempt in many books to clarify the problem of modern terrorism.

This is the first real text on next generation warfare designed for the general population and it sets the bar high for following acts. It is smart, it is a short read, and it will change your thinking. It also embraces the new paradigm of authorship, in that Robb, by providing the logic for his thinking in the book and tracing new developments and specific examples online, is able to add value to both his paper and electronic streams. For the first time the leading war theorist is directly accessible to his customers. A sign of the times I suppose. Robb understands this and makes engaging in both print and web an incredible experience.

This is very important, because at its very core, the book is a catalyst, a conversation starter, a first but pivotal step in assessing and adapting paradigms. The burdens of security are increasingly being off-loaded onto the shoulders of the average individual and those around him. Robb wants us to understand and embrace this change. He understands that there will be as many different approaches to resiliency as there are groups involved, and so he offers us the basics, a platform, to do with what we will.

We would all do well to understand the logic and the framework John Robb offers in Brave New War, because our enemies have proven, without a doubt, that they do.

The author ignores three obvious facts on his way to perpetrating a grand hoax on the best-seller-reading public:

1. Guerrilla warfare is nothing new, for goodness' sake. The American colonies gained their independence thanks to guerrilla warfare tactics 225 years ago.
2. When empires attack weaker countries, the people will fight back. That was old news before the Roman legions learned it. What does this have to do with futurology, other than melodramatic hyperbole? The insurgents are not attacking the US, nor did "Al-Qaeda" carry out the Reichstag Big Lie attacks of 9/11.
3. Robb carelessly conflates terrorism with guerrilla warfare. The word terrorism originally meant state terror, as in the French reign of terror, and this remains the reality today. Pick up a good book on the 9/11 conspiracy and find out how modern terrorism is largely state-sponsored false-flag terror - that is, violence against civilians.
Guerrilla warfare is the reverse of terrorism: it is the defensive struggle of civilians against the terrible weaponry of aggressive state armies.

Brave New War should have been the title of a book about the Bush administration's push for endless war, under an Orwellian web of lies against its own people and the innocent victims of the Middle East.

5 STARS OF FIVE ! WOW!!! THIS DECEPTIVELY SIMPLE BOOK CONTAINS DYNAMTE !!!! THIS BOOK IS A "MUST READ AND UNDERSTAND" FOR EVERY DECISIONMAKER INVOLVED IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM !!!!!

AUTHOR JOHN ROBB COOLY AND DIPASSIONATELY HAS LAID OUT HOW A SMALL, BUT DETERMINED ENEMY WITH PROPER MEANS CAN BRING THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF OUR OWN TECHNOLOGY DOWN UPON US AND IN SO DOING, DESTROY, IN SHORT ORDER, THOUSANDS OF YEARS OF CIVILIZATION. HAVE NO DOUBT. THAT ENEMY IS HERE TODAY !

Harvey J. Adkins
Commander, Medical Service Corps, United States Navy, Retired

Since the end of World War II, the world's population has nearly tripled, the Internet has allowed anybody to network with everybody, nuclear weapons have made conventional war obsolete among major powers, and the fall of the Soviet Union has unleashed a witches' brew of armed non-state groups - global guerrillas - that operate in the cracks of the disintegrating state system.

This is just the static picture; the dynamics are even scarier. Global guerrillas practice something Robb calls "open source warfare," which means that in the modern environment, people even on different continents can form or join groups, train, and carry out operations much more quickly than in the past or than the major legacy states can today. As the groups learn from each other (and a sort of Darwinism selects out the unfit), a larger pattern forms, an "emergent intelligence," similar to a marauding colony of army ants, no one of which is very sophisticated, but operating together according to simple rules, they are survivable, adaptable, and in a suitable environment, invincible.

As Robb summarizes it:

... the behavior of these insurgencies as a whole seems to learn, achieve goals, and engage in self-preservation, despite the vast differences in how individual groups are organized. (p. 126)

One could dismiss all of this as speculation except for a couple of facts:

* Much of the software industry and a lot of the Internet (e.g., the Wikipedia) operate using the open source model today
* Nothing else seems to explain the success of the people attacking our forces in Iraq

To construct this model, Robb employs a number of concepts that may be new to people unfamiliar with modern systems theory: close-coupled systems, self-organization, emergent properties (particularly "intelligence"), stigmergy, and the concept of complexity arising from simple processes. He also introduces new tools for understanding how systems work in the modern world: open source insurgency, global virtual states, superempowerment, systempunkts, and "black swans."

These are all powerful ideas and not in the least theoretical as Robb illustrates with events from the evening news. Whether you agree with Robb's end position or his solutions, these are concepts that are needed to describe why today's world is different from that of the Cold War.

As the framework for his solution, Robb proposes a modern version of survivalism. We won't all be holed up in cabins in the woods, a la the Unabomber. But if we are living in a world that is "tightly coupled," where a glitch in the power system in Ohio can cascade into a massive outage involving 50,000,000 people along the entire East Coast, then the solution must involve some loosening.

Robb's general strategy is to improve resilience by any means possible. I could imagine, for example, that instead of building new power plants that, along with their distribution systems, are vulnerable to disruption, the government provides market incentives to improve resilience. The government could increase subsidies to utilities and require all of them to buy electricity from homeowners during the day and sell it at reduced rates at night. As more people add power generation capability to their houses - solar, wind, geothermal, hydroelectric, whatever - resilience improves. This may not be the most efficient solution, but in the age of open source insurgency, too much efficiency can be dangerous.

Robb makes a compelling case that this model will also work for national security. It is certainly working very well for the groups we are fighting.

Whether you agree with his particular solutions is not important. However, the pieces of the problem are real and we are going to have to create ways to deal with open source conflict - an intelligence that emerges through the dynamic interaction of religious fanatics, street gangs, criminal cartels, and at times even other states - or face a series of disruptions that will severely degrade our quality of life.

I'm giving 'Brave New War' five stars not because it's engaging and fascinating (which it is), but because it's an important book. The media rarely addresses the dramatic changes now underway in military conflict with anything deeper than good-versus-evil jingoism. But here, Robb explores the drivers that are reshaping global warfare and the decentralized networks (digital and physical) that make this possible. The author provides an entirely new toolset for understanding why the world is changing and why familiar solutions no longer work.

This book does not pull its punches. Some may be upset by its matter-of-fact presentation of guerrilla strategies, but it is precisely this type of honest analysis that's needed if we're going to build a sustainable civilization. If you live in the modern world, then you need to read this book. If you are in command of an army, then you especially need to read this book.

Brave New War by John Robb is a book that was really written for two audiences.

The first is the relatively small number of specialists in military affairs, serious students of geopolitics and bloggers who are already avid readers of Robb's Global Guerillas site. For them, Brave New War is a systematic and footnoted exposition of the theories of conflict and "dangerous ideas" that Robb discusses daily on his blog. They will be entertained and challenged by the same analysis that makes them return again and again to Global Guerillas to debate John Robb and one another.

The second audience is composed of everyone else. Brave New War is simply going to blow them away.

Brave New War is a tightly written, fast-paced work on the emergent nature of warfare, conflict global society with a decidedly dystopian take. In a mixture of original ideas and synthesis of the works of other cutting edge "thought leaders", Robb, a platform designer and former mission commander for USAF Counterterrorism operations, draws analogies from the tech world to explain changes in warfare in the age of globalization. Calling the Iraq War " the modern equivalent of the Spanish Civil War" Robb highlights a robust number of critical concepts in Brave New War that are, in his view, altering international and subnational conflict, including:

Bazaar of Violence
Black Swans
Brittle Security
Dynamc Decentralized Resilience
Emergent Intelligence
Fourth Generation Warfare
Guerilla Entrepreneurs
Global Guerillas
Market-States
Minimalist Platforms
Open-Source Warfare
Plausible Promises
Primary Loyalties
Stigmergic Systems
Superempowered Groups
Systempunkt
The Long Tail of Warfare
Urban Takedowns

Some of these concepts are Robb's, some belong to others and in Brave New War you will find citations for figures as diverse as William Lind, Chris Anderson, Nicholas Nassim Taleb, Valdis Krebs, Eric S. Raymond, Thomas P.M. Barnett, Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, Philip Bobbitt, Moises Naim and David A. Deptula. One of the great strengths of Brave New War is Robb's capacity as an analyst and theorist to apply the revelations of research into network theory to warfare, and to conceptualize armed political conflict within the framework of platforms and ecosystems. This gives Robb's arguments a degree of horizontal "interconnectedness" seldom seen in works on military affairs ( except, as Robb himself points out, in the work of his frequent online sparring partner, Thomas Barnett).

Robb is betting heavily on increasing levels of global instability and systemic breakdown as "feedback" from global guerillas overloads "the system" and disrupts globalization. It is this orientation toward discerning the worst-case scenarios and descent into entropy that will raise hackles amongst some readers, though Robb ultimately predicts a strengthening of systemic resilience and a burst of innovation as a result of these tribulations.

Brave New War is the must read book of 2007.

For anyone involved in strategic planning, security, financial markets, energy infrastructure, scenario planning, transportation or communications networking, this book is a must-read. For those of us who follow his work at the GlobalGuerrillas blog, much of the information is familiar, but presented here in book form, the many strands of thought that make up the concept come together effectively.

In short, modern communications technology and complex infrastructure make it much easier for small groups to "hollow out" a state. These groups usually don't want to take over a government, they just want to make the state weak so they can get on with their goals of smuggling, ethnic violence, or other profitable criminal activies. This ability to leverage violence and the inability of most to understand the goals of these groups will loom large in policy circles in the future.

This is the kind of book that sparks a lot of further reading and research, in my opinion. Mr. Robb is taking concepts from war, commerce and communications and making a useful model from them. This concept will be useful for families, corporations and countries.

If you want to understand the concepts that will define debate about war, insurgency, globalization and society in the coming decades, buy a copy of this book. If you are low on cash, skip a few lunches and save up the money. It is worth it.