Frankly, I was disappointed in the depth of insight and reflection offered in this book. This little volume is essentially a recapitulation of a narrow and shallow view of Constitutional Law and exegesis of the US Constitution that lacks a unifying logic or point of view that underlies it. And, I found him disingenuous in that he adopts a literalist position while knowing full well that no such position is possible in reading documents more complex and abstract than simple assembly instructions. His responses to the criticisms of Dworkin, Glendon, Tribe and Wood were frequently glib and self-indulgent, even self-congratulatory. Contrast this work with Justice Breyer's Active Liberty.

My favorite part of the book is when Scalia criticizes those who bash textualism for being formalistic. "Of course, it's formalistic! Law is formalistic!," he claims.

Beyond that, the book is more or less dull precisely because Scalia did not provide any satisfying answer to any of the non-originalist criticisms.
One of the core criticisms raised against Scalia is that originalist interpretation can be, too, and often is, a subjective view of an individual judge. It's just a matter of how you, as a judge, support your decision and originalist judges tend to stick by their textual interpretation as a way of doing that. But how, one might ask, do you prove that the text is saying what you believe it is saying? Some say we should rely on legislative or framers' intent. But that doesn't solve the problem either, because there has to be an interpretation of the intent, and there you see another layer of subjectivity involved.

I hope someday Scalia, or any other originalist for that matter, can clearly answer the criticism so that we all can move on to the next stage. But this book is not doing that.

This is an excellent book that provides valuable insight into understanding the modern controversy and problem of construing the American Constitution. Unique in that Justice Scalia graciously provides his theory first. He is then rebutted in different ways by university scholars in very varied manner. Each rebuttal is quite unique and interesting in its own right. Fascinating in that Scalia also provides responses to each rebuttal at the end of the book.

The format is very educational and enlightening and it's remarkable that a sitting Justice of the Supreme Court would provide such candid and unapologetic theory of interpretation, knowing that his views would face challenging if not scathing attack by some very important scholars on the topic.

The only thing that would have made this book more interesting is a discussion, or forward describing just how this process of argument, response and rebuttal was organized. Just how did these authors get together to create such an honest discussion of what are, in some cases, very polar views on the issue of interpretation. That's why I gave it four stars. But I loved it.

I would caution that some of the writing is technical both legally and philosophically. Legally in that some discussion referring to the doctrine of incorporation seem to be assumed understood. Philosophically in that Dworkin's discussion of "meaning" and "intention" could be daunting though I think he does a beautiful job of simplifying and clarifying what are often considered some of the most complex philosophical issues of the 20th Century.

Very well done. Very appreciated work. I was fascinated and thoroughly enjoyed the format of argument, counterargument and response.

First of all, let me make it clear that I think Scalia is a brilliant Justice. I have a very high level of respect for him intellectually. However, I think that he is too conservative, as is this book. I still think people should read it, because I advocate hearing all sides of an argument, but I thoroughley disagree with Scalia's opinions.

Be that as it may, everyone should sill read this insightful and interesting book, if for no other reason than the debate that takes place at the end of the book.

I think the largest challenge facing Scalia was turning his simple philosophy into an entire book.

When interpreting the constitution we should look at its original meaning.

There it is in 11 words. Scalia manages to expound on his theory a little bit by differentiating it from strict textualism and reinforcing his views here and there. Scalia allows several scholars to give their replies followed by Scalia's rebuttals. This back-and-forth provides an engaging read and expands the simple premise into a full-length, comprehensive read. All in all I enjoyed this book.

I feel compelled to warn potential readers that from time to time this book will sink into the worst of academia. That pseudo-intellectual, acting smart for the sake of sounding smart mentality that plagues universities across the country. These lapses are usually brief and do not greatly detract from what is otherwise a great book on an important debate currently occuring within the highest court in America.

I also recommend you read Active Liberty by Justice Breyer. I have nothing against Tribe, Dworkin or the other respondents in this book, but Breyer takes the discussion out of originalism and into his own philosophy.

I actually picked this up at the end of my second year of law school and I found Scalia's insight and opinions to be original and thought provoking. I feel that so much time is spent teaching law students how to analyze and interpret case law, without often directing our attention to how judges deal with the vast field of statutory interpretation. Very easy and quick read, hope you enjoy it as much as I did.

This book was not exactly what I expected; it was better. It contains an essay by Justice Scalia about the judicial role in deciding statutory and constitutional questions. His essay is followed by comments by other individuals which, in turn, is followed by Justice Scalia's response. The most fascinating part of the entire book was the recognition by the writers that judges have taken it upon themselves to legislate and decide what government policy "ought to be" in rendering judicial decisions. Some of the writers seem to think this is acceptable and expected. To an attorney who has watched courts reach intellectually dishonest decisions in cases where there is potential economic or political impact (for example, one appellate court went so far as to render an unpublished opinion in one case -- apparently to conceal its dishonesty in letting a state divert millions of dollars from a state retirement plan -- then followed up a few months later with a published opinion by the same judges with a precisely opposite holding on an important legal question decided in the first case), the concerns expressed by Justice Scalia were more than theoretical. While our legislators may not be the sharpest knives in the drawer, at least voters can remove them from office or persuade them to change their minds. There is no such opportunity with unelected judges who not only can manipulate facts and law in their rulings, but can issue decisions that never see the light of day and thus escape public scrutiny. Both liberals and conservatives have plenty to fear from judges who believe that they are a law unto themsleves.

Justice Antonin Scalia may be the most dynamic and melodramatic personality on the United States Supreme Court. His opinions burst with bombast. Oddly, Scalia has written very little about the law even though he served as a law professor before launching a career as a government attorney and judge. He has penned only a handful of law review articles. The articles are slightly more illuminating on his theory of jurisprudence, textualism, than is this thin book, "A Matter of Interpretation."

"A Matter of Interpretation" is filled up with a round table dialogue that Scalia graciously initiated to invite notable liberals to disagree with textualism.

In the brief paragraphs that Scalia allocates to himself, he sets out his principles of textualism, which is a combination of Latin parsing and historical analysis. In short, Scalia looks for a constitutional meaning in the actual words of the constitution, and if he cannot find a meaning in the set text, he embarks on an historical investigation of whether the rule or right existed in English common law at the time of the writing of the U.S. Constitution.

Scalia's textualism, therefore, is a good deal more involved than mere glancing at words written in the late 18th century. In fact, Scalia protests that he is not a "strict constructionist," not a justice who merely looks blindly at James Madison's handiwork. Scalia claims that he does not read the Constitution strictly, but rather he reads the Constitution reasonably.

This will no doubt come as a shock to a generation of law professors, law students, and attorneys, who have maintained that Scalia is a rigid strict constructionist. This revelation may also undermine Scalia's reputation as a writer of court opinions and dissents that are always consistently and impressively logical.

It may also come as a shock that Scalia, the titan of tradition, partly bases his textualist theory on the ideas of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the man who insisted that law changes with the times, or reflects "the felt necessities of the time."

The weakness in Scalia's historical origins method is that more importance is placed on English common law than revolutionary American experience. A reason perhaps that Scalia is a staunch defender of free speech, long a principle of English law, and lacks sympathy for search and seizure defendants, persons caught up in the Fourth Amendment right, a right inspired by the searching of Boston homes by British troops during the Revolutionary War.

Scalia's textualism, as set out in this book, is a good deal more flexible than many of his disciples or opponents would give him credit for. Scalia tends to apply this "historical "orgins" method most often in areas such as punitive damages, an area of law which has scarcely changed in centuries. However, in cases where the issue implicates modern rights, such as abortion, Scalia has departed from textualism completely for rationales ranging from stare decisis and reliance to a more or less nihilistic rejection of substantive due process.

Nevertheless, "A Matter of Interpretation" places Scalia in the pantheon of legal scholars, such as Holmes and Judge Richard A. Posner, who have bravely put forward their own theories of jurisprudence. And in the end, this theory, rather than his bombastic rhetoric and conservative prosyletizing, will probably be his enduring legacy.

[Hansen Alexander is an attorney in New York City. His most recent book is the comic novel, "The Death of Chauvinism."]

Justice Antonin Scalia may be the most dynamic and melodramatic personality on the United States Supreme Court. His opinions burst with bombast. Oddly, Scalia has written very little about the law even though he served as a law professor before launching a career as a government attorney and judge. He has penned only a handful of law review articles. The articles are slightly more illuminating on his theory of jurisprudence, textualism, than is this thin book, "A Matter of Interpretation."

"A Matter of Interpretation" is filled up with a round table dialogue that Scalia graciously initiated to invite notable liberals to disagree with textualism.

In the brief paragraphs that Scalia allocates to himself, he sets out his principles of textualism, which is a combination of Latin parsing and historical analysis. In short, Scalia looks for a constitutional meaning in the actual words of the constitution, and if he cannot find a meaning in the set text, he embarks on an historical investigation of whether the rule or right existed in English common law at the time of the writing of the U.S. Constitution.

Scalia's textualism, therefore, is a good deal more involved than mere glancing at words written in the late 18th century. In fact, Scalia protests that he is not a "strict constructionist," not a justice who merely looks blindly at James Madison's handiwork. Scalia claims that he does not read the Constitution strictly, but rather he reads the Constitution reasonably.

This will no doubt come as a shock to a generation of law professors, law students, and attorneys, who have maintained that Scalia is a rigid strict constructionist. This revelation may also undermine Scalia's reputation as a writer of court opinions and dissents that are always consistently and impressively logical.

It may also come as a shock that Scalia, the titan of tradition, partly bases his textualist theory on the ideas of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the man who insisted that law changes with the times, or reflects "the felt necessities of the time."

The weakness in Scalia's historical origins method is that more importance is placed on English common law than revolutionary American experience. A reason perhaps that Scalia is a staunch defender of free speech, long a principle of English law, and lacks sympathy for search and seizure defendants, persons caught up in the Fourth Amendment right, a right inspired by the searching of Boston homes by British troops during the Revolutionary War.

Scalia's textualism, as set out in this book, is a good deal more flexible than many of his disciples or opponents would give him credit for. Scalia tends to apply this "historical "orgins" method most often in areas such as punitive damages, an area of law which has scarcely changed in centuries. However, in cases where the issue implicates modern rights, such as abortion, Scalia has departed from textualism completely for rationales ranging from stare decisis and reliance to a more or less nihilistic rejection of substantive due process.

Nevertheless, "A Matter of Interpretation" places Scalia in the pantheon of legal scholars, such as Holmes and Judge Richard A. Posner, who have bravely put forward their own theories of jurisprudence. And in the end, this theory, rather than his bombastic rhetoric and conservative prosyletizing, will probably be his enduring legacy.

[Hansen Alexander is an attorney in New York City. His most recent book is the novel, "From West Point to Watergate."]

Justice Antonin Scalia may be the most dynamic and melodramatic personality on the United States Supreme Court. His opinions burst with bombast. Oddly, Scalia has written very little about the law even though he served as a law professor before launching a career as a government attorney and judge. He has penned only a handful of law review articles. The articles are slightly more illuminating on his theory of jurisprudence, textualism, than is this thin book, "A Matter of Interpretation."

"A Matter of Interpretation" is filled up with a round table dialogue that Scalia graciously initiated to invite notable liberals to disagree with textualism. In the brief paragraphs that Scalia allocates to himself, he sets out his principles of textualism, which is a combination of Latin parsing and historical analysis. In short, Scalia looks for a constitutional meaning in the actual words of the constitution, and if he cannot find a meaning in the set text, he embarks on an historical investigation of whether the rule or right existed in English common law at the time of the writing of the U.S. Constitution.

Scalia's textualism, therefore, is a good deal more involved than mere glancing at words written in the late 18th century. In fact, Scalia protests that he is not an originalist, not a justice who merely looks blindly at James Madison's handiwork.

The weakness in this method, of course, is that more importance is placed on English common law than revolutionary American experience. A reason perhaps that Scalia is a staunch defender of free speech, long a principle of English law, and lacks sympathy for search and seizure defendants, persons caught up in the Fourth Amendment right, a right inspired by the searching of Boston homes by British troops during the Revolutionary War.

Scalia's textualism, as set out in this book, is a good deal more flexible than many of his disciples or opponents would give him credit for. Scalia tends to strictly apply this "historical "orgins" method in areas such as punitive damages, an area of law which has scarcely changed in centuries. However, in cases where the issue implicates modern rights, such as abortion, Scalia has departed from textualism completely for rationales ranging from stare decisis and reliance to a more or less nihilistic rejection of substantive due process.

Nevertheless, "A Matter of Interpretation" places Scalia in the pantheon of legal scholars who have bravely put forward their own theories of jurisprudence. And in the end, this theory, rather than his bombastic rhetoric and conservative prosyletizing, will probably be his enduring legacy.

I think that it is good to read widely and get divergent perspectives. Thus, Christians and Jews should read the Quran and Muslims should read the Torah and the New Testament. Conservatives should read the Nation or the New Republic and visit the DailyKos website and liberals should read the Weekly Standard or National Review and visit RealClearPolitics. The same perspective applies with Breyer's book. Regardless of your perspective, you should read this brief and easily understandable statement of judicial philosophy from a sitting Supreme Court justice. (And, it would also be good to read the counterpoint from Justice Breyer for the same reasons.)

I find this book to be a more interesting and powerful presentation than the recent book by Justice Breyer. In Breyer's book we read just his perspective and much of it is a response to this book by Scalia. In Scalia's book we are given Scalia's approach to judging and then we are given critical responses to that approach by several different authors, not all judges themselves. It is clear that Scalia likes the clash of argument and finds great benefit in that clash.

This book is brief and extremely well written so that even someone untrained in law can still easily follow the arguments and counterarguments. Anyone interested in our Supreme Court would find this book (and Breyer's) to be extremely useful and enlightening.

For myself, I found that reading both books left me believing that while both Justices approach the world in different ways, we are in good hands. Given the incredibly politicization of the Supreme Court, I found these books to be reassuring of the intelligence, character, and skill of these two Justices.

Even after trying to put to one side whatever opinion one has of Justice Scalia as a judge - something that, for example, the WSJ reviewer plainly couldn't manage, rating or reviewing this book poses (at least) two difficulties:

- the first is that, regardless of the merits - see below - of Justice Scalia's text, he has nonetheless had the decency (or hubris) to seek and publish critical reviews from Ronald Dworkin and Laurence Tribe, notwithstanding that both could be expected to (and do) reject Scalia's assertions. This, in itself, redeems the book to some degree - while many, if not all, Scalia fans may skip these sections, it has to be accepted that he has provided a forum for meaningful discussion of his asserted judicial approach.

- the second and less equivocal point is that the text itself is most use as an exercise in legal pathology, on at least two levels. First, and as Tribe and Dworkin demonstrate, Scalia's originalism is intellectually incoherent and anything but the value-free transparent methodology that he claims it to be. Second, the prominence of Scalia as a Federalist Society icon and, according to President Bush, a model member of the Supreme Court demonstrates the clear conviction that dubious judicial method is irrelevant provided that one agrees with the ideology espoused. This is not to say that Scalia is invariably ideologically motivated - see, for example, his dissent in -Hamdi- but that he is often influenced by ideology yet denies it.

In brief, it's worth buying for the critique and that's about it.

Great read. Scalia exposes the deceptive means by which activist judges often cloak their misdeeds, relying upon supposed rules of construction or plumbing the legislative record in a feigned effort to discern the "intent" of the legislature, when in reality the courts are often using these interpretive tools to "sanctify" judicial mischief, that is to say, conceal their true purpose of reaching their preferred result. At times providing historical examples, he leaves the activists naked and embarrassed. Come take a peak.

Enjoyed the clear writing of Scalia and his honest approach to statutory interpretation. Book is organized as a series of essays by experts in a variety of disciplines. They respond to Scalia's opening articulation of proper interpretive philosophy. A couple of the responding essays are not clearly written and require one to wade through them. Overall, however, this is a wonderful examination of the traditional theory of constitutional interpretation that has fallen into the minority over the last fifty years.

In this lively debate between conervative "originalist" Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia and several other scholars who generally take a less frozen-in-time approach to interpreting the Constitution, Scalia comes across as the liveliest and most entertaining participant. But for my money, Scalia simply cannot answer Professor Dworkin's critique that the founders and ratifiers of the Constitution--18th Century Renaissance Men one and all--could not possibly have intended that the broad principles they laid down should be forever interpreted only as they themselves would have done at the close of the 18th century. Instead, it is far more reasonable to infer that the intent of the founders would have been for subsequent generations to apply the broad principles they established in the historical and cultural context of the present.

This is a very straightforward look at the Federal constitution, that does not overwhelm you with legalese but gives you just enough to understand the thinking behind that important Federal document. The examples and illustrations are practical - you can use and relate to them.

There is a great deal to be said for textualism. However, the reality of law-making has been, and is likely to continue to be, that law-makers compromise. The compromises are often reflected in ambiguity or obscurantism that is intentional. Note the key word, "often." So when it can be used, textualism is a good thing.

And one can argue (as I often do) that what we need is a return to a strict interpretation of the constitution. But, of course, that is neither a panacea nor a clear command. The founding fathers were themselves of diverse views as to how things ought to proceed. Consequently, there was compromise (do you suppose politics had been invented, way back then?). The predictable result is that all the research in the world will not lead to a single, unambiguous outcome for all matters.

Imagine the uproar if the SCt decides to go back to a strict interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Clause. The Drug Enforcement Administration will instantly be out of business because there is no plausible link between illicit drugs and interstate commerce. Or intrastate commerce, for that matter. But would Scalia vote to put the DEA out of business? He didn't last term, even though Thomas did.

And that leads to the major hidden flaw in this book. The reader is invited to assume Scalia has and will vote as he writes. He doesn't unless it fits with his own personal philosophy. The man has the intellectual honesty of a jackal, which is to say none whatsoever. My remark is, of course, based on having read most, but not all his opinions, and having a rather decent background in legal & constitutional scholarship.

Don't construe my low opinion for Scalia as a high opinion for the Warren court. Douglas was as intellectually dishonest as Scalia, and maybe a bit trickier. No, my preference is for judicial conservativism. John Paul Stevens is the purist of the last 50 years, perhaps longer. I have never read an opinion of his in which I could honestly say that logic and precedent could not reasonably lead to his conclusion. I may construe some of the precedents differently, but JPS has never in my reading made any outlandish interpretations of precedent. And, without exception, if you accept his interpretation, the logic of the law leads to his conclusion. That, Diogenes, is an honest man.

This book presents the readers with a clear and persuasive view on the foundations and principles that guide one of the greatest legal minds of America. At a time when "judicial activism" is said to be a problem in today's judiciary, Scalia's thoughts on constitutional law display the meaning and method of faithfully interpreting the Constitution and not legislating from the bench. He makes it clear, in an American democracy of checks and balances which separates the legislative from the judicial branch, that it is the job of a judge not to impose his or her personal ideologies and beliefs into interpretations of constitutional law thereby risk shaping and gradually transforming a law into what it is not supposed to be but to consider and utilize the original meaning of a law in any interpretation therefore mainintaing the primary and original function and purpose of that law.

Though a favorite to conservatives, Scalia's intellect and wisdom command respect from people on both sides of the political spectrum. His devotion to faithfully interpreting the law and leaving out any personal bias or prejudice has led him to siding with what have sometimes been considered liberal Supreme Court decisions. For example, in the 1989 Texas v. Johnson decision which ruled that flag burning was protected under the First Amendment rights of free speech, Scalia sided with the majority. Though he still holds the opinion that flag burning is a right protected by the Constitution, Scalia has often expressed his discomfort of having had to vote for the majority. He said that though he would have liked to put the defendent, Johnson, in jail, because of what the First Amendment promises, regardless of his personal opinions and ideologies, he had to side with the majority establishing the right to burn a flag. This is a perfect example of Scalia's interpreting the Constitution faithfully and strictly without allowing personal bias and views to distort an interpretation of the law.

This book is a must-read for scholars and students of the American jurisprudence as well as for those who seek to learn more about a leading voice of the most powerful court in the nation.

A no nonsense text, he got across his philosphy and ideas.
Without ponding it into your skull. A very skillful and articulate justice. This was on my reading list for law school.

I loved the format of the book! Scalia presents his judicial interpretative process, and honestly admits hypocrisy when he occasionally votes ideology rather than using his system. Then, rather than providing a half-hearted attack on his ideological opponents, he invites them to respond to his thesis, each with their own chapter!

You may not agree with Scalia, but you can't doubt his moral courage based on his invitation for criticism in his own book.

I also appreciated the chapter on the structure of Germany's Constitution to help us understand why principle, rather than statue, plays such a big role in American judicial interpretative processes.

Everyone that cares about the Supreme Court should read this book. I have yet to find a better book to learn the motivations and processes utilized by each ideological camp. After reading this book, my ability to understand the logic of the court, for both rulings and the opinions, has been greatly enhanced.

While unintended, Scalia also helped cement my personal belief that a blend of original meaning (aka textualism) and abstract principalism, and not Scalia's textualist approach alone, is by far the optimal method for judicial interpretation based on our Constitution.

I'd like to mention, first of all, what this book it not. It is not for the casual observer of the American judicial system. Justice Scalia gives a probing examination of various methods used in Constitutional and judicial interpretation. If the reader is not consumed with learning law, or delineating the intent of the Constitution, this book will probably be a major disappointment.

On the other hand, if you have a solid foundation of knowledge on the judiciary and the U.S. Constitution, you will enjoy this book and will learn a great deal of what Justice Scalia has to offer. Scalia offers up a 50 page paper on the various methods of judicial interpretation, each methods strengths and weaknesses, and the how and why of whether or not each method is viable.

Scalia's paper is then cross-examined by Ronald Dworkin, Mary Ann Glendon, Amy Gutmann, Lawrence Tribe and Gordon Wood. Scalia then offers up his rebuttal and I believe, strengthens his theories of judicial interpretation. I am not going to go into my own how's and why's, as I am a fan of Scalia's and would rather allow the reader to reach their own conclusions.

Whether you like this book, or hate it, one thing is for certain, you will come away with a much better knowledge of the U.S. judicial system, how it reaches some of its conclusions, and what the consequences of continuing with current methods of judicial interpretation will be on our country.

Monty Rainey
www.juntosociety.com

Antonin Scalia might be best described as a conservative American. Conservatism often means not taking the "far-out-there" approach to life.

Although his section of the book is rather short, it is a bit difficult to follow for those of us who are not lawyers. Nevertheless, it is an excellent view into his thinking process. It details the reasons for not siding with contemporary liberal thinking, believing that the U.S. Constitution should be interpreted literally (in most cases).

I read the book a few pages at a time, absorbed what I read, and read more the next day. Frequently, during the responses to his writings by other prominent lawyers, I found myself going back and re-reading parts of his writings again. To complete the book and understand it I probably read the entire book several times - back and forth between the writers.

Whatever your political leanings, it is an insight into why one Supreme Court Justice votes the way he does.

I wish all the Justices would write a similar book so we could understand their viewpoints.

Adroitly Justice Scalia shows how judicial interpretation follows no known set of principles or constraints. Without a useful set of rules, the judicial branch has usurped the powers delegated to the legislative and executive branches. Instead, the judicial branch continues its common law tradition of making law for the King. Unfortunately, this practice pre-dates democratic government.

The term "interpretation" now includes the raw law making and law setting-aside power that has ripped the fundamental freedom of self governance. Have you ever wondered, when you've read a recent Supreme Court ruling about the latest, newly-unconstitutional law, that the attendant ruling makes no reference to any specific part of the Constitution? Instead, Justices refer to their previously-declared law on that or even another subject. In effect, courts have "interpreted" new law, then used that interpretation or some arbitrary re-interpretation to make whatever decision they think is best. This has led to the bold ignoring of the written law in favor of what judges (and their attendant activists) believe "should" be the law.

In this 50-page main article, Scalia lances a splinter in the eye of the "living Constitution" people. Don't get it, yet? Well, Scalia will be happy to jam a 2x4 piece of lumber in that same eye - his footnoting is right on point. In contrast, the critiques by famous (and liberal) Harvard law professors and other attendants pale in comparison. I suspect that is why the good Justice agreed to write the book in this manner. The Harvard types furnish only silly words-without-meaning to support their claims of a "living Constitution". The contrast is spectacular and enlightening.