Tushnet knows his subject, The Supreme Court, extremely well. No doubt about that. I did not like the way the book was put together and found it hard to follow what Tushnet's ideas were that he was trying to get across. Although he's very knowledgeable , I don't think this is a book that adds a lot of value or knowledge to the subject: specifically the Renquist Court. I think many other books on the court and individual essays on it's members would be better and more easily accessible to the layman.

This book deals with the Rehnquist Court up until sometime before the Presidential Election of 2004. The extraordinary stretch of incumbent justices (no changes since Breyer's confirmation in 1994) was still in progress, although we know now that it would not last for much longer. The author introduces all of what were then the nine justices, but some such as Thomas and Scalia definitely get more attention than others. Roughly the first half of the book deals in some way with the personalities of the justices; how their judicial temperaments and their politics have been shaped by their life experiences. The second half of the book concerns broad issues such as takings, federalism, and affirmative action. I found this second half a bit challenging to read, as it departed from the interactions of the justices and dealt with the abstractions of legal strategies and tactics and then the kind of manuevering through Constitutional Law that the justices do to validate their opinions. Still, it provides an introduction, though a bit burdensome, to the use of different kinds of "scutiny", "compelling interests" and balancing tests, and such concepts as "substantive due process."



The author views the Rehnquist Court as basically a political struggle between the conservative Republicans (Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas) and the traditional Republicans (O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy) with the more liberal members (Ginsburg, Stevens, and Breyer) more or less on the sidelines. The traditional Republicans have been especially pivotal in holding the line on social issues, particularly on abortion. And, on the whole they have managed to steer the Court not very far from the precedents set by the New Deal and the Warren Court.



One of the major underlying topics is the question of interpreting the Constitution according to its original literal sense. In this regard, the author states that Clarence Thomas is the leader of the conservative cause, the most relentless of those rejecting a changing Constitution for changing times. This independence goes against the grain of public perception, which tends to see Scalia as the conservative leader after whose forcefulness Thomas follows. But Scalia is more likely to bend to precedence. As an example, Thomas would more readily change such New Deal government regulations that deal with agriculture and manufacturing because he believes that they cannot be regulated as interstate commerce.



A characteristic of the conservative trend on the Court concerns the adherence to rules and the authority of text. It makes an outsider or a layman wonder a little bit about what happened to any passion for justice. Certainly, the United States is a nation of laws not of men, and the insistence on rules or laws is not such a bad thing. But when does insistence upon the letter of the law work at the expense of justice? Would the literalists ever have done anything to change the system of segregation? One wonders. The author points out that Rehnquist made it a practice to reduce the number of cases reviewed, thereby reducing the concern of the Court for remedying injustices resulting from lower courts.

This book deals with the Rehnquist Court up until sometime before the Presidential Election of 2004. The extraordinary stretch of incumbent justices (no changes since Breyer's confirmation in 1994) was still in progress, although we know now that it would not last for much longer. The author introduces all of what were then the nine justices, but some such as Thomas and Scalia definitely get more attention than others. Roughly the first half of the book deals in some way with the personalities of the justices; how their judicial temperaments and their politics have been shaped by their life experiences. The second half of the book concerns broad issues such as takings, federalism, and affirmative action. I found this second half a bit challenging to read, as it departed from the interactions of the justices and dealt with the abstractions of legal strategies and tactics and then the kind of manuevering through Constitutional Law that the justices do to validate their opinions. Still, it provides an introduction, though a bit burdensome, to the use of different kinds of "scutiny", "compelling interests" and balancing tests, and such concepts as "substantive due process."

The author views the Rehnquist Court as basically a political struggle between the conservative Republicans (Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas) and the traditional Republicans (O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy) with the more liberal members (Ginsburg, Stevens, and Breyer) more or less on the sidelines. The traditional Republicans have been especially pivotal in holding the line on social issues, particularly on abortion. And, on the whole they have managed to steer the Court not very far from the precedents set by the New Deal and the Warren Court.

One of the major underlying topics is the question of interpreting the Constitution according to its original literal sense. In this regard, the author states that Clarence Thomas is the leader of the conservative cause, the most relentless of those rejecting a changing Constitution for changing times. This independence goes against the grain of public perception, which tends to see Scalia as the conservative leader after whose forcefulness Thomas follows. But Scalia is more likely to bend to precedence. As an example, Thomas would more readily change such New Deal government regulations that deal with agriculture and manufacturing because he believes that they cannot be regulated as interstate commerce.

A characteristic of the conservative trend on the Court concerns the adherence to rules and the authority of text. It makes an outsider or a layman wonder a little bit about what happened to any passion for justice. Certainly, the United States is a nation of laws not of men, and the insistence on rules or laws is not such a bad thing. But when does insistence upon the letter of the law work at the expense of justice? Would the literalists ever have done anything to change the system of segregation? One wonders. The author points out that Rehnquist made it a practice to reduce the number of cases reviewed, thereby reducing the concern of the Court for remedying injustices resulting from lower courts.

This book deals with the Rehnquist Court up until sometime before the Presidential Election of 2004. The extraordinary stretch of incumbent justices (no changes since Breyer's confirmation in 1994) was still in progress, although we know now that it would not last for much longer. The author introduces all of what were then the nine justices, but some such as Thomas and Scalia definitely get more attention than others. Roughly the first half of the book deals in some way with the personalities of the justices; how their judicial temperaments and their politics have been shaped by their life experiences. But at a certain point the author departs from the effects of personality, stating that it would be a mistake to overemphasize the quirks of the justices in their differing interpretations of the Constitution. The second half of the book concerns broad issues such as takings, federalism, and affirmative action. I found this second half a bit challenging to read, as it departed from the interactions of the justices and dealt with the abstractions of legal strategies and tactics and then the kind of manuevering through Constitutional Law that the justices do to validate their opinions. Still, it provides an introduction, though a bit burdensome, to the use of different kinds of "scutiny", "compelling interests" and balancing tests, and such concepts as "substantive due process." I do believe that here in some places the book would have benefitted from a little more clarity in the text, perhaps more careful editing to avoid ambivalent phrasing.

The author views the Rehnquist Court as basically a political struggle between the conservative Republicans (Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas) and the traditional Republicans (O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy) with the more liberal members (Ginsburg, Stevens, and Breyer) more or less on the sidelines. The traditional Republicans have been especially pivotal in holding the line on social issues, particularly on abortion. And, on the whole they have managed to steer the Court not very far from the precedents set by the New Deal and the Warren Court.

One of the major underlying topics is the question of interpreting the Constitution according to its original literal sense. In this regard, the author states that Clarence Thomas is the leader of the conservative cause, the most relentless of those rejecting a changing Constitution for changing times. This independence goes against the grain of public perception, which tends to see Scalia as the conservative leader after whose forcefulness Thomas follows. But Scalia is more likely to bend to precedence. As an example, Thomas would more readily change such New Deal government regulations that deal with agriculture and manufacturing because he believes that they cannot be regulated as interstate commerce.

A characteristic of the conservative trend on the Court concerns the adherence to rules and the authority of text. It makes an outsider or a layman wonder a little bit about what happened to any passion for justice. Certainly, the United States is a nation of laws not of men, and the insistence on rules or laws is not such a bad thing. But when does insistence upon the letter of the law work at the expense of justice? Would the literalists ever have done anything to change the system of segregation? One wonders. The author points out that Rehnquist made it a practice to reduce the number of cases reviewed, thereby reducing the concern of the Court for remedying injustices resulting from lower courts.

This book deals with the Rehnquist Court up until sometime before the Presidential Election of 2004. The extraordinary stretch of incumbent justices (no changes since Breyer's confirmation in 1994) was still in progress, although we know now that it would not last for much longer. The author introduces all of what were then the nine justices, but some such as Thomas and Scalia definitely get more attention than others. Roughly the first half of the book deals in some way with the personalities of the justices; how their judicial temperaments and their politics have been shaped by their experience. But at a certain point the author departs from the effects of personality, stating that it would be a mistake to overemphasize the quirks of the justices in their differing interpretations of the Constitution. The second half of the book concerns broad issues such as takings, federalism, and affirmative action. I found this second half a bit challenging to read, as it departed from the interactions of the justices and dealt with the abstractions of legal strategies and tactics and then the kind of manuevering through Constitutional Law that the justices do to validate their opinions. Still, it provides an introduction, though a bit burdensome, to the use of different kinds of "scutiny", "compelling interests" and balancing tests, and such concepts as "substantive due process." I do believe that here in some places the book would have benefitted from a little more clarity in the text, perhaps more careful editing to avoid ambivalent phrasing.

The author views the Rehnquist Court as basically a political struggle between the conservative Republicans (Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas) and the traditional Republicans (O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy) with the more liberal members (Ginsburg, Stevens, and Breyer) more or less on the sidelines. The traditional Republicans have been especially pivotal in holding the line on social issues, particularly on abortion. And, on the whole they have managed to steer the Court not very far from the precedents set by the New Deal and the Warren Court.

One of the major underlying topics is the question of interpreting the Constitution according to its original literal sense. In this regard, the author states that Clarence Thomas is the leader of the conservative cause, the most relentless of those rejecting a changing Constitution for changing times. This independence goes against the grain of public perception, which tends to see Scalia as the conservative leader after whose forcefulness Thomas follows. But Scalia is more likely to bend to precedence. As an example, Thomas would more readily change such New Deal government regulations that deal with agriculture and manufacturing because he believes that they cannot be regulated as interstate commerce.

A characteristic of the conservative trend on the Court concerns the adherence to rules and the authority of text. It makes an outsider or a layman wonder a little bit about what happened to any passion for justice. Certainly, the United States is a nation of laws not of men, and the insistence on rules or laws is not such a bad thing. But when does insistence upon the letter of the law work to the expense of justice? Would the literalists ever had done anything to change the system of segregation? Rehnquist certainly never gave any indications of being very disturbed by "separate but equal". Another thing - the author points out that Rehnquist made it a practice to reduce the number of cases reviewed, thereby reducing the concern of the Court for remedying injustices resulting from lower courts.

This book deals with the Rehnquist Court up until sometime before the Presidential Election of 2004. The extraordinary stretch of incumbent justices (no changes since Breyer's confirmation in 1994) was still in progress, although we know now that it would not last for much longer. The author introduces all of what were then the nine justices, but some such as Thomas and Scalia definitely get more attention than others. Roughly the first half of the book deals in some way with the personalities of the justices; how their judicial temperaments and their politics have been shaped by their experience. But at a certain point the author departs from the effects of personality, stating that it would be a mistake to overemphasize the quirks of the justices in their differing interpretations of the Constitution. The second half of the book concerns broad issues such as takings, federalism, and affirmative action. I found this second half a bit challenging to read, as it departed from the interactions of the justices and dealt with the abstractions of legal strategies and tactics and then the kind of manuevering through Constitutional Law that the justices do to validate their opinions. Still, it provides an introduction, though a bit burdensome, to the use of different kinds of "scutiny", "compelling interests" and balancing tests, and such concepts as "substantive due process." I do believe that here in some places the book would have benefitted from a little more clarity in the text, perhaps more careful editing to avoid ambivalent phrasing.

The author views the Rehnquist Court as basically a political struggle between the conservative Republicans (Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas) and the traditional Republicans (O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy) with the more liberal members (Ginsburg, Stevens, and Breyer) more or less on the sidelines. The traditional Republicans have been especially pivotal in holding the line on social issues, particularly on abortion. And, on the whole they have managed to steer the Court not very far from the precedents set by the New Deal and the Warren Court.

One of the major underlying topics is the question of interpreting the Constitution according to its original literal sense. In this regard, the author states that Clarence Thomas is the leader of the conservative cause, the most relentless of those rejecting a changing Constitution for changing times. This independence goes against the grain of public perception, which tends to see Scalia as the conservative leader after whose forcefulness Thomas follows. But Scalia is more likely to bend to precedence. Thomas would more readily change, as an example, such New Deal government regulations that deal with agriculture and manufacturing because he believes that they cannot be regulated as interstate commerce.

The Legacy of the Rehnquist Supreme Court is that not much has really happened, according to Mark Tushnet, Professor of Constitutional Law at Georgetown University Law Center. The Court has maintained the line on Abortion and Affirmative Action, expanded gay's rights in its famous Lawrence vs. Texas decision, and in the cause of Federalism, it made only slight moves (it did limit the power of the US Congress under the Commerce Clause, for the first time since the New Deal, but upheld most Federal Laws against "Federalist" assaults).

The Reason for the maintenance of the Status Quo, according to Tushnet, is that the Court's Republicans, like the Republican Party in General, are split between two kinds of Republicans: Economic Republicans, like Sandra Day O'Connor, who believe in small government, tax cuts and business de regulation, and the Cultural Republicans, like Antonin Scalia, who oppose Gay's Rights and abortions. The Coalition of Moderate Republicans and Liberals on the Court is sufficient to block major changes in Constitutional Law, particularly regarding Abortion and Privacy, especially as that is also the direction the United States is heading towards generally.

According to Tushnet, the future is also generally temperate: "The Roberts Court in its first decade is likely to seem themeless overall" (p.358). As the United States continue to be divided, so will the Court. On issues the people care about - particularly abortion, there's unlikely to be much of a movement.

Unfortunately, I am not sure that the Court is as moderate as Tushnet thinks it is, and I am much less certain that the future will see the Court's moderation continue. First, I think that Tushnet over estimates the reliability of decisions made by the Supreme Court. Both Texas vs. Lawrence and Planned Parenthood vs. Casey are held by 6 to 3 majorities, which have quite possibly shrunk to 5 to 4 majorities following the appointments of Justices Roberts and Alito. All it takes is one more extremist appointment - by Bush or by a possible successor - to overturn both decisions. Compare those to Roe vs. Wade and Griswold v. Connecticut, which were decided on a 7 to 2 majority, or Brown vs. Board of Education and Hernandez v. Texas which was decided unanimously, and the soundness of the Court seems less a fortress but a fluke.

Furthermore, Tushnet ignores several areas where the Supreme Court's decision may be changing. In Edwards v. Aguillard (1987), the Supreme Court decided 7-2 that Creationism was not science, and could not be taught at schools. Today, it is quite possible that the majority has shrunk to a single vote (Scalia dissented then, and I am speculating that Roberts, like Rehnquist before him, would dissent, as would Alito and Thomas).

Possibly because it is not a Constitutional Law case, Tushnet only peripherally mentions "Bush vs. Gore", even though that decision gave the Presidency to Bush. In a more partisan Roberts Court, how many elections will be settled by the Judiciary? In "The Great Unraveling", Paul Krugman speculated that the Bush Junta is not dedicated to majority rule. Was he alarmist or prescient?

Also unmentioned goes the Bush administration's assault on Civil Liberties in its uses of the Patriot Acts, and in the US's holdings of people in Guantanamo and Abu Gharib prisons. The Supreme Court has been mostly deferential to the administration's abuse of both international Law and the Constitution in pursuit of its War on Terror. I think an easy prediction is that Roberts and Alito will walk that line.

Although Tushnet recounts the failed nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court, I don't think that he quite captures the most important point. That is, since Bork was nominated, Conservative Republicans have hidden the opinions of their Supreme Court nominees. That tendency (also apparent in Liberal appointments like Ruth Ginsburg) reached a climax with the appointments of Roberts and Alito. As Tushnet writes "Judge Roberts 's performance at his confirmation hearings provide no clues as to what he would do as Chief Justice... no matter what their views, listeners could take comfort in Judge Roberts's words" (p.348). Since Bush confirmed that his model Justices where Scalia and Thomas (p.356), how moderate can we expect Roberts and Alito to be?

A Scalia-Thomas dominated court may very well overrule Roe v. Wade and Texas v. Lawrence. It may allow the President, via his War powers, virtually unlimited possibilities to limit the liberties of suspected Terrorists. It may even overrule Edwards v. Aguillard as allow Creationism at Public Schools. Maybe I'm paranoid, but I find it unnerving that only one vote may stand between us and that rough beast, its hour finally coming round, slouching towards Washington to be born.

The Legacy of the Rehnquist Supreme Court is that not much has really happened, according to Mark Tushnet, Professor of Constitutional Law at Georgetown University Law Center. The Court has maintained the line on Abortion and Affirmative Action, expanded gay's rights in its famous Lawrence vs. Texas decision, and in the cause of Federalism, it made only slight moves (it did limit the power of the US Congress under the Commerce Clause, for the first time since the New Deal, but upheld most Federal Laws against "Federalist" assaults).

The Reason for the maintenance of the Status Quo, according to Tushnet, is that the Court's Republicans, like the Republican Party in General, are split between two kinds of Republicans: Economic Republicans, like Sandra Day O'Connor, who believe in small government, tax cuts and business de regulation, and the Cultural Republicans, like Antonin Scalia, who oppose Gay's Rights and abortions. The Coalition of Moderate Republicans and Liberals on the Court is sufficient to block major changes in Constitutional Law, particularly regarding Abortion and Privacy, especially as that is also the direction the United States is heading towards generally.

According to Tushnet, the future is also generally temperate: "The Roberts Court in its first decade is likely to seem themeless overall" (p.358). As the United States continue to be divided, so will the Court. On issues the people care about - particularly abortion, there's unlikely to be much of a movement.

Unfortunately, I am not sure that the Court is as moderate as Tushnet thinks it is, and I am much less certain that the future will see the Court's moderation continue. First, I think that Tushnet over estimates the reliability of decisions made by the Supreme Court. Both Texas vs. Lawrence and Planned Parenthood vs. Casey are held by 6 to 3 majorities, which have quite possibly shrunk to 5 to 4 majorities following the appointments of Justices Roberts and Alito. All it takes is one more extremist appointment - by Bush or by a possible successor - to overturn both decisions. Compare those to Roe vs. Wade and Griswold v. Connecticut, which were decided on a 7 to 2 majority, or Brown vs. Board of Education and Hernandez v. Texas which was decided unanimously, and the soundness of the Court seems less a fortress but a fluke.

Furthermore, Tushnet ignores several areas where the Supreme Court's decision may be changing. In Edwards v. Aguillard (1987), the Supreme Court decided 7-2 that Creationism was not science, and could not be taught at schools. Today, it is quite possible that the majority has shrunk to a single vote (Scalia dissented then, and I am speculating that Roberts, like Rehnquist before him, would dissent, as would Alito and Thomas).

Possibly because it is not a Constitutional Law case, Tushnet only peripherally mentions "Bush vs. Gore", even though that decision gave the Presidency to Bush. In a more partisan Roberts Court, how many elections will be settled by the Judiciary? In "The Great Unraveling", Paul Krugman speculated that the Bush Junta is not dedicated to majority rule. Was he alarmist or prescient?

Also unmentioned goes the Bush administration's assault on Civil Liberties in its uses of the Patriot Acts, and in the US's holdings of people in Guantanamo and Abu Gharib prisons. The Supreme Court has been mostly deferential to the administration's abuse of both international Law and the Constitution in pursuit of its War on Terror. I think an easy prediction is that Roberts and Alito will walk that line.

Although Tushnet recounts the failed nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court, I don't think that he quite captures the most important point. That is, since Bork was nominated, Conservative Republicans have hidden the opinions of their Supreme Court nominees. That tendency (also apparent in Liberal appointments like Ruth Ginsburg) reached a climax with the appointments of Roberts and Alito. As Tushnet writes "Judge Roberts 's performance at his confirmation hearings provide no clues as to what he would do as Chief Justice... no matter what their views, listeners could take comfort in Judge Roberts's words" (p.348). Since Bush confirmed that his model Justices where Scalia and Thomas (p.356), how moderate can we expect Roberts and Alito to be?

A Scalia-Thomas dominated court may very well overrule Roe v. Wade and Texas v. Lawrence. It may allow the President, via his War powers, virtually unlimited possibilities to limit the liberties of suspected Terrorists. It may even overrule Edwards v. Aguillard as allow Creationism at Public Schools. Maybe I'm paranoid, but I find it unnerving that only one vote may stand between us and that rough beast, its hour finally coming round, slouching towards Washington to be born.

I read this book as to get a simple foundation/understanding of the U.S. Supreme Court and their historical trends covering the major issues talked about in society today. It is dry, typical book you would read before or during law school but would not recommend it for someone not interested in pursuing law.

I read this book as to get a simple foundation/understanding of the U.S. Supreme Court and their historical trends covering the major issues talked about in society today. It is dry, typical book you would read before or during law school but would not recommend it for someone not interested in pursuing law.

Books for well-read non-lawyers interested in the "behind-the-scenes" Supreme Court and its relationship to the Court's jurisprudence have been around for quite some time. Bernard Schwartz, beginning in the early 1980s, published a series of books on the Warren, Burger and early Rehnquist Courts, usually focusing on unpublished memoranda and draft opinions circulated among the justices. Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong published a best-selling account of the Supreme Court -- The Brethern -- in the late 1970s. This book was fascinating, albeit quite gossipy. Edward Lazarus, in Closed Chambers, tried the Woodward/Armstrong trick for the late Burger/early Rehnquist Courts, leavening gossip concerning mutual antipathies among the justices with more doctrinal analysis.

Now comes Professor Tushnet's rewarding analysis of the Rehnquist Court. Tushnet's basic thesis is that the Supreme Court is not as radical as many Americans dissatisfied with their holdings might argue. Following the scholarly lead of eminent political scientists such as Robert Dahl, Tushnet argues that the Court follows the election returns. The justices usually reflect the various components of the successful political parties who earn the right to nominate and confirm them. Thus, Professor Tushnet argues, it makes sense to call the Supreme Court at various times in its history The New Deal Court, the Great Society Court, or the Reagan Court.

From this it follows that in the past thirty or so years, the Court has gradually come to reflect the GOP coalition that first emerged triumphant in 1968. But, Tushnet notes, this coalition has itself been non-cohesive, comprised of "traditional" and "modern" Republicans, who differ on starting principles, especially the emphasis that the Republican Party should give to either economic or social conservatism. This division has prevented the GOP from fulfilling its long term promise to overturn the legal liberalism of the Warren Court (as confirmed by the Burger Court). At least until 2004, Tushnet argues, conservative justices could not agree among themselves on such issues as abortion and sexual freedom, for example, with the upshot being that the Warren Court dispensation has held together.

Tushnet's thesis is interesting as far as it goes, but outside the area of individual rights, he does not connect the political and judicial worlds enough to sustain his thesis. For example, Tushnet provides very informative and interesting analysis of Rehnquist Court attempts to change the calculus of federalism and takings clause jurisprudence, but he never ties this to splits in the governing GOP coalition. How does the break between "traditional" and "modern" Republicans get reflected in these areas of consitutional law? Tushnet doesn't draw this picture particularly well.

Still, though, this is a valuable book. His biographical analyses of Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia and, especially, Thomas, are fascinating. Clarence Thomas, in fact, emerges from Tushnet's book as the figure most likely to unify the various strands of constitutional conservatism into a new conservative jurisprudential synthesis. The paperbook edition ends with an epilogue -- some Tushnetian analysis of the Court perhaps finally ready to shake off the Warren Court coil. Perhaps Clarence Thomas will be the ideological leader of that effort not, as alot of Court observers seem to think, Antonin Scalia.

Also, Tushnet does a very commendable job of presenting complex doctrinal developments in easy-to-understand terms for the intelligent lay reader. This is a book, then, that covers doctrinal and institutional developments without relying on a People Magazine's version of "life under the robes on the Supreme Court." For this reason I recommend this book for citizens interested in the Court and how it is affected by politics -- just be aware of the fact that Professor Tushnet does not always bring the narrative back to the book's overarching thesis.

Books for well-read non-lawyers interested in the "behind-the-scenes" Supreme Court and its relationship to the Court's jurisprudence have been around for quite some time. Bernard Schwartz, beginning in the early 1980s, published a series of books on the Warren, Burger and early Rehnquist Courts, usually focusing on unpublished memoranda and draft opinions circulated among the justices. Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong published a best-selling account of the Supreme Court -- The Brethern -- in the late 1970s. This book was fascinating, albeit quite gossipy. Edward Lazarus, in Closed Chambers, tried the Woodward/Armstrong trick for the late Burger/early Rehnquist Courts, leavening gossip concerning mutual antipathies among the justices with more doctrinal analysis.

Now comes Professor Tushnet's rewarding analysis of the Rehnquist Court. Tushnet's basic thesis is that the Supreme Court is not as radical as many Americans dissatisfied with their holdings might argue. Following the scholarly lead of eminent political scientists such as Robert Dahl, Tushnet argues that the Court follows the election returns. The justices usually reflect the various components of the successful political parties who earn the right to nominate and confirm them. Thus, Professor Tushnet argues, it makes sense to call the Supreme Court at various times in its history The New Deal Court, the Great Society Court, or the Reagan Court.

From this it follows that in the past thirty or so years, the Court has gradually come to reflect the GOP coalition that first emerged triumphant in 1968. But, Tushnet notes, this coalition has itself been non-cohesive, comprised of "traditional" and "modern" Republicans, who differ on starting principles, especially the emphasis that the Republican Party should give to either economic or social conservatism. This division has prevented the GOP from fulfilling its long term promise to overturn the legal liberalism of the Warren Court (as confirmed by the Burger Court). At least until 2004, Tushnet argues, conservative justices could not agree among themselves on such issues as abortion and sexual freedom, for example, with the upshot being that the Warren Court dispensation has held together.

Tushnet's thesis is interesting as far as it goes, but outside the area of individual rights, he does not connect the political and judicial worlds enough to sustain his thesis. For example, Tushnet provides very informative and interesting analysis of Rehnquist Court attempts to change the calculus of federalism and takings clause jurisprudence, but he never ties this to splits in the governing GOP coalition. How does the break between "traditional" and "modern" Republicans get reflected in these areas of consitutional law? Tushnet doesn't draw this picture particularly well.

Still, though, this is a valuable book. His biographical analyses of Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia and, especially, Thomas, are fascinating. Clarence Thomas, in fact, emerges from Tushnet's book as the figure most likely to unify the various strands of constitutional conservatism into a new conservative jurisprudential synthesis. The paperbook edition ends with an epilogue -- some Tushnetian analysis of the Court perhaps finally ready to shake off the Warren Court coil. Perhaps Clarence Thomas will be the ideological leader of that effort not, as alot of Court observers seem to think, Antonin Scalia.

Also, Tushnet does a very commendable job of presenting complex doctrinal developments in easy-to-understand terms for the intelligent lay reader. This is a book, then, that covers doctrinal and institutional developments without relying on a People Magazine's version of "life under the robes on the Supreme Court." For this reason I recommend this book for citizens interested in the Court and how it is affected by politics -- just be aware of the fact that Professor Tushnet does not always bring the narrative back to the book's overarching thesis.

In general, the author provides a valuable survey of the state of the Supreme Court during the Rehnquist years. Tushnet examines the obligatory areas of interest such as culture war conflicts, adjustments in the lines of federal vs. state powers, etc. At times these overviews are not as flowing and explanatory as this reader might wish. Various summations of cases and their Court opinions could be more lucid and less compressed, and more case quotations in the text would have enhanced the book for me. Still, this is a convenient compilation of Rehnquist Court activity for to those who prefer pre-analyzed assessments to digging through the cases themselves (a group to which many, including myself, surely belong). Depending upon the reader's own opinions, Tushnet's interjection (sometimes subtle, sometimes not) of his judgments of the justices and his perspectives on issues will either be a boon or an irritation. Tushnet prose unmistakably favors the liberal view and, for the most part, justices who best reflect those leanings. The author also seems to value graciousness in Court members over convictions, leading to disparagement of Justice Scalia whose opinions are often blunt but more consistent and predictable than those of, say, Justices O'Connor or Breyer. Although I am a fan of more balance than this book delivers, in fairness, absolute objectivity is not easily attainable vis-a-vis the emotion-laden realms the Supreme Court often treads, and a narrative with a viewpoint may sharpen the reader's own assessments of where the Supreme Court has been and where it will (and/or ought) to go. To the discerning student of the Supreme Court, then, this book can be a very useful tool.

In general, the author provides a valuable survey of the state of the Supreme Court during the Rehnquist years. Tushnet examines the obligatory areas of interest such as culture war conflicts, adjustments in the lines of federal vs. state powers, etc. At times these overviews are not as flowing and explanatory as this reader might wish. Various summations of cases and their Court opinions could be more lucid and less compressed, and more case quotations in the text would have enhanced the book for me. Still, this is a convenient compilation of Rehnquist Court activity for to those who prefer pre-analyzed assessments to digging through the cases themselves (a group to which many, including myself, surely belong). Depending upon the reader's own opinions, Tushnet's interjection (sometimes subtle, sometimes not) of his judgments of the justices and his perspectives on issues will either be a boon or an irritation. Tushnet prose unmistakably favors the liberal view and, for the most part, justices who best reflect those leanings. The author also seems to value graciousness in Court members over convictions, leading to disparagement of Justice Scalia whose opinions are often blunt but more consistent and predictable than those of, say, Justices O'Connor or Breyer. Although I am a fan of more balance than this book delivers, in fairness, absolute objectivity is not easily attainable vis-a-vis the emotion-laden realms the Supreme Court often treads, and a narrative with a viewpoint may sharpen the reader's own assessments of where the Supreme Court has been and where it will (and/or ought) to go. To the discerning student of the Supreme Court, then, this book can be a very useful tool.

Tushnet explains the nearly 20 years (at time of writing) history of the Rehnquist Court and argues that while it has not produced the conservative constitutional revolution that many predicted in the mid-80s, the groundwork has been laid for such a revolution to occur in the future. Who sits upon the Court in the future will determine the result of the Rehnquist Court. Tushnet argues that the revolution has failed because of a division between the traditional small-government, business oriented conservatives (O'Connor, Kennedy) and the modern social conservatives (Scalia, Thomas).

In terms of coverage, Tushnet hits all the major areas: equal protection, gay rights, crime, federalism, takings, first amendment, etc. He covers each of these fairly and notes when the doctrines and arguments are weak. Most interestingly, Tushnet argues that Scalia often produces weaker constitutional arguments because he prefers the quotable punch lines over exacting legal language. Instead of relying on Scalia for leadership, Tushnet argues that modern conservatives should turn to Thomas because he often produces stronger constitutional arguments that lay a foundation for future change that Scalia has demonstrated little interest in.

In sum, Tushnet has written a strong introduction of the Rehnquist Court. Nothing in here will surprise anyone with familiarity in the subject, but for constitutional novices this is the best start for the modern Court. In particular, I recommend it highly for students about to take their first year of Constitutional Law because Tushnet presents all of the modern developments in clear, accessible language and he presents the various doctrines of importance.

Tushnet's thesis, which is only of minor importance in the work, is that the Rehnquist Court is divided in its most interesting fashion not between liberals and conservatives, but rather between two different types of Republicans: moderates and conservatives. Perhaps it's true, perhaps not, but regardless, it's all the excuse one needs for this informative work.

The book is organized into chapters concentrating on either a Justice or an issue of contemporary constitutional jurisprudence, organized without any rigid framework (nor does one seem required). Supreme Court law is the lawyer's Super Bowl; the trivia delights us because we know the players, hating some of them, worshipping others. This book satiates the urge: fun and fascinating factual nuggets abound. We learn about our Justices' lives, the wellsprings of their philosophies. Details are filled in about the plaintiffs and defendants of our landmarks.

The style is accessible and intentionally so, I have no doubt. Legal analysis is light and briefly sketched. One needn't have the slightest bit of lawyerly education to get through the work.

There is an undeniably liberal sheen to the work. I could fault the work for it--considered doing so--considering doing so even in spite of the author's belief (if my understanding of critical legal studies is correct) that neutrality is impossible, since I don't subscribe to that belief. But there's no need. Professor Tushnet gives as good as he gets: he scours Scalia (somewhat unfairly), but at the same time praises Thomas (almost to the point of condescension), and the liberal Justice Breyer doesn't escape unscathed. Professor Tushnet gives fair appraisals of conservative arguments and liberal rejoinders: we could ask more from the author, but not much more.

All in all, an enjoyable work, and an excellent encapsulation of the high Court.

Mark Tushnet is absolutely terrific in translating what seemingly is a difficult subject into common and simple terms understood by the general public. However, the subject of the book is far from simple to interpret and analyze.
Mark Tushnet gives a brief biography as he introduces each one of the justices (although some justices get more attention than others, probably due to importance and etc). Putting this biographical touch almost inevitably leads one logically to see how the life experience in the past shapes one's opinion for the future. For each justice and given theme throughout the book, he cites numerous cases, explaining them thoroughly and in simple terms, interpreting their relevance, citing the justices' opinion and noting their outcome as well as their implication as precedence in future cases. This way, the reader gets a broad perspective of the law, not only of its present effect but also of future influence. Mark Tushent doesn't miss anything including the big and divisive cases like Roe vs. Wade (abortion), religion in schools and public squares, affirmative action programs, civil rights, criminal justice and much more.

It's also notable that Mark Tushnet abstains from political bias and opinion, writing in a very objective and straight forward format. All in all, a GREAT read, very educational and informative... and more importantly, its for everyone.
I am a biology major, but enjoyed this book more than many in my field.
Highly recommended!

Mark Tushnet subtitled his book "The Rehnquist Court and the Future of Constitutional Law". There is no question in my mind that he has attempted to provide us with a well researched book that addresses this very topic.

Tushnet only looks at the Supreme Court under the guidance of William Rehnquist, the current Chief Justice (although, as is pointed out in the book in no uncertain terms, he will not be Chief for much longer because of his medical ailments).

There is no doubt that Rehnquist is a brilliant justice and a highly qualified leader; he does not permit long winded discussions of cases that lead off onto unrelated tangents, and he runs a pretty tight ship.

The book looks at each of the nine justices currently sitting on the court (Rehnquist, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Breyer, & Ginsburg), although the author pays more attention to certain justices than others. For example, Clarence Thomas gets an entire chapter devoted to his judicial philosophy and his conservatism. Scalia and Kennedy likewise get chapters devoted mostly to their judicial philosophies. Other justices, such as Souter and Breyer, get very little attention in this book.

I enjoyed reading the book - it gave me much more respect than I had for at least one of the justices, although it lessened my respect for another of the justices. Tushnet does give us a relatively unbiased picture of the justices, and does a spectactular job of explaining what makes the justices "tick" (when he devotes enough pages to that individual member of the court).

There are two things that I would change about this book, although neither of them should deter anyone with interest in this subject matter from reading this book. The first is that the entire book (with the notable exception of the final chapter, which addresses what is likely to happen in the future) is written in the past tense. It is almost like we're reading about justices from the middle of the 19th century that have all been buried for 100+ years. I feel as though the justices should be given more present tense treatment. The second thing I would change is the unequal amount of discussion time each justice receives. Let's hear more about Breyer, more about O'Connor, more about Souter. Those three make up 1/3 of the court, they should make up 1/3 of the book - especially since O'Connor is so frequently a swing vote on the court.

I enjoyed the book tremendously, and would highly recommend it to anyone.