To many Americans, the CIA and KGB are things of a James Bond movie. Lots of sex and violence with the KGB being at best stupidly evil. In addition,many Americans today think of the CIA as almost more of an enemy to the Republic than Moslem terrorists, the Chinese, or the resurgent Russians. Far too many people today blame the CIA for not having clearer information about Iraq or worse actively plotting with the 'Government' to get us into a war.

This book of Bearden and Risen though, is one that both popular historians and casual reader alike can get into. They show that often intelligence services make educated guesses on fragments of information that may or may not be compromised by the enemy. Concerned with a period of global turmoil that was surprisingly governed by understood rules of intelligence gathering and other activities, this book brings the reader into the world of the CIA. Far from the James Bond style killing and counter killing by the Allies and Soviet Empire, it was one of limited violence between the two principal powers. A busted or captured agent was interrogated briefly and put on a plane for home, no killing and seldom more than a mild roughing up.

The dying days of the Soviet Empire were ironically the period that that the KGB (with help from American traitors like Aldrich Ames and Robert Hannsen)had wiped out most of the CIA operatives in Russia. The Americans had been sent home and the Russian agents of the Americans killed. The US had virtually no human intel assets behind the Iron Curtain. This is some of the most interesting parts of the book, seeing how much damage a couple of American traitors did as we blindly tried to understand what was going on. The bewildered KGB agents simply cannot believe their Empire is collapsing while they have gotten the upper hand over their Western enemies.

Bearden's insider accounts need to be taken with a grain of salt but his recounting of that period and the US efforts in Afghanistan are informing. Many of us who have studied the period or were in the Armed Forces knew in a general manner what was going on, but seeing the CIA somehow keep Congress on their side while turning on the heat on the Russians in Afghanistan is a both a pleasure and source of wonder. One does not have to think hard to wonder what our present Congress would have done in similar circumstances.

This book illustrates a critical period in our history. Depicting intelligence services being blindsided by events is something critics should remember happens far too often. No intel service of any country has a 100% batting average, not even the legendary Mossad of Israel and that is something Congress and the American public too often forget.

To many Americans, the CIA and KGB are things of a James Bond movie. Lots of sex and violence with the KGB being at best stupidly evil. In addition,many Americans today think of the CIA as almost more of an enemy to the Republic than Moslem terrorists, the Chinese, or the resurgent Russians. Far too many people today blame the CIA for not having clearer information about Iraq or worse actively plotting with the 'Government' to get us into a war.

This book of Bearden and Risen though, is one that both popular historians and casual reader alike can get into. They show that often intelligence services make educated guesses on fragments of information that may or may not be compromised by the enemy. Concerned with a period of global turmoil that was surprisingly governed by understood rules of intelligence gathering and other activities, this book brings the reader into the world of the CIA. Far from the James Bond style killing and counter killing by the Allies and Soviet Empire, it was one of limited violence between the two principal powers. A busted or captured agent was interrogated briefly and put on a plane for home, no killing and seldom more than a mild roughing up.

The dying days of the Soviet Empire were ironically the period that that the KGB (with help from American traitors like Aldrich Ames and Robert Hannsen)had wiped out most of the CIA operatives in Russia. The Americans had been sent home and the Russian agents of the Americans killed. The US had virtually no human intel assets behind the Iron Curtain. This is some of the most interesting parts of the book, seeing how much damage a couple of American traitors did as we blindly tried to understand what was going on. The bewildered KGB agents simply cannot believe their Empire is collapsing while they have gotten the upper hand over their Western enemies.

Bearden's insider accounts need to be taken with a grain of salt but his recounting of that period and the US efforts in Afghanistan are informing. Many of us who have studied the period or were in the Armed Forces knew in a general manner what was going on, but seeing the CIA somehow keep Congress on their side while turning on the heat on the Russians in Afghanistan is a both a pleasure and source of wonder. One does not have to think hard to wonder what our present Congress would have done in similar circumstances.

This book illustrates a critical period in our history. Depicting intelligence services being blindsided by events is something critics should remember happens far too often. No intel service of any country has a 100% batting average, not even the legendary Mossad of Israel and that is something Congress and the American public too often forget.

I read this regular book, here in Brazil.This book was writen by two CIA's men.This book is about the last years of Cold War.The years between 1985 and 1991 are the focus of this regular book.
The failures of this are:
1-Has too much space dedicated to Afghanisthan.
2-This book is very biased.
3-Even having some little paragraphs about years, before 1985, this book almost talks about 1985 and 1991.
War in Afghanisthan wasn't so important, in Soviet Union's defeat.The real thing was that socialism was defeated in Afghanisthan, years before Soviet Union invasion of Afghanisthan.As a source of lives, Afghanisthan killed (in almost ten years) just about 15,000 soviets, against more than 23,000,000 just between 1941 and 1945.The authors were in afghanisthan and they use this experience as a big part of this book.
As a external way to broke Soviet Union the fall of oil's price, between 1985 and 1986 was a sucess.Soviet Union paid its food, from oil's money and money from weapons selled to oil's exporters.When the oil's prices fell between 1985 and 1986, Soviet Union became a crippled country.And this fact has too little space in this book.
This book is too much biased.Aldrich Ames made so much calamities, not just because of himself, but because of CIA's failures.Before of CIA's men, the CIA's agents are americans, having the american failures.To search for confort and happiness are americans, but they can be a calamity, because spies are to be looking for duty, not confort.

Good book. Gives unique insights. Shows to what degree the heroes in the CIA go to protect this great country.

There's lot of spy vs. spy folklore here but it's presented in a format that really jumps around, making it unnecessarily confusing. The story of the CIA's operations in Afghanistan could have made a separate book and doesn't fit with the rest of the more familiar spy games. In fact, that book has already been written- Ghost Wars, the Pulitzer-Prize winner by Steve Coll. It seems like Bearden wasn't sure whether he wanted to write an autobiography or a history of CIA operations.

This reads like a Tom Clancy novel only cheep. We have seen this story before in many spy movies. There is little substance and a lot of editorializing (which I thought was a bit heavy on the US side). At one point the author tells us the CIA boss was so wonderful even the KGB studied him for his professionalism. PLEASE!!!

In this important history of the final spy war's of the cold war, Milt Bearden, a high ranking CIA officer let's us look over his shoulder as events unfold. He informs us as to the treason of Edward Lee Howard, Aldrich Ames, and Robert Hansen. He describes and introduces us to the personalities of the KGB officer's who manned the battlements for the otherside. And most hauntingly he informs us that their must have been atleast one other KGB mole left undiscovered inside the CIA!

if youve been through any books about the intelligence business, youll notice a few parallels that hold true here. Letter drops, complex routes, ect....What is our fascination with company men, or them with themselves has yet to be seen as these books continue to be written in such a volume that the market seems to sustain, but none the less, Im 100 pages into it and can give you a few things to watch for.

Characters are glossed over very quickly, in a few sentences or so, leaving much to the imagination of the reader as to why for example, a scientist in a comfortable position would start dropping love notes at a CIA diplomat like a 3rd grader. We live in an age of cell phones and email making much of the spycraft being written about look tiresome and dull.

The CIA and KGB were two organizations actively trying to collapse eachother for many years and many men switched sides from both sides, and perhaps back again.

What makes people want to handle hot potatoes and seek out danger and risk losing their lives, as many did? The money? no. Their governments were treating them poorly? Hardly, all of the people involved were well paid and looked after, and of high rack in their respective beuracracies. My only guess is that these spies wanted to somehow wrestle away the pen of their diplomats and seat themselves at the decision makers throne by passing along state secrets. And in some cases, they did. but they all get caught and killed.

They are all in there, risk takers, operators, spies, and its a redirect thats recognizeable and predictable, doting on details that probably dont move the reader, particularly this one, at a fast enough pace.

I purchased this book to read about the afghani section which I havent got to. if its good enough, Ill revise my luke warm review here

My introduction to Milt Bearden came from reading "Charlie Wilson's War" by George Crile. A great book by the way, I would highly recommend it.



I would recommend this book to people who are interested in Cold War history.



My only dissapointment with this book is that in the epilogue Milt doesn't approach the question of whether or not the rules have changed from when he was chief of the SE Division, and if those changes are for the better. For example, let's take "extraordinary renditions" - in the days when Milt was chief of SE Division the unwritten rule was that USA and USSR didn't kill or unduly rough up each other's spies. Now that we engage in those kinds of activities, are our CIA operatives in the DO more cautious? Are there more restrictions on their movements when they are overseas? And has the change in methods and attitudes affected our relationships with other intelligence agencies, and if so, for the better or for the worse?

My introduction to Milt Bearden came from reading "Charlie Wilson's War" by George Crile. A great book by the way, I would highly recommend it.

I would recommend this book to people who are interested in Cold War history.

My only dissapointment with this book is that in the epilogue Milt doesn't approach the question of whether or not the rules have changed from when he was chief of the SE Division, and if those changes are for the better. For example, let's take "extraordinary renditions" - in the days when Milt was chief of SE Division the unwritten rule was that USA and USSR didn't kill or unduly rough up each other's spies. Now that we engage in those kinds of activities, are our CIA operatives in the DO more cautious? Are there more restrictions on their movements when they are overseas? And has the change in methods and attitudes affected our relationships with other intelligence agencies, and if so, for the better or for the worse?

My introduction to Milt Bearden came from reading "Charlie Wilson's War" by George Crile. A great book by the way, I would highly recommend it.

I would recommend this book to people who are interested in Cold War history.

My only dissapointment with this book is that in the epilogue Milt doesn't approach the question of whether or not the rules have changed from when he was chief of the SE Division, and if those changes are for the better. For example, let's take "extraordinary renditions" - in the days when Milt was chief of SE Division the unwritten rule was that USA and USSR didn't kill or unduly rough up each other's spies. Now that we engage in those kinds of activities, are our CIA operatives in the DO more cautious? Are there more restrictions on their movements when they are overseas? And has the change in methods and attitudes affected our relationships with other intelligence agencies, and if so, for the better or for the worse?

Much as I have enjoyed this fascinating book, I wish to point out a startling anachronism. Bearden makes much of the delivery of the "120 mm Spanish mortar" to the Mujahideen in 1987, and elaborates on how teams were trained in applying GPS readings to precisely deliver their ordnance beyond visual range. "It came...with a ranging system worked out by Langley...that fused the low-tech mortar with the high-tech world of satellite guidance." And "Once their exact coordinates had been calibrated, the leader of the team would feed the GPS data into a small computer, add the coordinates of the target, and then query the computer for the precise compass direction and elevation..." This procedure, GPS and all, supposedly led to devastating night attacks on the Spetsnaz battalion at Chagasaray on 28 Nov 1987 and 15 Dec 1987.
Problem: Although initial use of GPS was reported in 1990, it did not become operational until 1993. In 1987 the satellites had not been launched yet (this was during the Challenger stand-down).
We can only conclude that while the attacks and the mortars were real, the procedures and the "ranging" method used must have been invented by the authors for literary convenience. No doubt this is the ghost writer's shortcut, not Bearden's, but this does raise questions about technical accuracy throughout the volume.

Much as I have enjoyed this fascinating book, I wish to point out a startling anachronism. Bearden makes much of the delivery of the "120 mm Spanish mortar" to the Mujahideen in 1987, and elaborates on how teams were trained in applying GPS readings to precisely deliver their ordnance beyond visual range. "It came...with a ranging system worked out by Langley...that fused the low-tech mortar with the high-tech world of satellite guidance." And "Once their exact coordinates had been calibrated, the leader of the team would feed the GPS data into a small computer, add the coordinates of the target, and then query the computer for the precise compass direction and elevation..." This procedure, GPS and all, supposedly led to devastating night attacks on the Spetsnaz battalion at Chagasaray on 28 Nov 1987 and 15 Dec 1987.
Problem: Although initial use of GPS was reported in 1990, it did not become operational until 1993. In 1987 the satellites had not been launched yet (this was during the Challenger stand-down).
We can only conclude that while the attacks and the mortars were real, the procedures and the "ranging" method used must have been invented by the authors for literary convenience. No doubt this is the ghost writer's shortcut, not Bearden's, but this does raise questions about technical accuracy throughout the volume.

In a brief period of time between 1989 and 1991, the world changed dramatically. Several significant events transpired, each literally changing the way the world worked overnight. In The Main Enemy, Milt Bearden and James Risen provide a detailed and fascinating view into the struggle between the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Soviet security service, Komitet Gosudarstvenoj Bezopasnosti (KGB).

Anyone aware of the state of world affairs for the last half of the twentieth century would be hard pressed to believe any of the events that took place as the final decade of the century was poised to begin. Starting with the Soviet Union's withdraw from Afghanistan in 1989, we observed as one event followed another, each coming as a greater surprise than the previous. We watched the collapse of the Berlin Wall and saw the reunification of Germany shortly thereafter. Not long behind Germany's rejection of socialism, we saw revolutions in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and elsewhere. In the latter half of 1991, we watched a failed coup in the Soviet Union, and as that year drew to a close, the Soviet hammer and sickle was replaced with the Russian tricolor flag over Moscow.

These were not events that took place on their own. These were the highly visible climax of an ongoing struggle between the proponents of the Soviet Revolutskyj Mir ("World Revolution") and their counterparts in the West -- including Britain's MI6 and America's CIA. Such a conclusion wasn't always assured, and there were times when CIA was baffled by the tremendous success of KGB's operations against Western agents and interests. It is during these "1985 losses" that the book opens, providing a foundation that helps the reader to see just what was happening in the world of intelligence.

Milt Bearden is a career CIA officer, having spent a lifetime in the shadows and working for America's interests. James Risen is an accomplished journalist. The collaboration -- which also includes the input and assistance of many other players from many sides in this international game of strategy and intrigue -- is an admirable success. The story is gripping, compelling, and personal. The book is well-structured and the prose makes it easy to forget that The Main Enemy isn't a novel, but a book of real history.

For those of us whose understanding of intelligence is primarily from the technical side -- most likely through Bamford's glimpses into the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) -- The Main Enemy is instructive, helping us to see the value of human intelligence (HUMINT) and its role in world affairs.

While hardly the definitive work on the operations of CIA, The Main Enemy provides valuable insight into the climax of the Cold War. Hopefully its accessible style will help to open this important chapter of history to a wide audience -- not just spy buffs.

For those of us who were a bit younger at the end of the Cold War and were more interested in girls and cars than politics, this is a great read about the spy games that went on between the CIA & KGB, both directly (eg. in Washington or Moscow) or indirectly (Afghanistan) and about the political changes that happened at the end of the 80's and early 90's. I have read a lot of Tom Clancy's novels, and this one has them beat for intrigue and insight. Anyone who enjoys books told from a truly inside perspective will love this one.

This is the story gathered through hundreds of interviews with both US and USSR players of the battle between the CIA and KGB in the closing days of the Cold War, 1985 through the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Part I, Year of the Spy tells of the efforts to "turn" KGB agents, Government officials and high-ranking military and subsequent contacts by their American controllers. We're told of the constant surveillance of embassy officials, the training of new agents, tricks for eluding tails. Surprising to me was the involvement of spouses who often accompanied the agents on "runs" or otherwise aided the agents. In training there would be surprise arrests that would seem real to the agents, they would include a roughing up by FBI agents. The test for the agent was to hold back his CIA connection.
Starting in 1985 a string of our moles were arrested by the KGB. Despite ridicule of James Jesus Angleton whose paranoia about moles inside the CIA was legend, it appeared now that his paranoia was well-placed.
The luring of moles, their exchanges of money and information at drop points are covered from both sides. For example meticulous planning has gone into a "run," i.e., CIA meeting with a KGB agent to exchange money, needs, information. The story is told by the US agent arriving at the drop site, having shaken his KGB tail; the same story is then told by KGB officials who are setting him up and the capture of the spy (a scientist in this case).
Almost at the same time, June '85, Aldrich Ames was meeting in DC with his Russian handler, delivering to him the name of every spy he knew. He did this because John Walker, US Navy man, had been arrested in May as a Russian spy. Ames feared Walker had been fingered to the FBI by someone in the KGB that the CIA had previously "turned." He didn't want the same fate.
In their recruitment efforts the CIA always had to be on the alert for "dangles." These were spies trying to be double agents. Some of the Russians turned for money, some for ideology, a hatred for the Communist system. Edward Lee Howard was a CIA agent who was fired by the CIA and who betrayed us out of his anger over what he thought was unfair treatment. He eluded capture and escaped to Russia with help from his wife, his training in eluding tails, and the incompetence of the FBI.
There were constant turf wars between the FBI and CIA which sometimes got in the way.
Robert Hanssen (FBI) started spying in 1979. Among information turned over to the KGB was his revealing to them the spy tunnel under the Soviet embassy in DC.
There were many more tales of recruitment, capture and sometimes execution.

Part II, Afghanistan. In December 1979 Russia invaded Afghanistan. They were fearful of the country coming under the sphere of the US, further completing the ring around the USSR.
When the British decided decades earlier to withdraw from Afghanistan, the cost of marching out was horrific, 16,000 men were reduced to 1 left standing
After the loss of 15,000 soldiers, in 1986 Gorbachev decided enough was enough. He wanted to get out, but how to do it without looking like the US in Vietnam or with the costs the British incurred.
US efforts helped Gorbachev reach his decision to exit. We had been pouring in money and arms. The destruction of a huge Russian arms depot was pivotal in firming up his mind as was the introduction of Stinger missiles and advanced anti-tank weapons, both of which produced spectacular results.
They managed the withdrawal at a minimum loss of life. Then began the tribal chiefs dislodging the puppet leader in Kabul and the jockeying amongst themselves for leadership.

Part III, Endgame. The story here is the winding down of the Soviet Union, starting with tearing down the Berlin Wall, the role of the East German secret police, STASI and the interplay with the CIA. The dissolution of Reagan's Evil Empire, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and the Baltic states; the fragility of the new Russia and its near fall to reactionary forces, the emergence of Yeltsin.

Aldrich Ames was arrested in 1994 after 20 years of spying. A Russian agent provided enough information but no name, enabling the CIA to identify him. A group within the CIA had spent years trying to locate the leak that James Jesus Angleton was sure existed.

Robert Hanssen was arrested in 2001 after 22 years of betrayal, his capture also aided by Russian agents.

The author Milt Bearden was close to all the activities he recounts. He concluded after a thorough analysis of times and dates that there must be another mole yet to surface within the CIA.

I found much of the book exciting. After all, this wasn't fiction; these were real people and events.