The other reviews allready tells you what you need to know about the very good analysis this good provides about the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union. In addition to give a comprehensive understanding of what happened the writer also manages to put new light on common assumptions. For instance he illustrates that Gorbachev's huge unpopularity among many Russians is rather unfair, as any Soviet leader in his position would have to make many of the same decissions. He illustrates that one should be careful before jumping to conclusions about Gorbachev's democratic and open policies as these policy was an absolute condition for getting political loans - the only type of credit that the Soviet Union was able to get in the 2nd half of the 80s.

The book has two mayor weeknesses in my view. First, the book gets too unfocused as a result of first telling a story about why autoritarian empires tends to collaps and why and how oildominated economies tends to experience certain problems, before he starts on the story about the downfall of the Soviet Union. This could be made much shorter, clearer and integrated in the actual story. If he wants to write a story about the problem all the world's oil economies experiences, the sensible way to do this is to write another book about it. This weekness is not very important as you can skip these chapters if you want to read about what what is written on the cover - the collapse of an empire.

A more serious problem is that the writer is like a sales man that keeps giving you new arguments for his product, even though you are convinced and are ready to buy. Sometimes less is more - a few tables can illustrate the point better than 600 tables that by no means is equally informative. Include 1 or 2 quotes where it offers a clear added value to the writer's own text. It is not necesary to add several quotes of varying informative value to virtually every argument. This is a more serious problem as it more difficult to skip the quotes or tables that is not very interesting without reading all of them.

All in all though, for anyone interested in the Soviet Union and its collapse, this books provides an uniqe insight - even insights that can give new insight into other books about the same subject.

The other reviews allready tells you what you need to know about the very good analysis this good provides about the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union. In addition to give a comprehensive understanding of what happened the writer also manages to put new light on common assumptions. For instance he illustrates that Gorbachev's huge unpopularity among many Russians is rather unfair, as any Soviet leader in his position would have to make many of the same decissions. He illustrates that one should be careful before jumping to conclusions about Gorbachev's democratic and open policies as these policy was an absolute condition for getting political loans - the only type of credit that the Soviet Union was able to get in the 2nd half of the 80s.

The book has two mayor weeknesses in my view. First, the book gets too unfocused as a result of first telling a story about why autoritarian empires tends to collaps and why and how oildominated economies tends to experience certain problems, before he starts on the story about the downfall of the Soviet Union. This could be made much shorter, clearer and integrated in the actual story. If he wants to write a story about the problem all the world's oil economies experiences, the sensible way to do this is to write another book about it. This weekness is not very important as you can skip these chapters if you want to read about what what is written on the cover - the collapse of an empire.

A more serious problem is that the writer is like a sales man that keeps giving you new arguments for his product, even though you are convinced and are ready to buy. Sometimes less is more - a few tables can illustrate the point better than 600 tables that by no means is equally informative. Include 1 or 2 quotes where it offers a clear added value to the writer's own text. It is not necesary to add several quotes of varying informative value to virtually every argument. This is a more serious problem as it more difficult to skip the quotes or tables that is not very interesting without reading all of them.

All in all though, for anyone interested in the Soviet Union and its collapse, this books provides an uniqe insight - even insights that can give new insight into other books about the same subject.

Yegor Gaidar's Collapse of an Empire is an insider's view of the causes and events that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The author is has a fascinating and improbable background. He served as acting Prime Minister, First Deputy Prime Minister, and Economics Minister of Russia under Boris Yeltsin in the early 1990s but is an academic economist rather than a politician or bureaucrat. He received his PhD in economics under the Soviet educational system but, somehow, developed a solid understanding of economics of free markets. In Collapse of an Empire, Gaidar offers his historical and economic perspective on the Soviet collapse as a lesson and caution for today's Russia. It is as close to a definitive work on the Soviet collapse as I have yet read.

Gaidar starts with two general observations, one on empires and one on oil, and then proceeds to describe the Soviet Collapse.

Empires

Empires come in two flavors: Overseas empires (British, French, Dutch) and territorially contiguous empires (Austria-Hungary, Tsarist Russia, Ottoman Turkey, Soviet Union, and, on a smaller scale, Yugoslavia). Of these two types, the overseas empires are the easier to dismantle: The imperial power can simply declare the former colonies free and, possibly, repatriate a limited number of colonists with a claim to citizenship in the mother country. In territorial empires, diverse ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious groups usually reside in close proximity to each other and often have longstanding conflicts over rights to land and under the law. Abolishing a territorial empire leaves all these conflicts in place, ready to boil over as soon as imperial control has been lifted. Members of the formerly dominant ethnic group may even find themselves a minority in one of the successor states and subject to the rule of one of their formerly subject people. Many of the troubled areas of the world today (Balkans, Middle East) are parts of former territorial empires where population segments have not succeeded in making peace with their neighbors.

Oil

Countries with significant natural resources, especially oil, have generally not been on the forefront of democracy or economic liberalism. Gaidar attributes this phenomenon to the steady stream of revenues the sale of oil provides the ruling party. Secured by this source of income, the government has no need to reach an accommodation with its people that gives them a voice in how they are governed. In exchange, the tax burden on the population often remains very light. The western democracies grew out of accommodations that essentially gave the people a voice in how their countries were governed in exchange for their acceptance of the government's imposition of taxes.

Soviet Collapse

Prior to WWI, Russia was one of the largest grain exporters in the world. In the West, industrialization followed the production of an agricultural surplus which released excess farm labor for industrial employment. Russia followed a different path after the Bolshevik revolution. Rather than building an agricultural surplus, Lenin and Stalin seized the grain and other agricultural products of the countryside to feed the urban and industrial populations. Simultaneously, they reallocated labor from agriculture to industry to support their goal of rapid industrialization. The result was an economic and human disaster. Soviet agriculture never recovered, never produced a sustained surplus, and the country became dependent on imported grain. (See Robert Conquest's Harvest of Sorrow for details). By the 1970s, the Soviet Union was the world's largest grain importer.

At that time (the 1970s), the Soviets were able to pay for their grain imports by exporting oil. This was the time of high oil prices and the Arab embargo on oil exports to the US. Grain prices were low, so Soviet trade balanced nicely: Expensive exports, inexpensive imports.

In 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and Ayatollah Khomeini overthrew the Shah of Iran. These events led the Saudis to become concerned about a Soviet drive to the Persian Gulf and a threat to their kingdom. To counter this perceived threat, in the mid 1980s the Saudis greatly expanded their production and export of oil causing the world price to drop from the $30-40/bbl range to about $10/bbl. Obviously, this price change damaged the Soviet balance of trade.

At about the same time (mid 1980s), the world price of grain shot up significantly. This further damaged the Soviet trade balance.

If this wasn't enough, the volume of Soviet oil production declined in the late 1980s for two reasons. First, to generate foreign exchange, oil production had been focused on the most productive fields which were exploited at a rate that was harmful to the long-term productivity of the fields. Second, the reduced availability of foreign exchange and the continuing requirement to import grain led the Soviet government to reduce imports of industrial materials from the West, including equipment for oil drilling, production, and transport.

By 1989, food subsidies constituted a third of the Soviet national budget. Retail prices were fixed at artificially low levels, which was one form of subsidy. At the same time, the Soviet government was subsidizing the import and domestic production of food. The costs of producing or importing food were as much as 70% higher than the retail prices. With a net outflow of hard currency and a grossly imbalanced domestic budget, the only way to "pay" the government's bills was to print more rubles. With prices fixed by the state, the resulting inflation could only result in shortages at the retail level and a huge increase in individual "savings" since there was nothing for the population to buy with its rubles. By 1991, of 1200 officially recognized consumer goods, 1150 were not readily available.

Declining credit-worthiness drove most western commercial banks to refuse to make further loans to the Soviet government, leaving Gorbachev with only the option of begging for foreign aid from the capitalist governments. Gaidar even suggests that he made the following deal with George H. W. Bush at their Malta conference in 1989: In exchange for US financial assistance, the Soviet government will refrain from using force to maintain its control of its Eastern European satellites.

Throughout its 70+ years of existence, the mantra of the Soviet government and the Communist Party had been that The Party had a special role in the Soviet system because of its unique "wisdom", its understanding of communist economics and the Soviet man. By the late 1980s, the Russian people and even the Soviet bureaucracy knew that this was a lie. However, the inertia of the system did not allow The Party to admit it's "wisdom" had been wrong and that a major economic reform based on free markets was desperately needed.

By revealing the true history of the Soviet Union (e.g., the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact), Glasnost destroyed any lingering myth of the legitimacy of the Soviet Empire. In the end, the Empire could only be maintained by force, but the use of that force would have ended any hope for financial aid from the West.

The August 1991 coup was only the farce that followed the tragedy that constituted the history of the Soviet Union.

Yegor Gaidar's Collapse of an Empire is an insider's view of the causes and events that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The author is has a fascinating and improbable background. He served as acting Prime Minister, First Deputy Prime Minister, and Economics Minister of Russia under Boris Yeltsin in the early 1990s but is an academic economist rather than a politician or bureaucrat. He received his PhD in economics under the Soviet educational system but, somehow, developed a solid understanding of economics of free markets. In Collapse of an Empire, Gaidar offers his historical and economic perspective on the Soviet collapse as a lesson and caution for today's Russia. It is as close to a definitive work on the Soviet collapse as I have yet read.

Gaidar starts with two general observations, one on empires and one on oil, and then proceeds to describe the Soviet Collapse.

Empires

Empires come in two flavors: Overseas empires (British, French, Dutch) and territorially contiguous empires (Austria-Hungary, Tsarist Russia, Ottoman Turkey, Soviet Union, and, on a smaller scale, Yugoslavia). Of these two types, the overseas empires are the easier to dismantle: The imperial power can simply declare the former colonies free and, possibly, repatriate a limited number of colonists with a claim to citizenship in the mother country. In territorial empires, diverse ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious groups usually reside in close proximity to each other and often have longstanding conflicts over rights to land and under the law. Abolishing a territorial empire leaves all these conflicts in place, ready to boil over as soon as imperial control has been lifted. Members of the formerly dominant ethnic group may even find themselves a minority in one of the successor states and subject to the rule of one of their formerly subject people. Many of the troubled areas of the world today (Balkans, Middle East) are parts of former territorial empires where population segments have not succeeded in making peace with their neighbors.

Oil

Countries with significant natural resources, especially oil, have generally not been on the forefront of democracy or economic liberalism. Gaidar attributes this phenomenon to the steady stream of revenues the sale of oil provides the ruling party. Secured by this source of income, the government has no need to reach an accommodation with its people that gives them a voice in how they are governed. In exchange, the tax burden on the population often remains very light. The western democracies grew out of accommodations that essentially gave the people a voice in how their countries were governed in exchange for their acceptance of the government's imposition of taxes.

Soviet Collapse

Prior to WWI, Russia was one of the largest grain exporters in the world. In the West, industrialization followed the production of an agricultural surplus which released excess farm labor for industrial employment. Russia followed a different path after the Bolshevik revolution. Rather than building an agricultural surplus, Lenin and Stalin seized the grain and other agricultural products of the countryside to feed the urban and industrial populations. Simultaneously, they reallocated labor from agriculture to industry to support their goal of rapid industrialization. The result was an economic and human disaster. Soviet agriculture never recovered, never produced a sustained surplus, and the country became dependent on imported grain. (See Robert Conquest's Harvest of Sorrow for details). By the 1970s, the Soviet Union was the world's largest grain importer.

At that time (the 1970s), the Soviets were able to pay for their grain imports by exporting oil. This was the time of high oil prices and the Arab embargo on oil exports to the US. Grain prices were low, so Soviet trade balanced nicely: Expensive exports, inexpensive imports.

In 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and Ayatollah Khomeini overthrew the Shah of Iran. These events led the Saudis to become concerned about a Soviet drive to the Persian Gulf and a threat to their kingdom. To counter this perceived threat, in the mid 1980s the Saudis greatly expanded their production and export of oil causing the world price to drop from the $30-40/bbl range to about $10/bbl. Obviously, this price change damaged the Soviet balance of trade.

At about the same time (mid 1980s), the world price of grain shot up significantly. This further damaged the Soviet trade balance.

If this wasn't enough, the volume of Soviet oil production declined in the late 1980s for two reasons. First, to generate foreign exchange, oil production had been focused on the most productive fields which were exploited at a rate that was harmful to the long-term productivity of the fields. Second, the reduced availability of foreign exchange and the continuing requirement to import grain led the Soviet government to reduce imports of industrial materials from the West, including equipment for oil drilling, production, and transport.

By 1989, food subsidies constituted a third of the Soviet national budget. Retail prices were fixed at artificially low levels, which was one form of subsidy. At the same time, the Soviet government was subsidizing the import and domestic production of food. The costs of producing or importing food were as much as 70% higher than the retail prices. With a net outflow of hard currency and a grossly imbalanced domestic budget, the only way to "pay" the government's bills was to print more rubles. With prices fixed by the state, the resulting inflation could only result in shortages at the retail level and a huge increase in individual "savings" since there was nothing for the population to buy with its rubles. By 1991, of 1200 officially recognized consumer goods, 1150 were not readily available.

Declining credit-worthiness drove most western commercial banks to refuse to make further loans to the Soviet government, leaving Gorbachev with only the option of begging for foreign aid from the capitalist governments. Gaidar even suggests that he made the following deal with George H. W. Bush at their Malta conference in 1989: In exchange for US financial assistance, the Soviet government will refrain from using force to maintain its control of its Eastern European satellites.

Throughout its 70+ years of existence, the mantra of the Soviet government and the Communist Party had been that The Party had a special role in the Soviet system because of its unique "wisdom", its understanding of communist economics and the Soviet man. By the late 1980s, the Russian people and even the Soviet bureaucracy knew that this was a lie. However, the inertia of the system did not allow The Party to admit it's "wisdom" had been wrong and that a major economic reform based on free markets was desperately needed.

By revealing the true history of the Soviet Union (e.g., the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact), Glasnost destroyed any lingering myth of the legitimacy of the Soviet Empire. In the end, the Empire could only be maintained by force, but the use of that force would have ended any hope for financial aid from the West.

The August 1991 coup was only the farce that followed the tragedy that constituted the history of the Soviet Union.

This remarkably accessible, lucid survey of recent Russian history is a must-read for anyone interested in global affairs. Yegor Gaidar, an acting prime minister under Boris Yeltsin, provides a concise yet comprehensive summary of the course of empires during the 20th century, and draws some pointed lessons. His goal is to counter current nostalgia for the glory days of the Soviet Union. getAbstract admires how effectively he executes his objective, with a step-by-step recapitulation of the economic blunders that led inevitably to the Soviet Union's dissolution. However, he also shows why those who expected democracy to grow must face the fact that it is on the retreat - and he leaves no doubt about the dangerous crossroads at which Russia stands.

Professor Gaidar has done it again! He has given us another thoughtful work on Russia, yet not purely from an economic perspective- although there is lots of that in the book- but in terms of the context of history. Readers new to Gaidar would do well to get hold of his work 'State and Evolution'. This work also brilliantly examines recent of events in Russia in the context of the development of nations.

I look forward to more from this man's pen. And my sincere appreciation to the Brooking Institute for making this work available in English. Possibly, with the level of interest in such a work, its sales may not be high and Broooking may be making a financial loss. But to readers like myself, I feel a great gratitude of debt to both the author and publisher.

Buy this book and enjoy an intellectual feast! It is simply fantastic!