The author of takings sorts out some vital issues. This book sorts out eminent domain issues, based on a clearly described economic theory of government. Epstein settles the 'Lockean Proviso' issue, and reasons through many other issues. For example, he makes the case for flat taxes over so called progressive taxes. But above all, this book establishes that anything that the government does constitutes a taking of some kind, and takings are only justified in very limited circumstances.

Takings is the best reasoned critique of modern transfer states that I have seen. This is one of a few books that has really changed the way I think about political economy. Every Law and Public Policy student should read this book, as should David Souter.

The author of takings sorts out some vital issues. This book sorts out eminent domain issues, based on a clearly described economic theory of government. Epstein settles the 'Lockean Proviso' issue, and reasons through many other issues. For example, he makes the case for flat taxes over so called progressive taxes. But above all, this book establishes that anything that the government does constitutes a taking of some kind, and takings are only justified in very limited circumstances.

Takings is the best reasoned critique of modern transfer states that I have seen. This is one of a few books that has really changed the way I think about political economy. Every Law and Public Policy student should read this book, as should David Souter. Read this book carefully.

The takings clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which had a brief surge of popularity recently due to the eminent domain case of Kelo v. New London, reads: "Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."

Epstein, a law professor at the University of Chicago, begins his book by examining briefly the purpose of the clause and the power of eminent domain, invoking Lockean and Hobbesian theories of the state. After a cursory look at originalist theories of constitutional interpretation, dismissed as unworkable, Epstein has distilled the clause down to its theoretical underpinnings. This is the stepping point, the beginning of a masterful journey through American jurisprudence, which touches upon such varied fields as nuisance, tort, regulation, welfare, taxation, and police power.

His theory is simple in its particulars, essentially reduced to a few theories of representative government: 1. the state stands no better legally than the citizens it represents: its rights are merely the rights of its citizens in summation, and 2. the change in wealth from the primordial state of nature to the civilized body under government must not only increase, but the proportion between the shares of each individual must remain the same: that is to say, the distribution matters as rightly as the sum.

Simple as his premises are, the book is by no means humble in its application, and his conclusions are in no sense lacking for justification. Epstein's logic is buttressed at every turn by law review articles, often complex economic analyses, and veins of political science. His conclusions are not incontrovertible, but they are indeed mighty.

He brings this approach to what seems to be nearly every aspect of common and constitutional law (antitrust law being the one exception I noticed), all through the eye of the clause. Chapters stand on their own: one is barely aware of the arch of the grand overall argument until the final chapters, when the logic calmly leads us down lanes to ends we would dare not consider at the beginning of the book. But even then the approach is characteristically precise, honest, and stark.

The case is made for a society more libertarian, but it is not borne from the insipid koan of "non-aggression," but rather structured upon modern economic analytic techniques, the lessons of the common law, calculus both utilitarian and Kantian. Nevertheless, this is, to be sure, a legal book, despite the invasion of philosophy and social science. Supreme Court cases are introduced and appraised, Latin terms of art are utilized, the earthy grounding of common law precedent and principles will never be far away. It is only in the final and initial chapters that Epstein examines explicitly political philosophy, Nozickian, Rawlsian, and civil republican theories, and the implications his arguments bear when considered by their lights.

The legal center of the book will doubtlessly make it easier for lawyers to digest. The political implications will doubtlessly make it a better meal for libertarians than other political classes. Nevertheless, the layman will find much within to pique his interest (or enrage it), and any one with an appreciation of the excellent would do well to admire Epstein's arguments.

Something must be said for the author's style; it is certainly an academic one. Epstein does not use excess words, and will not waste ink restating a point already made. Superfluous sentences have not been included: every phrase exists as a necessary brick in the overall argument. The author throws no lifelines to his readers if they are confused, does not repeat what you were foolish enough to briskly skim over before, nor does he flash italics or CAPS when his points are particularly important. His manner is confident, never arrogant. If his argument has a weakness, he acknowledges the weakness and moves on without wasting more words. For example, perhaps my favorite passage:


But there is in fact good reason to recognize the practical strengths of the maxim [a common law principle of riparian rights], even if it does not capture an ultimate truth. That the rule bridges the gap between is and ought is hardly a demerit, for every rule of entitlement so functions. Better there be a connection between is and ought than no connection between ought and anything of interest in the external world. For dealing with the eminent domain clause, it is surely preferable to recognize a system of rights already in place than to invent one to replace it.

It is a dense and rewarding style. And it is a dense and rewarding read. Those looking for a comprehensive judicial philosophy may find it here entirely; those who already have one will find much to assimilate into the whole.

The final lines, which trickle by with characteristic understatement, and the final snap of the book's covers, left me in awe. I cannot recommend Takings highly enough.

The takings clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which had a brief surge of popularity recently due to the eminent domain case of Kelo v. New London, reads: "Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."

Epstein, a law professor at the University of Chicago, begins his book by examining briefly the purpose of the clause and the power of eminent domain, invoking Lockean and Hobbesian theories of the state. After a cursory look at originalist theories of constitutional interpretation, dismissed as unworkable, Epstein has distilled the clause down to its theoretical underpinnings. This is the stepping point, the beginning of a masterful journey through American jurisprudence, which touches upon such varied fields as nuisance, tort, regulation, welfare, taxation, and police power.

His theory is simple in its particulars, essentially reduced to a few theories of representative government: 1. the state stands no better legally than the citizens it represents: its rights are merely the rights of its citizens in summation, and 2. the change in wealth from the primordial state of nature to the civilized body under government must not only increase, but the proportion between the shares of each individual must remain the same: that is to say, the distribution matters as rightly as the sum.

Simple as his premises are, the book is by no means humble in its application, and his conclusions are in no sense lacking for justification. Epstein's logic is buttressed at every turn by law review articles, often complex economic analyses, and veins of political science. His conclusions are not incontrovertible, but they are indeed mighty.

He brings this approach to what seems to be nearly every aspect of common and constitutional law (antitrust law being the one exception I noticed), all through the eye of the clause. Chapters stand on their own: one is barely aware of the arch of the grand overall argument until the final chapters, when the logic calmly leads us down lanes to ends we would dare not consider at the beginning of the book. But even then the approach is characteristically precise, honest, and stark.

The case is made for a society more libertarian, but it is not borne from the insipid koan of "non-aggression," but rather structured upon modern economic analytic techniques, the lessons of the common law, calculus both utilitarian and Kantian. Nevertheless, this is, to be sure, a legal book, despite the invasion of philosophy and social science. Supreme Court cases are introduced and appraised, Latin terms of art are utilized, the earthy grounding of common law precedent and principles will never be far away. It is only in the final and initial chapters that Epstein examines explicitly political philosophy, Nozickian, Rawlsian, and civil republican theories, and the implications his arguments bear when considered by their lights.

The legal center of the book will doubtlessly make it easier for lawyers to digest. The political implications will doubtlessly make it a better meal for libertarians than other political classes. Nevertheless, the layman will find much within to pique his interest (or enrage it), and any one with an appreciation of the excellent would do well to admire Epstein's arguments.

Something must be said for the author's style; it is certainly an academic one. Epstein does not use excess words, and will not waste ink restating a point already made. Superfluous sentences have not been included: every phrase exists as a necessary brick in the overall argument. The author throws no lifelines to his readers if they are confused, does not repeat what you were foolish enough to briskly skim over before, nor does he flash italics or CAPS when his points are particularly important. His manner is confident, never arrogant. If his argument has a weakness, he acknowledges the weakness and moves on without wasting more words. For example, perhaps my favorite passage:


But there is in fact good reason to recognize the practical strengths of the maxim [a common law principle of riparian rights], even if it does not capture an ultimate truth. That the rule bridges the gap between is and ought is hardly a demerit, for every rule of entitlement so functions. Better there be a connection between is and ought than no connection between ought and anything of interest in the external world. For dealing with the eminent domain clause, it is surely preferable to recognize a system of rights already in place than to invent one to replace it.

It is a dense and rewarding style. And it is a dense and rewarding read. Those looking for a comprehensive judicial philosophy may find it here entirely; those who already have one will find much to assimilate into the whole.

The final lines, which trickle by with characteristic understatement, and the final snap of the book's covers, left me in awe. I cannot recommend Takings highly enough.

This fine book by Prof. Richard Epstein has probably been more influential than the casual reader may be aware.

The heart of Epstein's claim is that _anything_ the government does that imposes any sort of "cost" on anybody amounts to a "taking" for which the Constitution requires just compensation. We all know how this is supposed to work as applied to the usual exercise of eminent domain. But Epstein casts his net wide and argues that the takings clause applies to all sorts of things you never would have thought of -- welfare programs, rent control, jiggery-pokery with the national currency, you name it.

The impact of the book is evident mainly through "negative" evidence. For example, some readers may recall that during the Clarence Thomas hearings, somebody asked Thomas if he believed the stuff in this book (as the Congresscritter in question clearly did not). I think Thomas managed to duck the question, but the point was made. And at any rate, it tells you something that somebody found it important to _ask_ the question in the first place.

Then, too, my own property-law casebook remarks somewhere near the end that Epstein's views on "takings" have not been found convincing by too many people. Interesting that the book still finds it necessary to mention his work, then.

So check it out. Sure, it's radical, and (let's admit it frankly) it's probably not a correct interpretation of the framers' intent. But if you're not a tax-and-spend Congresscritter, maybe you'll find it as pregnant and alluring a suggestion as I do. And it's one of Epstein's best books; I think he wrote it before he had completely converted to utilitarianism. You don't have to agree with it, but you should at least learn why Federalistas are afraid of it.