Kimmerling and Migdal are correct in saying that Arabic-speaking people have lived in the Levant since the early days of Islam. Some Arab tribes were in the region even earlier. But I'm not so sure what this proves. Germanic-speaking people have lived in various parts of Europe for quite a while as well. But it still is neither reasonable nor proper to give Arabic-speakers or German-speakers a right to swipe land by gobbling up small neighboring nations.

Kimmerling and Migdal show a tendency to repeat some of Arafat's absurd and arbitrary untruths as if they were valid. Reading this book, you would get the idea that unprovoked attacks ordered by Arafat were somehow spontaneous and provoked by Israel.

However, there is a deeper problem with the whole idea of such a book. Namely, are we taking a few thugs and misrepresenting them as leaders of a "people?" Surely, we would not call the Ku Klux Klan a "people." Nor the "Aryan Nation."

The authors ought to have been more serious about their language. Are the Arabs of the Levant truly a people, such as, say, the Hungarians, who have a language, traditions, a foreign policy, and so forth? With impeccable national credentials? Of course not. Are these Arabs more like the Mormons, a group that in the nineteenth century clearly lacked national credentials but were prepared to consider their options, including an option to take advantage of nationhood and behave like a nation? Or are they more like the Sudetens, who in the 1930s became a manifest fraud for the purpose of depriving Czechs of their rights, all in the name of German nationalism and Empire?

This book is not a contribution to a scholarly assessment of such questions. It's just propaganda for use in a war against the rights of non-Arabs in the Levant.

Kimmerling and Migdal are correct in saying that Arabic-speaking people have lived in the Levant since the early days of Islam. Some Arab tribes were in the region even earlier. But I'm not so sure what this proves. Germanic-speaking people have lived in various parts of Europe for quite a while as well. But it still is neither reasonable nor proper to give Arabic-speakers or German-speakers a right to swipe land by gobbling up small neighboring nations.



Kimmerling and Migdal show a tendency to repeat some of Arafat's absurd and arbitrary untruths as if they were valid. Reading this book, you would get the idea that unprovoked attacks ordered by Arafat were somehow spontaneous and provoked by Israel.



However, there is a deeper problem with the whole idea of such a book. Namely, are we taking a few thugs and misrepresenting them as leaders of a "people?" Surely, we would not call the Ku Klux Klan a "people." Nor the "Aryan Nation."



The authors ought to have been more serious about their language. Are the Arabs of the Levant truly a people, such as, say, the Hungarians, who have a language, traditions, a foreign policy, and so forth? With impeccable national credentials? Of course not. Are these Arabs more like the Mormons, a group that in the nineteenth century clearly lacked national credentials but were prepared to consider their options, including an option to take advantage of nationhood and behave like a nation? Or are they more like the Sudetens, who in the 1930s became a manifest fraud for the purpose of depriving Czechs of their rights, all in the name of German nationalism and Empire?



This book is not a contribution to a scholarly assessment of such questions. It's just propaganda for use in a war against the rights of non-Arabs in the Levant.

Kimmerling and Migdal are correct in saying that Arabic-speaking people have lived in the Levant since the early days of Islam. Some Arab tribes were in the region even earlier. But I'm not so sure what this proves. Germanic-speaking people have lived in various parts of Europe for quite a while as well. But it still is neither reasonable nor proper to give Arabic-speakers or German-speakers a right to swipe land by gobbling up small neighboring nations.

Kimmerling and Migdal show a tendency to repeat some of Arafat's absurd and arbitrary untruths as if they were valid. Reading this book, you would get the idea that unprovoked attacks ordered by Arafat were somehow spontaneous and provoked by Israel.

However, there is a deeper problem with the whole idea of such a book. Namely, are we taking a few thugs and misrepresenting them as leaders of a "people?" Surely, we would not call the Ku Klux Klan a "people." Nor the "Aryan Nation."

The authors ought to have been more serious about their language. Are the Arabs of the Levant truly a people, such as, say, the Hungarians, who have a language, traditions, a foreign policy, and so forth? With impeccable national credentials? Of course not. Are these Arabs more like the Mormons, a group that in the nineteenth century clearly lacked national credentials but were prepared to consider their options, including an option to take advantage of nationhood and behave like a nation? Or are they more like the Sudetens, who in the 1930s became a manifest fraud for the purpose of depriving Czechs of their rights, all in the name of German nationalism and Empire?

This book is not a contribution to a scholarly assessment of such questions. It's just propaganda for use in a war against the rights of non-Arabs in the Levant.

The Israeli historian Baruch Kimmerling and the American historian Joel Migdal have written an excellent study of the development of Palestinian society, economy and national identity over the last two centuries. Part 1 looks at the development from the 1834 revolt against the Ottoman empire, the start of modern Palestine, to the 1936-39 revolt against the British ruling class, who decimated Palestinian institutions, to Zionism's benefit. It shows how the Europe-dominated world market, Zionism and government intervention framed the Palestinian nation. Part 2 examines the dispersal of 1948. Part 3 looks at how the Palestinian nation was reborn in resistance against occupation, up to the 1987 Intifada.

Part 4 studies the Oslo peace agreement of 1993, negotiated away from the Washington talks. Large majorities of both the Israeli and the Palestinian peoples backed Oslo. The left, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the diaspora, conspicuously Edward Said, opposed it - all put the right of return above every other consideration.

Oslo negotiated a two-state settlement - two states for two peoples. It involved explicit acceptance of each other's existence, and mutual acceptance of the idea of partition, with agreed borders between the two states. Both sides renounced violence, and committed themselves to cooperation, negotiation and peaceful coexistence.

Its gains included Israeli withdrawal from the urban areas of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and the first establishment of Palestinian self-government. Yet between 1993 and 2000 successive Israeli governments undermined the agreement by doubling the numbers of settlers in the West Bank.

For the future, the authors conclude, "Neither people can achieve peace without fulfilling some of the most deeply held the aspirations of the other." Israel will have to make concessions on settlements, the refugees' right of return, a capital city in Jerusalem, and Palestinian control over sufficient water resources. It must end the brutal, illegal occupation, and - the key issue - it must accept a sovereign Palestinian state.

The alternative is that both sides strive for maximalist goals involving mutual denial, which will lead only to their mutual destruction.

Rejecting standard Palestinian and Israeli historiographies, this book puts forth an explanation of why we are in the present situation by relying heavily on published material and undisputed facts but viewed from the author's particular perspective and interpretation. Stephen Covey, in his book 'The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People' illustrates the fact that we can all see the same world completely differently by the picture of a woman. To some who have been conditioned beforehand she is an old hag while to others, conditioned differently, she is a real cutie. No where does this point have greater validity than when we view the history of the relationship between the Palestinian and Israeli peoples. To put it crudely, the Israelis have been conditioned to view the Palestinians as the old hag, while the Palestinians, quite naturally, see themselves as the real cutie. For the neutral outsider who is concerned that the Third World War might arise in this area, it is very difficult to get past the passions and prejudices, to get to facts and solutions that are acceptable to everyone. It seems that we have two broad alternatives - let the contestants fight it out until one is the victor or both are so exhausted that they are prepared to negotiate. During their centuries of immaturity, humans have used this method. I like to think that humans have grown beyond that stage and can act in a more mature manner and this is basically what this book sets out to do. They have tried to gather the facts of history in an unbiased way and work on the solution in a mature manner.

Their 1993 book "Palestinians: The Making of a People', was the first full account of Palestinian society and politics from their origins to the present and was published as the Oslo peace process was starting. It generated considerable interest from neutral people, Palestinian acclaim and vitriolic debate in Israel. When Rabin took Arafat's hand on the White House lawn in September 1993, it was acknowledged that the Oslo agreement demanded a new way of thinking about old issues and stubborn problems. The prime issue was whether or not there was a unified Palestinian people prior to Zionism - an assertion that the authors reaffirm in this book, recognizing that it is extremely unpopular in Israel as it undermines the Zionist story. However, since 1993 there has been a growing acceptance of the authors' points and in an August 2002 poll 78% of Israeli Jews accepted that Palestinians have a legitimate right to a state. After Barak's 1999 election, 75% of Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza Strip voted for negotiations, knowing that this meant acceptance of Israel's legitimate existence and Israel's occupation of 80% of historic Palestine.

The Oslo process induced Palestinians and Israelis to reconsider their shared history - a painful undertaking for both sides. Building the future requires an ability to deal maturely and honestly with the past and it is the hope of the authors that this book will contribute to that process. Tracing events from the 1834 Revolt and the making of the modern Palestine in the first three parts of the book, the final part examines what went right and what went wrong in the Oslo process. If we accept the fact that the authors have made an effort to present the facts in a neutral way - recognizing that the hag and cutie prejudice will not be easily overcome - the important thing is to study the final part, stop the bloodshed and move forward.

It is a responsibility of all peace loving people to read this book and lend their support to finding and implementing the solution which comes closest to being fair for all. I am reminded of Edmund Burke's statement: "For the triumph of evil it is only necessary that good men do nothing."

Kimmerling and Migdal in the part four of their book provide the readers for the first time the true and non-biased story behind the failure of Oslo-Taba talks, within a wide historical perspective. It is a must be reading for every person who want to understanding the reasons of the recent development between the Israelis and the Palestinians. A scholarship at its best.

Kimmerling's and Migdal's analysis of Palestinian politics and society is hopelessly biased. The authors soft-pedal the Palestinians' basic rejection of Israel's legitimacy and their implicit (and often explicit -- cf. Arafat's many pronouncements in Arabic) wish to destroy Israel. For example, Kimmerling and Migdal, incredibly, fail to discuss the 2000 Camp David negotiations, the later Clinton proposals, or the January 2001 Taba negotiations, deferring instead to the extensive coverage of this sequence "elsewhere." This glaring omission is evidence enough of the authors' biases. Absent is any mention of the Palestinian rejection, without counter-offer or any other serious sign of a willingness to compromise, of Barak's proposals. Absent is the subsequent Palestinian response: another intifida. Absent is the Palestinian rejection of the Clinton proposals, which offered the Palestinians all of Gaza, 94-96% of the West Bank, and shared sovereignty over Jerusalem, including dominion over the haram al-sharif/temple mount. Further underscoring the Palestinians' unwillingness to negotiate and their basic rejection of Israel's right to exist is another fact that Kimmerling and Migdal ignore: the unyielding insistence by the Palestinians in all negotiations (at least beginning with Oslo) on their so-called "right of return." Of course, a full right of return would mean the end of Israel as a Jewish state. One may debate whether the Palestinians are merely being tactical here or whether it is truly their intent to destroy Israel demographically. But it is irresponsible of Kimmerling and Migdal to omit any discussion of these events. Consequently, I do not recommend this book.

In a field littered with propaganda, two knowledgeable scholars, Baruch Kimmerling, the George S. Wise Professor of Sociology at the Hebrew University, and Joel Migdal, professor at the University of Washington, have written an objective, scholarly treatise on the history of the Palestinian people and the forces that shaped the development of their national consciousness.

It is difficult to imagine a better collaboration than the one between Kimmerling and Migdal. Kimmerling is one of the best social scientists in Israel with a list of impressive publications on his vita. I am less familiar with Migal's work, but his prose is often breathtakingly beautiful, especially when he describes the land itself. Rarely will one find a better writer in the social sciences than Migdal.

Those without a scholarly knowledge of the field will find the book tough to read at times but the patient reader will be rewarded for his efforts with a deeper understanding of the world's most intractable conflict.